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 I
ABSTRACT 
 
This research examines management of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in the two 
transitional countries of the former Soviet Union - Kazakhstan and Russia.  The study 
focuses on how key PPP actors in Russia and Kazakhstan perceive and adapt to contract 
regulation, risk allocation and dispute resolution challenges in PPP management.   
The qualitative study draws on data from 30 in-depth semi-structured interviews with 
the respondents from four partnership projects, national and regional PPP centres, law firms 
and the government.  Through a qualitative analysis of the interview data, four principal 
themes have emerged including partner opportunistic behaviour in a PPP; partner 
interaction; risk management in a PPP; and constraints and impediments to effective PPP 
governance.  Utilising the PPP governance concept as the guiding theoretical framework, 
the research highlighted partners' opportunistic behaviour.  A private partner exhibited its 
opportunism in a tariff setting and cost increases, whilst the public sector partners 
demonstrated their opportunistic behaviour by shifting public acceptance risk to a private 
party, exerting pressure in order to achieve results faster than contracted and framing a 
private partner's management flexibility.    
The findings revealed that partners from both sectors tend to downplay the significance 
of governance structures that would permit them to effectively interact and resolve all kinds 
of issues including those of risk management.  Investigation of tools for dispute resolution 
between partners showed that this area of collaboration is virtually non-existent.  Partners 
largely disregard formal mechanisms for dispute resolution and excessively rely on 
informal relations.  The research identified a large number of commonalities in PPP 
management and no major discrepancy between Kazakhstan and Russia with regards to 
partnership management and PPP critical success factors.  In the latter, managing public-
private relationship during the entire project term is the principal factor. 
The study developed a model for more deeply understanding PPP governance in the 
two countries, which is the thesis' original contribution to knowledge.  The model's core is 
the emergent PPP policy paradigm that the governments in both countries use.  The study 
delineated the paradigm's principal elements and dynamics that contribute to PPP 
management changes in Kazakhstan and Russia.  The research also contributes to 
knowledge by enhancing opportunism's definition and its application in the PPP setting.   
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
This research explores public-private partnership (PPP) governance in Kazakhstan 
and Russia.  Specifically, the research investigates the experiences, views and 
perceptions of PPP actors regarding a range of management issues that emerged during 
the interviews and that formed the principal study's themes.  The study focuses on 
understanding the managerial challenges facing PPP actors and how interviewees and 
their organisations have adapted to these challenges.    
This first chapter aims to explain the rationale behind the research topic, state the 
research question and objectives, highlight the study's methodology and context, present 
the research contribution and outline the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.2 Research Rationale 
 
1.2.1 A personal perspective 
 
This section reflects upon my personal motivation to investigate the topic of PPP 
management in transitional countries.  As Russia is my country of birth, I have been 
watching closely many changes in the nation's political, economic and social life since 
1991 when Russia began its transition to a free market system.  In many respects, the 
country's landscape significantly has transformed during the past twenty years and 
multiple institutional, organisational, business and social changes have become a part of 
Russia's reality.  Public-private partnerships that the country started to develop in the 
beginning of the twenty-first century are one of these innovations.  As PPPs might 
revolutionise how public services are financed and provided, it is no surprise that 
partnerships instantly drew considerable attention from policymakers, economists, 
investors, financial analysts, infrastructure experts and researchers in many fields.  With 
an educational background in economics and management, I have been following the 
country's progress in the PPP area with curiosity and have developed my keen interest 
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toward partnerships.  Whilst many PPP aspects remained obscure to me, I thought about 
PPP management as an opportunity to conduct research and to develop my own 
research agenda.   
Additionally, I have been watching equally closely Kazakhstan's advancement in 
the area of partnerships.  Having lived and worked in Kazakhstan for a few years, I 
began comparing Kazakhstan's PPP progress with that in Russia.  As I identified many 
commonalities between the two countries and found some differences in how PPP 
governance progressed, this became a starting point in my thinking about a research 
project that would embrace both Kazakhstan and Russia and would permit me to 
conduct a cross-country comparison of PPP management.  I thought about this potential 
research as an exciting opportunity to explore the recent developments in the two 
nations that are looking for ways to improve public sector efficiency.  The research 
opportunity materialised when I was accepted into a PhD programme at the University 
of Northampton.  This is where my academic interests have transformed into the 
research objectives that are outlined later in this chapter.   
 
1.2.2 Literature perspective 
 
The literature about PPPs is diverse.  With regards to the geographical coverage 
(i.e., countries that research covers), the vast majority of studies focus on industrialised 
(i.e., OECD) nations that have accumulated significant experience with partnerships.  
Although the literature stream that investigates PPPs in transitional countries is 
expanding (see, for example, Pongsiri, 2003; Jamali, 2004; Urio, 2010), scholars and 
practitioners know little about partnerships in Russia and virtually no studies are 
available about PPPs in Kazakhstan.  Furthermore, to the best of author's knowledge, 
studies that are devoted to Russia highlight mostly the financing schemes underlying 
partnerships or the technical aspects of the PPPs' work (see, for example, Pankratov, 
2010; Varnavskiy et al., 2010; Firsova, 2012).  There are no comprehensive studies that 
focus on PPP management in Russia.  This permits the author to argue that at present, 
the Russian PPP literature is lacking the management stream that would use a robust 
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theoretical foundation for investigating empirical data.  The Kazakhstani literature is 
also silent about PPP management.   
The rationale for this study emerged, in part, out of the literature appraisal.  Whilst 
the researcher reviewed the large body of OECD literature that highlights certain 
theories underpinning partnerships and the experience of Western countries in PPP 
formation and implementation (see, for example, Akintoye et al., 2003; Grimsey and 
Lewis, 2004; Hodge and Greve, 2005), the relevant questions regarding PPP 
governance in Kazakhstan and Russia transpired, such as: what underpins the PPP 
formation in the two countries; what interests does the government pursue by forming 
partnerships; what are the management practices in newly formed PPPs; what are the 
key issues regarding which partner interaction evolves; how do partners manage risks; 
and what factors may ensure success in PPP management?  The PPP literature does not 
address these and many other questions, which stimulated the author's interest and 
motivation to conduct research. 
It is fair to argue that the lack of understanding regarding how PPP governance 
evolves in Kazakhstan and Russia have induced the researcher to embark upon this 
empirical study.  The gaps in the PPP literature, which Chapter Two discusses more 
fully, served as an additional stimulus for the researcher to undertake the study and 
address the gaps, fully or at least, in part.    
 
1.3 Research Question and Objectives 
 
This research will draw on the comparison of management issues in PPPs in two 
countries of the former Soviet Union – Kazakhstan and Russia.  The overall aim is to 
examine the experience and perceptions of key stakeholders involved in the PPP 
projects in Kazakhstan and Russia in order to identify PPPs’ shortcomings and critical 
success factors.  The research addresses the following question: 
 
How do key PPP stakeholders in Russia and Kazakhstan perceive and adapt to 
contract regulation, risk allocation and dispute resolution challenges in PPP 
management?   
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 In order to answer the research question, the author set the following research 
objectives: 
1. Investigate experiences and perceptions of key PPP actors in Kazakhstan and 
Russia regarding the contractual environment of partnership projects and how 
stakeholders perceive the effectiveness of government requirements and 
expectations;     
2. Analyse perceptions and experiences of key partnership stakeholders (such as 
project managers, officials in government agencies and national and regional 
PPP centres) regarding risk management in a project, including initial risk 
allocation and how these actors should manage subsequent changes;  
3. Identify commonalities and differences in PPP management in Kazakhstan and 
Russia, with the focus on critical success factors; and 
4. Develop a new model for understanding the nature of PPP governance in 
Kazakhstan and Russia.   
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
 
The nature of all four research objectives calls for a qualitative, rather than 
quantitative, study.  The methodology has to address the variety of participants' 
subjective insights and views in the contextual environment of the two countries and 
should permit the researcher to identify commonalities and differences in PPP 
management arising from what is essentially an individual experience and interpretation.  
As this research focuses on collecting and analysing actors’ experiences, opinions and 
interpretations regarding PPP management, the study addresses all four objectives by 
qualitative data that the author collected and examined by employing a range of 
methods.  The methodology chapter provides a detailed discussion of these methods and 
emphasises the appropriateness of the study's approach to meeting the research 
objectives.  
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1.5 Research Context 
 
Russia and Kazakhstan represent useful countries for study and analysis.  With 
regards to why the author examined and compared PPP management in Kazakhstan and 
Russia together, one can argue that the two nations possess a large number of 
commonalities in their economies and public policies.  Both countries are transitional 
economies and share many economic, political, business, social, educational and 
cultural realities that stem from a common Soviet legacy.  Although the two economies 
are different in size, the ways in which governments have shaped PPP development, 
created a legal and regulatory framework and selected sectors for partnership projects 
show considerable similarities.  These similarities allow for meaningful comparisons 
both between Kazakhstan and Russia, but more broadly with western philosophies and 
practices (Mouraviev et al., 2012).  An empirical examination of the nature and scope 
of PPP arrangements in Kazakhstan and Russia may thus contribute to a more 
comprehensive understanding of whether partnerships can be a successful public 
management tool and what the unique features of PPP governance in the two countries 
are.     
 
1.6 Research Contributions 
 
This section presents a summary of key contributions that this research makes.  A 
more detailed and complete explanation of research contributions is located in Chapter 
Seven.   
The research makes a number of contributions to theory.  The research adds new 
insights into conceptualising PPPs.  The thesis argues that one should view PPPs as 
interplay between the public agencies, private investors, PPP centres, a special purpose 
vehicle, which is a project operator, contractual dependencies, and formal and informal 
interaction between actors.  Hence, the study augments the theoretical underpinnings of 
a partnership by emphasising PPP arrangements and relationships that include multiple 
organisations and stakeholder groups (Fischbacher and Beaumont, 2003; Mouraviev 
and Kakabadse, 2012), rather than just a PPP operator.   
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Additionally, the study adds to deeper understanding of partnerships by adopting a 
view on the nature of PPP arrangements as a cooperative effort to jointly create value 
for its stakeholders.  Furthermore, the research contributed to conceptualising a PPP by 
contrasting the value creation in a partnership with partners' opportunistic behaviour, 
which diminishes the PPP's value for money.  Whilst the value creation may co-exist 
with opportunism, the author argued that opportunistic behaviour essentially manifests 
the ways in which partners adapt to government PPP regulations.   
The research paid significant attention to partner opportunistic behaviour in a PPP 
and further contributed to theory by enhancing opportunism's definition and its 
application in the PPP setting.  Defining and investigating partners' opportunism 
appeared critical for the PPP research as opportunistic behaviour is a distinctive feature 
of partnerships in Kazakhstan and Russia.  
Another theoretical contribution is related to the model that the author developed 
for in-depth understanding of PPP governance in Kazakhstan and Russia.  The model 
rests on the policy paradigm, to which the author has contributed insights by combining 
emergent ideas, defined problems, government strategies, organised actors and 
institutions, their capacities and expertise and interaction between all these elements.  
Both theorists and practitioners may potentially use this model to reflect upon the 
opportunities, constraints and prospects for PPP development in the two countries.   
From the methodological perspective, the research makes a contribution by 
adopting a pioneering, for Kazakhstan and Russia, phenomenological stance and 
employing an unusual (for the study's region) data collection method (i.e., in-depth 
interviews) as opposed to the vast majority of the two countries' PPP studies that use 
documentary analysis.  This research's qualitative methodology has allowed the author 
to explore topics, such as opportunistic behaviour in a PPP, partner interaction and risk 
management, specifically within a Kazakhstani and Russian context. 
This research also makes an important contribution to management practice by 
highlighting the constraints and impediments to PPP development using the interview 
data, i.e., study participants’ experience and views.  The detailed account of 
interviewees' opinions has permitted the researcher to identify critical factors that may 
ensure partnership successes in Kazakhstan and Russia.  For practitioners and 
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policymakers, critical success factors might serve as useful guidance in choosing better 
options for a PPP, avoiding pitfalls and ineffective solutions.  The researcher has 
grouped by category the most essential factors for PPP success in Kazakhstan or Russia 
including:    
 legal and regulatory environment;  
 partner interaction; and 
 risk management.  
In addition to PPP critical success factors, the research has contributed to practice 
by suggesting measures that might overcome partners' opportunism.  These 
recommendations include creation of incentives for achieving the project's performance 
targets; deregulating private operators; and re-focusing the public agencies on the PPPs' 
value for money as a matter of economic principle. 
Additionally, the research contributes to management practice in the field of partner 
interaction.  It has demonstrated that partner interaction is a distinct and highly 
disregarded (in Kazakhstan and Russia) area of governance.  Based on the interview 
data, the research has concluded that partner interaction should be incorporated in PPP 
management.  Specifically, PPP governance would significantly benefit from designing 
a formal framework for effective partner communication, building management 
structures for partnerships and creation of tools for dispute resolution between partners.   
 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
 
The thesis comprises seven chapters.  This introductory chapter (Chapter One) has 
provided an overview of the research rationale and context and outlined the research 
scope, objectives and methodology.  The introduction chapter also highlighted the key 
contributions of the PhD thesis to theory, methodology and practice.  Finally, the chapter 
presents a review of the research structure. 
Chapter Two provides the literature appraisal in relation to the research topic.  In 
addition to the PPP literature review from OECD countries, which presents the Western 
approaches to PPP management, the chapter also discusses the Russian language literature 
that is available in Kazakhstan and Russia, which demonstrates country-specific, contextual 
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views on partnerships.  The chapter identifies the gaps and weaknesses in the literature and 
delineates areas of further research.   
Chapter Three explains the methodology that has guided this research.  It highlights the 
philosophical stance that the author adopted, provides justification for the qualitative 
approach that the researcher selected and demonstrates its suitability for answering the 
research question and meeting the research objectives.  The chapter also discusses the 
practical choices that the author made regarding data collection and data analysis methods.  
Additionally, the chapter presents the pilot study findings that set the initial framework for 
investigation and shed light on the principal themes that required further examination.           
Chapter Four identifies the research findings and presents their analysis using a 
thematic approach.  This chapter discusses four emergent themes, including opportunistic 
behaviour in a PPP; partner interaction; risk management in a partnership; and 
constraints and impediments to effective PPP governance.  The chapter incorporates 
interviewees' voices in the form of direct quotes and excerpts that enabled the 
researcher to capture the respondents' experience, opinions and perceptions using their 
own words.   
Chapter Five discusses the research findings and continues to explore the themes 
from the previous chapter.  The chapter reveals the research results as they relate to 
existing knowledge and theories that underpin PPP formation and management.  The 
chapter underscores the links between the interview data and concepts by presenting a 
comprehensive in-depth discussion of the meaning that interviewees attach to their 
perceptions and opinions.   
Chapter Six presents a model for deeper understanding of PPP governance in 
Kazakhstan and Russia from the policy paradigm perspective.  The chapter highlights 
the model's theoretical framework, the paradigm's principal elements, as well as its 
underlying dynamics.  A set of propositions accompanies the PPP model.  Theorists and 
practitioners might use these propositions to test the model in the future or in a different 
contextual setting.  The chapter also includes a detailed discussion of the PPP critical 
success factors that the researcher categorised by three groupings as they emerged from 
the interview data. 
Chapter Seven concludes this PhD thesis by highlighting the key findings and 
explaining how and to what extent the author has met the research objectives.  The 
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chapter also demonstrates the originality and contributions of the research to theory, 
methodology and practice.  Finally, this closing chapter discusses the research 
limitations and makes suggestions regarding areas of further study in the field of PPP 
management.  
 
1.8 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has introduced the research topic and provided an overview of the 
rationale for the study and its contextual setting.  The chapter identified the research 
question and research objectives along with a summary of principal theoretical, 
methodological and practical contributions that this study makes.  The chapter also 
outlined the structure of this thesis.  The following chapter presents the literature 
appraisal which critically examines the relevance of extant PPP studies to the topic of 
this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Certain literature streams provide a useful theoretical background for this study, in 
particular, in the area of PPP governance arrangements, governance strategy and 
relational governance or the quality of the relationship between public and private 
partners.  Both PPP governance strategy and relationship quality complement legal 
contracts and the effective interaction between partners may significantly mitigate risks 
and contribute to overall PPP success.  Conversely, a lack of effective interaction may 
facilitate partners' opportunistic behaviour and may lead to a project failure.  The strong 
influence that relationship governance exerts on PPP success or failure has determined 
the nature and scope of the literature appraisal.  This chapter begins by highlighting the 
historical context of the PPP emergence in Europe, and then proceeds to 
conceptualising PPP and the different forms that PPP projects may take.  It moves on to 
discuss specific PPP characteristics, the reasons for partnering, PPP shortfalls, the 
nature of risks and details of risk allocation and management.   
The chapter also provides specific coverage of the Russian and Kazakhstani context 
and an evaluation of PPP operations in Russia and Kazakhstan, so that one can view 
partnerships in the context of political, economic and social realities in these transitional 
countries. Whilst the literature appraisal draws heavily on Western sources, it deals with 
the Russian language literature separately not only because it is contextually specific, 
but also because it appears biased: some key concepts, such as transaction cost 
economics and its impact on PPPs, are not even mentioned in the literature.  In order to 
clear the investigation of any biases, Section 2.10 presents mainly a critical review of 
the Russian language literature and focuses on the analysis of the PPP context in Russia 
and Kazakhstan.            
Scholarly approaches to PPPs are just emerging in Kazakhstan and Russia and 
focus mainly on the legal aspects of PPP formation.  Relational issues are largely absent 
from the Russian language literature. With this in mind, the discussion of the 
partnerships' general aspects, such as the reasons to employ PPPs, understanding of risk 
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and risk allocation in a partnership and PPP forms, allows the researcher to contrast and 
compare the Western sources with evolving academic views on PPPs in Russia and 
Kazakhstan.  It allows consideration of whether discrepancies exist and in which areas, 
what is unique about PPPs in those two countries and whether specific features and 
approaches characterise the academic discussion about partnerships in the Russian 
language literature. An analysis of the Russian language literature that this chapter 
presents allows an investigation to the extent to which expressed viewpoints are in line 
with those in the Western sources, or whether they present a culturally and contextually 
specific view of partnerships and PPP management.   
 
2.1.1 The PPP emergence in Europe: the historical context 
 
Before the PPP conceptualisation, this section highlights the historical context in 
which partnerships emerged in Western Europe and subsequently in Eastern Europe.  
As partnerships provide public services privately (i.e., instead of the government), one 
may view PPPs as a manifestation of the policy aimed at contracting out the 
government activities (Urio, 2010).  From the historical perspective, the emergence of 
PPPs in Western Europe is often associated with New Public Management (NPM) 
(Grimsey and Lewis, 2004; Wettenhall, 2005; Yescombe, 2007).  ‘... Contracting out 
has become, since the beginning of the 1980s, part of the vast NPM programme and of 
its major explicit goal, i.e. the reform of the State and the improvement of its efficiency’ 
(Urio, 2010: 32).  Whilst the PPP meaning is much broader than a mere hire of a private 
company in order to provide a public service (which Section 2.2 discusses in detail), the 
PPP proliferation marks the shift of government policies in many Western European 
nations toward the greater use of the private sector for the provision of traditional public 
services, such as water treatment, health care, tunnels, bridges and roads.  Historically 
until the 1980s and 1990s, among the three forms of interaction between the 
government and the private sector (i.e., commercial exchange, coercion and gift), the 
two latter forms prevailed (Wettenhall, 2005).  However, in line with the NPM 
movement, since the 1980s governments in Western Europe increasingly began looking 
for mechanisms of co-production involving commercial exchange, rather than coercion 
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(Wettenhall, 2005).  For example, in the United Kingdom from 1992 PPPs have become 
‘a key element in the Government's strategy for delivering modern, high quality 
services and promoting the UK's competitiveness’ (Akintoye et al., 2003: 14).  Whilst 
the government in the UK and other Western European nations aimed at ‘marketisation’ 
of the public sector (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003), the NPM agenda included greater 
use within the public sector of management practices drawn from the private sector and 
an increased emphasis on more explicit and measurable performance standards in terms 
of the range, level and content of services to be provided (Hood, 1995).  ‘PPPs are one 
exemplification of these trends, and of changing markets for public services, in that they 
allow for public services to be provided by public and private sector bodies working in 
a partnership’ (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004: 52).  In addition to the UK, many countries in 
Western Europe including France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, among others, 
have been actively employing PPPs (Akintoye et al., 2003).      
 In contrast to Western Europe, governments in Eastern European nations, such 
as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, began the PPP formation later, at 
the end of 1990s.  Triggered by disintegration of the Soviet Union, the economic 
transition of these nations to a market system naturally incorporated the PPP 
employment as part of pro-market agenda aimed at free enterprise development, wide 
use of market tools and reversing historical government dominance.  Additionally, as in 
the 1990s these nations faced severe economic difficulties on their way to sustainable 
and balanced growth, their persistent budget shortages became the principal driver of 
PPP development (Urio, 2010).  Hence, the historical context of PPP emergence in 
Western Europe (i.e., the adoption of the neo-liberal agenda) varies from that in Eastern 
Europe (i.e., the acute shortages of budget funds for the provision of public services 
during the time of considerable economic instability and transition to a market system).                
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2.2 Conceptualising PPPs1  
 
It is useful to begin the literature review with a discussion of PPP definitions and 
analysis of the partnership's key features.  This will give the basis for further 
comparisons regarding how PPPs are understood in Russia and Kazakhstan.     
There is no single definition of a PPP upon which most academics and practitioners 
could agree, and quite a few definitions are available.  Various definitions capture 
selected PPP features and, as a result, researchers understand the term ‘public-private 
partnership’ differently.   
Many studies begin with an attempt to define a PPP and/or to enhance the available 
definitions.  Often, instead of giving a comprehensive and complete definition, a 
researcher pays attention to a selected PPP feature.  For example, Sedjari (2004) 
emphasises solidarity as a key feature that is supposed to exist between the public and 
private partners.  Sedjari argues that a PPP is a new cultural phenomenon by itself.  He 
calls PPP ‘a culture of engagement’ (Sedjari, 2004: 303).  One can understand this as a 
‘capacity for the collective mobilisation of participants which now forms the substance 
and strength of public programmes’ (Sedjari, 2004: 303), although there might be quite 
different national expressions of this mobilisation.          
Similarly, Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2004) point out that mutuality is a key 
characteristic in a PPP.  Bovaird (2004) defines PPP as commitment above and beyond 
contracts.  Whilst Haque (2004) argues that there is no common consensus on the 
meaning of a partnership, he emphasises the two key PPP features – mutuality and 
organisational identity.  Haque (2004) describes the latter as maintenance, rather than 
surrender, of each partner’s own identity, beliefs and values.  
The features described above are useful because they highlight partnership 
properties that make PPPs different from traditional forms of collaboration between the 
public and private sectors, such as public procurement contracts or where the 
                                               
1 The author wrote the text of this section in 2011-2012.  Later, this text was included in the article co-
authored with Nada Kakabadse, which Society and Business Review published in 2012 (Mouraviev and 
Kakabadse, 2012).  The author certifies that the text in this section is his original contribution to the thesis.    
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government sub-contracts a private company for implementation of a specific task.  In 
sub-contracting, the government normally does not expect features, such as solidarity, 
mutuality or commitment above contracts.  Hence, these features usually are non-
existent.  Nevertheless, identification of special PPP features noted above is insufficient 
to explain how exactly collaboration in a partnership happens and for what purposes.       
Klijn and Teisman (2003) emphasise that a PPP should be an institutionalised 
arrangement between public and private actors in which they share a responsibility for a 
product, risk, costs and benefits.  Although this definition captures essential partnership 
features, it lacks explanation of what exactly a PPP intends to provide and how.       
Grimsey and Lewis (2002) offer a more comprehensive and complete definition 
and describe a PPP as an ‘agreement where the public sector enters into long-term 
contractual agreements with private sector entities for the construction or management 
of public sector infrastructure facilities by the private sector entity, or the provision of 
services (using infrastructure facilities) by the private sector entity to the community on 
behalf of a public sector entity’ (Grimsey and Lewis, 2002: 108).     
This definition includes and implies the following key PPP properties: (a) an 
agreement between a public agency and a private partner must take a form of a legally 
binding contract, (b) a contract should be long-term, (c) PPPs normally provide services 
in infrastructure, or PPPs may provide other services that some view as the public 
sector’s responsibility, (d) PPPs provide services on behalf of a public agency, (e) in the 
framework of a PPP, a physical asset is normally constructed or renovated, (f) in some 
cases the government can transfer an asset to a private partner and the latter accepts 
responsibility for its maintenance and (g) a PPP provides services to customers with the 
use of the asset(s) constructed by a private partner or transferred to a private partner by 
the public entity (Mouraviev and Kakabadse, 2012).  Yet an additional PPP feature is 
that ‘provision of service may be compensated through payments by the government or 
may be funded through user charges and fees’ (Morallos and Amekudzi, 2008: 114).  
Hall gives a similar set of PPP features (Hall, 2008a: 3).    
A notable feature of Grimsey and Lewis’s (2002) definition is that it focuses on 
tangible PPP elements – legal long-term contract, asset construction and provision of 
services with the use of constructed assets.  These elements set the framework for 
 15 
public-private collaboration.  However, the above definition is silent about the process 
of the PPP project implementation and about interaction between PPP partners.           
Other authors emphasise partner interaction, rather than legal framework.  
Andersen (2004) argues that a PPP is a continuous process of interaction and 
negotiation.  Klijn and Teisman (2003) emphasise the same view and also claim that the 
involved parties realise the idea of mutual added value.  Furthermore, interaction 
between partners that is supposed to create added value determines yet another PPP 
feature – the emphasis on output management (Pierre and Peters, 2000).  This means 
that output specification in PPPs, which defines the elements of the service and how a 
partnership must provide it, becomes more important than input specification, i.e., how 
much a private partner has to spend on asset construction or maintenance, how exactly 
the construction should be done or how many staff should be hired (Morallos and 
Amekudzi, 2008: 116).  Output management focuses on governance and on the process 
(Bult-Spiering and Dewulf, 2006), as opposed to input-oriented management in the 
public sector that focuses on institutions.  To summarise, those researchers who 
emphasise partner interaction as the main PPP feature tend to pay less attention to legal 
frameworks underpinning PPP arrangements.  In their opinion, the creation of added 
value in a partnership depends first and foremost on the interrelationship between the 
partners.           
Revisiting the approach that argues that public and private partners have a shared 
responsibility in a PPP for a product, risk, costs and benefits (Klijn and Teisman, 2003), 
one should acknowledge that this definition includes key elements that partners have to 
share.  Hence, it is sharing that transforms collaboration into a partnership.  This is most 
evident with regards to costs: if public and private partners do not jointly contribute to 
project costs, then one partner’s involvement becomes considerably reduced, which also 
is likely to result in risk reduction.  In this case, cooperation may be managed by a 
contract, i.e., by hiring a private party to do a job for the government.  In other words, 
the absence of one or more shared elements in a partnership may change the nature of 
public-private cooperation significantly – normally from a partnership-type interaction 
to contracting public services out to a private firm.  From the perspective of shared 
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responsibilities, this definition successfully captures the collaborative nature of a PPP as 
opposed to hiring a private company for implementing a public sector task.     
Additionally, some scholars often emphasise another partnership feature – a long-
term character of interaction – as a distinctive PPP property (Klijn and Teisman, 2003; 
Hall, 2008a).  Long-term projects as a rule require mutual contribution of resources, and 
this is why those involved implement them jointly, as each party is unable or unwilling 
to undertake a project on its own due to high risk and/or high costs associated with the 
long-term activity (Klijn, 2010).  In contrast, short-term projects are easier to finance 
and they carry less risk.  For a short-term project, the government can simply hire a 
private company in order to implement a public task, or the government agency can 
accomplish a task on its own.  Hence, there may be no need to form a PPP.  Thus, the 
long-term nature of collaboration also becomes an essential feature that comes along 
with a partnership’s shared elements.      
Most often researchers understand a PPP as a specific project of public-private 
collaboration to which the features discussed above apply.  Sometimes this kind of a 
PPP is called a contractual PPP (Renda and Schrefler, 2006).  However, there is one 
more meaning of a partnership which is called an institutional PPP (IPPP).  ‘This is a 
joint venture company, providing a public service, which is partly owned by a public 
authority and partly owned by a private company or private investors.  They may also 
have a contract with the municipality to provide a service – for example, in Italy, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and other countries some water operators are partly 
owned by the municipality, and partly by private companies, under contracts with the 
municipality to run the water services.  These joint ventures may operate public services 
without having had to compete for a formally tendered contract, especially where they 
originated as municipal companies, or where a service was ‘delegated’ without 
tendering’ (Hall, 2008b: 3). 
This description illustrates that there can be two types of institutional PPPs.  One is 
when a the government and private investors (either institutional investors or private 
individuals) jointly own a company and are involved in provision of a public service on 
an ongoing basis, without a time limit and without a specific contract with the 
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government agency.  The other is when a jointly owned company has a delegated 
service and it may have a contract that includes regulating the service provision.    
With regards to the features of institutional PPPs, Hall (2008b) examines the 
European Commission (EC) guidelines regarding various aspects of partnerships and 
emphasises that a private partner must play an active role in managing the partnership 
activities.  He cites the 2008 European Commission Interpretative Communication on 
the Application of Community Law on Public Procurement and Concessions to 
Institutionalised Public-Private Partnerships (IPPP) C(2007)6661 Brussels, of 
05.02.2008.  Regarding institutional PPPs, this communication states that: ‘The private 
input to the IPPP consists – apart from the contribution of capital or other assets – in the 
active participation in the operation of the contracts awarded to the public-private entity 
and/or the management of the public-private entity’ (Hall, 2008b: 11).         
Some key features which reference project-based PPPs would not apply to 
institutional PPPs.  In particular, a private party may or may not construct an asset for 
the purpose of a service provision.  A joint venture company does not provide a service 
on behalf of a public agency in the case where the government directly owns part of this 
business. Instead, it becomes a semi-government company.  Depending on the 
government share of property ownership, customers may view a joint venture company 
as mostly private or, on the contrary, mostly government-owned.  Also, an institutional 
PPP may have an unlimited life.   
Thus, an institutional PPP has substantial differences with a project-based PPP and 
the meaning of an institutional PPP often may not match the key characteristics of a 
project-based partnership.   
In summary, various approaches in the academic literature in defining PPPs are as 
follows:  
(1) a PPP is a contractual partnership which means a legal long-term contractual 
arrangement that involves asset construction by a private party and a service provision 
on behalf of a public agency with the use of a constructed asset;  
(2) a PPP is a project in which partner interaction and the parties’ relationship are 
the most important features;   
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(3) a PPP is a project that requires a shared responsibility from both the public 
sector partner(s) and the private sector partner(s) for product, risk, costs and benefits; 
and  
(4) a PPP is an institutional partnership which the government and private investors 
jointly own.   
The first three PPP definitions do not contradict each other.  On the contrary, 
researchers may view them as complementary.  The fourth presents a special meaning 
which is not in line with the other three because it represents mostly a structural form of 
PPP.  It is worth emphasising that this thesis focuses exclusively on contractual PPPs in 
Kazakhstan and Russia, whilst institutional partnerships are beyond the thesis' scope.    
Having discussed the understanding of a PPP, it is useful to identify the forms that 
PPPs may take and discuss their reflection in the academic literature.  This will permit 
to capture additional details of how respective parties initiate partnerships, what their 
organisational structures are and how participants arrange property ownership in PPPs.    
 
2.3 PPP Forms1  
 
PPPs may take many different forms.  Sadran (2004) emphasises multiplicity and 
heterogeneity of PPP forms.  He notes that PPPs vary infinitely from one policy sector 
to another and from one locality to another.  One can view the scope of this variation 
from an industry perspective (i.e., sectors in which PPPs operate) and the organisational 
perspective (i.e., how exactly participants arrange a partnership).       
Sectors of PPP operations in many countries vary widely and include, but are not 
limited to, transportation services and transport infrastructure (construction and 
operation of automobile roads, railroads, metro, airports, tunnels and bridges), the 
energy sector (construction and operation of power generation facilities and power 
lines), education (schools and dormitories), health care, criminal justice (courts and 
prisons), telecommunications, water treatment and water supply, disaster management, 
                                               
1 The author wrote the text of this section in 2011-2012.  Later, this text was included in the article co-
authored with Nada Kakabadse, which Society and Business Review published in 2012 (Mouraviev and 
Kakabadse, 2012).  The author certifies that the text in this section is his original contribution to the thesis.    
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micro-credit provision, skill development, poverty eradication, sewage treatment, waste 
disposal and environmental management (Haque, 2004; Renda and Schrefler, 2006).  
Sedjari provides his own classification of what he calls partnership intervention 
areas: sector partnerships, such as the housing sector in Morocco; PPPs limited to 
certain sectors or projects – those are widespread around the world; PPPs at the city 
level, such as a city water purification facility; and PPPs with regional impact, such as 
an inter-regional power station and/or regional electric grid (Sedjari, 2004: 299).  
Sadran (2004), whilst focusing on the French experience, emphasises that PPPs at the 
local level are especially common and important in France because the country is highly 
decentralised.   
From the organisational perspective, PPPs may take specific forms such as a 
concession, or private finance initiative (PFI) or an asset life-cycle contract (Bovaird, 
2004; Sadran, 2004; Sedjari, 2004; Kakabadse et al., 2007).   
A concession implies that a private party with the use of private funding constructs 
or renovates an asset, such as a road, or in some cases a public agency transfers an asset 
to a private sector partner.  A private company assumes responsibility for the service 
provision for a specified period of time, often between 20 and 30 years, with the use of 
this asset, and at the same time accepts responsibility for asset maintenance and 
upgrading.  To recover its investment and operating expenses, in return for its services a 
private company receives user fees.   
With regards to a concession, there are varying opinions about the source of 
payments that a private partner receives.  Hall argues that a concession contract is 
where a company receives user charges, meaning that government funds are not 
involved, whilst another form of a partnership – PFI – receives payments from a public 
agency (Ball et al., 2001; Boyfield, 1992; Hall, 2008a).  Other researchers claim that in 
a concession a private company can receive some form of compensation from final 
users or through regular payments by the public authority (Renda and Schrefler, 2006).  
The latter point of view acknowledges the possibility for the use of public funds for 
making payments to a concessionaire.  At the same time it is unclear whether one can 
still categorise this PPP form as a concession in the case of payments to a private 
company by both the government and final users.  
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Also, in some concessions, the so called shadow tolls exist.  They are used when 
the government guarantees certain revenue to a private partner for a pre-specified 
volume of service and the government pays these tolls instead of the final users (Sadka, 
2007: 13; Williams, 2003: 9).  Chapter Four (Analysis) and Chapter Five (Discussion) 
of this thesis will demonstrate that in two out of four studied PPP projects, which the 
governments in Kazakhstan and Russia call concessions, the government makes 
payments to the private sector partner whilst final users pay nothing.     
PFI is yet another form of a PPP, although the difference between them is not clear 
cut.  In contrast to other PPP forms, in which service provision requirements may 
change and evolve over time, in PFI the service specification is defined at the time 
when the parties sign a contract for the entire contract term.  Additionally, in PFI a 
private company is a direct service provider, rather than a consortium or a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV) – a company formed solely by a private partner or jointly with a 
public agency – that frequently serves to implement the PPP project (Asenova and Beck, 
2003; Grimsey and Lewis, 2004).  However, often the difference between PFI and a 
PPP is blurred, and the literature uses both terms synonymously.   
Yet another form of a PPP is asset life-cycle contracts.  They are similar in nature 
to concessions although the difference may be that it is the public agency, not final 
users, that pays for the asset provision and related services (Bovaird, 2004; Sadran, 
2004; Sedjari, 2004).  The asset’s useable life determines the contract length.  
Specific partnership arrangements, which are also sometimes called PPP forms, 
depend on the underlying concept that a public authority intends to apply to a PPP.  
Available arrangements include BOT (build-operate-transfer), or DBFOT (design-build-
finance-operate-transfer), or DBFOOMT (design-build-own-operate-maintain-transfer) 
or other combinations of some or all elements that assign responsibility for provision of 
public services to a private partner (Williams, 2003; Sadka, 2007; Morallos and 
Amekudzi, 2008).   
For example, in the DBFOT scheme, a private company designs and constructs an 
asset using private funding, and then provides a service with an ongoing responsibility 
to operate a newly constructed facility.  Immediately after construction is completed, a 
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private partner assumes the asset ownership.  At the end of a PPP contract, a private 
company transfers an asset back to the government.   
Sedjari (2004) offers yet another approach to PPP forms.  Referencing Francois 
Ascher, Sedjari identifies three main PPP types: a public sector initiated PPP, a private 
sector initiated PPP and an appointed PPP (Sedjari, 2004: 298).   
An appointed PPP, according to Sedjari (2004), is a mixed economy company that 
a city or a region may create, for example, for provision of city services.  The public 
authorities own most of the capital, with some private ownership.  These companies 
pursue public objectives, and at the same time they have flexibility in operational forms.  
Thus, the description of an appointed PPP resembles an institutional PPP.  However, 
those who discuss IPPPs do not emphasise, as opposed to Sedjari (2004), that a public 
agency should own most of a company’s capital.   
Observing how respective players can initiate a PPP is useful for understanding 
project types that countries, which have varying degrees of political, administrative and 
fiscal centralisation, are likely to approve and launch.  In a centralised federation, such 
as Russia, PPPs may focus on regional or national projects, at least in the beginning.  In 
Kazakhstan, with a unitarian political and administrative system in place, PPPs are even 
less likely to exist at the local level.   
For example, although the governments encourage PPP formation at all levels, 
including municipal, as of January 2011 in Kazakhstan there were no approved PPP 
projects at the local (city or village) level and regional level.  The only current PPP 
projects in Kazakhstan are those of inter-regional and national scope, such as 
construction of an inter-regional electrical power grid and the operation of an 
international airport.  The existing partnerships in Russia and Kazakhstan clearly 
illustrate that societal governance structure can also influence corporate governance 
models including those of PPP projects.  Section 2.10 will discuss the existing PPP 
projects in Russia and Kazakhstan, as well as the understanding of PPP forms in the two 
countries.  
Having reviewed PPP forms, it is useful to turn to how the literature identifies 
reasons for partnering or, in other words, what advantages PPPs may possess.  This will 
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allow the researcher to compare the PPP benefits that Russia and Kazakhstan emphasise, 
and how their views contrast with the views in the Western literature.     
 
2.4 Reasons for Partnering 
 
As PPPs are often associated with a number of advantages, it is worth discussing 
what benefits partnerships may bring.  PPPs also have shortfalls that will be discussed 
in the next section of the literature review.   
There are three major options for infrastructure delivery (although each has many 
variations): direct public provision, contracting-out or public–private partnerships 
(Vining and Boardman, 2008a).   
The literature thoroughly explores numerous reasons for partnering.  Hofmeister 
and Borchert (2004) point out that in most cases economic efficiency and effectiveness 
are the only criteria.  Although the literature highlights certain benefits related to PPPs, 
the majority of scholars commonly embrace the value for money perspective when they 
discuss PPPs' advantages and disadvantages (Brown, 2007; Kakabadse et al., 2007).   
Value for money (VfM), when applied to a PPP, means that a PPP is supposed to 
bring greater value for the money that the public sector spends, compared to where the 
government provides a service in-house (i.e., by a public agency) or where the 
government contracts out a service to a private company.  The underlying logic is that 
using a PPP will make sense only if a PPP can deliver public sector services cheaper 
and better, meaning at a smaller cost as opposed to other options, and with improved 
quality (and other enhanced output features) as opposed to other options (Kakabadse et 
al., 2007). If value for money is not there, for example, when government PPP project 
costs are higher than the cost of the direct public service provision, a PPP should not be 
employed.  
The value for money perspective also manifests itself in a different way: whilst the 
government considers whether to employ a PPP, the overarching aim should be to get a 
good deal for the taxpayer (Colman, 2000).  If the overarching aim is different, two 
serious risks to value for money can arise: that the government attention will be focused 
on executing the process, rather than achieving a good outcome; and that the 
 23 
government attention will focus on reaching agreement on a deal and not on getting a 
good deal (Colman, 2000: 73).  
The comprehensive definition of value for money is available in the U.K.’s Her 
Majesty’s Treasury Value for Money Assessment Guide: ‘Value for money is defined as 
the optimum combination of whole-of-life costs and quality (or fitness for purpose) of 
the good or service to meet the user’s requirement.  The term whole-of-life is used to 
refer to the lifecycle of the good or service.  VfM is not the choice of goods and 
services based on the lowest cost bid’ (Her Majesty’s Treasury, 2006: 7).   
The VfM concept allows public agencies to compare the costs of a planned PPP 
project with the cost of the same project, if participants are to accomplish it through 
traditional procurement.  The definition above emphasises the need to take into account 
both the lifetime project costs and the quality of a good or service, making the output 
specification (which is a PPP property discussed earlier in this literature review) an 
important partnership feature.  Hence, a trade-off between lifetime PPP project costs 
and the service quality is in the core of the VfM concept.  
Having discussed the VfM assessment methodology and its application, Morallos 
and Amekudzi (2008) argue that, despite VfM usefulness, the government should look 
at the broader picture.  ‘Although the VfM assessment can be used to determine 
whether to pursue a PPP, public agencies must be aware of the complexities of the 
overall PPP process and the limitations of the VfM methodology. It is important for 
agencies to realise that VfM cannot be the only factor in the decision to pursue a project 
as a PPP; they must evaluate their own capacity to manage such large, complex, and 
long-term projects aside from what the final value might say’ (Morallos and Amekudzi, 
2008: 125). 
In their conclusion above, the authors acknowledge the limitations of the VfM 
assessment methodology.  Additionally, a researcher can draw two other implications 
from their observation.  First is that authors do not imply in any way that other factors 
noted by many (such as an ability of a PPP to innovate, or superior management and 
technological expertise that a private company brings to a PPP, or a possibility for the 
government to faster meet the needs of infrastructure development) can take precedence 
over value for money.  Although VfM is not the only basis for making a decision to 
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employ a PPP, VfM remains the most important factor.  Second is that the lack of a 
government’s own capabilities to manage large scale long-term projects may be a 
limiting factor.  Even if the government identifies value for money in a prospective PPP, 
a public agency may opt to not pursue the project in the PPP form and may look for 
other ways of accomplishing a public sector task.                
In addition to value for money, there are other reasons to employ partnerships.  The 
researchers often emphasise the synergy that PPPs create as a result of mobilising 
public and private resources (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2004; Sedjari, 2004).  Other 
reasons for PPPs include the use of comparative advantages and rational division of 
labor; multi-actor, integrated solutions (which means that a few public agencies, private 
firms and financial institutions can join forces for the implementation of a specific task); 
and engagement in open decision-making processes to promote a broader 
operationalisation of a public good (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2004).  One can 
describe the latter as follows: as the partnership's ability to deliver a specified output (a 
good or a service) is a strong factor in deciding on the PPP’s value for money, the 
involvement of final users in the discussion regarding what public goods they need and 
what their service requirements are will be useful for enhancing transparency and 
achieving the public sector’s greater efficiency.  
Other PPP advantages include: the use of private funds and know-how for the 
implementation of public sector tasks; insourcing private expertise in various fields 
including advancements in business as well as technology; and improvement of public 
sector management capabilities (Hofmeister and Borchert, 2004).  With regards to 
management capabilities, the government, whilst employing PPPs, can learn from its 
own experience and use private sector partners’ knowledge and skills for better service 
provision in the future and/or in other regions, and/or in other sectors, thus improving 
the public sector management.  Partnerships, through the private sector involvement, 
may significantly accelerate project implementation and innovation in service delivery 
and technology (Morallos and Amekudzi, 2008).   
With regards to other partnerships' drivers, scholars argue that PPPs enable public 
agencies to transfer a substantial amount of costs to the private sector.  PPP advocates 
endorse the persuasive argument that people will either obtain some public services 
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with the use of private partners and private funds, or not.  ‘The ability to shift the 
government’s financial burden of providing and maintaining facilities and services is a 
major driving force especially for nations and states facing funding strains on their 
infrastructure budgets’ (Morallos and Amekudzi, 2008: 114).  This note applies to 
transitional countries including Russia and Kazakhstan as their infrastructure is in a 
great need for upgrading and development.     
This argument in favour of PPPs – the increased use of private funds – has yet 
another side: it allows the government to greatly reduce its own borrowing and move 
some projects off the public sector books (Maskin and Tirole, 2008).  Sadka asserts that 
we can view PPPs as a means to disguise conventional contracting undertakings that are 
subject to standard budgeting processes because PPPs are carried out off budget (Sadka, 
2007: 2). 
Hence, where the government opts to employ PPPs, the private sector will bear the 
cost of capital-intensive projects, such as those in infrastructure, and PPP costs will not 
be counted as public spending (Gallay, 2006).  In many countries, especially in the 
European Union that restricts the size of its member-states’ public debt, this is a strong 
incentive, from the government perspective, to use partnerships.  In February 2004, a 
ruling by Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the European Commission, stated that the 
assets involved in a PPP should be classified as non-government assets (Hall, 2008a: 5).         
Additionally, an advantage of PPPs is that they enable governments to spread a 
certain amount of investment over many future budget years, rather than report the 
whole amount of investment in the same year when they carry it out, thereby converting 
a present budget deficit into future budget deficits (Sadka, 2007: 23).  Spreading the 
costs over many years is a controversial feature associated with PPPs.  The benefit is 
that the government’s fiscal stability in some particular years may not be compromised 
as a PPP does not require large government expenses over a short time.  However, as 
overall government costs may be higher in a PPP, this will shift a burden to future 
generations and future governments (Osborne, 2000; Savas, 2000; Parker, 2012).          
The often used argument in favour of PPPs is that they allow for better risk 
allocation and burden-sharing.  Public agencies are attracted to the PPP concept due to 
their ability to transfer many project risks to the private sector.  PPPs may optimise risk 
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allocation by transferring the risks to the party best able to manage them (Morallos and 
Amekudzi, 2008).  ‘In PPPs, the core principle lies in the allocation of risk between the 
two parties: well designed PPPs redistribute the risk to the party that is the 'superior 
insurer' or the 'least cost avoider', i.e., the party best suited to control and/or bear the 
risk’ (Renda and Schrefler, 2006: 1).  Sections 2.8 and 2.9 of this literature review will 
discuss PPP risk allocation in greater detail.    
Another concept that focuses on the benefits of the public service provision by 
partnerships is derived from transaction cost economics (TCE).  TCE emphasises 
minimising total social costs as a criterion for choosing an option for the public service 
provision (Vining and Boardman, 2008a).   
Scholars define total social costs as production costs incurred in service provision 
(including construction costs and payments to third parties), plus transaction costs, such 
as bidding costs and interest payments on loans, plus (net) negative externalities (e.g., 
cost of pollution less value of positive externalities, such as reduced waiting time), 
holding quality constant (Vining and Boardman, 2008a: 149).   
The TCE perspective argues that, if the employment of a PPP as opposed to the 
traditional public service delivery (via direct government provision or contracting out) 
minimises the sum of total social costs, a PPP should be preferred (Brown and Potoski, 
2003; Vining et al., 2006).  Vining and Boardman (2008a) emphasise that, whilst doing 
an assessment, one should include all government transaction costs over the entire 
project period that derive from the project even if they do not appear in the project’s 
budget.  Also, one should include all externalities and account for quality differences, 
although these costs rarely show up in any budget (Parker and Hartley, 2003; Boardman 
et al., 2005). 
The concept of using a PPP where it permits minimising total social cost has some 
similarities with the value for money concept: both perspectives compare the PPP 
project’s cost (or value) with a certain benchmark, which is the cost (or value) of a 
traditional way of the public service provision.  Also, both perspectives require not only 
the use of quantitative methods, but also applying qualitative methods, for example, for 
assessment of value of externalities in TCE, or for assessing the PPP’s effect on 
ensuring wider access to the public services in the VfM concept. 
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Concluding the section about the PPP advantages and benefits, it is worth noting 
that some of them may or may not be realised in a specific PPP project.  For example, 
the PPP ability to innovate for the purpose of increasing the profit may not materialise 
(e.g., costs may rise whilst the profit may remain the same).   
Many advantages are potential.  Participants may or may not achieve them.  
Whether some advantages and benefits will materialise depends on how the partners 
designed a specific PPP project, and under which terms participants have formed a 
partnership.  It also depends on how effective a partner interaction is in the course of the 
PPP project, which a separate section of this literature review will discuss.  However, 
claims that the government should employ PPPs because they possess a number of 
distinct advantages seem unjustified as advantages are in no way guaranteed.                
A thorough investigation of PPPs requires a discussion of not only their benefits, 
but also disadvantages, which the next section presents.  As Kazakhstan and Russia 
both have limited experience in partnerships, some PPP disadvantages may not yet be 
observed.  Transitional countries might significantly benefit from learning not only 
from the successful partnerships in other economies, but also from the PPP failures, and 
try to avoid mistakes in the future.  Part of this research will be investigating what kinds 
of shortcomings transpire in Russian and Kazakhstani PPPs and whether these shortfalls 
are similar to those in OECD countries.             
 
2.5 PPP Shortfalls  
 
Although PPPs may have strong advantages, they also have certain shortcomings.  
Haque (2004) argues that in the literature there is a tendency to stress mainly PPPs' 
positive sides.  This section focuses on disadvantages involved in using PPPs.     
One significant disadvantage is that a PPP usually costs the government more than 
the direct provision of services by a public agency.  The reason is that private firms, as 
opposed to the government, normally are facing higher interest rates on loans that they 
need for financing the PPP project.  A PPP may be an expensive way of solving the 
public sector problems because private sector borrowing normally is more expensive, 
and, in the case of the PPP failure, the government should bear the project’s full cost 
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(Bovaird, 2004; Kakabadse et al., 2007).  In line with the above, Hall argues that ‘in 
almost every country in the world, governments can borrow money more cheaply, at 
lower rates of interest, than the private sector’ (Hall, 2008a: 7). 
Sadka (2007) explains why financial institutions are willing to lend money to the 
government at a lower rate (a ‘risk-free’ rate) than they are willing to lend money to the 
private sector.  This is because banks correctly perceive that the government will not 
default on its loan, whereas the private sector may (Sadka, 2007: 17). 
This means that, although it seems that private companies undertake PPP project 
financing and the costs should not concern the government, eventually the government 
and/or final users will pay all partnership costs.  Hence, attracting a private sector party 
in a PPP normally costs the government more than where it opts to provide a service 
itself.  In the case where a private company receives fees from final users, the outcome 
is the same: final users will have to pay more than what they would have been required 
to pay if the government provided the service.   
Higher costs associated with PPPs are a significant shortcoming as they may 
outweigh value for money, which is the major argument in favour of partnerships.  
Additionally, PPPs may lead to erosion of a government’s own obligation for provision 
of public services (Haque, 2004).  This may happen, for example, if quality of service 
deteriorates over time, and the government fails to correct a problem in a timely fashion.  
Although later on the government may discipline the private sector partner, daily 
monitoring and control are hardly possible.  In addition, where customers do not see 
government involvement in the service provision, they may form a perception that the 
government distances itself from the traditional public services.               
Other PPPs' shortcomings include personal and organisational differences between 
public and private partners that reduce overall partnerships' efficiency; commitment 
problems (Acar and Robertson, 2004); absence of methods to analyse risks and 
opportunities; a lack of clearly defined objectives; inadequate control and evaluation 
mechanisms (Hofmeister and Borchert, 2004); and contract alterations and difficulties 
in working relationships (Kakabadse et al., 2007).   
For example, a public agency may assign a high priority to the quality of customer 
service and reduction of waiting time for service, whilst a private partner may be more 
 29 
interested in purchasing the equipment that makes fee collection easier.  The public 
sector partner may be interested in keeping a user fee stable, whilst a private company 
may be pushing for raising fees and tariffs for the variety of reasons.  A private 
partner’s commitment to a project may be fading rapidly when a project approaches its 
completion and may transform to unwillingness to properly maintain or upgrade 
equipment and other physical assets that a private partner soon will have to transfer to 
the public agency.  
Yet another PPP shortcoming is associated with risks to which PPPs are exposed.  
Certain risks may result from the lack of understanding between partners and a poor 
operating environment on each partner’s side, for example, when a private partner 
abandons the project in the course of project implementation having faced the 
unforeseen risks and related costs.  ‘Unethical behaviour will backfire on both partners 
and will dramatically increase political risks.  This will lead politicians to cancel PPPs 
too quickly’ (Hofmeister and Borchert, 2004: 219).  Some reasons may be relational 
issues in a PPP (which a separate section of this literature review will discuss) or there 
may be a poor project design, or financing issues or other problems.  Regardless of the 
reason, a PPP failure might raise serious concerns whether the public policy regarding 
partnerships was effective and whether it misused taxpayers’ money.  This is likely to 
generate a discussion about the core issue: why was it necessary to employ PPPs in the 
first place if the participants cannot assure the value for money?                   
There is another, broader view on drawbacks associated with PPPs.  Whilst PPP 
management requires transparency as part of good governance, transparency may 
highlight existing public sector shortcomings (Hofmeister and Borchert, 2004).  This 
note may have a particular relevance to Kazakhstan and Russia, in which the public 
sector historically, from Soviet times, lacks transparency.  In the context of the two 
countries, this implies that the government may use a PPP contract’s commercial 
confidentiality as a protective device to shield its actions, expenses and contract terms 
from public disclosure and potential criticism.  In the worst-case scenario, the 
government may use PPP confidentiality in order to conceal its costs, subsidies, the 
process of selecting a private partner, risk allocation and other issues that may concern 
the public.   
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PPPs' drawbacks deserve further elaboration in the Russian and Kazakhstani 
context, given limited experience that both countries have with partnerships.  One of the 
objectives of this research is to investigate whether PPP shortcomings, if any, in the two 
countries are similar to those in other nations or whether shortfalls possess some 
features unique to Russia and Kazakhstan.      
 
2.6 PPP Governance Strategy and Relationship Quality between  
  Partners  
 
According to Griffiths and Meyers (2005), the stream of literature that discusses 
governance strategy for PPPs includes: 1) economic governance strategies such as 
contracts (Lusch and Brown, 1996), and 2) relational governance strategies such as 
relational norms (Haugland and Reve, 1993).  A contract is a formal governance 
mechanism, whilst relational governance is an informal governance mechanism.   
The debate on governance includes a number of areas (Montfort, 2004, cited in 
Bult-Spiering and Dewulf, 2006), of which the interaction and links between parties in 
the public domain is most pertinent to PPP management.  Bult-Spiering and Dewulf 
(2006) note that most PPP research focuses primarily on contracts, risks and financial or 
legal arrangements; however, we know little about the way public and private 
representatives interact during partnership formation and operation.    
One should not downplay the importance of legal contract provisions because a 
contract specifies each party’s rights and responsibilities (at least, as many as one can 
identify at the time of the PPP formation) and helps to remove ambiguities in both the 
short and the long run.  At the same time, anticipating some events and putting relevant 
provisions in a PPP contract is a difficult task.  Because of that, often PPPs emerge from 
incomplete contracts (Sadran, 2004), and parties have to interact and address together 
multiple issues in the course of project implementation, which calls for effective PPP 
governance (Ahadzi and Bowles, 2004).       
This section begins with the insights of the literature debate on the role of PPP 
governance in public policy and public management.  It moves on to discuss power 
arrangements in partnerships and possible sectoral influences on PPP management.  The 
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discussion then focuses on partners' opportunistic behaviour as the principal factor that 
determines the need for effective PPP governance.  The section concludes by 
highlighting the literature debate regarding how to improve PPP governance. 
      
2.6.1 PPP governance as a contribution to public management   
 
Academic literature on PPP governance strategy establishes a connection between 
partnerships and the concept of good governance and places PPPs in the broader context 
of public policy and public management (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000; Johnston and 
Kouzmin, 2010).  Researchers argue that PPPs contribute in many ways to public 
management effectiveness.  For example, Sedjari looks at PPPs as a tool for 
modernising public administration and concludes that the use of PPPs ‘means the end of 
the central role of public bodies in providing services’ (Sedjari, 2004).   
Although this observation seems to lack justification as in most countries, both 
industrialised and developing, the provision of many public services still remains the 
public sector task, it contrasts another view, which claims that a potential disadvantage 
of partnerships in a transitional country is a tendency of the government to avoid its 
development responsibilities and shift the blame for its own development failures onto 
others (Haque, 2004).   
It would be useful to find out to what extent this observation applies in Russia and 
Kazakhstan because government avoidance of public sector responsibilities may be a 
strong factor against using PPPs.  On the contrary, if the empirical evidence supports 
the claim that PPPs enhance the government’s ability to deliver public services, this is 
likely to become a strong factor for the broader employment of partnerships in the two 
countries.          
Similarly to Haque (2004), Sadran (2004) argues that PPPs do not by themselves 
create good governance.  The evidence of multiple PPP failures and lack of PPP 
effectiveness in many countries support his view (Shaoul, 2002, 2006; Siemiatycki, 
2006).  Discussing how PPPs contribute to achieving the values of good governance, 
Sadran (2004) asserts that a partnership is (or should be) a triangle of relationships 
including a public authority, a private sector partner and a citizen affected by the state 
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intervention.  However, he claims that because in reality ‘the triangle is rarely 
equilateral and relationships are often asymmetrical, the partners often undermine each 
other rather than offer each other mutual support …’ (Sadran, 2004: 246).   
The point about the nature and scope of partner collaboration deserves further 
investigation in the Russian and Kazakhstani context, especially the question regarding 
how much interaction with citizens and/or NGOs takes place, for example, for detailing 
the requirements for the public services that a PPP intends to provide.  This is because 
involving citizens (i.e., beneficiaries of public services) in the discussion regarding what 
exactly they need is likely to ensure a better match between the population's needs and 
what a partnership plans to deliver.                 
Hofmeister and Borchert (2004) suggest their own approach to PPP governance 
strategy and discuss what they call ‘a PPP governance model’.  The core of this model 
is that PPPs should contribute to the balance between political, economic, social and 
cultural elements in a country.  This is why Section 2.10 of this chapter provides a 
background discussion of PPPs in Kazakhstan and Russia in order to view partnerships 
in the contextual environment of these transitional countries.  To make a contribution to 
the balance of elements in a country, both parties, public and private, need to overcome 
an inward-looking orientation (Hofmeister and Borchert, 2004).  Similarly to Sadran’s 
(2004) concept of a PPP as a triangle that includes a public sector agency, a private 
company and citizens, the PPP governance model stretches beyond the limits of 
interaction between organisations in the public and private sectors and implies a broader 
PPP role in the society (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000; Wettenhall, 2003; Robinson et al., 
2010).   
Bovaird (2004) puts forth a similar notion regarding governance strategy for PPPs 
and argues that PPPs should be part of public policy, not just one of the tools that the 
government can occasionally use in public administration.  Bovaird (2004) asserts that 
the government needs to form and develop an appropriate policy regarding partnerships.  
In this case, the government can harmonise the PPP policy with other policies, which 
can make larger contributions to good governance.   
In the context of Bangladeshi realities, Haque (2004), similarly to Bovaird, also 
points out that it is necessary to identify an overall development vision in a country and 
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determine how PPPs fit in this vision.  Strategic vision regarding PPPs may be 
particularly useful in transitional countries, including Kazakhstan and Russia, as it 
specifies the policy direction, the government expectations and the PPP governance 
strategy that the government intends to employ.  The PPP governance strategy may 
include guidelines and regulations regarding formal governance (contracts).  
Additionally, the government may develop its vision of relational governance in PPPs, 
for example, how parties should resolve disputes.   
Whilst the role of PPPs evolves in Kazakhstan and Russia, it is useful to study how 
the government shapes the public policy regarding partnerships, and what the policy 
elements, priorities, and the driving forces are.  This research will investigate the PPPs' 
role in the political, economic, social and cultural context of each of the two countries, 
from the public policy's perspective, which permits the researcher to evaluate PPP 
governance strategy.       
 
2.6.2 Power arrangements in PPPs 
 
In connection with the public policy regarding PPPs, part of the governance 
literature devotes itself to a discussion of different stakeholders and their interests, the 
impact of a PPP on these interests and assessment of each stakeholder's significance for 
the project's success (Fischbacher and Beaumont, 2003; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 
2004).  Differing interests that partners in a PPP have and different tools that each 
partner uses to pursue them (such as administrative approvals, quality checks or 
discretionary use of funds) lead to certain power arrangements in a partnership.   
The balance of power arrangements in PPPs depends on many factors, for example, 
on the general PPP legislation and how it defines partners’ responsibilities, on the 
realities of the court system and whether participants can use it effectively for dispute 
resolution and on specific contract provisions.   
The public partner dominance (which means that private partner's flexibility in 
planning, spending, price setting, purchasing and/or other aspects of decision making 
during the project implementation is constrained) may undercut the full expression of 
PPP principles, such as mutuality (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2004).  This note may 
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have particular relevance to Kazakhstan and Russia as in both countries the government 
sector historically dominated.  In this study, one of the research objectives is to analyse 
the partnership projects’ contractual environment in Kazakhstan and Russia, which 
includes power arrangements, and to identify what influence these arrangements may 
have on PPP management and partner behaviour.  
One can connect yet another aspect of power arrangements in PPPs to an industry’s 
nature. The government regulates some sectors, such as the oil and gas sector, more, 
whilst other sectors may enjoy less regulation.  As interaction issues between PPP 
partners often stem from differences in their interests, the nature and scope of 
government regulation including price setting, determination of import and export 
quotas and customs duties, environmental control, safety standards and administrative 
procedures influence the latter.  Studies conclude that in some sectors, such as 
construction, the involved parties pay little attention to PPPs’ relational aspects and 
rather focus on contractual arrangements (Egan, 1998; Doree, 2004; Bult-Spiering and 
Dewulf, 2006).   
This suggests that there may be a sectoral influence on PPP management.  In other 
words, power arrangements in partnerships may reflect not only what the PPP laws and 
regulations require, but power structures and related processes that a particular industry 
designed earlier also may influence them, based on other (unrelated to PPPs) economic, 
political and social considerations.  In addition, PPP management processes and tools 
that might work successfully in one sector, such as toll roads, might not be effective in 
another sector, such as health care.  A sectoral influence on PPP management in Russia 
and Kazakhstan is one of the issues that this research intends to address using the data 
from the studied projects.      
 
2.6.3 Opportunistic behaviour as the main determinant of the need for 
  PPP governance     
 
The literature about PPP governance often highlights partner opportunistic 
behaviour as a reality of many projects.  One can describe opportunistic behaviour as 
any kind of behaviour or action (or non-action) that pursues a party’s self-interest and 
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departs from the project goals.  Vining and Boardman (2008a) argue that, as it is 
impossible to write complete PPP contracts, parties are facing a longer time frame for 
opportunism to emerge from either side of the transaction.  In other words, not only is 
opportunistic behaviour inevitable because of the natural pursuit of a party’s self-
interest; furthermore, opportunism may grow over time because of the long-term nature 
of PPP projects.  Inevitable changes in government, policies, legislation, economy and 
technology over a lengthy period of time, such as 30 years, may significantly divert the 
parties’ interests from originally set goals for a PPP project.      
Naturally, the possibility for partner opportunistic behaviour calls for revisiting 
original arguments that transaction cost economics provided and used at the time of the 
PPP formation.  Why form a PPP in the first place if it appears that growing 
opportunism may significantly increase project risks and the likelihood of the overall 
project failure?   
This possibility for growing opportunistic behaviour becomes a considerable 
concern for either party in a partnership as it may lead to contract alterations, additional 
responsibilities, higher costs and greater risk.  Hence, one can characterise opportunistic 
behaviour as the major factor that contributes to various types of risk, and this 
behaviour is a potential or ongoing problem that PPP management needs address.   
Through the prism of opportunistic behaviour, one should emphasise the limitation 
of the transaction cost economics theory: it cannot provide reliable data in favour of a 
decision whether to form a PPP.  Reliability of long-term estimations whether a PPP 
will incur lowers costs than traditional government procurement methods may be 
undermined because of unknown risks and partner opportunism, whilst cost savings 
may be significantly overrated.  In addition, TCE cannot address a question whether a 
partnership is going to be successful (Hill, 1990; Madhok, 1995).   
Uncertainty over the long run and related risks may increase the total PPP social 
costs (which were discussed in connection with TCE in Section 2.4 regarding reasons 
for partnering) to the point at which direct government provision of services becomes 
more cost-effective.  Naturally, partners have to avoid this as it means that a PPP's 
overall economic efficiency is lower than that of direct government provision, assuming 
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that other factors, such as service quality, customer satisfaction or technological 
innovation remain the same in both options.               
Pongsiri argues that ‘implications of the transaction cost economics (TCE) theory 
concern the emergence of a co-operative relationship as a response to the uncertainty of 
transactions’ (Pongsiri, 2003: 74).   
Similarly to Pongsiri (2003), researchers assert that enhancing conformity of goals 
between the partnering organisations may allow parties to mitigate the transaction 
uncertainty by reducing their opportunistic tendencies (Ouchi, 1980).  If interaction 
between parties becomes more effective, spreading risks may be easier, and effective 
interaction may serve as a safeguard against a partner’s opportunistic behaviour.     
Many studies (Pierre, 1997; Teisman and Klijn, 2002; Fischbacher and Beaumont, 
2003; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2004; Bult-Spiering and Dewulf, 2006) support the 
concept of relationship quality, i.e., the need for managing relations between parties in a 
partnership, because, as their research concludes, PPP success strongly depends on the 
way partners manage interests and interactions. 
Another way of looking at the link between incomplete PPP contracts and the need 
for PPP governance is to identify whether a partner interaction is trustworthy.  Reliance 
only on a formal contract that governs the relationship would not be sufficient to 
establish the partners’ desired actions, but there also should be a positive social 
atmosphere which exists in a trusting relationship (Madhok, 1995).  Madhok (1995) 
claims that trust facilitates shared expectations, common interests and tolerance to 
partners’ goal conflicts.  This research will investigate the partners’ behaviour with 
regards to trust, which will allow the author to understand the general atmosphere in 
which parties collaborate and identify a trend.         
In summary, the PPP governance literature concludes that it is unlikely that a 
contract can embrace and properly address all possible risks and other situations for 
many years ahead.  Specifically, there are logical links between three factors.  The first 
is that partnerships often begin with incomplete contracts or contracts that simply could 
not foresee potential PPP problems and address them.  The second, which stems from 
the first, is that there is a threat of growing opportunistic behaviour of either party in a 
PPP due to the increasing probability of exposure to risks and, consequently, of losing 
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gains from the project.  The third observation, which stems from the previous one, is 
that there is a need for a PPP governance strategy and effective interaction, in order to 
mitigate risks and reduce opportunism.  This inevitably leads academics and 
practitioners to pay greater attention to informal PPP governance mechanisms, i.e., 
relationship quality in a PPP.   
Figure 2.1 highlights the links between factors that explain the need for PPP 
governance.  
                
 
Figure 2.1 Why PPP governance is needed: The links between principal factors 
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Source: Compiled by the author  
 
Figure 2.1 emphasises the logical link that originates from a PPP contact that 
inevitably has to be incomplete due to difficulties in foreseeing all possible project 
development scenarios for the long term.  This creates opportunities for either partner's 
opportunistic behaviour that is likely to grow over time owing to increasing risks, which 
in turn may be growing because of changing political, regulatory, economic and social 
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conditions.  One way of resolving uncertainty and mitigating risks is to ensure effective 
interaction between partners by formal and informal management tools and procedures.             
 
2.6.4 Literature debate on how to improve PPP governance    
 
The academic literature seems to have paid less attention to PPP management.  
However, those whose research focuses on relations in partnerships often make 
recommendations regarding how to improve partner interaction.  Drawing upon these 
recommendations, Acar and Robertson (2004) point out some unique PPP features.  In 
their view, it is the partnerships’ common organising properties that differentiate them 
from hierarchical, autonomous organisations that matter most.  They emphasise that 
often ‘managers in PPPs face the challenge of influencing the behaviour and 
performance of different individuals coming from different organisations without 
having the requisite formal authority to do so.  …  An implication of this characteristic 
of public-private partnerships is the need to take into consideration alternative means 
and ways of influencing the behaviour and performance of participants in the absence of 
formal, hierarchical authority structures and processes’ (Acar and Robertson, 2004: 
332).                 
For example, in order to reconcile multiple personal and organisational differences 
between partners’ staff and increase PPP effectiveness, Acar and Robertson point out 
the need to employ a combination of informal and formal means and processes of 
accountability in a mutually reinforcing way (Acar and Robertson, 2004: 342).  Their 
study suggests that partners should pay adequate attention to informal processes and to 
building good personal relationships among the partnership’s individual members.  
Another study concludes that, in order to facilitate effective PPP operations, ‘an 
accountability plan needs to be in place to establish the outcomes for which each partner 
is responsible, to outline the constituents to whom the partnership is accountable, and to 
delineate the consequences of failure to meet establish goals’ (Acar et al., 2008: 18).    
Another study (Kakabadse et al., 2007) has proven the positive influence of 
standardised processes (such as regular monthly meetings between key stakeholders, 
systematic development of negotiation skills and specialist legal knowledge in key 
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members of staff and regular face-to-face discussions between managers and staff) on 
making the working relationships within a partnership better and more effective.  
Yet another suggestion is to use special dispute resolution provisions for PPP 
projects and concessions, such as Dispute Resolution Boards composed of party 
appointed experts, which provide an informal and expeditious mechanism for resolving 
disputes and preventing costly and potentially unsuccessful full blown litigation or 
arbitration (Cook, 2007: 4).   
The examples above serve to illustrate the high importance of informal means and 
processes for effective PPP management.  However, there is a contrasting view of the 
informal governance mechanism in partnerships.  Rufin and Rivera-Santos (2010) argue 
that ‘trust-based governance, while theoretically desirable, will play an insignificant 
role in the governance structures of PPPs’ (p. 16).  Among the reasons for this statement 
the authors claim the following:  
‘Once the alliance is established, the monitoring of the partners’ behaviour 
both inside and outside the alliance by external stakeholders is likely to add to 
the challenge of developing trust particularly.  PPPs, which, unlike most 
agency activities, involve the generation of profits, are particularly susceptible 
to stakeholders questioning the fact that public resources are used to create 
profits and those profits are shared with private firms (Ahadzi & Bowles, 
2004).  As a result, we expect agencies to reinforce the formalisation of their 
interactions with the firm to avoid any suspicion of wrongdoing by its 
stakeholders.  This will make it very difficult, if not impossible, for informal 
governance mechanisms to play a major role in the everyday governance of 
PPPs…’ (Rufin and Rivera-Santos, 2010: 15).    
The implication for a private firm that is willing to form a partnership with a 
government agency is that a firm needs to be prepared for much more intense scrutiny 
and disclosure in a PPP than in other activities; to anticipate the direct or indirect 
influence of external stakeholders on the unfolding of the alliance; and to rely on 
different mechanisms to prevent opportunism on the part of the alliance partner, whilst 
not being able to rely on the trust-based mechanisms (Koppenjan, 2005; Rufin and 
Rivera-Santos, 2010: 17).    
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Although the conclusion that Rufin and Rivera-Santos derive from their research is 
less common than the one that puts strong emphasis on informal PPP governance, 
which is supposed to complement formal governance mechanisms, nevertheless, it is a 
useful contribution to the scholarly literature on partnerships as it offers an alternative 
understanding of success factors critical to PPP management.       
Effective interaction between partners may serve not only the goal of reducing 
opportunistic behaviour of either party.  A study of PPPs in Bangladesh concludes that 
private partners want to get close to the government in order to escape from state 
regulations (Haque, 2004).  One can view avoiding state regulations as a way of 
keeping a private partner’s commitment to a PPP project by using special tools, such as 
loopholes in existing laws, or by getting preferential government treatment through 
legal lobbying.  However, government agencies in developing countries are typically 
characterised by less democracy, transparency and stakeholder monitoring, which likely 
means weakening of rules through corruption (Rufin and Rivera-Santos, 2010: 18).  
Given a relatively high level of corruption in Russia and Kazakhstan, private parties 
may be particularly interested in getting a special arrangement for themselves at any 
time of a PPP project, using the justification that they are involved in the provision of 
public goods (instead of the government) and, hence, that they deserve special treatment.      
To conclude, scholars need to investigate PPP governance strategy in the Russian 
and Kazakhstani context by addressing a range of interaction issues between partners, 
including whether parties exhibit opportunistic behaviour and why; what informal and 
formal means and processes they use in their relations; and what tools they employ to 
reconcile the differences between their goals.  This will allow the researcher to assess, 
from the relationship quality perspective, whether one can consider partner interaction a 
critical success factor for the PPP management.   
  
2.7 Principal PPP Risks  
    
Partnerships are exposed to various kinds of risk.  The purpose of this section is to 
explore what principal risks PPPs face and how researchers understand them.  This will 
allow the researcher to investigate whether partnerships in Kazakhstan and Russia are 
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exposed to the same kinds of risk and what the differences are.  The next section of this 
literature review (Section 2.8) discusses how risk is allocated between partners and 
what risk allocation issues the existing literature delineates. 
Guidelines of the European Commission (EC) define risk as ‘any factor, event or 
influence that threatens the successful completion of a project in terms of time, cost or 
quality’ (European Commission, 2003: 52).  Similarly, researchers describe risk as ‘… 
the uncertain possibility of something going wrong that can result in increased cost or 
cause delay’ (Hardcastle and Boothroyd, 2003: 573).  It is worth noting that risk may 
have direct impact on costs, and/or it may have an indirect impact, for example, on the 
quality and/or volume of services.   
There are many different types of risk that PPPs may face.  Grimsey and Lewis 
(2002), in their study of risks affecting infrastructure projects, identify the following 
nine types:  
- Technical risk.  This may happen due to engineering and design failures, and 
may lead to overhaul of the entire project. 
- Construction risk.  It includes errors in construction, inappropriate construction 
techniques and/or flaws in construction materials.  This may lead to delays and 
escalation of costs. 
- Operating risk.  It involves higher than planned operating and maintenance 
costs. 
- Revenue risk.  It is also often called demand risk and it includes risk that comes 
from insufficient (i.e., below forecasted) demand for PPP services and from 
price volatility for services. 
- Financial risk.  It involves errors in the estimation of project revenue flows and 
project financing costs.    
- Force majeure risk.  It involves wars and calamities.   
- Regulatory/political risk.  It includes changes in government and/or public 
policies, and changes in laws and regulations pertinent to PPP operations and 
asset ownership.   
- Environmental risk.  This risk stems from adverse impact of the project on the 
environment (such as greater pollution), and adverse impact of changing 
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environmental conditions on the PPP operations, such as climate change that 
may cause a greater need in air conditioning a facility and, consequently, greater 
costs.   
- Project default.  Researchers view this risk as the overall project failure that 
may result from a combination of any kinds of risk described above.     
Similarly, the EC guidelines discuss eleven types of risk as follows: revenue risk, 
construction risk, foreign exchange risk, regulatory (contractual) risk, political risk, 
environmental risk, latent defect risk, public acceptance risk, sustainability risk, hidden 
protectionism, and risk involved in the choice of a private sector partner (European 
Commission, 2003).  Some kinds of risk are the same as in Grimsey and Lewis' (2002) 
classification, although there are few additional kinds: 
- Foreign exchange risk.  It involves the changing value of a domestic (national) 
currency compared to major world currencies, such as the U.S. dollar or euro.  
The risk comes into play if and when PPP parties have to purchase some 
equipment, materials or services from other countries during the project term.  
As these purchases were planned in a national currency, by the time one must 
make a purchase, the national currency’s value may change and a buyer may 
have to pay more for materials and equipment (if national currency has 
depreciated), which will mean higher PPP project costs.  In other cases, a buyer 
may have to pay less, if a national currency appreciated, which will mean cost 
savings for a PPP project.  Naturally, this kind of risk is more relevant to 
transitional countries including Russia and Kazakhstan as their economies and 
currencies are less stable than those of industrialised countries.            
- Latent defect risk.  Grimsey and Lewis (2002) call this risk technical risk, 
which refers to potential technical flaws in the way that an asset was constructed.     
- Public acceptance risk.  This risk comes from the degree of willingness of 
population to use PPP services.  As some services involve user fees, public 
acceptance often means the citizens’ readiness to pay these fees.  If many people 
are not willing to pay, the PPP facility may be underutilised leading to smaller 
revenue and the need for government subsidies.  In addition, lack of public 
acceptance may lead to political ramifications for the government as the public 
 43 
may be concerned with the misuse of taxpayers’ money.    In Kazakhstan and 
Russia where many people from the Soviet time became accustomed to free or 
heavily subsidised public services, such as health care or free roads, those who 
initiate PPP projects must carefully address public acceptance risk.  
- Sustainability risk.  This risk stems from a question whether a project can 
continue for the full length of its term as citizens' preferences may change, or the 
service may become outdated.  For example, a recreational facility may face 
smaller use because of the development of new kinds of sports, entertainment 
and recreation; traditional railroads may become obsolete because of the 
development of new high-speed trains and railroads.  This may result in earlier 
PPP project shutdown as opposed to the contract term.  In this case, the 
government is likely to incur additional costs in order to compensate a private 
partner for its investment.             
- Hidden protectionism.  This is the risk of creating a private monopoly that the 
government protects from competition.  The examples include power generating 
stations, toll roads, sports and leisure facilities and educational centres.  In fact, 
examples may include any PPP if a government-protected monopoly restricts 
competition and leads to higher prices without losing customers.            
- Risk involved in the choice of a private partner.  This risk may exist because 
of a private partner’s lack of experience or commitment to a PPP project, which 
may result in increased project costs and/or multiple disputes between parties.  
In the worst case, a private party may even abandon the project if it becomes 
money-losing.           
The longer list of PPP-related risks, offered by the European Commission (2003), 
captures a larger number of details relevant to PPP formation and operation as opposed 
to placing some types of risk in more general categories, as did Grimsey and Lewis 
(2002), and, as a result, one can consider the two classifications complementary.   
Out of many kinds of risk to which PPPs are exposed, revenue risk (or demand risk) 
is one of the most common because it is difficult to forecast accurately what revenues a 
project can bring over a long period of time.  Such factors as tariffs (or prices), 
utilisation level and the price elasticity of demand influence revenue.  Different sectors 
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have different historic information about demand for a service.  The EC report 
emphasises that historical data may be a reliable basis for the demand estimates or may 
not.  If costs were subsidised in the past, forecasting how consumers may react to 
unsubsidised prices may be a challenging task (European Commission, 2003).  This 
applies to projects such as transportation services (railroads, automobile roads and 
airports), water supply, energy supply and educational services.    
Additional factors may influence a PPP project’s revenue.  For example, a toll-road 
project also depends on drivers’ income and level of automobile ownership.  In 
countries with low incomes and low automobile ownership people may prefer to use 
slower but free of charge roads rather than paying tolls (Timar, 1998).  Although in 
Russia and Kazakhstan incomes are generally lower than in industrialised countries, the 
level of automobile ownership is fairly high as many people drive inexpensive and older 
cars.  As a result, the toll-road projects may be facing some unpredictable behaviour of 
drivers with regards to tolls.  Partners need to carefully investigate patterns of consumer 
behaviour and the likelihood of public acceptance of such projects before their launch 
with the help of surveys, interviews and public discussions.  
As for other kinds of risk, the research will investigate their relevance to 
partnerships in Kazakhstan and Russia.  This research will explore what kinds of risk 
have greater importance for partnerships in the Russian and Kazakhstani context and 
why, and what risks have lesser importance.  In addition, there might be some other 
risks that are unique to one country or both.  The study of PPP risks will allow the 
researcher to understand how they are allocated among partners, and what tools and 
mechanisms partners use for risk mitigation.  An overarching goal is to investigate 
whether existing risk management in Kazakhstan and Russia is a PPP success factor or 
an impediment.           
        
2.8 Principles of Risk Allocation in PPPs   
 
Scholarly literature and various guidelines for practitioners extensively discuss risk 
allocation in partnerships (Hodge, 2004; Hood et al., 2006).  PPP governance strategy 
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and partner relations should incorporate risk allocation as one can view it from the two 
perspectives.   
The first is that initial risk allocation must be reflected in the original PPP contract, 
with an attempt to avoid or reduce uncertainty regarding which party accepts 
responsibility for what, in case some event happens.  Klijn and Teisman (2003) argue 
that the public and private partners should share the PPP risks.  As accepting an 
additional risk is likely to increase private partner’s costs and decrease its profits, the 
risk acceptance is subject to discussion during the PPP contract negotiation process and 
getting some compensation in order to offset potentially higher costs.  Effective 
negotiation of identified risks and related compensation in the initial PPP contract 
becomes, from this perspective, a factor that contributes to partnership success.  
Researchers often view risk sharing, much of which is specified in a partnership 
contract, as one of the main PPP aspects, especially in major infrastructure development 
projects due to their high capital costs (Hodge and Greve, 2005).   
The second perspective suggests that, notwithstanding the contracts, how exactly 
partners bear the risk in the course of project implementation significantly depends on 
their interaction (Hofmeister and Borchert, 2004).  Some risks may not be spelled out in 
a contract, and may require further negotiation, whilst some other provisions may be 
subject to interpretation by either party.  Additionally, in the long run, new 
circumstances of any kind may develop, which may present new challenges and 
possibly the need to reallocate risks, responsibilities and costs.  The examples of 
challenges to PPPs include changes in legislative environment, political and economic 
reforms and/or international influences.  The partners cannot foresee some challenges, 
such as formation of (or phasing out) a regional customs union or a change in the 
region’s administrative boundaries, which may influence the demand for a service.  
Especially in such cases, it is the partner relationship dynamics, rather than initial risk 
allocation, that will determine distribution and redistribution of risks and related 
expenses (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2004).  
The EC guidelines point out that ‘risk should be transferred to the party best able to 
manage it in the most cost effective manner’ (European Commission, 2003: 52).  The 
reason for this is that risk has direct influence on the party’s financial position and on 
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the project’s total cost.  Risk allocation is not about just transferring some risks from the 
public sector to the private sector.  Effective risk allocation requires finding out which 
party is going to be in a better position to deal with a particular kind of risk, so that the 
risk itself is mitigated, and related costs are the lowest as opposed to where another 
partner handles the risk.  Guidance for Public Private Partnerships in New Zealand 
(National Infrastructure Unit of the Treasury, 2009) discusses similar notions about risk 
allocation. 
The lowest cost becomes a critical factor in deciding which partner should bear a 
certain risk because the private party’s costs have an impact above and beyond the 
private sector: the government and/or citizens have to compensate the private party’s 
costs.  The more a PPP project will cost to a private party, the more the government 
and/or citizens will have to pay.  ‘… The degree of risk transfer to the private sector 
will influence the overall cost of the project to the public sector as all risk will be 
associated with the price premium.  Therefore the objective must be to achieve a cost 
effective risk transfer, not simply a risk allocation for its own sake’ (European 
Commission, 2003: 52-53).  One can describe optimal risk allocation as follows.  If 
greater ability to mitigate some risks and deal with them at the least possible cost 
belongs to the public sector partner, these risks should remain with the public sector.  
Those risks that a private partner can mitigate better and cheaper should transfer to the 
private sector.   
Based on the concept of effective risk allocation, the European Commission 
guidelines for successful PPPs state four objectives for risk transfer, which include (a) 
reduction of long-term project costs; (b) creation of incentives to deliver projects on 
time, to required standard and within the budget; (c) improvement of quality of service 
and increase in revenue through efficient operation; and (d) ensuring consistent and 
predictable profile of expenditure (European Commission, 2003: 53).  If both partners 
pursue these objectives, risk transfer, instead of assigning as many tasks and 
responsibilities as possible to the private sector partner, involves determination of which 
party can handle each risk best and how cost effective this risk management might be.     
Guidance for Public Private Partnerships in New Zealand (National Infrastructure 
Unit of the Treasury, 2009) illustrates the meaning of proper risk allocation between 
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parties with the following two examples.  One example suggests that the public sector 
should bear the demand risk for a prison because ‘the demand for the prison is very 
much influenced by legislation and therefore by the government’s sentencing policy, by 
the sentencing policy of the courts, by the approach taken by parole boards and by the 
Department of Corrections’ prisoner management policies’ (National Infrastructure Unit 
of the Treasury, 2009: 17).  Further, Guidance concludes that transferring demand risk 
to the private sector partner would therefore be an inefficient allocation of risk.  Instead, 
the payment mechanism should be based on some combination of service performance, 
availability and occupancy rates. 
Yet another example from the same source is about the ground conditions in a 
tunneling project.  Guidance for New Zealand partnerships claims that the public sector 
should bear the risk for the ground conditions because it is impossible to determine fully 
these conditions before tunneling operations begin.  The document concludes that a 
private contractor responsible for the construction is in the better position to manage 
such risks and should therefore bear them (National Infrastructure Unit of the Treasury, 
2009: 17).  This is because it is in the contractor’s interest to complete construction at 
the least cost.  Additionally, the contractor possesses the necessary expertise and 
technological solutions to undertake construction under various ground conditions.  The 
ultimate influence on the PPP project is that the risk allocation becomes cost effective, 
and the overall project costs are smaller than in the case of assigning responsibility for 
the ground conditions to the public agency.   
 
2.9 Approaches to Risk Management 
 
Lam et al. (2007) provide fruitful insights into risk allocation.  Their study 
identifies seven key risk allocation criteria.  They include: ability of the party to foresee 
the risk; ability of the party to assess the possible magnitude of the consequences of the 
risk; ability of the party to control the chance of the risk occurring; ability of the party 
to manage the risk in case it occurs; ability of the party to sustain the consequences if 
the risk occurs; whether the party will benefit from bearing the risk; and whether the 
premium charged by the risk-receiving party is considered reasonable and acceptable 
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for the owner (Lam et al., 2007).  Although the above criteria are quite detailed and 
may be helpful in partnership design and contract preparation, risk allocation 
discussions often shift the focus to the links between risk management and private 
partner performance incentives.      
There is a general consensus in the literature that at least some risk should transfer 
to the private sector in order to give incentives to a contractor to perform better, to 
improve its management and project performance.  One of the tools to ensure that such 
incentives are in place is to not make full payments to a private partner until it meets all 
performance standards.  The EC guidelines claim that ‘under most PPP projects, full 
payment to the private sector contractor will only occur if the required service standards 
are being met on an ongoing basis’ (European Commission, 2003: 15).   
Similar to the EC guidelines, Guidance for PPPs in New Zealand states that ‘the 
payment should only be paid to the extent that the service is available, i.e., it should be 
proportionate to the quality or quantity of units.  There should not be a fixed element 
which the contractor receives irrespective of performance.  In principle, abatements for 
nonperformance (or penalties) should be large enough so that the contractor’s incentive 
to perform or to remedy performance defects is fully aligned with the government’s 
interests’ (National Infrastructure Unit of the Treasury, 2009: 20).  The above shows 
how government can mitigate risk of a private partner’s nonperformance in a cost 
effective manner and, therefore, ensure that the public interest is served by receiving the 
pre-determined service quality and quantity without an increase in public fund use.       
With regards to how PPPs allocate and mitigate risks, one can argue that ‘perhaps 
the most challenging feature of PPPs for contractors is the need to understand fully the 
risk allocation mandated under the PPP agreement between the project company and the 
government’ (Cook, 2007: 3).  This view calls attention to the first and foremost 
challenge for parties – the need to identify the risks that each partner intends to accept 
in a partnership.  This task has particular relevance to Kazakhstan and Russia: due to 
limited experience with PPPs in the two countries, parties may not fully realise the 
nature and range of risks to which they may be exposed, and how difficult and costly 
dealing with each risk might be.  However, risk management tools may be available.  
As an example, Cook (2007) suggests using insurance coverage, such as surety bonds, 
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for a number of project situations to offset a private company for some unaddressed 
risks in an original PPP contract.   
In line with Cook’s (2007) proposal is a suggestion that ‘those risks that are 
foreseeable and can be insured shall be handled by insurance as much as possible’ (Shin, 
2004: 4).  Shin (2004) advocates a notion that risks should be insured whenever 
possible and should be allocated through negotiations between parties.  However, 
purchasing insurance depends on the insurer's willingness to accept a certain risk, which 
in turn depends on how high a risk is priced.  Thus, buying insurance may be possible, 
although it may be pricey for a private company and, ultimately, for the government and 
citizens. 
Tools, such as insurance, for coping with risks may prove useful in Russia and 
Kazakhstan, and this study will investigate what instruments for risk management PPPs 
use and which of them are more effective.   
As demand risk is one of the most common in partnerships, researchers often 
emphasise the government role in coping with demand risk.  Prud’homme (2004) finds 
that participants underestimate partnership costs whilst they overestimate benefits.  
With regards to PPP revenues and expenses, he claims that ‘errors of 50 per cent or 
more seem to be the rule rather than the exception’ (Prud’homme, 2004: 2).  There is 
almost always a difference between planned and actual outcomes and many reasons that 
explain that fact, such as low demand and/or additional expenses.  As demand risk is 
often high, the government may play a significant role in mitigating it.   
Sadka states that ‘under many PPP arrangements, the government provides the 
concessionaire with a guarantee against certain cost overruns or revenue shortfalls’ 
(Sadka, 2006: 8).  In such cases, the contract should specify that the government would 
compensate extra costs to the concessionaire.  Another safeguard which the government 
could provide concerns the benefit side.  The government may offer insurance in those 
cases when the actual benefit is less than estimated.  Hence, the government would 
share some risks, or may bear a risk instead of a private partner.   
At the same time, demand risk is not merely the subject of negotiation and 
allocation between the parties regarding who is responsible for what aspect of it.  
Demand can shift, and some tools are available to a private company to encourage 
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demand.  For example, in the case of a toll road, a private operator could do aggressive 
advertisement and marketing, provide clean and comfortable rest areas along the road, 
provide fast and good breakdown services, or, if demand is elastic, the private partner 
may charge a toll below the maximum level allowable in the concession agreement 
(Sadka, 2006: 13).  Partners may prefer this way of coping with demand risk as opposed 
to the option where the government accepts responsibility for making additional 
payments to a private partner if revenue falls short of the projection, for the reason that 
this mobilises private partner innovation without the use of public funds.                            
Another government tool for dealing with demand risk is to give a guarantee to a 
private partner regarding the fixed amount of revenue.  However, such guarantees may 
lead to a situation where a private operator has no incentive to increase the volume of 
services, such as boost traffic on the road.  There would be no incentive because higher 
traffic volume is likely to lead to an operator's higher maintenance costs.  In such cases 
‘some revenue-sharing arrangement, between the public and private partners, would 
seem to be efficient, as it would maintain an incentive for the concessionaire to take 
demand-enhancing measures’ (Sadka, 2006: 13).   
Instead of fixed government payments, Sadka (2006) offers a solution in which he 
sets out demand as a benchmark.  ‘If actual demand falls short of this benchmark, then 
the public partner pays the private partner a fraction α of the deficit; if actual demand 
exceeds the benchmark, the private partner transfers to the public partner a fraction β of 
the surplus’ (Sadka, 2006: 13).  This proposal seems more effective as it resolves the 
problem with lack of the private partner's incentives, creates motivation for increasing 
the volume of services and permits more efficient use of government money if demand 
is smaller than projected.        
At the same time, a United Nations report suggests that ‘guarantees and supports by 
governments must be provided with care’ (United Nations, 2008: 38).  By providing 
support the government not only deals with some kinds of risk, but also creates a 
‘guarantee culture’ which reduces the private sector’s incentives to accept risk, and the 
private sector may become increasingly risk averse.  Similarly, the European 
Commission guidelines for PPPs argue that grant financing carries certain risks.  Grants 
‘provide little incentive to efficiency enhancements usually associated with the 
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pressures of commercial financing.  Additionally, the availability of free funds can 
cause a degree of dependency and ‘crowding out’ of alternative sources’ (European 
Commission, 2003: 66).  As private investors are likely to view government grants as 
coverage of some of their risks, this method of coping with risks may be quite 
ineffective because it discourages private partner's innovation and reduces incentives for 
better performance.   
The insights regarding a guarantee culture in PPPs and government grant financing 
of partnerships may have significant importance for Kazakhstan and Russia due to 
lesser development of private business in general and restricted opportunities for long-
term financing, in particular.  This research will explore what kinds of financial support 
the government uses in Kazakhstan and Russia and what influence government 
financing has on risk management in partnerships.    
The concluding observation about risk management in PPPs is that, as the literature 
shows (e.g., United Nations, 2008), often in the course of project implementation one 
partner may try to shift risks to another partner, and usually parties cannot agree on the 
proper risk allocation.  This is one of the main reasons why PPP projects fail (United 
Nations, 2008).  This note reiterates the importance of governance and partner 
interaction in a PPP as opposed to an intent to fully decide on risk allocation in an 
original partnership contract.  In other words, risk management includes not only initial 
risk allocation specified in a contract, but also – and more importantly – additional 
allocation and/or reallocation that may stem from unforeseen factors and that are likely 
to be heavily influenced by how effective partner interaction is.  With regards to 
partnerships in Kazakhstan and Russia, this research intends to embrace both 
perspectives: the first is to analyse how partners shared risk initially, and second is to 
investigate what decisions, if any, partners make regarding risk redistribution during a 
project and what factors drive those decisions.   
The thesis now moves on to highlight the PPP context in the two countries and 
evaluate the Russian language PPP literature that is available in Kazakhstan and Russia 
and to contrast and compare this literature with OECD approaches to partnerships.           
   
 
 52 
2.10 Kazakhstan and Russia: An Analysis of the Context    
 
This section provides contextual background for partnerships in Kazakhstan and 
Russia and includes the following:  
 discussion of sectors in which PPPs operate;  
 investigation of government approaches in the two countries to what a 
partnership is and what partnership types the governments form;  
 overview of a concession as a preferred PPP form in the two countries and 
 appraisal of available Russian language literature about PPPs and topics on 
which the literature focuses.   
This contextual discussion will permit the researcher to identify PPP features that 
are unique to Kazakhstan and Russia and draw insights into whether discrepancies exist 
between the Western literature, on the one hand, and the government approaches and 
PPP practice in Kazakhstan and Russia, on the other hand.    
 
2.10.1 Areas of PPP operations in Kazakhstan and Russia1 
 
PPP operations in Kazakhstan include the transportation sector (railroads and an 
airport), the energy sector (electrical power generation and transmission) and the social 
sector (construction and operation of kindergartens).  There is a plan to convert in the 
near future a road from Astana, the capital, to the northern resort area of Borovoye, to a 
toll road, and give its operation and maintenance to a private company in the form of a 
concession.  Additionally, there are three PPP projects targeting railroad construction, 
with the goal of establishing private companies to manage, maintain and operate these 
projects in the form of a concession for 25-30 years.  Those include a railroad in Eastern 
Kazakhstan between the station of Shar and the city of Ust-Kamenogorsk, also a 
                                               
1 The author wrote the text of this section in 2011-2012.  Later, this text was included in the article co-
authored with Nada Kakabadse and Izabela Robinson, which International Journal of Public 
Administration published in June 2012 (Mouraviev et al., 2012).  The author certifies that the text in this 
section is his original contribution to the thesis.    
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segment of railroad between Eraliyevo and Kuryk and a segment of railroad between 
Korgas and Zhetigen (Kazakhstan Public-Private Partnership Centre, 2012).  Another 
PPP project in Kazakhstan is the construction and operation of an international airport 
passenger terminal in Aktau, also as a long-term concession.   
There are three further concessions in Kazakhstan in the field of power supply.  
One project involves the construction of power lines, power transmission and 
generation as well as maintenance of a railroad power system for a segment between the 
Makat and Kandyagash stations in the Aktobe region.  The second project includes the 
construction and operation of an inter-regional electrical grid between Northern 
Kazakhstan and the Aktobe region.  The third PPP project includes the construction and 
operation of a power station that will use natural gas for power generation in the town 
of Kandyagash in the Aktobe oblast (region).  
Table 2.1 summarises the available information about concessions that have been 
approved in Kazakhstan, although some of them have yet to become operational.  
Table 2.1 shows that some projects initially approved by the Kazakhstani 
government have been subsequently put on hold and are under reconsideration.  Whilst 
the government never disclosed the exact reasons, this leaves just four concessions 
active (#1, #2, #3 and #8 in the table) out of eight that the government originally 
designed and planned for implementation.   
Table 2.1 also highlights the organisational arrangements applying to concessions 
and indicates the partner representing the government in each of them.  In three 
concessions (#1, #4 and #7 in the table) the Kazakhstan national railroad company, 
which is the fully government-owned corporation, plays the public sector partner role.  
In two other concessions (#5 and #6) the national Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources initially, in 2007 and 2008, assumed responsibility of a public sector partner. 
Subsequently, this Ministry ceased to exist although some of its functions were 
integrated with the newly formed Ministry of Oil and Gas.  The virtual absence of the 
public sector partner and related changes in channels of government budgetary funding 
explain, at least in part, why the two projects have been put on hold.  The three 
remaining projects are ongoing: the public sector partner in #2 is the fully government-
owned Kazakhstan Electric Grid Operating Company, and in #3 and #8 the regional 
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Table 2.1 Concessions approved by the Kazakhstani government as of January 2013  
No Project title 
Project cost 
(U.S. 
dollars) 
Concession 
term 
Project status 
Organisational 
arrangement with 
government:  public 
sector partner 
1 
Construction and 
operation of a railroad 
between the station of 
Shar and the city of Ust-
Kamenogorsk in Eastern 
Kazakhstan   
$202.5 mln 23 years,  
from 2005 
Concession 
contract signed 6 
July 2005.  
Construction has 
been completed 
(in part) in 2008;  
the project is 
operational. 
Kazakhstan Temir 
Zholy (100% 
government-owned 
national railroad 
company)  
2 
Construction and 
operation of 
interregional electrical 
grid from Northern 
Kazakhstan to Aktobe 
region 
 
$165.82 mln 17 years,  
from 2005 
Concession 
contract signed 
28 December 
2005.  
Construction 
phase has been 
completed; 
services are 
being provided. 
Kazakhstan Electric 
Grid Operating 
Company (KEGOC) – 
100% government-
owned national power 
transmission company  
3 
Construction and 
operation of the 
passenger terminal of 
international airport in 
the city of Aktau  
$65.5 mln 30 years,    
from 2008 
Concession 
contract signed 3 
December 2007. 
Construction 
phase has been 
completed; 
services are 
being provided.   
Regional government 
of the 
Mangistausskaya 
oblast’  
4 
Construction and 
operation of  a railroad 
segment between 
Yeraliyevo station and 
Kuryk station 
$63.06 mln 23 years  
Concession 
contract signed 
14 December 
2007. 
Construction has 
been postponed.  
Kazakhstan Temir 
Zholy (100% 
government-owned 
national railroad 
company) 
5 
Construction and 
operation of the power 
system for the railroad 
segment between Makat 
and Kandyagash stations 
in Aktobe region   
$350 mln 23 years 
Concession 
contract signed 
14 December 
2007. Project is 
on hold. 
Kazakhstan Ministry 
of Energy and Mineral 
Resources. As it was 
reorganised in 2010 in 
the Ministry of Oil and 
Gas, the public sector 
partner is unclear  
6 
Construction and 
operation of natural gas 
power-generating plant 
in the town of 
Kandyagash in the 
Aktobe region 
 
$146.52 mln  
 
20 years  
Concession 
contract signed 7 
April 2008. 
Construction has 
been delayed.  
Kazakhstan Ministry 
of Energy and Mineral 
Resources. As it was 
reorganised in 2010 in 
the Ministry of Oil and 
Gas, the public sector 
partner is unclear 
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7 
Construction and 
operation of  a new 
railroad between Korgas 
station and Zhetigen 
station in South-East of 
Kazakhstan 
$775.4 mln 28 years 
Concession 
contract signed 
18 April 2008. 
Project is on 
hold. 
Kazakhstan Temir 
Zholy (100% 
government-owned 
national railroad 
company) 
8 
Construction and 
operation of 11 
kindergartens in the city 
of Karaganda 
 
$39.12 mln 14 years 
Concession 
contract signed 
in November 
2011. Project is 
operational 
Regional government 
of the 
Karagandinskaya 
oblast' 
 Source: Adapted from Tilebaldinov, 2008; Kazakhstan Public-Private  
  Partnership Centre, 2011; Regional Centre for Public-Private  
  Partnership of the Karagandinskaya Oblast’, 2011. 
 
governments assumed the public sector partner role. 
These organisational arrangements and the current on-hold status of PPP projects 
demonstrate the dominance of the public partner and the reluctance or inability of 
private partners to accept larger risks.  A project cannot begin or continue without 
extensive government financial support.  For example, in the power-generating station 
construction project (#6), 20 per cent of the funding was to come from the public sector 
partner, 70 per cent from loans, and only 10 per cent from the private partner (Union.kz, 
2009).  Heavy reliance on government financial involvement both in Kazakhstan and in 
Russia is one of the key characteristics of a PPP in these countries.  This confirms the 
different nature of a partnership in the context of these two countries.  One can contrast 
them with the approach that OECD countries take, particularly in relation to risk sharing.  
In Russia, PPP operations are broader and include transportation (both railroads 
and toll roads, airport construction and management, sea ports); urban and regional 
infrastructure, such as reconstruction of a water supply system in Perm (i.e., the 
Permskaya oblast’); construction of water purification facilities, such as in 
Petrozavodsk and the Republic of Karelia; construction of refuse recycling plants, such 
as in Yanino (i.e., the Leningradskaya oblast’); the creation of special economic zones 
for recreation and tourism, such as in the Stavropolskaya oblast’ and a similar project in 
the Republic of Altay; and housing construction, such as the ‘Simbirskoe Koltso’ in the 
Ulyanovskaya oblast’ and a similar project in the ‘Krasnoyarskaya oblast’.  
Additionally, the PPP project lists at the federal, regional, and municipal levels include 
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projects involving oil extraction and refining, centralised urban heating systems, 
construction of agricultural facilities, and creation of special economic zones for 
innovation and technological development (Public-Private Partnerships in Russia, 2010).  
One can attribute the much longer PPP lists in Russia to the country's larger economy, a 
more active collaboration between all levels of government and private businesses, as 
well as to the government’s broader understanding of PPPs.      
 
2.10.2 Internal and external PPP drivers in Kazakhstan and Russia1   
 
The Russian language literature normally lacks the discussion of background for 
partnerships.  Instead, the literature usually underscores three items: many Western as 
well as transitional countries broadly use partnerships; PPPs are associated with 
perceived benefits (which section 2.10.5 of this literature review will discuss); and 
governments in Kazakhstan and Russia have already approved PPPs as a policy tool for 
the long run.  The Russian language literature uses these three arguments as a typical 
justification for partnerships.      
Nevertheless, some insights regarding the background for PPPs are available: some 
researchers argue that effective cooperation between government, business and civic 
groups in Russia is lagging behind that of industrialised nations, and is likely to be at 
the very beginning stage (Alpatov et al., 2010: 17).  The same applies to Kazakhstan, 
perhaps to the higher extent, due to authoritarian trends in government and 
underdevelopment of the civil society.   
Many authors claim that there is a general lack of trust between the business 
community and government (Kabashkin, 2010; Pankratov, 2010: 86; Varnavskiy et al., 
2010), which means that private companies often are not interested in engaging in long 
term cooperation with the public sector.  Hence, researchers can consider lack of trust 
between businesses and government as the background for PPPs.  To reverse this 
                                               
1 The text of this Section 2.10.2 embracing Sections 2.10.2a and 2.10.2b has been included in the article 
that the author has published in Organisations and Markets in Emerging Economies (Mouraviev, 2012).  
The author certifies that the text in this section is his original contribution to the thesis.    
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situation, the government and scholars view partnerships as a policy tool that would 
ensure closer collaboration between the public sector and the private sector. 
However, it is insufficient to explain PPP development in Russia and Kazakhstan 
exclusively by the government approval of partnerships as a policy tool.  In order to 
understand what factors contribute to the enhanced employment of partnerships, it 
would be useful to identify principal internal and external PPP drivers, which is the 
purpose of this section.   
Figure 2.2 summarises PPP drivers as follows.  They are divided in two groups – 
internal and external.  There are five internal and three principal external drivers.   
Figure 2.2 depicts PPPs as a priority tool in the government development policy as a 
background factor that supports and enhances other drivers, both internal and external.     
Figure 2.2 shows interrelations between the factors that drive the PPP development.  
For example, there is a certain pressure on governments in Russia and Kazakhstan from 
foreign investors supported by international organisations.  In turn, this enhances the  
 
  Figure 2.2 Internal and external PPP drivers in Kazakhstan and Russia  
Internal PPP Drivers External PPP Drivers
Need to give stronger impetus 
to regional economic 
development 
Need to get private financing 
for the housing and utilities 
infrastructure 
Need to increase the 
attractiveness of some 
industries for private investors 
Lack of 
public funds
Lack of 
innovation
Globalisation
Foreign investors
International 
organisations
PPPs
PPP as a direction and priority of the public policy  
       Source: Compiled by the author  
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influence of globalisation processes on the public policy in the direction of broader 
employment of partnerships.  At the same time certain public policy actions, such as 
selection of a concession as a preferred PPP form, aim to align Kazakhstan and Russia 
with perceived globalisation processes.   
All drivers that Figure 2.2 depicts are discussed in detail below.      
 
2.10.2a Internal PPP drivers 
 
The discussion of internal factors that act as stimuli to the enhanced employment of 
partnerships in the Russian language literature is normally brief and does not involve 
elaborate justification of any of the factors.  In other words, the literature considers PPP 
drivers as a given, obvious and not subject for an extensive debate.  One can explain 
this by the notion that the strongest internal PPP driver in both Kazakhstan and Russia 
is the public policy that includes statements regarding the PPP employment as the 
government priority in collaboration with the private sector for the long run.   
In particular, in the Conception for the Long-Term Social and Economic 
Development of the Russian Federation to 2020, which was approved by the Russian 
government in 2008, the government has determined a broad development of 
institutions and tools of public-private partnerships as a strategic direction (Alpatov et 
al., 2010: 7).  In 2008, the Kazakhstani government approved the Conception for 
Development of Public-Private Partnerships for 2009-2015.  Similarly to Russia, this 
policy document has assigned a priority to the expansion of sectors for PPP 
employment as well as to the need for expanded use of various partnership tools and 
mechanisms (Conception for Development of Public-Private Partnerships in the 
Republic of Kazakhstan for 2009-2015, 2008: 18-19).  In addition to railroads and the 
energy sector, the document calls for the use of PPPs in such sectors as water supply, 
education, health care, penitentiary system, utilities and housing infrastructure and 
urban transport infrastructure.        
In turn, the public policy as an internal driver of a comprehensive nature is 
grounded in other, more specific drivers.  Among these drivers, two are traditional for 
many countries in the world.  They include lack of public funding and the intention to 
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obtain greater access to private funds; and lack of new technology and related 
anticipation that private firms will bring along technological, management and other 
kinds of innovation (Alpatov et al., 2010: 16-17; Kabashkin, 2010: 9-11, 18-19, 30; 
Pankratov, 2010: 32; Varnavskiy et al., 2010: 29-30).   
Three other drivers are more relevant to the Russian and Kazakhstani context.  
They include the need to receive private financing specifically for upgrading the 
housing and utilities infrastructure; the need to increase investment attractiveness of 
selected industries; and the need to give stronger impetus to regional economic 
development.   
 
A Need to Obtain Private Financing for Utilities and Housing Infrastructure 
As Figure 2.2 shows, one internal factor is the assumption that scholars and 
policymakers commonly share – that PPPs may improve conditions in the housing 
sector which includes housing itself and housing and utilities infrastructure, such as 
water and energy supply, sewerage, supply of natural gas and heating systems 
(Kabashkin, 2010: 14, 17).  This requires additional comments as follows.     
As most people in both countries live in apartments, not individual homes, during 
the Soviet era all these systems were designed as centralised, meaning that service 
delivery originates from some central source that a government agency historically 
owns and manages.  A typical illustration of the centralised service delivery is 
apartment heating.  Aside from water for household needs, a family in its apartment 
receives from the centralised water heating service hot water that runs in heating units 
in each room.  For this heating service a family pays a public agency a monthly flat fee.  
As these facilities were built in Russia and Kazakhstan 50-60 or more years ago, they 
have become outdated and require extensive renovation and upgrading.  As a result, the 
need to obtain private investment in housing and utilities infrastructure is often the 
major driving factor for those in favour of PPPs (Kabashkin, 2010: 29-30).   
 
A Need to Increase Attractiveness of Selected Industries to Private Investors 
One more internal PPP driver also has a country-specific nature and applies to both 
nations.  The government, with PPP help, aims to increase the attractiveness of selected 
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industries to private investors.  Naturally, this driver is closely connected with the first 
one as the housing and utilities infrastructure is the sector that needs private investment 
the most.   
However, the range of industries that would significantly benefit from private 
investment is broader and includes railroads, automobile roads, regional and local 
airports, health care, childcare, sports and recreation and education.   
To raise a project’s financial attractiveness in a selected industry means, according 
to the Russian language literature, that the government should pay part of the project 
cost (Pankratov, 2010: 88).  Some authors assert that government support of a PPP 
project should be, as a rule, extensive and may take many forms such as a subsidy to a 
private partner’s capital expenditure, periodic payments to an operator, tariff subsidies 
(i.e., citizens pay part of the tariff, whilst the government pays another part) and 
government guarantees for a private partner's loans and bonds (Pankratov, 2010; 
Varnavskiy et al., 2010).  Pankratov (2010: 80) suggests that the government should 
play the role of a guarantor in a PPP.   
Similarly, other researchers argue that extensive government financial involvement 
in a partnership is one of the principles of PPP formation and operation (Varnavskiy et 
al., 2010: 26).  Although calling government financial support to a private partner ‘a 
principle’ seems to be lacking justification as this significantly increases public sector 
risks and costs and may undermine partnership’s value for money, this approach is 
indicative of the typical understanding of the role that the government in Kazakhstan 
and Russia is supposed to play in a PPP, specifically from the financial point of view.          
        
A Need to Give a Stronger Impetus to Regional Economic Development     
Yet another country-specific PPP driver is the need to give – with the use of 
partnerships – the greater impetus to the development of regions (as opposed to projects 
aimed at improvements in major cities such as renovation of airports or construction of 
bridges and tunnels).  This task is common for both Kazakhstan and Russia (Alpatov et 
al., 2010: 26; Pankratov, 2010: 96; Varnavskiy et al., 2010: 180-194).   
The policy response to this need is that both countries currently are pushing for the 
formation of regional government-owned PPP centres that would provide institutional 
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structure for project selection, preparation and implementation monitoring.  As of 
January 2011, 15 regions in Russia (out of 83 regions total) have formed PPP centres 
(Bazhenov, 2011: 11), although only one has been formed in Kazakhstan – Regional 
PPP Centre of the Karagandinskaya oblast’ (Regional Centre for Public-Private 
Partnerships of the Karagandinskaya Oblast’, 2011).  Regional PPP centres aim to 
integrate with regional governments in order to ensure more effective and faster project 
selection and, ultimately, faster economic development.  Overall, the government 
assigned PPP centres the task to facilitate the formation of regional partnerships by 
guiding participants through the preparation and project approval process and helping 
them to arrange proper financing.            
 
2.10.2b External PPP drivers 
 
In addition to internal drivers, three external factors spur PPP employment.  They 
include influence of international organisations, pressure from foreign investors and, 
more generally, globalisation impulses.  
 
Impact of International Organisations 
In Russia, the impact of international organisations has concentrated on the joint 
project of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Russian 
government-owned Vnesheconombank.  One of the departments of the latter is the 
national PPP Centre which serves as the government financing and coordinating vehicle 
for partnership development.  Designed for five years from 2010 to 2014, the joint 
UNDP-Vnesheconombank project aims to develop Russia’s potential for PPP projects.  
Its activities include staff training, consulting and providing assistance to regional PPP 
centres, and preparation of the model projects in water supply, refuse management, 
energy supply, transport infrastructure and social infrastructure.  In addition, the project 
aims to give recommendations regarding drafting regional laws and regulations that 
would allow extensive employment of PPPs (United Nations Development Program, 
2009: 3-4).  Although it is premature to evaluate the project’s impact, its goals clearly 
address the core impediments to development of partnerships in Russia, i.e., virtual 
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absence of regional legislation governing PPPs, lack of qualified staff and lack of pilot 
projects, the experience of which would allow the government to employ some typical 
financing and management solutions tailored to a certain sector, such as water supply.   
The same core impediments also exist in Kazakhstan, although no international 
organisation has come up yet with a similar PPP development project.  It is worth 
noting that the UNDP project in Russia has an additional goal of contributing to the 
formation of the Regional PPP Centre for the Countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS).  The project has acknowledged Russia’s growing role in the 
CIS and intends to use the Russian experience for promoting PPPs in other CIS 
countries including Kazakhstan (United Nations Development Program, 2009: 5).    
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) included Kazakhstan in its technical 
assistance project (2010-2012) aimed at preparing road maps for Central and West Asia 
in three sectors including energy, transport, and urban services (Asian Development 
Bank, 2010).  ADB defines a road map as a strategic plan for both ADB and the 
government, which will enable better decisions to provide innovative solutions to sector 
challenges.   
Describing these challenges and the need for technical assistance, the ADB report 
states that ‘reforms are needed to improve the efficiency of service provision and to 
allow the private sector to participate’ (Asian Development Bank, 2010: 1).  Among its 
goals, ADB claims the improvement in ‘delivery of infrastructure services that will 
create an enabling environment for public–private partnerships and private sector 
engagement’ (Asian Development Bank, 2010: 3).  As ADB works in tight 
collaboration with national governments, and, in addition, the Kazakhstani government 
co-finances this project, it is fair to argue that the ADB goals are synchronised with 
those of Kazakhstani public policy.  Thus, this international financial institution is likely 
to impact Kazakhstan in the direction of increased employment of partnerships.             
 
Pressure from Foreign Investors  
Another external PPP driver is pressure that comes from foreign investors who are 
interested in using new business opportunities in transitional countries.  The use of 
foreign investors in Russia and Kazakhstan possesses a number of advantages: foreign 
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firms may bring along the expertise that domestic companies lack, and financing can be 
arranged easier through foreign banks and access to foreign capital markets.   
An example of foreign investment in PPPs in Russia is Northern Capital Gateway – 
an international consortium that includes Fraport AG Company (Germany), a leading 
worldwide operator of airports, Greek investment group Copelouzos and the Russian 
bank VTB Capital (Northern Capital Gateway, 2010).  The consortium won a contract 
for re-construction and operation of Pulkovo airport in St Petersburg, Russia, and the 
project has commenced in April 2010.       
In 2007, a Turkish company, ATM Grup Uluslararasi Havalimani Yapim Yatirim 
ve Lsletme Ltd Sti, won a contract for one of the first PPP projects in Kazakhstan – a 
concession for 28 years that includes the construction and operation of an international 
airport passenger terminal in the city of Aktau (Kazakhstan Today, 2009).  In 2011, 
another Turkish company, 7 Piramit, won a contract for construction and operation of 
eleven kindergartens in the city of Karaganda – the first Kazakhstani concession in the 
social sphere.  These examples show the interest of foreign investors in using the newly 
opened opportunities in Russia and Kazakhstan.   
 
Integration with the Globalisation Processes  
Finally, one can attribute a significant role in sending external impulses to PPP 
development in Kazakhstan and Russia to globalisation processes.  The interest of the 
two countries in globalisation manifests itself as a general intention in those countries to 
align their policies, processes and tools in both the public and private sectors with 
international trends.  Kazakhstan and Russia perceive the growing employment of PPPs 
in many countries around the world as one of those trends.  Alpatov et al. (2010: 26) 
assert that Russia’s integration with the world economy is one of the PPPs' main goals.  
The Russian language literature argues that the connections between PPPs and 
globalisation are developing in two directions: globalisation calls for the enhanced 
employment of partnerships, especially in transitional countries, such as Russia and 
Kazakhstan, because the government perceives PPPs as an internationally recognised 
tool; and partnerships serve as an impetus for further development of globalisation 
processes.  Researchers explain the latter by two factors: increased use of foreign 
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investment in domestic PPPs is a sign of openness and internationalisation, and the 
government support of domestic private companies that seek participation in PPPs in 
other countries is also part of globalisation (Pankratov, 2010: 30-32).            
The impact of globalisation impulses becomes more evident with regards to the use 
of concessions: not only do the governments in Kazakhstan and Russia deem PPPs as a 
global trend; furthermore, the governments in the two countries deem a prevailing use 
of concessions, as opposed to other PPP forms, as an international trend as well.  
Section 2.10.4 of this literature review will discuss the reasons behind the focus on 
concessions, in connection with globalisation impulses.  
In summary, internal and external PPP drivers in Kazakhstan and Russia possess 
similar characteristics without any major discrepancies between the two countries.  
Many drivers are intertwined with and supported by a respective country’s public policy, 
which has determined PPPs as a priority tool for developing long-term collaboration 
between government and business.  The following section highlights the public policy 
approaches to PPPs in the two countries. 
 
2.10.3 Public policy approaches to PPPs in Kazakhstan and Russia1 
 
When Russian government agencies and officials discuss public-private 
partnerships, they broadly categorise them as follows: 
a) concessions (Section 2.10.4 will discuss the nature of a concession in 
Kazakhstan and Russia); 
b) projects funded by the Investment Fund of the Russian Federation, which is the 
Russian federal government’s financing channel; and  
                                               
1 The author wrote the text of this section in 2011-2012.  Later, this text was included in the article co-
authored with Nada Kakabadse and Izabela Robinson, which International Journal of Public 
Administration published in June 2012 (Mouraviev et al., 2012).  The author certifies that the text in this 
section is his original contribution to the thesis.    
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c) special economic zones, which are areas that enjoy more liberal taxation 
provisions and other privileges for businesses according to Russian legislation (Public-
Private Partnerships in Russia, 2010).   
These three broad categories are indicative of a government approach to 
partnerships which has two dimensions.  One is understanding ‘partnership’ as a generic 
term for enhanced public-private collaboration; the other is understanding partnership as 
a specific project.  These dimensions overlap in various government policy documents 
and classifications and can result in confusion and misunderstanding.           
The term ‘partnership’, particularly in Russia, is a generic term for closer 
collaboration between government and business.  It is a notion that emphasises the 
importance of public-private cooperation in many different forms and ways as a tool for 
social and economic development at the national, regional and municipal levels 
(Varnavskiy et al., 2010: 12).  This explains why the Russian government considers, for 
example, special economic zones as a form of partnership.  A special economic zone is 
a powerful way to boost the economy in a particular area by providing preferential 
treatment and tax incentives for private firms in order to facilitate investment.  However, 
the creation of such a zone implies the design of special rules and regulations for 
businesses that will be operating in the zone rather than a specific partnership project 
with one or few companies. Nevertheless, based on the idea of intensified collaboration 
with the private sector, the Russian government’s understanding of the term 
‘partnership’ includes special economic zones.  Similarly, projects of the Russian 
Investment Fund are large-scale projects that the federal government selects and funds.  
For regional projects, the government may extend this funding only in the form of a 
federal subsidy to the regional government.  Nevertheless, as these projects mean 
greater cooperation with private firms, from the government perspective, these projects 
fall into the PPP category (Varnavskiy et al., 2010: 37-39).        
An alternative view of PPPs is that a partnership is a specific project.  However, 
when it comes down to the discussion of PPP forms, the use of the term ‘PPP’ again 
becomes confusing.  Within a classification of PPP forms, one can understand a 
partnership in different ways, again embracing a PPP as a term for enhanced 
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collaboration and a PPP as contract.  Officially, PPP forms in Russia include 
(Varnavskiy, 2004; Glumov, 2009; Varnavskiy et al., 2010: 37): 
- all kinds of short-term contracts (service contracts, management contracts, 
technical assistance contracts, procurement contracts); 
- rental (or leasing) contracts when government rents out an asset - a building, an 
office, a production facility or equipment - to a private company and receives a rental 
fee; 
- production sharing agreements.  Based on the Federal Law of 1995 and designed 
mostly for the oil and gas sector, these contracts specify that the government gives a 
private company a permit for the use of the certain territory for a fixed period of time.  
A private firm makes all the investment related to natural resource exploration and 
extraction, and part of the output belongs to the government; 
- public-private corporations in which private participation is in the form of stock 
ownership.  These range from major companies such as Gazprom (the largest Russian 
oil and gas company) and Sberbank (the largest Russian bank) to smaller regional and 
municipal companies.  Both private companies and individuals may own stock shares; 
however, the controlling interest is in the hands of the government; and          
- concessions (see separate discussion below in Section 2.10.4). 
Table 2.2 summarises the meaning and key features of a PPP in the Western 
literature as opposed to Russia and Kazakhstan. 
 
Table 2.2 Understanding and features of a PPP  
PPP in Western Literature PPP or Concession in Russia PPP or Concession in 
Kazakhstan 
 Mutuality  
 The joint contribution of 
resources for the common goal  
 Asset construction or 
renovation by a private party 
which then uses this asset in 
order to provide services 
 Use of private companies for 
the delivery of public services  
 Shared risk allocation between 
 PPP is broad form of public-
private collaboration 
 Special economic zones with 
tax and other privileges for 
private firms 
 Investment contracts with 
participation of the Federal 
Investment Fund and private 
companies 
 Many public-private 
corporations are not involved 
 PPP is a project  
 Only one form of PPP – a 
concession – is used 
 Extensive government 
financial support to a PPP is 
allowed and expected 
 Only one PPP model is used: 
build-transfer-maintain 
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parties 
 Shared responsibility of 
partners  
 Multiple PPP forms (a 
concession, private finance 
initiative, asset life-cycle 
contract)  
 Multiple PPP models 
(including all or some of the 
elements such as:  design-
build-finance-operate-
maintain-own-transfer) 
 
 
 
in the provision of public 
services 
 Private investors normally 
have no influence on the 
public-private corporation’s 
business policy 
 A production sharing 
agreement shifts all the 
business risk to a private 
partner  
 Short-term contracts are a 
simple way of hiring a private 
party for a specific purpose   
 Also, PPP can be a project 
such as a concession 
 Only one PPP model is used: 
build-transfer-maintain 
 Extensive government 
financial support to a PPP is 
allowed and expected 
 
 Source: Compiled by the author   
 
In Russia, the broader interpretation of a partnership to include almost any kind of 
public-private cooperation allows the government to claim that the country is 
implementing a large number of PPPs.  Other PPP forms, according to the official 
approach, such as the creation of special economic zones with tax and other privileges 
for private firms, and investment contracts with the participation of the Federal 
Investment Fund and private companies, are even further from the understanding of 
PPPs that the Western literature presents.  Key partnership elements – mutuality, the 
joint contribution of resources for the common goal, use of private companies for the 
delivery of public services and shared risk allocation between parties – often appear to 
be missing and/or downplayed in the Russian approach.  For example, in public-private 
corporations, private investors normally have no influence on the corporation’s business 
policy, and many of those companies (such as Sberbank and Gazprom) are not involved 
in the provision of public services.  A production sharing agreement shifts all the 
business risk to a private partner and the government role is limited to issuing a permit 
for the use of a piece of land which may or may not have some natural resources. The 
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government does not bear any risk.  Short-term contracts, such as renovation of a water 
purification facility, or procurement contracts, often do not involve the use of 
government resources and are a simple way of hiring a private party for a specific 
purpose (Mouraviev et al., 2012: 413-415).   
In Kazakhstan the understanding of a PPP over the past few years has narrowed 
down to a concession.  All current PPP projects in Kazakhstan are implemented in the 
form of a concession, and those that are prepared and are waiting for government 
approval (e.g. regional projects in the Karagandinskaya oblast' in the Northern part of 
Kazakhstan) are concessions as well (Regional Centre for Public-Private Partnership of 
the Karagandinskaya Oblast’, 2011).                          
 Despite discrepancies in meaning and approach when compared with OECD 
countries, both Kazakhstan and Russia are keen on the use of concessions.  The 
rationale for public policy in Kazakhstan and Russia regarding PPPs is the general 
intention to become closer to international standards and to adopt perceived ‘best 
practice’ standards.  Whilst both countries become more open economically and 
politically, they use this typical justification for policy changes and actions and apply it 
to many sectors.  For example, Kazakhstan is making the transition to a 12-year school 
education despite widespread public concern.  In an effort to respond to globalisation 
impulses, Kazakhstan’s government also approved a change to a three-tier academic 
degree structure – Bachelor’s, Master’s, Ph.D. – despite widespread concerns about the 
quality of education.  Claiming globalisation as a goal of their educational reforms, both 
Russia and Kazakhstan have officially joined the Bologna process which aims at 
harmonising higher education in Europe.  In July 2010, Russia and Kazakhstan entered 
a customs union in a controversial attempt to follow international trends in enhancing 
regional economic integration which they later invited Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine 
to join.  Russia and Kazakhstan are striving for other countries to perceive them 
positively as they attempt to formulate policies and practices and create institutions that 
are in line with those of industrialised countries and western orthodoxy of best practice. 
This incentive drives many policy actions including PPP policy (Mouraviev et al., 2012: 
416).   
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2.10.4 Concessions in Kazakhstan and Russia1  
 
This section discusses the meaning, nature and application of a concession as a 
preferred PPP form in Kazakhstan and Russia in order to set a context for further 
investigation of PPP management.     
According to the Russian and Kazakhstani laws, a concession is a long-term 
arrangement when a private partner builds and operates an asset at its own expense, 
whilst property ownership belongs to the government from the moment a private partner 
completes the asset construction.  A standard arrangement in OECD countries implies 
that a private company uses an asset to provide services, and in return for its investment, 
a private partner receives service fees from the population, which allows it to cover the 
project costs and make a profit.     
In a search for better, more effective PPP policy instruments, both countries from 
2005 are paying greater attention to concessions.  As Kazakhstan exclusively uses a 
concession as a form of a PPP, and Russia puts strong emphasis on concessions, it is 
worth explaining when and why concessions became the focus of public policy in those 
countries.   
In Russia, the legislature in the 1990s discussed a number of drafts of the law on 
concessions.  However, the federal government finally passed the law ‘On Concessional 
Agreements’ in 2005.  Although a major step forward in creating a legislative 
framework for concessions, there were no concessions until 2008, when the government 
approved subsequent amendments to this law. From 2008, the preparation of concession 
agreements became more intense, although until the beginning of 2009 the number of 
concessions still remained small.  As of 30 January 2009, there were 23 concessions in 
Russia, with terms between 5 and 49 years, and all of them were at the municipal level 
                                               
1 The author wrote the text of this section in 2011-2012.  Later, this text was included in the article co-
authored with Nada Kakabadse and Izabela Robinson, which International Journal of Public 
Administration published in June 2012 (Mouraviev et al., 2012).  The author certifies that the text in this 
section is his original contribution to the thesis.    
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(Varnavskiy et al., 2010: 47).  They included power and heat generation projects, water 
supply and sewerage systems, waste utilisation facilities and sports projects.    
As of January 2011, there were 200 concessions at the municipal level in Russia.  
In addition, there were two concessions at the regional level and two at the federal level 
(Bazhenov, 2011: 6).  Table 2.3 summarises the rapid growth in the number of 
concessions.   
 
   Table 2.3 Number of concessions in Russia, 2009-2011  
20023Municipal level
20Regional level
20Federal level
January 2011January 2009
Source: Compiled by the author from Varnavskiy et al., 
2010: 47; Bazhenov, 2011: 6.  
 
The dramatic increase in the number of concessions over just two years, as Table 
2.3 shows, illustrates the direction of the public policy aimed at enhanced employment 
of partnerships, particularly at the municipal and regional levels, although the latter is 
clearly lagging behind the former.  Regional projects are likely to be larger and more 
expensive than municipal.  Difficulties with finding investors and obtaining financing 
explain the slower growth in the number of regional partnerships.       
Kazakhstan passed a similar national law on concessions in July 2006, although the 
government approved two concessions in 2005, possibly, as pilot projects on an 
experimental basis.  These two projects included a railroad in Eastern Kazakhstan 
between the station of Shar and the city of Ust-Kamenogorsk (approved in July 2005, 
with the concession term of 23 years, until 2028), and construction and operation of an 
inter-regional electrical grid between Northern Kazakhstan and the Aktobe region, 
approved in December 2005, with a 17 year concession term, until 2022 (Tilebaldinov, 
2008).   
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It is worth noting that the existing legislation in Russia and Kazakhstan allows 
governments to provide additional forms of support to a concessionaire, which makes 
the understanding of a concession quite different from the typical approach in OECD 
countries.  For example, Article 14 of the Law on concessions in Kazakhstan says that 
government can (a) co-finance concession projects, and (b) compensate some 
investment expenses of a concessionaire during the concession period.  This amendment 
to the original law was made in 2008, to address concerns that PPP projects were 
financially unattractive to private companies.  The same Article says that the total 
monetary value of government support to a concessionaire should not exceed the total 
cost of an asset constructed by a private company.  In other words, this provision 
includes a possibility that the government will pay all the private partner’s investment 
expenses whilst the population (customers) may pay some amount or even nothing.   
Similarly, in Russia the law allows the government to pay part of the investment 
cost of private companies.  An example of government support to a private company is 
the concession contract signed by the Russia’s Federal Road Agency on 17 July 2009.  
This concession includes construction of a road which will link one of the federal 
highways (which is called M-1 ‘Belarus’ and runs from Moscow to Minsk) with a ring 
road around Moscow.  The concession term is 30 years and the total cost of construction 
is 25.7 billion Russian rubles (USD $857 million).  The Russian Federal Investment 
Fund will pay 11 billion rubles ($367 million) which is more than 42 per cent of the 
total project cost.  A concessionaire will pay the remainder (Varnavskiy et al., 2010: 48).               
Undoubtedly, economic and political reasons for PPPs in Russia and Kazakhstan 
exist.  Many of them stem from the onset of the 2008-2009 economic crisis.   
In 2009, total funding from Russia’s Investment Fund decreased from 113 billion 
rubles ($3.77 billion) to 64 billion rubles ($2.13 billion) due to budgetary constraints, 
and the number of investment projects including PPPs dropped from 21 to 15 
(Varnavskiy et al., 2010: 170).  Governments in both countries in 2008-2010 
experienced larger budget deficits than in pre-crisis years coupled with a general long-
term policy goal aimed at reducing the tax burden and providing more social benefits to 
people.  For example, in 2009, value-added tax in Kazakhstan decreased from 13 per 
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cent to 12 per cent as a part of the long-term taxation policy.  During the time of 
economic decline this further decreased total government revenues.   
In 2009, i.e., in the midst of the economic crisis accompanied by growing budget 
deficit, the Russian government decided not to cancel its original intention to raise 
pensions and proceeded with its long-term plan of increasing retired people’s incomes.  
As a result, many regional and municipal budgets substantially decreased (Gusev, 2009) 
as those budgets are formed mostly by transfers from the federal government, which 
faced growing expenses and consequently, experienced a rising budget deficit.  
Similarly, budgets in regions and municipalities in Kazakhstan decreased as there is no 
regional and municipal tax structure in place.  Both Kazakhstan and Russia have a high 
degree of fiscal centralisation, thus most of the tax revenue is in the hands of the 
national government.  In the light of shrinking national, regional and municipal budgets 
in a time of economic downturn, governments in both countries paid greater attention to 
concessions as a tool to obtain private funding in order to implement public tasks.  It is 
no surprise that the government focus coincides with the approval of the Kazakhstani 
law on concessions and Russian amendments to the law on concessions.  These 
legislative acts gave a stronger impetus to the use of concessions in both countries 
(Mouraviev et al., 2012: 415-416).  
 
2.10.5 The Russian language literature regarding PPPs: Focus areas 
 
This section provides an overview of the Russian language literature about PPPs in 
Kazakhstan and Russia and topics on which the literature focuses.  The subsequent 
section (2.10.6) identifies specific themes and issues in the PPP management literature.  
The following section (2.10.7) reveals gaps and weaknesses in the literature. 
As the PPP experience is limited in both countries, the number of scholarly 
publications is very small.  Among commonly discussed topics, PPP advantages are by 
far the most popular.  However, this discussion mostly highlights the items that the 
Western literature already has identified, whilst additional scholarly contribution is 
lacking.   
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For example, the Russian language literature and policy documents in Russia and 
Kazakhstan likewise emphasise the PPP value for money and add a related feature, 
namely the lack of public funding, which PPPs permit to overcome (Varnavskiy, 2004; 
Zusman, 2008; Azizov, 2009; Glumov, 2009; Gusev, 2009).  PPP advocates endorse the 
persuasive argument that people will either obtain some public services with the use of 
private partners and private funds, or not.  However, in the abovementioned sources the 
discussion of PPP value for money switches to the following perspective: scholars 
understand VfM as the partnerships' ability to deliver public services instead of the 
government (in other words, no PPP means no public service, due to lack of 
government funds).  Although this argument – out of many others - in favour of PPPs is 
valid, using it as a single dominating factor in favour of partnerships is debatable, and is 
not in line with the Western literature regarding the nature of VfM (see discussion in 
Section 2.4 regarding reasons for partnering).   
The Russian language literature extensively discusses the benefits of concessions 
and identifies at least four of them.  First, long-term arrangements allow both partners to 
strategically plan their activities.  Second, a private partner has a high degree of 
autonomy and flexibility in making business decisions, which may increase the project 
efficiency.  Third, in the framework set by a concessional contract and general 
legislation, the government can discipline a private partner if it violates the concession’s 
terms, for example, by not releasing payments to a private firm.  This may be 
particularly useful for the protection of the public interests.  Fourth, a concession 
implies a temporary use of an asset by a private partner whilst the property ownership 
remains with the government (Varnavskiy, 2004; Zusman, 2008; Gusev, 2009).     
The literature normally discusses the above noted and other PPP advantages as a 
given, and the highlights often lack theoretical arguments and empirical evidence.  For 
example, the literature often cites technological innovation as a major advantage of 
partnerships, i.e., a PPP may provide a technological breakthrough stemming from the 
intention to cut costs and increase profits.  However, no particular evidence from Russia 
and Kazakhstan can support this at the present time.   
As opposed to the discussion of PPP advantages that is often quite extensive and 
may take pages of text, the literature normally does not pay adequate attention to PPP 
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drawbacks and limits a description to one or two paragraphs.  Overall, one can 
characterise the discussion in the Russian language literature as euphoria regarding 
partnerships, with high expectations about their performance.  This approach lacks 
justification because the partnerships' failures and performance problems are fairly 
common in OECD countries.  Also, the biased approach creates a distorted picture of 
PPPs by claiming that this form of public-private collaboration is most effective in 
many respects as it ensures reliable service delivery, rational use of public funds and 
innovation.    
Another common topic is how, in which direction to amend legal provisions that 
determine the PPP contract terms.  Both PPP policy documents in Russia and 
Kazakhstan, such as the laws on concessions in each country, and the Russian language 
literature emphasise a contract as the main and only document that ensures successful 
management for the partnership’s duration.  Many Russian and Kazakhstani scholars 
(Zusman, 2008; Azizov, 2009; Glumov, 2009; Gusev, 2009) conclude their studies with 
observations that the major reason for PPP shortfalls, both existing and potential, is that 
PPP-governing laws and regulations are underdeveloped, lack specifics and include 
‘grey areas’ that are subject to differing interpretations.  The most common conclusion 
is that the law on concessions in each country and other PPP-related laws and 
regulations require further improvement.   
For example, Glumov (2009) emphasises the need to draft a law on PPPs that 
would set the guiding principles and legal basis for PPP formation and management 
specifically for Russia's regions (‘oblasti’), rather than at the federal level.  This law 
would allow regional governments to use legally-defined procedures and instruments to 
initiate PPP projects, select a private partner and know how far they can extend their 
own participation.  
The extensive part of PPP literature in Russia devotes itself to special economic 
zones, projects financed by Russia’s Investment Fund and to semi-government 
corporations with private stock ownership.  This is because, as Section 2.10.3 discussed 
earlier, the government understanding of partnerships includes these three categories.  
As a result, about half of the PPP literature in Russia devotes itself to forms of public-
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private collaboration, other than project-based PPPs.  This is in sharp contrast with the 
Western literature which almost exclusively devotes itself to project-based partnerships.   
Finally, it is worth identifying some neglected areas of PPP studies in the Russian 
language literature.  They include research regarding specific PPP projects; PPP 
governance and partner interaction; and stakeholder interests and operating 
environments.  Additionally, PPP shortfalls deserve further elaboration in the Russian 
and Kazakhstani context, given that the experience of the two countries with PPPs is 
relatively new and limited.  Also, although some studies address risk management in 
PPPs, there is room for significant expansion in this research area.    
In general, PPP management studies that the Russian language literature reflects 
are in their infancy.  No specific study has examined the aspects and determinants of 
relationship quality in PPPs in Kazakhstan and Russia, partner interaction, risk 
management and overall partnership performance.      
 
2.10.6 The Russian language literature: PPP management themes  
 
Having described the topics that draw attention of the Russian language literature 
in the area of public-private partnerships, this section discusses specific themes and 
issues related to PPP management that the literature identifies.  The next section 
highlights the gaps and weaknesses in the literature.     
The Russian language literature considers a number of issues in PPP management 
in Russia and Kazakhstan.  Although the range of issues is quite broad and diverse, one 
can categorise them by the following themes: (1) the nature of government involvement 
in partnerships and the extent of government support to PPPs; (2) risk management in 
PPPs; (3) legal and other practical issues that address existing drawbacks in PPP 
regulations, and suggestions how to improve PPP formation and management; (4) issues 
stemming from automatic, although often unjustified, association of PPPs with some 
advantages; and (5) criteria for PPP project selection.  Figure 2.3 summarises these 
themes and issues.   
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            Figure 2.3 Themes and issues in PPP management outlined in the literature 
 
                 
Risk management 
in PPPs
Government role in 
PPPs
PPP laws and 
regulations 
• Is the range of employed risk 
management tools adequate? 
• How effective are they?
• What is the appropriate 
extent of government 
involvement in PPP projects?
• What forms may government 
financial support to PPPs take?
Association of PPPs 
with some intrinsic 
advantages
Criteria for PPP 
project selection 
• On what grounds is a 
project deemed suitable for a 
PPP? 
• What legal issues shall be 
solved in the near future and 
in the long run?
• What PPP model might be 
successful in the Russian and 
Kazakhstani context?
• What are the advantages that 
a PPP can bring along in the 
Russia and Kazakhstan 
context?         
• What PPP drawbacks may 
diminish their advantages?
Themes 
and issues 
in PPP
management
 
 Source: Compiled by the author 
 
Figure 2.3 highlights the five main themes in PPP management that the literature 
discusses, as well as the main issues within each theme.  Naturally, each theme is 
intertwined with all others, although the figure shows the connection with the 
neighbouring theme(s) only.  In addition, issues within each theme are interconnected 
with issues from other themes, although the figure does not show this explicitly, 
because of graphical and space limitations and in order to keep the figure’s structure 
clear.  The discussion of themes and issues is provided below. 
 
2.10.6a The nature and scope of government involvement in partnerships 
 
The first theme includes issues regarding the nature and extent of government 
involvement in partnerships.  In the Russian language literature, the project's social 
significance (Zusman, 2008; Azizov, 2009; Varnavskiy et al., 2010) determines the 
nature of government involvement in PPPs. The Russian language literature claims that 
the government is not supposed to be involved in just any PPP project.  In order to 
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justify the government participation in a partnership, a project has to be deemed socially 
significant.  The latter means that a PPP should implement a project in a field or an 
industry that is significant for the population, such as health care or water provision, and 
the project results are supposed to have a positive influence on the standard of living by 
delivering some improvements for the people.  However, the literature is silent 
regarding how exactly one can assess this significance and why one PPP project may be 
more significant than the other, and how one can measure the improvements for the 
population.   
Additionally, the literature does not connect the project’s social significance 
specifically to public services.  In other words, the understanding of improvements that 
a PPP project is supposed to bring along is very broad and is not focused on anything in 
particular.  The following example highlights this controversy.  In the city of 
Karaganda, Kazakhstan, a PPP project targets the construction of 11 kindergartens, 
whilst another project aims at reconstruction of water purification facilities (Regional 
Centre for Public-Private Partnerships of the Karagandinskaya Oblast’, 2011).  Another 
ongoing PPP project in Northern Kazakhstan aims at construction of power lines and 
transmission of electrical power across the region (Kazakhstan Public-Private 
Partnership Centre, 2012).  The literature does not explain whether the social 
significance of the three above mentioned projects is equal to each other, and how their 
social significance differs from that of a PPP project that includes, for example, 
operation of a toll road.  
The same theme includes issues related to government financial involvement in 
partnerships.  The literature often underscores that the government should serve as a 
guarantor for a PPP project (Varnavskiy, 2004; Maksimov, 2010; Varnavskiy et al., 
2010; Firsova, 2011a).  This means that the government is supposed to issue guarantees 
for loans and other obligations for a private partner in a PPP.  Yet another aspect 
restates and further develops the notion about the government’s key role in a PPP: 
scholars assert that the government should expand all kinds of financial support to 
partnerships via all available channels (Tilebaldinov, 2008; Kabashkin, 2010; 
Pankratov, 2010; Varnavskiy et al., 2010; Shabashevich, 2011).  For example, the 
government may provide additional benefits to a PPP in the form of a subsidy, by 
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raising a tariff for PPP services above a pre-determined level, by waiving fines and fees 
related to delays with completion of some of the project's phases and by giving 
guarantees for infrastructure bonds that a private company may issue to finance a PPP 
project (Firsova, 2011b).  The main justification for the enhanced government financial 
involvement is that this will increase the project’s financial attractiveness to a private 
partner and the likelihood of launching a PPP (Chernyavskaya and Varnavsky, 2010).    
 
2.10.6b Risk management in a PPP 
 
The second theme that the Russian language literature discusses includes risk 
management in a partnership.  Most often the literature understands risk management in 
a sense that risk should transfer from the public sector to the private sector (Varnavskiy, 
2004; Gusev, 2009; Alpatov et al., 2010; Varnavskiy et al., 2010).  This view becomes 
an issue since it contrasts the understanding of risk management in the Western 
literature, which argues that risk in a partnership should transfer to a party that is best 
able to manage it in the most cost effective manner (Section 2.8 of this literature has 
discussed principles of risk allocation in a PPP).  In addition, as highlights of the first 
theme showed, many authors express a controversial suggestion that the government 
should enhance its financial support to PPPs by paying some project costs in various 
forms.  Where government financial support to a partnership increases, government 
risks also increase.  However, the Russian language literature does not view government 
enhanced involvement as a risk.   
The literature largely downplays risk management.  Most often it views risk 
management in a simplistic way: that the government should properly allocate risks 
between the partners before a project begins.  In other words, the literature does not pay 
attention to dynamics of risk management: by disregarding risk management as a 
process, the literature emphasises exclusively initial risk allocation that parties specify 
in a contract at the time of PPP formation (Zusman, 2008; Azizov, 2009; Alpatov et al., 
2010).   
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2.10.6c PPP laws and regulations 
 
The third theme in PPP management includes legal and other practical problems 
that stem from existing drawbacks in laws and regulations, and suggestions how to 
improve partnership formation and management.  The theme concerns three issues: 
absence of regional PPP legislation; models that a PPP can take; and rights that partners 
in a PPP may possess.      
With regards to the first concern the literature points out the virtual absence of 
legislation that would govern PPP formation and operation specifically at the regional 
and local, rather than the national levels.  Regional (i.e., oblast’) and local governments 
often are reluctant to engage in a partnership because they are unaware how (in what 
forms and ways) and to what extent they can be involved in a PPP, for example, what 
resources and properties the government may use, what kinds of guarantees it may 
provide, what provisions a PPP contract may include and what kinds of approvals are 
necessary (Azizov, 2009; Glumov, 2009; Kabashkin, 2010; Pankratov, 2010; Bazhenov, 
2011).       
Another legislative issue concerns a model that a PPP can take.  The Russian 
language literature shares an opinion that the existing – and the only – BTOM (build-
transfer-operate-maintain) model is unsuccessful (Bazhenov, 2011).  This is because 
private companies often are not interested in adequate investment in asset construction 
and its proper maintenance due to the legal requirement in both Russia and Kazakhstan 
that immediately upon completion of construction an asset ownership must transfer to 
the government.  Private companies have a clear preference to own an asset during the 
project implementation, which creates stronger incentives for them to build, maintain 
and operate a property better.  However, at present, private firms both in Russia and 
Kazakhstan are not allowed by law to own an asset constructed during a PPP project 
and must transfer property ownership to the government as soon as the partner has 
constructed an asset.  Researchers suggest that a choice of PPP models should be legally 
available (Bazhenov, 2011).  
It is worth noting that in existing PPP model and suggested models in Russia and 
Kazakhstan the project’s design phase, normally marked by the letter D in a model 
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abbreviation, is missing because the government designs a project at its own expense. 
However, the literature does not identify the missing design phase, which the 
government has taken out of possible private partner involvement, as an issue.  Hence, 
both scholars and the government largely downplay the importance of private initiative 
at the project design phase.  
The third legislative issue is about partner rights in a PPP.  The Russian language 
literature argues that each partner must have equal rights and this should be reflected in 
the legislation and implemented in practice (Zusman, 2008; Varnavskiy et al., 2010).  
The notion about ensuring partners’ equal rights stems from the lack of trust in the 
government that private companies often have and possible public partner dominance in 
a PPP (Kabashkin, 2010; Pankratov, 2010; Varnavskiy et al., 2010).  Although the 
literature deems these concerns as valid, it does not discuss what exactly private party’s 
rights and privileges are missing, and/or what rights should be taken away from (or 
given to) the public sector partner.  
 
2.10.6d Association of PPPs with intrinsic advantages 
 
The fourth theme in PPP management literature includes claims that a PPP is 
instantly associated with at least two advantages that are intrinsic to partnerships.  The 
first claim is that a partnership is a tool that brings along technological innovation.  The 
second claim is that a PPP inherently carries greater efficiency due to the synergy 
effect. 
The Russian language literature describes the link between PPPs and innovation as 
a claim that PPPs should be employed because they bring along technological 
innovation (Varnavskiy, 2004; Pankratov, 2010; Varnavskiy et al., 2010; Firsova, 
2011b).  However, this claim remains unjustified as innovations are in no way 
guaranteed.  Furthermore, one should demonstrate that a certain partnership will 
produce innovation, and that the PPP technology will be truly innovative, rather than an 
incremental upgrade.  In addition, one should identify the criteria of what constitutes 
technological innovation.  For example, if in the beginning of the project a PPP employs 
highly efficient technology, which 20 years later becomes obsolete, although it remains 
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in a usable condition for another 10 years, are there enough arguments to claim that a 
PPP has brought along innovation?     
Furthermore, the literature is silent that technological innovation may be costly, 
which leads to an increase in total PPP costs and, consequently, rising risks for both the 
government and a private partner.   
The literature associates PPPs with yet another advantage - greater efficiency due to 
the synergy effect that stems from partner collaboration.  The literature shares the 
notion that combining government resources with the private partner initiative driven by 
the profit motive, as well as with private sector funds and management expertise is 
likely to be advantageous (Zusman, 2008; Pankratov, 2010; Varnavskiy et al., 2010; 
Firsova, 2011a).  However, there is no application of this notion to a specific project, 
and the explanation of why a certain PPP project may have greater efficiency 
(compared to the government in-house delivery) is often lacking.   
At the same time, the literature is silent about overall PPP costs, i.e., aggregate 
costs of both the public sector and the private sector.  As the literature does not view the 
overall PPP costs as a concern, this highlights an issue: participation in a partnership is 
likely to cost all parties more due to the following reasons.  For example, a private 
partner normally obtains a loan at a higher interest rate than the government because a 
bank associates a private firm with greater risk; the government extends a subsidy that 
pays part of the project cost; or customers may face higher tariffs because the 
government may approve higher fees to ensure that revenue covers a private partner's 
expenses.  In either case overall PPP costs increase.  Greater PPP efficiency due to the 
synergy effect, therefore, becomes debatable.   
Considering PPPs from the perspective of public policy and public management, it 
is worth noting that the Russian language literature is silent regarding concerns that the 
government, by engaging in a partnership, is likely to pay more as opposed to the cost 
of direct government provision or cost of contracting out.   
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2.10.6e Criteria for PPP project selection 
 
The fifth theme of PPP management that the Russian language literature discusses 
concerns criteria for PPP project selection.  Much like the previous theme, it is also 
linked to overall PPP costs and efficiency.    
The Russian language literature is silent about transaction cost economics.  Neither 
scholars, nor the government use this theory as a basis for deciding whether to form a 
PPP.  Although overall PPP costs may be higher due to extensive government financial 
support to a partnership, expensive technology and the higher cost of a private partner's 
borrowing, nevertheless the literature claims that PPPs are a preferred form of 
collaboration between the public sector and the private sector in both Russia and 
Kazakhstan (Tilebaldinov, 2008; Kabashkin, 2010; Pankratov, 2010; Varnavskiy et al., 
2010; Bazhenov, 2011).  This means that the literature in Russia and Kazakhstan 
accepts the notion that PPPs are associated with higher, not lower, total project costs (as 
opposed to the government in-house provision), although the Western literature argues 
the opposite.  According to KPMG data, government financial support in Russia reaches 
20 to 40 per cent of the total PPP project cost, which is significantly higher than in 
many other countries (10 to 20 per cent).  KPMG data also show that the cost of 
contracting out in Russia is about 6 per cent less than the PPP cost (Shabashevich, 2011: 
3-4).  Why then do the Russian and Kazakhstani governments engage in PPPs? 
Although the literature has identified this theme, it does not discuss the issues 
within the theme.  The principal questions are as follows.  What are criteria for PPP 
project selection in Kazakhstan and Russia?  Are these criteria used consistently across 
different sectors and regions?  Shall the government employ PPP project’s social 
significance as the major criterion?  If so, how will the government measure it?  Shall 
the government use technological innovation as one of the criteria?  Shall the 
government assign different weights or ranks to various criteria?  In a broader sense, 
what are the implications of including some criteria and excluding others?  The existing 
literature is silent with regards to all these questions.           
The understanding of PPP themes and issues permits the researcher to identify the 
literature gaps that the next section highlights.    
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2.10.7 Gaps and weaknesses in the literature 
 
The discussion of the principal themes in the PPP management literature available 
in Kazakhstan and Russia and identification of main issues within each theme allows 
the researcher to reveal literature gaps and weaknesses.  This section considers the same 
five themes and summarises each theme, its issues and literature gaps in a table format.                   
 
2.10.7a Government involvement in partnerships 
 
The first theme regarding the nature and scope of government involvement in PPPs 
features the following gaps and weaknesses.  First, the literature is strongly biased 
toward large and increasing government financial support to partnerships.  The 
literature recognises that often PPPs are not feasible without extensive government 
involvement that aims to make a project more attractive to the private sector partners.  
Additionally, the literature views the government financial support (such as guarantees 
for private loans) and other kinds of government participation in a project (such as 
active assistance to a private partner in purchasing land or in obtaining required licenses 
and permits) as a critical success factor that may significantly help a private partner 
implement a project.  These views have limited focus and are unbalanced because the 
literature associates the government role with larger payments of PPP costs and with 
overcoming the government’s own bureaucracy.  Furthermore, calls for ever increasing 
government financial and administrative support to PPPs contradict another notion that 
the literature discusses, namely that partners should have equal rights and privileges in a 
PPP (see discussion in Section 2.10.6c above).                     
Whilst the first gap concerns the nature of government support to PPPs, the second 
gap refers to forms, methods and tools of government financial support.  The weakness 
here is that discussion in the literature involves a limited number of existing and 
proposed forms and tools of government support.  Most often they include direct 
government payment of part of the project cost; waivers of some fees for a private 
partner during the project implementation; guarantees for the private partner's loans; 
guarantees for private partner's bonds; exemptions to a private partner for payments of 
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fines (such as for construction delays); and raising service tariffs above the agreed upon 
levels.  Although the government may use these tools for the benefit of a PPP project, 
the range of tools seems to be limited in scope, whilst other tools, such as tax 
exemptions or attraction of foreign investment, are beyond the current discussion.  In 
addition, with regards to existing and suggested tools, the literature focuses on making 
government payments larger, rather than on creating incentives for a private partner for 
more efficient performance.     
Table 2.4 summarises issues in this theme and relevant literature gaps. 
a) There is a strong bias in favour
of ever increasing government 
support to PPPs
b) The literature discusses a 
limited number of forms and 
tools of government financial 
support (e.g., a subsidy, fee 
waiver, government loan 
guarantees, increase in a 
tariff) 
a) What is an appropriate (i.e. 
optimal) extent of government 
involvement in PPPs?   
b)        What forms and methods 
may government support to 
PPPs take?
Nature of government role in 
partnerships, extent of 
government support to PPPs
1
Gaps and Weaknesses                  
in the LiteraturePrincipal Issues within the ThemeTheme#
Table 2.4 PPP Management Theme, Related Issues, and Gaps in the Literature
Theme 1: Government Role in PPPs
 
        Source: Compiled by the author 
 
2.10.7b Risk management 
 
The literature gaps and weaknesses in the risk management theme are as follows.   
First, the literature does not view government financial support to partnerships as 
risk.  The literature uses a biased notion that PPPs should transfer risks from the public 
sector to the private sector regardless of the context. 
Second, the literature discussion of risk management focuses exclusively on risk 
allocation when respective parties form a partnership and how to reflect this allocation 
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in a PPP contract.  As a result, the literature disregards or downplays some risks, 
namely those that may occur in the distant future.  The literature is silent regarding the 
ways and mechanisms of how to handle a certain unanticipated risk.   
Third, the literature discussion that views risk management as a process of partner 
interaction over the entire length of a PPP project is missing.  The dynamics of risk 
management, tools and mechanisms for risk mitigation are beyond the literature's scope.  
The literature is silent about partner interaction and the concept of relationship quality 
in a PPP.  
Table 2.5 highlights the literature gaps and weaknesses in this theme. 
 
 
a) Government financial support 
to a PPP is not viewed as a 
risk
b) Discussion of risk 
management focuses almost 
exclusively on initial risk 
allocation; some risks are 
disregarded or downplayed   
c)       The literature is silent about 
dynamics of risk management 
in a PPP. Risk management is 
not viewed as part of a 
process of interaction between 
partners
a) Is the range of risk 
management tools adequate? 
b) How effective are they? 
c) How can risks be mitigated in 
the course of project 
implementation?
Risk management in PPPs2
Gaps and Weaknesses                  
in the Literature
Principal Issues within the ThemeTheme#
Table 2.5 PPP Management Theme, Related Issues, and Gaps in the Literature. 
Theme 2: Risk Management in PPPs
 
 Source: Compiled by the author 
 
2.10.7c PPP legal issues and practical constraints 
 
Literature gaps and weaknesses in the theme embracing legal issues pertinent to 
PPPs include the following.   
First, the literature narrowly focuses on the various provisions of a proposed law 
that would create guidelines for PPPs specifically at the regional level.  Although the 
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proposed legislative changes may be useful, legislative aspects at other levels - the 
national and especially local - draw much smaller attention.      
Second, the literature discussion of a model that a PPP can take appears limited in 
scope.  Although the literature asserts that legislation should allow more than one model 
for prospective partnerships, the discussion focuses on just one aspect of a model, 
namely, that the government should permit a private partner to own an asset for the 
duration of a PPP project, rather than lease it or assume a management responsibility as 
it is now in Russia and Kazakhstan.  The literature considers an asset's private 
ownership as key to successful project implementation, which is unlikely to be true as 
there are clearly more than one PPP critical success factors.  The literature is silent 
regarding how partners can implement successfully other components of a model, such 
as the design stage or the lease stage.  The same limitation applies to various models: 
although the literature describes them, the analysis of how participants can employ a 
certain model in the Russian or Kazakhstani context is missing.        
Third, the literature is silent regarding what legislative and other practical PPP 
problems the government need to solve in the long run.  There is no discussion of 
political, economic, social, cultural and other possible impediments to the broader 
employment of partnerships in Kazakhstan and Russia.  However, the literature shows 
multiple concerns, especially in Russia, regarding the lack of trust in the government as 
a factor that slows down PPP development.  These concerns result in the discussion that 
partners in a PPP should have equal rights, and legislation should aim to assure this 
equality.  This discussion appears biased because of multiple calls to expand the private 
partner's rights.  The literature is silent as to why exactly these rights require expansion, 
what aspects of PPP management require the expansion of rights and what advantages 
and drawbacks changes in partners' rights and privileges may have.  Additionally, the 
literature is silent regarding how citizens can effectively participate in PPPs taking into 
account that consumers are also stakeholders in a partnership.                                   
Table 2.6 summarises the literature gaps and weaknesses in this theme. 
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a) The literature's focus is limited 
with discussion of provisions 
of proposed national law on 
PPPs at the regional level; 
literature is silent regarding 
PPPs at the local level  
b) The proposed change in the 
existing PPP model is biased 
toward private asset 
ownership: a private partner 
should be allowed to own an 
asset for the duration of a 
PPP project  
c) The long-run legal constraints 
to PPP employment are not 
identified; instead a discussion 
focuses on ensuring partners' 
equal rights in a PPP, 
although the literature is silent 
regarding citizens’ participation 
in PPPs
a) What legal and other
practical issues shall be 
solved in the near future?  
b)        What PPP models might be 
successful in the Russian and 
Kazakhstani context?       
c)        What are principal legal 
concerns for the long run?
Laws and regulations pertinent 
to PPPs
3
Gaps and Weaknesses                  
in the LiteraturePrincipal Issues within the ThemeTheme#
Table 2.6 PPP Management Theme, Related Issues, and Gaps in the Literature 
Theme 3: Laws and Regulations Pertinent to PPPs
 
  Source: Compiled by the author    
 
2.10.7d PPP selected advantages 
 
Literature gaps and weaknesses in the fourth theme that includes association of 
PPPs with selected advantages are as follows.   
First, the weakness is that justification of a certain advantage normally is lacking.  
Often the literature discusses PPP advantages without any empirical data to support the 
claims that selected advantages are truly intrinsic.  The literature is narrowly focused on 
technological innovation and the synergy effect in PPPs.  However, the literature is 
silent regarding other potential advantages such as innovation in business management 
or more effective delivery of public services.          
Second, the literature discusses PPP advantages as a given, regardless of specific 
conditions or context.  As factors, such as government regulations, public perception of 
a quality of service, economic conditions and many others, are both highly country-
specific and project-specific, the literature's assumption that one project's advantage 
may automatically transpire in another project is likely to be unjustified.  Although the 
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literature points to the PPP experience in many Western as well as transitional 
countries, taking partnership advantages out of the context and ‘moving’ them to Russia 
and Kazakhstan lacks justification. 
Third, in the discussion of PPP advantages the literature is silent regarding overall 
PPP costs.  For example, participants may implement technological innovation in the 
framework of a project with the use of both public and private funds.  However, costs 
do matter, and the literature largely disregards this.  Rising overall PPP costs may be 
one of the partnership's main drawbacks, whilst other issues, such as unanticipated risks 
or inflation, also contribute to higher costs.  However, the literature often downplays 
PPP drawbacks and it is silent regarding concerns about total PPP costs.       
Table 2.7 summarises the literature gaps and weaknesses in this theme.   
 
a) The literature is narrowly 
focused on selected PPP 
advantages that are deemed 
intrinsic, often without 
adequate justification.
b) The literature discusses PPP 
advantages as a given, 
regardless of specific 
conditions or context.
c)        The literature is silent 
regarding overall PPP costs.  
PPP drawbacks are 
downplayed.
a) What are the advantages that  
a PPP can bring along in the 
Russian and Kazakhstani
context?   
b) What PPP drawbacks may 
diminish their advantages?
Often unjustified association 
of PPPs with some intrinsic 
advantages 
(that a PPP brings along 
technological innovation, and 
a PPP possesses greater 
efficiency than direct 
government service provision 
or contracting out)
4
Gaps and Weaknesses                  
in the LiteraturePrincipal Issues within the ThemeTheme#
Table 2.7 PPP Management Theme, Related Issues, and Gaps in the Literature 
Theme 4: Association of PPPs with Selected Advantages  
 
 Source: Compiled by the author  
 
2.10.7e PPP project selection criteria 
 
The gaps in the theme regarding PPP project selection criteria are as follows.   
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First, the literature in Kazakhstan and Russia is silent regarding the use of the 
value-for-money concept and transaction cost economics as a theoretical foundation for 
project selection.  Although the literature makes a note of the VfM concept, there is no 
discussion of what value is in the Russian and Kazakhstani context and how exactly one 
can measure PPP value.     
Second, as the government does not employ VfM or TCE in project selection, it 
remains unclear what exact factors the government uses for making a decision to form a 
PPP.  Essentially, the governments in Russia and Kazakhstan make a decision on a 
case-by-case basis.  With regards to this, the gap area is that the literature does not 
identify criteria for PPP project selection, whilst the systematic discussion of criteria is 
missing.   
Table 2.8 highlights the literature gaps and weaknesses in this theme. 
 
a) The literature is silent 
regarding the use of the value-
for-money concept and the 
transaction cost economics 
concept as criteria for project 
selection.
b) Criteria for the project 
selection for a PPP are not 
identified.
On what grounds is a project 
deemed suitable for a PPP?PPP Project Selection Criteria5
Gaps and Weaknesses                  
in the Literature
Principal Issues within the ThemeTheme#
Table 2.8 PPP Management Theme, Related Issues, and Gaps in the Literature 
Theme 5: PPP Project Selection Criteria  
Source: Compiled by the author
       2.10.8 Identification of critical research gap 
 
Among the five themes that the literature review appraised, one theme - risk 
management in PPPs - has a critical influence on all the other themes.  The risk 
management investigation embraces risks that interviewees and their organisations 
experienced and perceived in the Russian and Kazakhstani context, risk mitigation 
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techniques and dispute resolution methods that actors employed.  From a broader 
perspective, risk management includes partner interaction, in which relationship quality 
may become an effective PPP governance tool.  This broader perspective makes risk 
management a critically important theme as opposed to government involvement in 
partnerships, legal constraints to PPP development or selected PPP advantages that the 
governments in Kazakhstan and Russia emphasise.  
Further, the rationale for viewing risk management as a critical theme is as follows.  
Partners cannot foresee many kinds of risk in a partnership that may occur in the course 
of project implementation.  Before the project launch, risk allocation addresses only 
known risks and only in such a way, in which partners anticipate the risk implications.  
The probability of unforeseen risks grows over time, whilst partners become more 
likely to exhibit opportunistic behaviour.  Whilst initial risk allocation cannot handle the 
problem of growing opportunism, the governance concept (which the next section 
discusses more fully) claims that effective collaboration between partners may 
significantly mitigate project uncertainties and risks and, ultimately, ensure PPP success.  
However, partners need to manage their relationship and to make partner interaction an 
integral part of PPP governance.  
To summarise, in the extant literature the discussion of risk management focuses on 
initial risk allocation, whilst the literature disregards or downplays some risks.  
Furthermore, the literature about Russian and Kazakhstani PPPs is silent about 
dynamics of risk management: researchers do not view risk management as an essential 
component of partner interaction in a PPP.  Hence, this study views the literature's 
disregard of PPP management as a process as a critical research gap.  In this gap, the 
central under researched theme is risk management that relies on partner interaction.       
 
2.11 Theoretical Framework 
 
This section highlights the PPP governance concept as the thesis' theoretical 
framework.  The PPP governance concept (Pierre and Peters, 2000, 2005; Bult-Spiering 
and Dewulf, 2006), with its focus on the process and on output management, in contrast 
to input-oriented management, is the main guiding theory for this study.  Many 
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researchers contributed to the development of the governance concept, and this research 
will utilise the notion of relationship quality, which states that managing relations 
between parties in a partnership is a major factor for a PPP’s success or failure (Pierre, 
1997; Fischbacher and Beaumont, 2003; Sedjari, 2004; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 
2004; Bult-Spiering and Dewulf, 2006).   
The literature review demonstrated why and how the PPP governance concept is 
useful for studying partnerships, particularly in the Russian and Kazakhstani context.  
The main argument for the usefulness of the PPP governance approach is that the 
transaction cost economics theory, which Section 2.4 devoted to reasons for partnering 
discussed in detail, appears insufficient for explaining whether the government should 
form a PPP in order to economise on public service provision costs, and whether a 
partnership will be successful (Hill, 1990; Madhok, 1995).   
Whilst TCE argues that the government should employ a PPP where it minimises 
the sum of total social costs compared to the cost of direct government provision or the 
cost of contracting out, it specifies a criterion for employing partnerships, although it 
does not resolve the issue of uncertainty and related risks.  In other words, TCE does 
not serve as a reliable framework that may ensure effective operation and successful 
partnership performance in the long run.   
Transaction cost economics implies that assessment of total social costs must 
happen during the PPP selection process, before implementation.  However, after the 
project has begun, partners often deal with unexpected events that may change the total 
social costs.  If during the project implementation the total social costs increase to the 
level that makes a PPP project less cost-effective than traditional government 
procurement, the technical application of the TCE concept implies that the government 
must revoke a PPP project, although in reality it may not be possible because shutting 
down the project also may be costly.   
As opposed to TCE, a more practical approach suggests that it may be useful to 
mitigate uncertainties by enhancing collaboration between partners.  The latter concept 
takes into account that uncertainty and risk involved in long-term projects often result in 
partners’ opportunistic behaviour, which may lead to even greater risk and increasing 
costs.  This is why the literature review discussed the scholarly understanding of the 
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nature, sources and implications of partner opportunistic behaviour.  The review 
elucidated that either partner's opportunistic behaviour is the main factor that 
determines the need for effective PPP governance (Ouchi, 1980; Hill, 1990; Madhok, 
1995; Pongsiri, 2003; Vining and Boardman, 2008a, 2008b).     
As the literature review showed, studies mostly investigate partnerships' contractual 
arrangements, including financial aspects and legal terms of PPP formation and 
operation, whilst partner interaction appears a largely neglected research area.  This 
point is relevant to the research of PPPs in Russia and Kazakhstan as in these countries 
the literature pays most attention to the parties’ responsibilities specified in a contract 
because partnerships are new and the two nations accumulated only a few years of 
experience with PPPs.  Naturally, before the project launch, parties focus on working 
out the contractual details.  As Russia and Kazakhstan have limited expertise in PPP 
management, parties in the public and private sectors lack the evidence whether they 
need to pay attention to partner interaction issues and, if so, to which ones.  Hence, it is 
no surprise that the literature is silent about partner interaction.   
To address the literature gap, this research will study PPP management in Russia 
and Kazakhstan in the framework of the PPP governance concept.  The governance 
concept argues that effective management of relationship quality between parties in a 
partnership is a major factor that ensures PPP success (Pierre, 1997; Fischbacher and 
Beaumont, 2003; Sedjari, 2004; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2004; Bult-Spiering and 
Dewulf, 2006).  As initial risk allocation cannot handle the problem of unforeseen risks 
and each party’s behaviour becomes opportunistic over time (Williamson, 1993), the 
governance concept claims that effective collaboration between partners may 
significantly mitigate project uncertainties and risks.  However, partners have to 
manage their relationship and employ effective tools and methods of risk mitigation.   
At present, the literature in Russia and Kazakhstan does not emphasise the 
governance aspects of partner relations due to two reasons.  First, PPPs are new and 
partners naturally pay most attention to defining their responsibilities and including 
them in a PPP contract.  Second, a few years of experience in PPPs that the two nations 
have accumulated have not yet called the government and researchers to embrace 
partner interaction issues in their focus.  In other words, parties in the public and private 
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sectors lack the evidence that they need to pay attention to partner interaction at all.  As 
a result, partners in Kazakhstan and Russia disregard PPP management as a process 
including partner interaction, which the literature appraisal has confirmed.   
The PPP governance concept as a guiding theoretical framework for this research 
allows one to accomplish certain tasks as follows.  It permits the researcher to discuss 
initial risk allocation in a partnership and investigate what a PPP contract specifies.  It 
also allows the researcher to identify issues and risks that emerge during the project 
term and to what extent partners foresaw them.  Further, it provides the foundation for 
understanding of how actors have adapted to the emerged problems in risk management 
and partner interaction.  Additionally, the PPP governance concept allows the 
researcher to explore the factors that play a critical role in a project, from the partner 
interaction perspective.  Finally, the guiding theory is useful as it highlights the need to 
collect qualitative data regarding partner interaction that this thesis subsequently will 
analyse.       
In summary, as the literature is silent regarding the PPP management process in 
Russia and Kazakhstan, the governance concept appears most appropriate for the study 
through the prism of partner relationship management that may effectively mitigate 
uncertainties and emerging risks and ultimately ensure partnership success.           
 
2.12 Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter presented a critical appraisal of PPP literature including Western (i.e., 
OECD) and Russian language sources.  The chapter elucidated PPP conceptualisation 
from the Western perspective and then contrasted and compared it with PPP 
understanding in Kazakhstan and Russia.  Further, the chapter discussed the literature 
views on PPP forms and models, partnerships' advantages and shortcomings.  The 
literature review paid special attention to such topics as opportunistic behaviour and 
relationship quality because partner opportunism is the main determinant of the need for 
PPP governance.  As risk management is one of the principal themes in PPP 
governance, the chapter provided detailed coverage of risks to which partnerships are 
exposed and risk management principles.            
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The chapter also provided contextual background for PPPs in the two countries.  
The literature review showed that the reasons for PPP employment may be different in 
Russia and Kazakhstan as opposed to Western countries.  Specifically, it is questionable 
whether Russia and Kazakhstan use the value-for-money concept as a guiding 
framework for PPP formation.  The chapter identified principal themes in the literature 
about partnerships in Kazakhstan and Russia and revealed gaps and weaknesses in each 
theme.  A critical research gap is in the risk management theme: the extant literature 
does not view risk management as an important process of partner interaction.  
Furthermore, currently the latter is beyond the focus of PPP governance.  
With regards to highlighted literature gaps and weaknesses, the chapter outlined the 
thesis' theoretical framework.  Its core is the PPP governance concept that argues that 
effective management of relationship quality between parties in a partnership is a major 
factor that may ensure PPP success.  Hence, this research will pay principal attention to 
partner interaction in a PPP.   
The next chapter, Chapter Three, will introduce the philosophical perspective that 
the researcher has chosen for this study and will explain and justify the research 
methodology.  Chapter Three also highlights the pilot study findings. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY      
                         
3.1       Chapter Introduction 
 
This chapter describes methodological choices available for a researcher and 
justifies the positions that the author has adopted.  The chapter begins by discussing this 
study’s philosophical stance regarding the nature of reality and the relationship between 
the researcher and the researched.  Then the chapter delineates the approach to social 
theory that this research takes in terms of direction of its reasoning and justifies an 
inductive approach that the author has adopted.      
Section 3.3 elucidates the author’s ontological and epistemological stances that 
determine the research strategy in the form of a quantitative approach and/or qualitative 
approach.  This section highlights the nature, purposes and characteristics of each 
method of inquiry and explains the author’s logic behind selecting a qualitative 
approach.      
The chapter moves on to the in-depth description of data collection methods that 
this study employs (Section 3.4).  This section highlights the details of four PPP 
projects that the researcher selected for investigation.  The next part (Section 3.5) 
outlines the pilot study that permitted the author to expand the range of data sources and 
enrich the approaches as to how he collected the data.  Section 3.6 focuses on the 
study's methods for data analysis.   
The chapter proceeds to the discussion of factors that ensure the research’s validity 
(Section 3.7).  Next, Section 3.8 raises and answers ethical concerns of this study.  The 
conclusive Section 3.9 summarises the research positions that the author has adopted in 
order to form robust methodological framework for the study of PPP management in 
Kazakhstan and Russia.     
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3.2 Research Approach 
 
3.2.1 Ontological positions   
 
The ontology of research concerns the nature of reality or ‘nature of the known’ 
(Sarantakos, 2005).  The underpinning philosophical approach that a researcher adopts 
heavily influences how one investigates a specific topic.  The two alternative 
philosophical paradigms in the ontology of research are positivism and phenomenology 
(Collis and Hussey, 2003).  One can view each research paradigm as a set of 
assumptions that describe the researcher’s perceptions of reality, approach to the 
research process and the tools and methods of data collection and data analysis (Collis 
and Hussey, 2003; Sarantakos, 2005).  This means that a research paradigm has 
implications for methodology that a researcher should employ in order to meet the 
study's objectives. 
According to the positivist approach, the nature of reality is objective, and the 
reality itself is singular.  There are ‘things out there’ that a researcher can discover, 
identify and illuminate.  In contrast to positivism, the phenomenological approach takes 
a stance that reality is socially constructed.  According to the phenomenological 
paradigm, reality is subjective and it has multiple dimensions (Hughes and Sharrock, 
1997; Tsoukas and Hatch, 2001; Collis and Hussey, 2003; Sarantakos, 2005). 
It is worth noting that the literature also uses other terms to designate the 
phenomenological paradigm.  In particular, academia uses instead of phenomenology, 
the term constructionism (or constructivism) (Flick, 2009: 69).  Scholars also use the 
term interpretivist (or interpretive) instead of phenomenological (Neuman, 2007).  
'Most researchers who use an interpretive approach adopt a version of the 
constructionist view of social reality.  This view holds that human social life is based 
less on objective, hard, factual reality than on the ideas, beliefs, and perceptions that 
people hold about reality' (Neuman, 2007: 43).  This description shows that researchers 
use essentially a different designation to illuminate the phenomenological approach, 
without any major discrepancies between designations in reference to the paradigm’s 
nature.  
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In this thesis, the author takes the phenomenological stance.  Ontologically, the 
author believes that the world is socially constructed and subjective as opposed to the 
positivist view that reality is objective and external.  The author’s phenomenological 
position is well justified by the nature of this thesis’ research objectives as they focus on 
investigation of experiences and perceptions of key PPP actors in Kazakhstan and 
Russia regarding management challenges to partnerships and how stakeholders have 
adapted to them.   
The thesis' philosophical research perspective is in line with the use of exploratory 
techniques that are part of qualitative, rather than quantitative research.  Academics 
often associate quantitative research with the positivist approach, whilst they associate 
qualitative research with a phenomenological approach.  The positivist paradigm 
emphasises the need to develop and test a hypothesis, analyse objective data and make 
generalisations based on the findings.  In the phenomenological approach, a researcher 
achieves a deeper understanding of ambiguous and multidimensional concepts by 
exploratory techniques such as interviews, although a researcher can use more than one 
method (Easter-Smith et al., 1994). 
The author's phenomenological stance in this thesis permits to pay significant 
attention to the context in which public-private partnerships develop in Kazakhstan and 
Russia.  As all things happen in a context, it is critically important not to overlook 
characteristics (such as political, economic, social and legislative features) that define 
the contextual environment in each country.  This will permit deeper analysis of how 
various stakeholders handle PPP issues.   
However, the phenomenological research paradigm has its shortfalls.  The principal 
drawback is the lack of ability to use findings for making generalisations.  As a 
researcher investigates the subjective world (or a part of it, such as a set of PPP 
management issues in a country) by capturing and understanding the unique context, 
one can hardly generalise the findings, unless the research concludes that commonalities 
between the two contexts are extensive enough that comparisons are appropriate and 
generalisations are valid.  This chapter's sections regarding methods for data collection 
and data analysis discuss the research limitations in greater detail. 
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Having described the author’s choice regarding the ontological approach, the 
chapter moves on to the discussion of the thesis' epistemological positions.                            
 
3.2.2 Epistemological positions   
 
The epistemological perspective of research concerns the relationship between the 
knower and the known, or between the researcher and the researched (Hughes and 
Sharrock, 1997; Tsoukas and Hatch, 2001; Collis and Hussey, 2003; Sarantakos, 2005).  
The researcher’s ontological stance determines her/his epistemological positions as the 
perception of the world inevitably underpins the role that a researcher assumes in 
relation to the world.   
For each of the two alternative ontological paradigms, a corresponding 
epistemological approach is available.  One approach assumes the researcher’s 
independent (from what he/she is researching) role.  The other approach, on the 
contrary, assumes the researcher’s interdependent role with what he/she is researching.  
The approach associated with positivism implies that a researcher is independent 
from what he/ she is researching (Tsoukas and Hatch, 2001; Collis and Hussey, 2003; 
Sarantakos, 2005).  As the world is objective and the research intends to discover and 
describe what is ‘out there’, no interaction between the objective reality and a 
researcher is expected or required.   
In contrast to the positivist paradigm and related epistemological approach, in the 
epistemological stance related to the phenomenological paradigm a researcher is part of 
what he/ she is researching and he/she interacts with objects of investigation (Tsoukas 
and Hatch, 2001; Collis and Hussey, 2003; Sarantakos, 2005; Neuman, 2007).  As the 
world is subjective and socially constructed, the interaction with what one is 
researching may benefit the social research in a sense of a deeper, more intimate 
understanding of this subjective reality through interactive enquiry with objects of a 
study and careful capturing of the contextual details.  The latter becomes available to a 
researcher exactly through the interaction with what one is researching, and by realising 
and interpreting perceptions of those involved in the study. 
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In this thesis, in line with the adopted ontological phenomenological research 
paradigm, the author takes on the epistemological stance that a researcher is part of 
what he/she is investigating.  Interaction with what he/she is researching is necessary, 
and it is an essential part of the research that this thesis presents.   
The author’s choice of the ontological research paradigm and the corresponding 
epistemological view permit consideration of PPP management issues in their 
contextual uniqueness of each country (i.e., Kazakhstan and Russia).  It is likely that 
these unique features will transpire as a result of the researcher’s interaction with those 
who he will research, such as PPP managers, government officials and experts of 
national and regional PPP centres.  As the author believes that the world is socially 
constructed, this research is concerned with how exactly the elements of reality (in the 
PPP field) are constructed and what the managerial perceptions of the PPP issues are.  
The chosen epistemological stance that implies interaction with those who will be 
researched serves the goal of accurately capturing the participants’ perceptions of 
managerial challenges facing partnerships. 
Capturing an insider perspective carries a clear advantage that participants may 
share their actual experiences with the intimate knowledge of details and may explain 
why and how they formed their perceptions in a certain way.  However, an insider 
perspective is not free from drawbacks that may include biased opinions, one-sided 
views or unbalanced judgments due to limited information or personal preferences.           
  
3.2.3 Approach to social theory 
 
This section discusses an approach to social theory that the author has adopted.  
Specifically, the discussion focuses on the researcher's direction of reasoning in the 
thesis.      
Researchers can approach social theory from a few perspectives.  Neuman 
categorises a theory by the direction of its reasoning, the level of social reality that it 
explains (i.e., micro level, meso level and macro level), the forms of explanation it 
employs (e.g., prediction, causal explanation, structural explanation, or interpretive) and 
the overall framework of assumptions and concepts, such as a positivist, interpretive or 
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critical approach (2007: 29).  As the previous sections have already discussed, the 
thesis’ research paradigm includes ontological and epistemological positions. Therefore, 
the overall philosophical stance will become more complete by highlighting, in this 
section, the approach to social theory that the research takes in terms of direction of its 
reasoning, deductive or inductive.  Additionally, this section delineates the level and 
units of data analysis for the study.  
Using deductive reasoning, a researcher begins with an abstract thought and then 
proceeds to collect empirical evidence (Neuman, 2007).  A researcher then tests 
concepts and theories that are the starting point of reasoning against the evidence.  In an 
inductive approach, observations of reality are the starting point of research, and from 
observations of empirical evidence a researcher moves toward more abstract 
generalisations and ideas (Neuman, 2007: 30).     
In this thesis, the author adopts an inductive approach (Patton, 2002; Creswell, 
2007; Silverman, 2010).  As the research’s principal objective is to investigate 
managers’ perceptions of issues involved in PPP formation and operation, an inductive 
approach is the most appropriate for the study.  Instead of putting forward a hypothesis 
upfront, the study will make detailed observations of reality in the PPP field in the 
context of Kazakhstan and Russia by interviewing various PPP stakeholders (Section 
3.4 of this chapter discusses methods of data collection in detail).  These observations 
will serve as the basis for new concepts that the thesis may develop.  With an 
understanding that theory is grounded in data, the thesis attempts to identify and explain 
patterns, relationships, commonalities or differences in PPP management in the two 
countries using thematic analysis (Section 3.6 provides an in-depth discussion of data 
analysis methods).  However, the author does not intend to undertake a grounded theory 
study that aims to generate or discover a theory and employs prescribed and structured 
procedures (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1998).     
An inductive approach to reasoning is harmonised with a grounded approach to 
research design and analysis that the author adopts.  The latter implies constantly 
making comparisons (Neuman, 2007), which is most appropriate for this study as it 
attempts to accomplish a comparative research of PPP management issues in 
Kazakhstan and Russia.   
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Yet an additional aspect of a grounded approach to research design is that a 
researcher needs to be prepared for the unexpected in the process of data collection and 
data analysis as one informs the other.  In other words, data collection and drawing 
theoretical insights occur simultaneously.  'When data collection and theorising are 
interspersed, theoretical questions arise that suggest future observations, so new data are 
tailored to answer theoretical questions that came from thinking about previous data' 
(Neuman, 2007: 89).  This is relevant to the thesis' positions because the author intends 
to draw theoretical insights mostly from interviews with those involved in PPP 
management, and the interview data may post new theoretical questions and influence 
what kinds of data the researcher may need to receive from other respondents.  
Whilst the author conducts part of this research at the micro level because it deals 
with individuals, their personal experiences and perceptions, the other part of analysis 
that the author undertakes is at the meso level.  Meso-level theory is an intermediate 
level that links the micro and macro levels.  The latter concerns the operation of larger 
aggregates such as social institutions and whole societies (Neuman, 2007: 34).  Meso-
level analysis refers to ‘how societal and institutional forces mesh with human activity’ 
(Olesen, 2000: 217).  Meso-level analysis is in line with this study’s overall objective, 
which is to examine the stakeholders’ experiences in the PPP management in 
Kazakhstan and Russia in order to identify management issues, how stakeholders have 
adapted to them and what PPP critical success factors are.  Naturally, some of these 
factors may refer to managers’ behaviour and their actions (i.e., micro level), whilst 
others may stem from interaction between organisations, which is influenced by 
institutional responsibilities and motivation, as well as government policies.  This mix 
of factors, including individual and organisational interactions and dependencies in the 
PPP management field, falls in the domain of meso analysis.   
This research uses two types of a unit of data analysis.  The first type embraces 
elements of PPP actors’ perceptions.  These include perceptions of PPP management 
issues and ways of adapting to them.  ‘Social situations’ (in the terminology used by 
Clarke, 2005, cited in Creswell, 2007: 63) form the second type.  This unit of analysis 
includes understanding the same issue (or ‘situation’) by a few participants, which calls 
for cross-examination of their perceptions, complemented by documentary analysis.  
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This unit of analysis permits the researcher to identify commonalities and differences 
between perceptions of different respondents, draw insights into the underlying reasons 
and better understand behaviour of participants and organisations.                     
An inductive approach to direction of reasoning, which is interconnected with a 
grounded approach to research design and analysis, is aligned with qualitative research, 
or one type of research strategy as opposed to quantitative research.  Qualitative 
research strategy is the one that the author has chosen for this thesis.   
After summarising the elements of the research approach, this chapter moves on to 
discuss a research strategy and justify the author’s choice.        
         
3.2.4 Research approach summary 
 
Table 3.1 summarises the components of the author's research approach adopted for 
this thesis. 
 
Table 3.1 Research approach summary 
An approach Core issue addressed 
by an approach 
Approach adopted in 
this thesis 
Description/ 
comments  
Ontological Nature of reality,      
nature of the known 
Phenomenological 
approach 
Reality is subjective, 
reality is socially 
constructed 
Epistemological Relationship between 
the researcher and the 
researched 
 
A researcher is part of 
what he/she is 
researching 
A researcher interacts 
with the study's 
participants  
Approach to social 
theory in terms of 
direction of reasoning 
Research process: 
deductive or inductive 
approach 
Inductive approach 
 
Research process 
begins with detailed 
observations of reality 
and moves to more 
abstract 
generalisations 
Level of theory  Level of data analysis Micro level and meso 
level 
Study of managers’ 
behaviour, coupled 
with examination of 
interaction between 
organisations  
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Unit of data analysis What exactly one 
studies 
Elements of managers’ 
perceptions; situations 
Study of actors’ 
perceptions of PPP 
management issues 
and ways of 
adaptation to them; 
study of situations 
from different 
participants’ 
perspectives 
Guiding theory What theoretical 
framework the study 
employs 
PPP governance 
concept 
Management of 
partner relations in a 
PPP is the key to 
successful partnership 
performance 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
Table 3.1 highlights the author’s key positions in this thesis.  The adopted 
phenomenological research paradigm that considers reality subjective and socially 
constructed (Collis and Hussey, 2003; Sarantakos, 2005; Neuman, 2007; Flick, 2009) is 
in agreement with the epistemological stance that implies the researcher’s interaction 
with the study’s participants (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997; Tsoukas and Hatch, 2001; 
Collis and Hussey, 2003; Patton, 2002; Sarantakos, 2005; Neuman; 2007).  In order to 
collect data, the author intends to interview stakeholders, whilst interaction with 
respondents is an essential part of the data collection process (which Section 3.4 
discusses more fully later in this chapter).   
Observations of participants’ perceptions and experiences are the starting point of 
critical investigation of management challenges in the field of public-private 
partnerships (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Creswell, 2007; 
Silverman, 2010).  The research continues by using a grounded approach to data 
analysis (Neuman, 2007), specifically by thematic analysis, based on the initial 
identification of themes in the literature (Patton, 2002) and subsequent adjustments in 
themes stemming from the pilot study and initial interviews (Section 3.6 of this chapter 
elucidates thematic analysis more fully).  The author also will complement thematic 
analysis of stakeholders’ perceptions by documentary analysis (Patton, 2002; Flick, 
2009; Silverman, 2010).  The latter includes government reports, written official 
statements, published interviews and policy documents as an additional data source that 
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intends to contribute to deeper understanding of the contextual environment related to 
partnership management in Kazakhstan and Russia.  Building on the study of these 
experiences and perceptions, i.e., on the micro-level analysis (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; 
Neuman, 2007), and using an inductive approach (Patton, 2002; Creswell, 2007; 
Silverman, 2010), the author will aim to draw theoretical insights that are compatible 
with the empirical reality in the setting of the two countries.  In other words, the author 
undertakes a meso-level analysis that factors in organisational dependencies and the 
influence of institutional forces (Olesen, 2000; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Neuman, 
2007).   
Western notions of governance play an important role in research design and 
analysis in this thesis.  The governance concept largely provides a legitimising 
framework for PPP management because partners can offset deficiencies in legal 
contract arrangements and mitigate unanticipated risks, as the literature argues, through 
effective governance of their relations.  Hence, the governance concept provides a 
useful lens through which this study investigates PPP management issues in Kazakhstan 
and Russia.       
The next section addresses options in the research strategy and the author’s choice, 
i.e., a qualitative research strategy.   
 
3.3 Methodological Choices and Research Strategy  
 
3.3.1 Research strategies 
 
Quantitative research and qualitative research represent principal methodological 
choices for a study.  One can view these two options as methods of inquiry or research 
strategies (Patton, 1990; Hughes and Sharrock, 1997; Patton, 2002; Collis and Hussey, 
2003; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Sarantakos, 2005; Neuman, 2007; Flick, 2009).  A 
strategy refers to how a researcher brings together particular methods and techniques in 
order to produce the most efficient means of collecting and analysing empirical 
evidence (Layder, 1993). 
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This section reviews the two research strategies.  The following section discusses 
the author's choice for this research and explains the rationale behind it. 
A set of distinctive features characterises each research strategy.  Table 3.2 
summarises key research strategy features.  
As Table 3.2 shows, quantitative research begins with a hypothesis that a 
researcher tests in the course of investigation.  This requires a researcher to identify 
variables which he/she will observe and measure.  Additionally, a researcher needs to 
design the measures in a reliable way so that he/she can analyse data using standardised 
procedures.  Consistent with the positivist ontological paradigm, quantitative research 
uses deductive reasoning.  In a quantitative method of inquiry, a researcher formulates 
the research hypotheses and then verifies it empirically on a specific set of data 
(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992; Neuman, 2007).    
Table 3.2 also illuminates the key features of qualitative research.  A researcher 
accomplishes the understanding and interpretation of complex reality by immersion in 
contextually determined data.  Unlike quantitative research that defines and measures 
observable variables that form a reality, qualitative research defines reality from within, 
based on observing empirical data.  A specific hypothesis often does not drive 
qualitative research.  On the contrary, a researcher develops concepts, themes or 
generalisations during the process of data discovery (Creswell, 2007).   
 
Table 3.2 Quantitative research versus qualitative research 
 
Quantitative Research Qualitative Research 
The researcher begins with a hypothesis 
and then tests it.   
 
The researcher captures and discovers 
meaning once he becomes immersed in the 
data. 
 
Concepts are in the form of distinct 
variables. 
 
Concepts are in the form of themes, 
motifs, generalisations and taxonomies. 
 
Measures are systematically created before 
data collection and are standardised. 
 
Measures are created in an ad hoc manner 
and are often specific to the individual 
setting or researcher. 
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Data are in the form of numbers from 
precise measurement. 
 
 
 
Data are in the form of words and images 
from documents, observations and 
transcripts. 
 
Theory is largely causal and is deductive. 
 
Theory can be causal or noncausal and is 
often inductive. 
 
Procedures are standard, and replication is 
assumed. 
 
Research procedures are particular, and 
replication is very rare. 
 
Analysis proceeds by using statistics, 
tables, or charts and discussing how what 
they show relates to hypothesis. 
 
Analysis proceeds by extracting themes or 
generalisations from evidence and 
organising data to present a coherent, 
consistent picture.  
 
Source: Neuman, 2007: 88.    
 
However, it is worth noting that the themes identified in the literature appraisal, 
literature gaps and the evidence from extant research also may guide qualitative 
research.  The starting point of this study is the thematic analysis based on themes and 
gaps that the author identified in the literature appraisal, whilst the themes can be 
adjusted after reviewing some collected data.  The researcher has determined the initial 
themes as follows: examples, sources and implications of partner opportunistic behavior 
in a PPP; partner interaction in a PPP; risks and risk management in a PPP; partnership 
critical success factors.   
In contrast to the quantitative method of inquiry, qualitative research often is 
inductive.  Qualitative research is in line with the phenomenological ontological 
paradigm that implies that reality is subjective and socially constructed.  Due to this, 
researchers often receive qualitative data in the form of words (such as from interviews) 
or images from documents and observations, whilst quantitative research deals with 
data in the form of numbers (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Creswell, 2009).   
Yet an additional distinction between quantitative and qualitative research concerns 
values.  In the quantitative method, a researcher views variables as objective data.  A 
researcher does not base a hypothesis on some values because a hypothesis is a 
reflection of an objective world.  In the quantitative method, a researcher’s own values 
do not have any influence on the study.  This is in contrast to qualitative research: as it 
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is interpretive, it inevitably takes into account the study participants’ values, biases and 
preferences.  A researcher treats the values and preferences as an essential part of 
subjective reality, from the respondents’ perspective.  Additionally, the researcher’s 
own values may have substantial impact on what data he/she collects and how he/she 
interprets the findings (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Neuman, 2007).   
In qualitative research, the social context is critically important (Neuman, 2007; 
Flick, 2009).  The qualitative method of inquiry accepts the context as an essential set 
of factors and circumstances that influence an event or issue in question.  When a 
researcher takes an event out of context, his/her interpretation of this event becomes 
different and may be distorted.  In quantitative research, a researcher treats variables 
under investigation as objective, without regard to the contextual setting, because he/she 
views reality as objective (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).  
The quantitative method investigates reality by isolating selected elements from the 
whole picture as opposed to qualitative research that places parts of social life into a 
larger whole (Neuman, 2007: 89).  The holistic approach to critical assessment of 
reality is, thus, an intrinsic feature of qualitative research (Creswell, 2007).        
Having reviewed the principal distinctions between the two research strategies, the 
next section provides justification for the author’s strategy for this thesis.       
 
3.3.2 Qualitative approach adopted in the thesis 
 
The ontological and epistemological paradigms that a researcher adopts determine, 
in part, the choice of a research strategy.  Most importantly, a research strategy should 
be suitable to the study’s objectives, so that the latter can answer research questions.  
From this perspective there is no single best, or ideal, research technique or strategy.  
'The central point of reference is the appropriateness of the methods to the issue under 
study' (Flick, 2009: 33).  
The main objective of this research is to investigate experiences and perceptions of 
various stakeholders in the field of public-private partnerships regarding management 
challenges to PPPs in Kazakhstan and Russia, and what ways and tools are available, in 
their view, in order to adapt to these challenges.  In pursuit of this objective, the 
 108 
research will use a qualitative approach as one can hardly quantify the study of 
perceptions and ways of adaptation to management challenges.  Conducting the study in 
two countries implies that the researcher will do a comparative analysis of interview 
results.  This determines that the study will not put forward hypotheses beforehand.  
Instead, it will categorise and use the collected data in order to explain the respondents’ 
perceptions of managerial challenges.  Subsequently, the study will identify the lessons 
from commonalities and differences in respondents' views and experiences for PPP 
governance.    
The qualitative approach adopted for this research has the following advantages. 
First, a qualitative method of inquiry allows examining complex reality in the PPP field 
as opposed to applying quantitative methods.  For example, many PPP benefits, such as 
customer satisfaction with a service or greater involvement of private companies in the 
delivery of public services, are qualitative in nature, and researchers can assess them 
non-quantitatively (Creswell, 2007; Flick, 2009).  A qualitative assessment of the PPP 
impact on the overall effectiveness of the government sector may serve as an illustration 
of an advantage involved in this research approach.   
Second, qualitative research allows capturing the context surrounding PPPs in 
Kazakhstan and Russia as opposed to a quantitative approach that focuses on selected 
variables and their measures without regard to how and in what circumstances PPP 
management issues evolve.  An analysis of a PPP issue in its interconnectedness with 
other issues and in the country-specific context is a distinct advantage of qualitative 
inquiry that ensures the holistic treatment of management problems facing PPPs.  In 
other words, when the researcher places PPP management aspects into the broader 
social context, this builds a richer picture of reality and allows a more accurate 
understanding of the meaning and significance of each element and avoiding distortions 
in this understanding (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Neuman, 2007; Flick, 2009).    
Third, qualitative research allows identifying values that the study participants may 
have regarding selected management aspects.  For example, some participants may 
place a high value on using a private firm’s expertise in implementing innovative 
technological solutions whilst the same participants may place a small value on the 
customer service that an operator provides.  In this respect, a qualitative approach 
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allows a researcher to identify participants’ values, and then ask questions related to 
them, and receive value-driven answers (Patton, 1990; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; 
Neuman, 2007).  As the qualitative method incorporates values, understanding these 
values contributes to building a holistic picture of the PPP reality (Patton, 1990).   
Fourth, qualitative research allows the researcher to use subjective data (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2005).  This is an advantage because the research aims to capture 
individual experiences, for example, of those PPP actors who were involved in 
negotiations regarding risk allocation between the partners.  Qualitative method avoids 
being locked in some rigidly defined variables under investigation, which allows 
performing in-depth investigation of issues and looking beyond precise numerical 
assessment of selected aspects.  In qualitative research, the benefit is that the researcher 
can receive diverse opinions about the same issue, for example, how to mitigate specific 
risk facing a partnership.  This is consistent with the subjective view of the world, i.e., 
the phenomenological research paradigm that the author has adopted.   
Fifth, a qualitative approach is most appropriate for this study because it allows 
exploring a new area of scholarly research in the PPP management field in Kazakhstan 
and Russia, namely relationship issues between parties in a partnership.  The PPP 
literature in the two countries is silent about these issues that one may investigate with 
the help of qualitative, rather than quantitative, data.  Specifically, PPP actors' 
comments, interpretations and opinions provide the basis for assessment of relationship 
challenges in a partnership and how participants handle them. 
Finally, although development of theory is not unique to qualitative research, this 
method forms the convenient foundation for drawing theoretical insights into PPP 
management.  Using an inductive process, the qualitative approach provides the basis 
for theory development from primary data gathered in the course of research as opposed 
to testing a pre-formulated hypothesis that is typical for the quantitative method.  Thus, 
theory development happens alongside data collection, and as a researcher collects and 
interprets more data, astute insights and richer details further contribute to the 
advancement of theory (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Creswell, 2007; Neuman, 2007; 
Flick, 2009).     
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Although this research's qualitative method has a number of advantages, it also has 
some limitations.  Because of the high degree of subjectivity in responses from 
participants, it may be difficult to generalise and make systematic comparisons.  Also, a 
researcher’s subjectivity inevitably plays a certain role in data analysis.  The 
researcher’s biases are unavoidable despite all efforts aimed at staying away from 
distortions.  Due to the in-depth nature of investigation, the scope of research is often 
limited.  For example, studying a large number of PPP projects in Russia is unfeasible 
because of time, labour and financial constraints, which limits the applicability of 
conclusions.  Additionally, it is difficult to replicate a study due to subjective and 
varying responses from participants (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Neuman, 2007).      
Notwithstanding some shortcomings, a qualitative approach enjoys distinct 
advantages that this section has highlighted.  Owing to this, the author has adopted a 
qualitative approach as it is most suitable for achieving the study's research objectives.            
 
3.4 Methods for Data Collection 
 
3.4.1 Data collection methods    
 
For this study, the researcher will use in-depth semi-structured interviews as a data 
collection method.  Researchers widely use in-depth interview as a method of primary 
data collection because it has a set of advantages that no other method can offer (Ritchie 
and Lewis, 2003; Creswell, 2009; Flick, 2009; Silverman, 2010).  These advantages 
include an opportunity for a researcher to combine structure with flexibility; an 
opportunity to obtain perceptions and opinions, rather than facts; an opportunity to 
achieve depth of an answer by asking additional questions that allow to clarify the 
interviewees' views; and a possibility to investigate issues and topics that were 
unanticipated and/or unplanned in the beginning of an interview (Ritchie and Lewis, 
2003; Jones, 2004; Silverman, 2010). 
Connecting the choice of the principal data collection method with the theme and 
context of this research, the author has identified a number of reasons in favour of 
interviews.  First, interviews will allow capturing actual respondents’ experiences and 
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their perceptions regarding PPP management, from the point of view of different 
stakeholders, rather than just gathering mere facts and figures about a partnership.  The 
study of PPP experiences and perceptions calls for face-to-face contacts with actors and 
for collection of their opinions, in their own words, on the variety of aspects that go 
beyond provisions included in partnership contracts.  Second, direct interaction with 
respondents by using a flexible interview structure permits a free expression of opinions, 
which may be, at times, not straightforward or contradictory.  The free flow of thoughts 
and comments is likely to provide an invaluable source of data.  Third, cultural 
traditions in Russia and Kazakhstan often form an interviewees’ preference for face-to-
face and informal contacts, rather than for written surveys or telephone interviews, 
because direct personal contact often is a key to more open and honest communication 
and better understanding of each other.  Provided with the possibility for an informal 
dialogue, respondents are likely to be more open and freely discuss their experiences 
and views regarding PPP management.  Fourth, direct personal contact with 
interviewees will allow the researcher to explain in detail the interview's purpose and, 
thus, completely eliminate participants’ concerns regarding how the researcher will use 
the data. 
The researcher has determined the choice between structured and unstructured 
interviews for the purposes of this thesis by the following.  Discussing a non-directive 
style of interviewing that may result in ambiguity of data, Jones (2004) emphasises the 
need to achieve a complex balance between restricting structure and restricting 
ambiguity.  Instead of a non-directive style, the more effective way of obtaining data 
and reducing data ambiguity is to set at least some interview structure.  'In short, 
researchers are more likely to get good data, and know what data they are getting, if the 
interviewees are told at the outset what the research topic is, even if initially in 
relatively broad terms, and why the topic is of interest' (Jones, 2004: 259).  This 
argument supports the choice of semi-structured interviews as a data collection method 
for this thesis as opposed to unstructured interviews.  In addition, semi-structured 
interviews, rather than unstructured, are a preferred method in this thesis because they 
allow the researcher to reduce the risk of collecting a considerable amount of data from 
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individually valuable interviews, although subsequent generalisations, based on widely 
diverse data, may be difficult (Miles and Huberman, 1994).    
Further, the researcher has selected semi-structured interviews for the following 
reasons.  First, interviews are an appropriate data collection method for obtaining 
informal opinions about selected aspects of PPP management regarding which there is 
no literature or any other sources.  A critical appraisal of PPP literature has identified a 
few gaps, namely that there is no discussion of relationship issues in a partnership and 
opportunistic behaviour.  In order to close these gaps and obtain relevant data, 
interviews with PPP stakeholders will be invaluable as no quantitative data can 
substitute the interview data. 
Second, interviews allow exploring respondents’ opinions about PPP critical 
success factors.  Keeping in mind that PPP projects in Kazakhstan and Russia are still in 
progress and empirical data regarding their performance are not yet available, an 
investigation of perceptions and subjective opinions provides valuable insights about 
factors that may ensure PPP success.  Additionally, interviews permit the researcher to 
explore actual experiences through questions regarding critical incidents related to 
partnerships (Patton, 2002).  During interviews participants inevitably will use their 
judgements about what PPP aspects are more significant and require greater attention of 
PPP stakeholders, and what aspects are less significant.  Hence, the study of 
interviewees' value judgments, in connection to PPP critical success factors, justifies the 
use of interviews as a data collection method that best suits the purpose of this 
qualitative research.         
With regards to interviewees’ values and those of a researcher, the interplay of 
which may influence the respondents-researcher relationship and, consequently, the 
data that a researcher collects, Jones (2004) has argued the following.  'What is crucial 
is that researchers choose their actions with a self-conscious awareness of why they are 
making them, what the effects are likely to be upon that relationship – and indeed 
whether their own theories and values are getting in the way of understanding those of 
the respondents' (Jones, 2004: 259).  This point is relevant to this thesis' methodology.  
Having adopted in-depth semi-structured interviews as a method for data collection, the 
author will make every effort to avoid biases or prejudices.  The researcher will 
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accomplish this by maintaining neutrality in asking a question and receiving an answer 
and by not providing an author’s opinion to a respondent or making a value judgment 
that may distort data and/or influence the data collection process, although removing the 
researcher’s own values and biases totally and completely from critical investigation is 
hardly possible.  Section 3.8 of this chapter discusses access to participants more fully.                
With regards to behavioural sciences, Sommer and Sommer have pointed out that 
'all methods have good and bad features.  The advantages may lie along one dimension, 
such as economy; the disadvantages along another, such as objectivity.  The goal of the 
researcher is not to find the single best method.  For most problems, several procedures 
will be better than one, even though each has its limitations; these tend not to be the 
same limitations' (Sommer and Sommer, 1980: 7). 
To minimise the researcher’s biases and ensure richness of data, this study uses yet 
additional method, namely documentary analysis (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005: 498-499).  
It includes gathering institutional documents and analysing the content of text in all 
kinds of media for communication such as books, newspaper and magazine articles, 
speeches and official documents (Neuman, 2007: 227).  As a native Russian speaker, 
the author is able to critically evaluate such sources without the use of translation 
services.  A critical appraisal of various kinds of documentation regarding PPPs in 
Kazakhstan and Russia intends to give the study much depth.  
The interplay between the data collection from interviews and documentary 
analysis is that one technique complements another.  For example, policy documents in 
Kazakhstan and Russia say little about risk mitigation in the course of PPP project 
implementation, and the documentary analysis has revealed this.  However, additional 
risks that a partnership faces are a real challenge that management has to address by 
interacting with multiple PPP stakeholders.  To this end, the researcher used in-depth 
interviews in order to obtain the necessary data regarding respondents’ perceptions of 
risk mitigation and the ways how to better manage risks.     
Yet an additional argument that highlights the need for two data collection methods 
is that documentary analysis has its limitation as it describes only what is in the text.  'It 
cannot reveal the intentions of those who created the text or the effects that messages in 
the text have on those who receive them' (Neuman, 2007: 236).  To overcome certain 
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limitations of chosen data collection methods, this research employs data triangulation.  
Data triangulation, i.e., the use of different data sources, permits further enriching the 
knowledge by combining different sorts of data (Denzin, 1989: 237-241; Flick, 2009: 
444-445).       
The use of two data collection methods may lead to three types of results: 
converging results, complementary results and contradictions (Flick, 2009: 450).  For 
example, a comparison of interview results with the data in policy documents, company 
reports and analytical papers may reveal discrepancies between the government 
understanding of PPP policies and management issues, on the one hand, and the PPP 
actors' perception of these policies and issues, on the other hand.  In other cases, results 
of different methods of data collection may complement each other.  Identification of 
differing data or of complementary data by using triangulation, rather than interviewing 
the largest possible number of respondents, makes the study more informative and 
contributes to the more effective production of knowledge (Flick, 2009).       
In addition to interviews, the focus group method could provide a possibility for 
collecting primary data.  However, this method is not feasible as managers of 
partnership projects, experts of national and regional PPP centres and government 
officials are physically located in different cities across Kazakhstan and Russia, making 
it unlikely that respondents may be available for participation in the focus group.  Also, 
a researcher may use the focus group method when he/she wants to obtain an opinion 
from individuals who belong to a certain social group (i.e., group members should be 
homogenous), and wants them to inspire each other with ideas, and, thus, generate an 
in-depth discussion (Flick, 2009: 300).  Since respondents in this research are 
individuals who are not a part of any specific social group, the researcher has rejected 
the focus group method as inappropriate.  On the contrary, an in-depth interview is the 
most suitable technique for this research as the goal is to gather actors’ unique opinions 
and experiences, rather than the views that are representative of the broader social 
group.  
In summary, data collection methods have to be consistent with the type of research 
question.  The qualitative nature of the research question in this thesis has determined 
the choice of interviews as a main instrument that permits the researcher to capture 
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participants' meanings and understanding of PPP management challenges.            
 
3.4.2 Participant selection  
 
This research follows the principle of gradual selection of respondents that is based 
on the notion of the relevance of cases and material to research objectives instead of 
participants’ representativeness (Flick, 2009: 120-122).  The researcher has employed 
purposive (or purposeful) sampling and, in accordance with this approach, the 
researcher has made certain sampling decisions during and as a result of data collection 
and analysis (Patton, 1990; Neuman, 2007: 142-144; Flick, 2009: 125).  
In both countries the researcher has selected three groups of respondents for an 
interview.  The first group includes key project actors of a private partner in a PPP, at 
the senior management level (director or deputy director) and/or middle management 
(head of a department or a section).   
The second group includes stakeholders from the government, such as experts from 
the department responsible for supervision of PPPs within the Ministry of 
Transportation of Kazakhstan.  This group also includes officials from a regional or city 
government that has become a partner in a PPP.  The city government of St. Petersburg 
in Russia is an example of municipal government that in October 2009 has signed a PPP 
contract aimed at reconstructing Pulkovo airport located within the city limits.                
The third target group for interviews is the staff in specialised national and regional 
PPP centres in Kazakhstan and Russia that are engaged in PPP project selection, 
evaluation and monitoring.  The main criterion for selection of respondents from the 
government agencies, national and regional PPP centres was how closely a person is 
involved in partnership project evaluation and/or monitoring of project implementation 
and/or resolution of disputes related to PPP management.   
The number of interviews is five per sample in each country (i.e., 15 in each 
country).  This results in a total of 30 interviews for this study. 
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3.4.3 PPP project selection    
 
This section highlights the reasons why the researcher has selected certain PPP 
projects for the study.  The selection aimed to ensure that projects permit cross-country 
and cross-sector comparisons in the area of PPP governance. Hence, the sectors in the 
two countries should be similar.   
The selection has begun with reviewing the PPP projects in Kazakhstan as the 
nation has a much smaller number of projects as opposed to Russia.  In 2012, 
Kazakhstan had four ongoing PPP projects.  The researcher has rejected two of them.  
These are the airport construction and operation in the city of Aktau and the 
construction and operation of an interregional electrical grid in Northern Kazakhstan.  
Both projects enjoy high visibility and, hence, the national government's close attention 
and support, which heavily influences the project management.  Also, both projects 
have offices in remote locations.  This logistically makes access to interviewees 
difficult.   
Two other projects in Kazakhstan include: 
 construction and operation of a railroad between the station of Shar and the 
city of Ust-Kamenogorsk in Eastern Kazakhstan, and 
 construction and operation of eleven kindergartens in the city of Karaganda. 
The first project is in transport infrastructure, whilst the second project is in social 
infrastructure.  The researcher also selected PPPs in Russia from the similar sectors.  In 
the transport infrastructure, this is a project that aims at construction and operation of 
the first toll viaduct (i.e., an automobile road overpassing the railroad) in Russia.  From 
2011, a private company called Regional Toll Roads implements this project in the city 
of Ryazan, which is about 190 km away from Moscow.   
In Russia's social infrastructure, the study focuses on a PPP project in St Petersburg, 
which involves the construction and subsequent maintenance of two kindergartens and 
three schools for 10 years beginning in 2011 by a holding of Russian companies called 
Baltros.    
Table 3.3 highlights the industries and projects in two countries that the researcher 
selected for a comparative study of PPP management. 
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Table 3.3 PPP projects selected for the study 
Sector Kazakhstan Russia 
 
 
 
Transport 
infrastructure 
 A railroad segment 
(construction and operation for 
23 years, from 2005) - a 
project in Eastern Kazakhstan  
 
 
 An operator–the company 
called Doszhan Temir Zholy 
(Kazakhstan) 
 A toll viaduct (construction 
and operation for 20 years, 
from 2011) - a project in the 
city of Ryazan, about 190 km 
away from Moscow   
 
 An operator–the company 
called Regional Toll Roads 
(Russia) and its SPV 
 
 
Social 
infrastructure 
 
 Eleven kindergartens 
(construction and maintenance 
for 14 years, from 2011) in the 
city of Karaganda 
 
 An operator–the company 
called 7 Piramit (Turkey) 
 Two kindergartens and three 
schools (construction and 
maintenance for 10 years, from 
2011) in St Petersburg 
 
 An operator–the company 
called Baltros (Russia) and its 
SPV 
        Source: Compiled by the author 
 
To summarise, the study embraces:  
 two countries - Kazakhstan and Russia,  
 two sectors in each country - transport infrastructure (a viaduct and a railroad) 
and social infrastructure (kindergartens and schools), and 
 two projects in each country (i.e., one in each sector).    
The selection of sectors and projects permits the researcher to successfully reach 
the following aims.  First, it ensures manageability of the study in terms of the 
appropriate scope of research objectives and the sample size.  Second, it provides a 
choice of typical projects that participants are implementing outside of capital cities and 
that are not subject to close attention of national governments and related political 
pressure.  Third, it gives a picture of similar, although not identical, projects in the same 
industries in two countries, which permits meaningful cross-country comparative study. 
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3.4.4 Project descriptors and the context  
 
3.4.4a Railroad in Eastern Kazakhstan 
 
This project – construction and operation of a railroad between the station of Shar 
and the city of Ust-Kamenogorsk in Eastern Kazakhstan – is the first public-private 
partnership in Kazakhstan.  The PPP contract was signed 6 July 2005, a year before 
Kazakhstan had adopted the law on concessions on 7 July 2006 (The Law of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On Concessions’, 2006), as a pilot project.  The Ministry of 
Transport and Communication that represented Kazakhstan's government was the 
original public sector partner with which a private operator – a company called Doszhan 
Temir Zholy – signed a concession for 23 years from 2005 to 31 December 2028.   
The project aims to construct a segment of the railroad (about 151 km) in Eastern 
Kazakhstan in order to shorten and speed up the cargo and passenger transportation in 
this part of the country.  In 2008, Doszhan Temir Zholy completed the main 
construction phase according to the original plan, and from January 2009, the railroad 
has operated in testing mode.  However, the company has not completed all the 
construction, and it still has to build about 30 km of the railroad.  Table 3.4 highlights 
project features. 
A unique project feature is that it utilises the build–own–operate–transfer (BOOT) 
model according to which a private operator will transfer the constructed assets (i.e., 
railroad and related facilities) to the government no later than 31 December 2028.  This 
is specified in the 2005 PPP contract, although the 2006 law on concessions has adopted 
a different (and the only) concession model for Kazakhstan, which is build–transfer–
operate (BTO).  Hence, the partnership uniquely features private asset ownership for the 
project's length as opposed to other Kazakhstani projects, in which an operator must 
transfer a newly built asset to the government immediately upon the completion of 
construction.  The latter applies to the kindergartens' PPP in Karaganda, which Section 
3.4.4c highlights.  As the national government approved the railroad project prior to the 
adoption of the 2006 law on concessions, the project's model remains legally valid.        
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The Doszhan Temir Zholy' investors have changed since 2005, and as of 2012, four 
organisations own an operator's shares of stock. The national government' agency called 
 
Table 3.4 Railroad concession: Summary of key project details 
Descriptor Detail information 
 
Country and city Kazakhstan, the Vostochno-Kazakhstanskaya oblast’ (Eastern 
Kazakhstan region)  
 
PPP objective Put together investment to build about 151 km of a railroad and 
provide long-term passenger and cargo transportation 
 
Capacity 15 trains each way per day  
 
Type of contract 
agreement between 
parties  
A concession 
Implementation model  
 
Build–own–operate–transfer (BOOT) 
 
 
Concession term  23 years, from 2005  
 
 
Construction cost Initial investment was 31.3 billion Kazakhstani tenge  
(USD $232.67 million)  
 
Construction phase Three to four years from 2005 to 2008 (completed in part) 
 
PPP actors National Ministry of Transportation; Investment Fund of 
Kazakhstan; the national railroad company Kazakhstan Temir 
Zholy; private investors; an operator, Doszhan Temir Zholy with 
shared ownership by four public and private organisations  
 
Financial structure Investors' contributions in exchange for the corporate shares of 
stock ($9.67 million), plus financing by selling corporate bonds 
($223 million), plus subsequent payments to a concessionaire by 
railroad users  
 
Government 
contribution to a PPP 
Land for the railroad, plus government guarantees for the corporate 
bonds worth $223 million, plus an exemption from corporate 
income tax, land tax and property tax for 10 years after the service 
launch 
 
Tariff setting Tariff setting requires an approval by the government agency 
responsible for regulation of natural monopolies 
 
 Source: Compiled by the author 
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Investment Fund of Kazakhstan owns 48.94 per cent of Doszhan Temir Zholy shares 
and the national railroad company called Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (which is a 100 per 
cent government-owned corporation) owns another 46.02 per cent.  Additionally, two 
private companies are involved in the investment: a company called Kazzhol Invest 
owns 2.86 per cent of the shares and a company called Corporation ABE - 2.18 per cent 
(Kazakhstan Stock Exchange, 2012).   
Originally, funding for the railroad construction came from two sources: equity 
(4.15 per cent) and debt (95.85 per cent).  Investors contributed funds in exchange for 
the corporate shares of stock (1.3 billion tenge, which was about USD $9.67 million in 
2005).  Additionally, to finance the construction, an operator in 2005 sold corporate 
bonds with the face value of 30 billion tenge (about $223 million) and the time to 
maturity of 23 years (Kazakhstan Stock Exchange, 2012).    
The company plans to cover operating expenses and receive profit from cargo and 
passenger transportation, for which Doszhan Temir Zholy will enjoy a government-
granted monopoly for the project term.     
 
3.4.4b A toll viaduct in Ryazan, Russia 
 
In Ryazan, a city of more than 500,000 people, located about 190 km away from 
Moscow, in 2011 the local government approved a PPP aimed at constructing and 
operating a viaduct - an automobile road overpassing the railroad.  The toll viaduct will 
replace an older free railroad crossing.  A traditional railroad crossing in Russia is a no-
frills facility with a bar that opens and lets the cars cross the railroad for a few minutes.  
It then shuts and typically cars have to wait a long time (e.g., 30 minutes or longer) 
before they cross the railroad, whether there is a train or not, because of the safety 
concerns.       
In May 2010, the Ryazan city government approved a concession where a private 
company called Regionalnye Platnye Dorogi (Regional Toll Roads) agreed to build a 
viaduct at its own expense under the condition that a company would collect a fee from 
each vehicle that uses the viaduct, except ambulances, fire trucks and other government 
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cars, for a 20 year period (Sopryakov, 2012).  Upon the project's completion, the 
operator must transfer the facility ownership to the municipal government.     
Russia's federal law on automobile roads requires that an alternative, free of charge 
railroad crossing should be available within close proximity to a toll viaduct 
(Federalnyi Zakon #257–FZ, 2007).  Because an alternative free railroad crossing in 
this case is available, a driver who needs to cross the railroad in Ryazan has a choice: 
use a modern toll crossing with no wait or a free old-fashioned crossing with 
unpredictable waiting time.  However, to use an alternative free crossing a driver will 
have to drive about 7 kilometres more.              
The project exclusively uses private financing, which the non-governmental 
pension fund called Norilskiy Nickel provides.  The pension fund is affiliated with a 
large Russian corporation Norilskiy Nickel that is one of the major nickel producers in 
the world.  The volume of investment (i.e., construction cost) is 250 million rubles 
(about USD $8.2 million (Sopryakov, 2012).  To implement a project, the private sector 
partner has formed an SPV - a stand-alone company called RTR-Ryazan.  
The project documentation that is available on the corporate Web site claims that a 
project is a public-private partnership, but is not a concession because it is not using the 
provisions of Russia's federal law on concessions.  The reason for this claim is that the 
municipal government does not extend any funding to the private sector partner.   
This claim deserves further explanation as it opens a loophole for future PPP 
projects.  As of 2012, the Russian federal legislation includes a few 'grey areas' 
regarding PPPs.  First, it does not define a public-private partnership.  Second, it defines 
a concession as a project that was formed and operates according to the federal law on 
concessions.  This means that a concession is a project that draws some forms of 
government financial support, which the law specifies (Federalnyi Zakon Rossiyskoy 
Federatsii #115-FZ, 2005).  Where the partners do not use the government financial 
support to a PPP, this permits them to argue that a project is not a concession.         
The project uses the build–own–operate–transfer (BOOT) model, in which the 
private sector partner will own the newly built viaduct for the full project's length.      
Table 3.5 delineates the essential project features.  
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Table 3.5 A toll viaduct in Ryazan, Russia: Key project details 
Descriptor Detail information 
Country and city Russia, Ryazan 
 
PPP objective Draw private funds in order to replace an older free railroad 
crossing with a modern toll viaduct and ensure its long-term 
operation 
 
Capacity 25,000 cars per day  
 
Type of contract 
agreement between 
parties  
A concession (although partners claim that they use a non-
concession contract) 
Implementation model  
 
Build–own–operate–transfer (BOOT) 
Concession term  20 years, from 2012 
 
Construction cost 250 million Russian rubles (USD $8.2 million)  
 
Construction phase One to two years 
 
PPP actors Ryazan municipal government; a private operator Regional Toll 
Roads; its SPV RTR-Ryazan; a private investor - Norilskiy Nickel 
pension fund 
 
Financial structure Private investor financing, with subsequent collection of tolls by a 
concessionaire 
 
Government 
contribution to a PPP 
The government temporarily provides land for a viaduct. After the 
project terminates, an operator transfers the facility and land to the 
municipal government      
 
Tariff setting Toll setting requires approval by the municipal government   
 
 Source: Compiled by the author 
 
3.4.4c Eleven kindergartens in Karaganda, Kazakhstan1 
 
Each of the 11 new kindergartens will provide care for 320 children, with a total 
capacity of 3,520 children (Stroitel'stvo i ekspluatatsiya kompleksa detskikh sadov v 
                                               
1 The author wrote the text of this Section 3.4.4c in 2012.  The text of this section subsequently has been 
included in the article co-authored with Nada Kakabadse, which Public Management Review plans to 
publish in 2013 (Mouraviev and Kakabadse, 2013, in press).  The author certifies that the text in this 
section is his original contribution to the thesis.    
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gorode Karagande po skheme kontsessii [Kindergartens' PPP], 2011).  Although all 
kindergartens will be within the city limits, the regional (rather than the municipal) 
government’s Education Department has assumed the role of the public sector partner.  
The municipality (rather than the regional government) has provided land for 
constructing each kindergarten, and will build a utilities infrastructure including a water 
supply and sewage system, power lines and telecommunication networks.   
The private sector partner must construct the kindergartens, equip them (one time 
only) with furniture and items needed for proper childcare and provide building 
operation and maintenance during the concession term.  Operation and maintenance 
include cleaning services inside the kindergartens and the adjacent areas, snow removal 
and maintenance of electrical, plumbing and heating equipment.  Additionally, a private 
partner must complete a cosmetic type of renovation twice during the concession term, 
i.e., every five years, and a major renovation of kindergartens two years prior to the end 
of the concession (Kindergartens' PPP, 2011).       
The regional Department of Education (rather than the municipal) is responsible for 
providing educational services, health care and food for children and for purchasing 
replacement furniture and childcare items as needed (Ibid.).       
The government, at its own expense, has specified all technical details of 
construction including the architectural design of buildings, their exact dimensions and 
the layout of land plots, car parking and lighting.  The government has determined the 
total construction cost to be 5.83 billion tenge (USD $39.12 million) (Ibid.).  This 
amount includes construction costs only and does not include maintenance costs for the 
concession term that should not exceed 20 years, as per the government project proposal.  
The Kazakhstan law requires that a concessionaire must have in its possession and 
invest in construction no less than 20 per cent of its own funds (out of the project 
construction cost), whilst an investor may borrow the remaining 80 per cent (The Law 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On Concessions’, 2006).     
The project will take the form of build-transfer-operate (BTO) meaning that a 
private company will have to transfer the property ownership to the government upon 
completion of construction, according to Kazakhstani law.   
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The government has determined its compensation to a concessionaire to be 5.34 
billion tenge ($35.84 million), which is 91.6 per cent of the total construction cost.  It 
has scheduled its payments to begin from year three, i.e., after a private investor 
completes the construction (Kindergartens' PPP, 2011).   
Table 3.6 highlights project features.  
 
Table 3.6  Kindergartens' PPP: Summary of key project details 
 
Descriptor Detail information 
Country and city Kazakhstan, Karaganda 
 
PPP objective Attract financial resources to build 11 kindergartens and provide 
long-term maintenance 
 
Capacity 320 children in each kindergarten, a total of 3,520 places  
 
Type of contract 
agreement between 
parties  
A concession 
Implementation model  
 
Build–transfer–operate (BTO) 
Concession term  Up to 20 years, from November 2011. The final contract was 
signed for 14 years. 
 
Construction cost 5.83 billion Kazakhstani tenge (USD $39.12 million) 
 
Construction phase One to two years 
 
PPP actors Regional government of the Karagandinskaya oblast'; Karaganda 
municipal government; a private investor/operator called 7 Piramit 
(Turkey)  
 
Financial structure Private investor financing, with subsequent government payments 
to a concessionaire, plus revenue from childcare fees, plus 
potential revenue stream from non-core PPP services 
Government 
contribution to a PPP 
Land for each kindergarten plus financial outlays to a 
concessionaire of 5.34 billion tenge (USD $35.84 million) 
 
Tariff setting Childcare fee setting requires government approval; government 
permits annual fee adjustment for inflation  
 
 Source: Compiled by the author 
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3.4.4d Two kindergartens and three schools in St Petersburg, Russia 
 
In 2011, the St Petersburg city government approved a partnership with a 
management company called Peremena for construction and subsequent maintenance of 
two schools and three kindergartens for a 10 year period (GK 'Baltros' investiruyet 2.2 
milliarda rublei v shkoly i detskiye sady, 2011).  Peremena is an SPV of Baltros, which 
is a private holding that includes development companies, housing construction 
companies, two companies making construction materials, an information technology 
firm, an energy company and a real estate agency.       
An essential detail of why the private sector partner is interested in the project 
refers to the range of its companies and business fields, namely to Baltros' business as a 
developer of urban areas in St Petersburg.  The PPP project was designed exactly in one 
of the new city areas that Baltros has developed.  In this area that lacks social 
infrastructure, the company has built significant volume of housing, a part of which, as 
of 2012, was still for sale.  Naturally, new schools and kindergartens can considerably 
raise the interest of prospective homebuyers in the area.              
The private sector partner has determined the construction cost of each school at 
770.3 million rubles (USD $25.7 million) and each kindergarten at 196.3 million rubles 
($6.5 million) (GK 'Baltros' investiruyet 2.2 milliarda rublei v shkoly i detskiye sady, 
2011).  Adding the operator's maintenance costs, the government will pay 1,284 million 
rubles ($42.8 million) for a school and 327 million rubles ($10.9 million) for a 
kindergarten during the partnership term.  The total government payment in nominal 
prices is $118.3 million, which is 67 per cent higher than the $70.9 million construction 
cost (Ibid.).  
To finance the project, the private sector partner uses its own funds and bank loans 
whilst the city government will make all payments to recoup private investment.  
Although the public kindergartens charge childcare fees, the fee level is unimportant for 
an operator as it will receive all payments directly from the government.  Public schools 
do not charge any fees.   
Table 3.7 illuminates project details.   
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Table 3.7 Kindergartens and schools in St Petersburg: Summary of key  
  project details 
Descriptor Detail information 
Country and city Russia, St Petersburg 
 
PPP objective Attract financial resources to build two kindergartens and three 
schools and provide long-term maintenance 
 
Capacity 110 children in each kindergarten and 825 children in each 
school  
 
Type of contract 
agreement between 
parties  
A concession  
Implementation model  
 
Build–transfer–operate (BTO) 
Concession term  10 years, from 2011-2012, after completion of construction 
 
Construction cost $70.9 million  
 
Construction phase One to two years 
 
PPP actors St Petersburg city government; a private investor/operator 
Baltros; its SPV Peremena   
 
Financial structure Private investor financing (mainly, bank loans); with subsequent 
government payments to a concessionaire; customers do not pay 
any fees to a concessionaire  
 
Government 
contribution to a PPP 
Land for each kindergarten and school plus financial outlays to 
a concessionaire of $118.3 million 
 
Tariff setting Not applicable as customers will pay childcare fees directly to 
public kindergartens, not to a concessionaire. Public schools do 
not charge any fees.  
 
 Source: Compiled by the author 
 
The project employs the build-transfer-operate model: a private company must 
transfer the property ownership to the government upon completion of construction.  An 
operator must undertake concurrent construction of two kindergartens and three schools 
and all of them should begin the service provision in 2012-2013.      
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3.4.5 Specific considerations 
 
The researcher conducted the study in two countries – Kazakhstan and Russia.  He 
examined two PPP projects is each country, or four in total.  
In each country the researcher conducted 15 interviews with key PPP actors.  It is 
likely that this has led to data saturation.   
The researcher had experience with interviewing more than 35 respondents during 
previous academic research in Russia and Kazakhstan.  Therefore, the researcher was in 
a position to capitalise on his experience for the benefit of this study.    
The researcher attempted to seek the respondents’ explicit consent to record (tape) 
an interview.  In those cases when a respondent disagreed, the researcher captured the 
interview data by taking notes.  The researcher conducted interviews in Russian because 
this is his mother tongue.  As Russian is widely used in Kazakhstan in both the home 
and office environment, this allowed the researcher to conduct interviews without a 
language barrier.   
The researcher ensured primary data authenticity by accurately translating from 
Russian to English.  After the interviews, the researcher himself translated the data to 
English.  As the researcher possesses native Russian language skills and a high degree 
of fluency in English, the researcher was able to accurately capture primary data and 
translate them in English with no distortions.  
 
3.5  Pilot Study  
 
3.5.1 Purpose and participants 
 
The researcher has conducted a pilot study in order to obtain initial understanding 
of the range of issues involved in PPP management.  A pilot study is a preliminary 
investigation that carries certain advantages.  It broadens an array of data sources; it 
allows a researcher to immerse in data and to get a feel of the directions in which the 
data search should proceed; it facilitates the choice of questions that a researcher plans 
to ask during interviews; and it facilitates corroboration of evidence.      
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To this end, the researcher has conducted episodic interviews (Jovchelovitch and 
Bauer, 2000; Flick, 2000; Flick, 2009).  Flick has extensively described the details of 
this method (2009: 185-191).  The episodic interview aims to obtain two kinds of 
knowledge – episodic and semantic.  'Whereas episodic knowledge is organised closer 
to experiences and linked to concrete situations and circumstances, semantic knowledge 
is based on assumptions and relations, which are abstracted from these and generalised' 
(Flick, 2009: 185).   
The first element of an episodic interview aims at getting 'episodic-situational 
forms of experiential knowledge' (Flick, 2009: 186).  PPP actors’ reflection of episodes 
in which participants had personal experiences is a valuable source of data.  The nature 
of this data collection method fits well with the objectives of this research as it intends 
to explore management experiences and perceptions of challenges to PPPs and how 
actors adapt to these challenges.  Thus, part of the data is linked to specific 
circumstances in which these PPP challenges have emerged and transpired, and 
accessing these data serves the study’s research objectives well.       
The second element of an episodic interview includes concrete pointed questions in 
order to explore concepts and their relation to each other.  This element aims at 
accessing semantic parts of knowledge (Flick, 2009). 
It is the combination of both elements that makes an episodic interview an effective 
research tool.  An episodic interview '…includes a combination of narratives oriented to 
situational or episodic contexts and argumentation that peel off such contexts in favour 
of conceptual and rule-oriented knowledge' (Flick, 2009: 186).     
The researcher has selected the participants for the episodic interviews as follows.     
The first interviewee is a member of the Board of Directors of the Kazakhstani 
corporation called Doszhan Temir Zholy, located in the city of Almaty.  This company 
is the PPP operator that is responsible for the construction and operation of a railroad 
between the station of Shar and the city of Ust-Kamenogorsk in Eastern Kazakhstan.  
The interviewee’s extensive experience in implementing a PPP project is invaluable for 
the subsequent data search and analysis.       
The second interviewee is the former senior manager of the Kazakhstan National 
PPP Centre that is located in Astana, the capital city of Kazakhstan.  As the principal 
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task of the PPP Centre is to assist the government agencies in project preparation and 
obtaining approvals for partnership project proposals, this participant was involved in 
the oversight and guidance of these activities.  His exposure to episodes regarding how 
the government agencies collaborate in the design of a PPP project is a valuable 
experience that might guide further data research.  Table 3.8 summarises attributes of 
the interviewees’ positions, their organisations and their areas of expertise.         
 
             Table 3.8 Attributes of interviewees selected for a pilot study 
# Interviewee’s 
position, company 
and location 
Interviewee’s 
areas of expertise 
Industry or 
agency  
 
1 
Member of the 
Board of Directors, 
Doszhan Temir 
Zholy.  
Office is located in 
the city of Almaty, 
Kazakhstan   
 PPP project 
launch 
 PPP project 
implementation 
 Interaction 
between 
partners in a 
PPP 
Railroads 
(construction and 
operation) 
 
2 
Senior manager, 
National PPP 
Centre located in 
the city of Astana, 
Kazakhstan  
 PPP project 
design 
 PPP approval 
process 
 Interaction 
between 
government 
agencies 
Government 
agency 
 Source: Compiled by the author  
 
 
3.5.2 Preliminary findings 
 
The researcher asked respondents questions regarding the four pre-determined 
categories:  
1. What issues seem to occupy most attention of PPP actors?  
2. How can a respondent prioritise these issues? 
3. Who are the PPP key actors?  
4. What organisational (institutional) documentation may be useful for a PPP study?  
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Respondents provided their answers that the researcher subsequently placed in 
appropriate categories and summarised.  The researcher compared respondents’ answers 
in order to identify commonalities and differences.  The researcher has not found any 
major discrepancies, although there were a few differences in how the respondents 
prioritised PPP management issues.  It is likely that these differences stem from 
different roles and positions that the two respondents have in the PPP field.  The 
preliminary findings have shown the following.    
The respondents have identified and subsequently prioritised the following issues: a) 
bureaucratic and lengthy interaction between the government agencies during a PPP 
project preparation; b) a difficult process of arranging financing for a project; c) 
problems with the PPP contract provisions that occasionally omit important points, 
which requires negotiation between partners after a project begins; d) the government 
strict regulations of tariffs for the PPP services.   
Although respondents did not use the terms ‘risk management’, ‘risk allocation’ or 
‘partner interaction’, all four sets of issues fall in the domain of risk management and 
partner relations, which are the key themes for this study.  This has confirmed the 
direction of further research in terms of selection of principal themes and issues.         
The preliminary findings also confirmed and expanded the range of organisations 
and interviewees which are useful for this study.  Specifically, the respondents 
underscored that the regional governments (in addition to the government ministries) 
play the role of the public sector partner.  This is the case of an approved PPP that aims 
at building kindergartens in the city of Karaganda in Northern Kazakhstan.  Hence, the 
preliminary findings pointed to the need to expand the range of possible interviewees.     
 Findings regarding PPP institutional documentation also confirmed the need to do 
documentary analysis.  In addition to laws and government regulations that are widely 
available, respondents pointed to annual reports that PPP operators prepare.  These 
reports may be useful as they contain financial and analytical data.  Additional 
organisational documentation may include analytical reports on specific issues that PPP 
operators, national and regional PPP centres occasionally release.   
The benefits of the pilot study are as follows.  It has confirmed the direction of the 
data search with the focus on partner interaction issues and risk management.  It has 
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expanded the range of possible interviewees to be included in the study.  It has 
confirmed the need for documentary analysis, in addition to in-depth interviews as the 
principal data source.  Finally, it has facilitated the development of categories for the 
interview data.  Section 3.6 will discuss these categories, along with the methods for 
data analysis.      
The differing respondents' views, i.e., the private contractor's perspective versus the 
government agency's perspective, have ensured diversity of data sources, whilst the 
employment of the episodic interview method in a pilot study has permitted the 
researcher to expand and enrich approaches to data collection.  'By linking narratives 
and question-answer sequences, this method realises the triangulation of different 
approaches as the basis of data collection' (Flick, 2009: 190).  
 
3.6 Methods for Data Analysis      
 
Qualitative thick description is the foundation of data analysis in this research 
(Holloway, 1997; Patton, 2002; Seale, 2004).  Thick description refers to the detailed 
account of interviewees’ experiences in which the researcher makes explicit the patterns 
of cultural and social relationships and puts them in the context (Holloway, 1997).  In 
this study, the researcher will carry out data analysis not by using the storytelling 
approach, but an analytical framework approach (Patton, 2002: 437-440), specifically, 
by a thematic analysis that involves providing the detailed account of actors’ 
experiences and putting them in context (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  Initially, the 
researcher has drawn the themes and analytical framework from the literature appraisal 
and subsequently integrated adjustments to the themes and the framework as a result of 
gradual data collection and evolving analysis.      
This corresponds well to the purpose of this study to investigate the actors’ 
experiences and perceptions of management challenges in the context of Kazakhstan 
and Russia because the researcher grouped perceptions and opinions by themes.  Each 
theme reflects a PPP management issue or a set of issues.  Unlike qualitative thick 
description that anthropological studies use (Holloway, 1997; Seale, 2004), the 
approach to data analysis in this thesis does not require capturing each and every small 
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detail of what an interviewee said.  As the researcher planned to examine data in the 
framework of a thematic analysis, which this section describes below, the researcher 
coded interview data and placed different chunks of data in different categories.   
The researcher has determined the initial themes and categories as follows: 
examples and sources of opportunistic behaviour in a PPP; short-run and long-run 
implications of partner opportunistic behaviour; interaction issues between partners in a 
PPP; tools and methods for dispute resolution between partners; emerging risks and risk 
management in a PPP; partnership critical success factors.  In order to accommodate 
and analyse qualitative data, the researcher has drawn these six specific areas from the 
literature appraisal and the framework set by the guiding theory, i.e., the PPP 
governance concept.  However, later on the researcher has reduced the number of 
themes from six to four by incorporating some issues in the remaining themes and by 
adjusting some themes.  As a result, the researcher has determined the four following 
principal themes for investigation: 
1) Opportunistic behaviour in a PPP; 
2) Interaction between partners in a PPP; 
3)  Risk management in a PPP; and 
4)  Constraints and impediments to effective PPP governance.          
Further, the research employs the process of data analysis, which includes the 
following stages.            
The first stage includes preliminary analysis of themes that the researcher identified 
as a result of the literature appraisal and revelation of literature gaps.  This stage 
generates the first order of data categories within each theme.  
The second stage involves the pilot study, i.e., two interviews of exploratory nature.  
At this stage, the researcher tests the relevance of theoretical insights drawn from the 
literature assessment, identifies issues that will guide further research and integrates 
additional sub-themes in the research design.   
At the third stage, the researcher develops a few categories within each theme.  
This permits him to structure data for further analysis. 
At the fourth stage, the researcher enriches categories by their properties.  The 
researcher shapes categories as a result of receiving additional data from interviews and 
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from documentary analysis.  Additional data may confirm initial observations or, 
alternatively, additional data may disagree with initial data and this leads to adjustments 
in categories, earlier identified patterns, dependencies or relationships.  It also leads to 
the need to obtain more data, so that they may contribute to deeper understanding of 
evolving patterns.  At this stage, the researcher develops a set of categories in order to 
capture various kinds of issues that the researcher has identified during interviews and 
documentation review.  The researcher then prioritises categories in order to separate 
more important issues from less important, subordinates them, and establishes links 
between them. 
The fifth stage requires setting the limits for themes and sub-themes and setting 
boundaries for the range of items that are factored in.  For example, at this stage the 
researcher needs to determine the scope of context-specific factors that may influence a 
specific PPP management issue (such as procedures for risk allocation between partners) 
and may need to set boundaries for situational factors.          
The sixth stage includes writing up brief descriptors of situations that interviewees 
commonly depict or refer to.  The purpose of descriptors is to identify typical issues in 
PPP management and commonly used ways of adapting to these problems.     
At the seventh stage, the researcher makes cross-country comparisons and 
identifies commonalities and differences in PPP management.  The eighth stage 
involves drawing up models, patterns, and observations that are based on earlier 
identified commonalities and differences in processes, interactions and relationships.  
Finally, the ninth stage includes writing the research report.   
The data analysis process described above has certain commonalities with the 
constant comparative method that the grounded theory approach employs for the 
purpose of generating theory (Patton, 2002; Flick, 2009).  Specifically, the constant 
comparative method implies multiple rounds of iteration marked by gradual changes at 
each stage.  'Although this method is a continuous growth process – each stage after a 
time transforms itself into the next – previous stages remain in operation throughout the 
analysis and provide continuous development to the following stage until the analysis is 
terminated' (Glaser, 1969: 220, cited in Flick, 2009: 407-408).  This feature, i.e., that 
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previous stages remain in operation throughout the analysis, applies also to data 
analysis in this thesis (Glaser, 1965).  
Having discussed methods for data analysis, the next section highlights how the 
study ensures its truthfulness.  Section 3.7 examines research validity. 
 
3.7 Research Validity   
  
Research validity refers to how truthful the study is (Neuman, 2007: 120).  
Similarly, Flick argues that 'the question of validity can be summarised as a question of 
whether the researchers see what they think they see' (2009: 387).  In qualitative 
research, three types of errors may occur: to see a relation or principle where they are 
not correct; to reject them when they are indeed correct; and finally to ask the wrong 
questions (Kirk and Miller, 1986: 29-30).    
In order to ensure high validity of their research, 'most qualitative researchers 
concentrate on ways to capture an inside view and provide a detailed account of how 
those they are studying feel about and understand events' (Neuman, 2007: 120).  In 
methodology of research, this refers to triangulation.  'Triangulation as a keyword is 
used to name the combination of different methods, study groups, local and temporal 
settings, and different theoretical perspectives in dealing with a phenomenon' (Flick, 
2009: 444).        
In this study, the researcher ensures validity by employing multiple data collection 
methods and data analysis.  Figure 3.1 highlights triangulation of data sources.  
Figure 3.1 illustrates methodological triangulation in collecting data that this 
research has employed.  The researcher has collected data from a number of sources.  
They include interviewees from the public sector organisations, such as Kazakhstan's 
Ministry of Transportation, the government-owned national railroad company, regional 
and local governments; private operators that implement partnership projects; national 
PPP centres in both Kazakhstan and Russia; regional PPP centres in each of the two 
countries; and law firms that are involved in preparation of PPP contracts.  Additionally, 
the researcher has collected data from organisational documentation, such as policy 
documents, project descriptions, industry and company statistics, analytical and 
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informational reports and published interviews with the government officials and 
company experts.  Hence, for the purpose of achieving high validity, this research has 
employed triangulation in data collection and secured multiple data sources.   
 
PPP research: 
triangulation 
of data sources
Documentary 
analysis
National PPP 
centre in each 
country 
Regional PPP 
centres in each 
country 
PPP project 
operators
Government 
agencies
Figure 3.1 Triangulation in collecting data
Source: Compiled by the author
 
In addition to data triangulation, the research has also employed the combination of 
methods in data analysis, which Figure 3.2 illustrates.       
Figure 3.2 shows triangulation in methods of data analysis.  The research has begun 
with the critical appraisal of scholarly literature that resulted in identifying principal 
streams, themes and gap areas.  The researcher paid special attention to the Russian 
language literature including PPP themes that it highlights and under researched areas.  
The researcher continued his project by conducting the pilot study, analysis of 
institutional documentation in Kazakhstan and Russia and thematic analysis which he 
applied to data from in-depth interviews.       
The researcher has borrowed his validity parameters for this study from Ritchie and 
Lewis (2003) who have described the following tools that are useful for checking the 
truthfulness of research.  They include:  
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Analysis of 
institutional  
documentation 
Figure 3.2 Triangulation in data analysis
Source: Compiled by the author
Critical appraisal 
of Western and 
Russian language 
literature
Triangulation
Thematic analysis of
actors’
experiences in the context  
(an analysis of in-depth 
interviews)
Episodic and semantic
knowledge from the
pilot study (i.e., episodic 
interviews)
 
 
 'Sample coverage: did the sample frame contain any known bias; were the 
criteria used for selection inclusive of constituencies known, or thought, to be of 
importance? 
 Capture of the phenomena: was the environment, quality of questioning 
sufficiently effective for participants to fully express/explore their views? 
 Identification or labeling: have the phenomena been identified, categorised and 
‘named’ in ways that reflect the meanings assigned by study participants? 
 Interpretation: is there sufficient internal evidence for the explanatory accounts 
that have been developed? 
 Display: have the findings been portrayed in a way that remains ‘true’ to the 
original data and allows others to see the analytic constructions that have 
occurred?' (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003: 274).    
By using tools described above (i.e., internal validation) and adopting triangulation 
of data sources and of data analysis methods, this research aims to ensure corroboration 
of empirical evidence, meanings and participants’ insights and, thereby, reach a high 
degree of the study's validity. 
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3.8 Ethical Considerations               
 
For interviewees, participation in interviews in this research has been voluntary, 
and the researcher sought consent from all respondents prior to interviews (Ritchie and 
Lewis, 2003: 66-67).  The researcher has informed all participants regarding the aims 
and nature of this study, as well as of the likely duration of an interview and of the 
researcher's intention to use results exclusively for analytical purposes.  In research, it is 
important to '… protect privacy by not disclosing a participant’s identity after 
information is gathered' (Neuman, 2007: 57).  Thus, in this study the researcher has 
made every effort to assure anonymity and confidentiality of all interviewees, which is 
in line with ethical standards in research (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Creswell, 2009).      
The researcher has addressed specific ethical considerations as follows. 
Permission requirement.  The researcher used personal connections for making 
contacts with potential interview participants.  The author’s personal professional and 
private connections have helped him to identify interviewees in the government 
agencies, operators' companies and PPP centres in Kazakhstan and Russia.  Using 
referrals, the researcher initially has approached potential study participants over the 
telephone in order to find out more about their area of expertise, their willingness to 
engage in a more detailed discussion and to solicit their consent to be interviewed.  
During the phone conversation, the researcher explicitly has raised a question whether a 
participant’s organisation has a policy regarding interviews to external contacts.  In all 
approached organisations there was no such a policy, and, in these cases, no permission 
from an organisation was required.  After the researcher made initial contact with a 
participant and received the consent for an interview, together, they mutually selected a 
date and time for an interview.  During the in-person interviews, the researcher asked 
participants to identify some key actors (normally, with whom they worked) that might 
be helpful for this study and provide contact information and referrals, which they did.  
Subsequently, the researcher approached newly identified respondents and asked to 
interview them using the procedure described above.   
Informed consent.  To maintain elements of informed consent, the researcher has 
notified participants of the study’s purpose and has provided full identification of the 
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researcher’s identity (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003: 66-67; Sarantakos, 2005; Creswell, 2009: 
89-90).  
Protection of participants’ identity.  The researcher analysed the data on an 
anonymous basis, only specifying the stakeholder group with which the participant is 
affiliated.  The researcher employed the coding system in order to use the data in 
analysis without revealing the participants’ identity.  The researcher has replaced real 
names with code names (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Neuman, 2007).    
Protection of confidentiality.  The researcher did not mention in any documents 
the name of a participant, the names of their organisations as well as any details that 
may lead to a breach of anonymity and confidentiality, unless a participant explicitly 
stated that keeping confidentiality is unimportant (Patton, 2002; Ritchie and Lewis, 
2003; Flick, 2009: 42).     
Participant’s comfort zone.  The researcher assured each study participant that 
his/her participation is voluntary and that he/she has the right to withdraw at any time 
(Flick, 2009: 41).   
Conflicts of interest.  There are no conflicts of interest related to the links between 
the researcher’s organisational affiliation and this study.   
Researcher bias.  By keeping neutrality during interviews, the researcher has taken 
steps in order to avoid showing any sign of appreciation or disagreement in the course 
of interviews and in particular, regarding topics of a sensitive or political nature (Patton, 
2002; Neuman, 2007; Creswell, 2009; Flick, 2009). 
 
3.9 Chapter Conclusion         
            
In this chapter, the author has discussed his stance regarding research methodology.  
Throughout the chapter, the author emphasised the key notion regarding the research 
design, namely that the adopted methodology should be appropriate to the study from 
the perspective of meeting its research objectives and answering research questions 
(Flick, 2009: 33).   
The starting point in the research methodology design was to identify the author’s 
position regarding the nature of reality.  This refers to the choice of an ontological 
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paradigm, positivist or phenomenological.  The author believes that reality is socially 
constructed and subjective, and in line with this, the author has adopted the 
phenomenological paradigm.  
The author’s phenomenological position regarding philosophy of research has had 
the defining influence on elements of methodology that the author subsequently has 
chosen.  In reference to epistemological positions, i.e., about the relationship between 
the knower and the known, the phenomenological approach has determined the author’s 
stance that a researcher is part of what he/she is researching and a researcher interacts 
with the study participants.    
The author’s philosophical positions have determined his choice in favour of the 
inductive approach to research process.  The author begins research with observations 
of empirical data.  Instead of putting forward a hypothesis upfront, the study makes 
detailed observations of PPP management issues in the context of Kazakhstan and 
Russia by collecting data from various sources.  As research progresses, the researcher 
develops more abstract ideas and theories.  This way theory builds from the ground up, 
based on the collection and observation of empirical data.     
As this study uses subjective data, the author has adopted a qualitative research 
approach.  The research objective was to not make some generalisations based on 
precise numerical measures, but to gain insights into how participants understand 
management challenges to PPPs.  Furthermore, a comparative analysis of Kazakhstan 
and Russia, in terms of PPP management perceptions and experiences, has also 
determined the choice of qualitative paradigm for the study. 
Methodology also requires selection of appropriate methods of data collection and 
data analysis.  The author has adopted in-depth semi-structured interviews as the main 
data collection method as this study investigates perceptions and opinions, not just mere 
facts and figures.  The author has identified and discussed in detail the reasons that 
make this method most appropriate for the research.  Additionally, the author employs 
content analysis that includes critical appraisal of extant literature and various kinds of 
organisational documentation.   
In designing methodology for this research, the author has paid special attention to 
ensuring triangulation in both data sources and methods of data analysis.  Multiple 
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sources of data for this study include interviewees from the public sector (such as 
ministries, government-owned companies, regional or local governments); private 
operators that implement partnership projects; and national and regional PPP centres in 
both Kazakhstan and Russia.  Review of organisational documentation complements the 
interview data.  The researcher achieves triangulation of data analysis by combining 
constant comparative method with episodic interviews from a pilot study, and by 
critical assessment of scholarly literature from both Western and Russian language 
sources.  This way triangulation ensures corroboration of evidence and permits the 
researcher to reach a high degree of validity of the study.   
The following chapter presents an analysis of the qualitative data that the researcher 
has collected during the in-depth interviews.       
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS 
 
4.0 Chapter Introduction 
 
This chapter delineates the results of in-depth interviews that the researcher 
conducted with the managers and key PPP project staff in Kazakhstan and Russia, as 
well as experts in the public agencies, national and regional PPP centres, law firms and 
non-governmental organisations that were or are involved in partnership governance.  
Using the participants' own words and opinions, the chapter captures their experiences 
in the exercise of PPP management and their perceptions of issues facing the 
partnerships.  The chapter highlights the four key themes including:  
 Opportunistic behaviour in a PPP; 
 Interaction between partners in a PPP; 
 Risk management in a PPP; and  
 Constraints and impediments to PPP governance.    
Figure 4.1 depicts the chapter's structure.    
                                   Figure 4.1 Chapter Four outline 
4.0 Introduction
4.1 Opportunistic 
behaviour in a PPP
4.2 Interaction 
between partners
4.3 Risk management 
in a PPP
4.4 Constraints to PPP
governance
4.1.1 Reasons and forms
4.1.2 Short-term 
implications of partner
opportunistic behaviour
4.1.3 Theme summary
4.2.1 Partner interaction 
issues: categories
4.2.2 PPP organisational 
forms and implications for 
partner relations
4.2.3 Tools and methods 
for dispute resolution
4.2.4 Theme summary
4.3.1 Technical risk
4.3.2 Construction risk
4.3.3 Operating risk
4.3.4 Revenue risk
4.3.5 Financial risk
4.3.6 Environmental risk
4.3.7 Regulatory/political risk
4.3.8 Public acceptance risk
4.3.9 Project default risk
4.3.10 Foreign exchange risk
4.3.11 Choice of a private 
partner
4.3.12 Hidden protectionism
4.3.13 Theme summary
4.4.1 Legal and regulatory
barriers
4.4.2 Institutional and 
managerial impediments
4.4.3 Financial constraints
4.4.4 Theme summary
4.5 Chapter summary
 
 Source: Compiled by the author 
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Having presented a thematic analysis of empirical data, the following chapter 
focuses on discussion, whilst the subsequent chapter draws a PPP governance model 
and identifies PPP critical success factors.       
   
4.1 Opportunistic Behaviour in a PPP   
 
This theme is structured as follows.  The discussion begins by highlighting the 
differences between opportunistic behaviour and defensive behaviour.  It then 
illuminates opportunism in the form of the public sector partner's pressure and outlines 
how a private partner exhibits opportunism in a tariff setting.  The theme concludes 
with the summary.  Figure 4.2 illuminates the structure of this theme.    
 
 Figure 4.2 Theme's structure: Opportunistic behaviour in a PPP      
4.1 
Opportunistic behaviour
in a PPP
4.1.1 Reasons and 
forms
4.1.2 Short-term 
implications
4.1.3 Theme one 
summary 
Source: Compiled by the author
 
For convenient affiliation of data with a project, the researcher has assigned each 
project a code, as Table 4.1 shows.   
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 Table 4.1 PPP projects' codes 
PPP project  Project code 
Railroad segment in Eastern Kazakhstan  KZ-1 
A toll viaduct in Ryazan, Russia RU-1 
Eleven kindergartens in Karaganda, Kazakhstan  KZ-2 
Two kindergartens and three schools in St Petersburg, Russia  RU-2 
 Source: Compiled by the author 
 
4.1.1 Opportunistic behaviour in a PPP: Reasons and forms  
 
Opportunistic behaviour in a PPP is the first theme that emerged during the 
interviews.  With regards to the PPP research, the author adopts a broad operational 
definition of opportunism that refers to a partner's method of pursuing self-interest with 
or without guile.  Opportunistic behaviour may manifest itself in the holdup problem 
(Besanko et al., 2009) where a party in a contractual relationship may take advantage of 
the other party's vulnerability owing to high asset specificity (i.e., where an asset is 
unique to a certain project and cannot be easily sold or used in other projects).  Besanko 
et al. (2009) assert that an incomplete contract offers a possibility for one party to 
exploit weaknesses of the other party's position whilst the transactions are in progress.  
Hence, from a strategy point of view, parties to a contract are generally interested in 
contemplating all relevant contingencies and determining a set of actions for every 
contingency.  Otherwise, an incomplete contract opens doors for the holdup problem 
and other manifestations of opportunistic behaviour: "A firm holds up its trading partner 
by attempting to renegotiate the terms of a deal" (Besanko et al., 2009: 140).  Section 
5.1 in Chapter Five provides the detailed discussion of opportunism's conceptualisation 
and its manifestation in partnerships.    
Whilst typically used in the literature for describing the occasional pursuit of self-
interest by either party in a PPP, the term 'opportunistic behaviour' overlaps with the 
term 'defensive behaviour'.  Researchers define the latter as the reactive defence of self-
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interests, rather than their active pursuit (Ashforth and Lee, 1990).  Defensive behaviour 
avoids action via over-conforming, smoothing, stretching and stalling; avoids blame via 
playing safe, misrepresenting and escalating commitment; and avoids change via 
resisting change and protecting turf (Ashforth and Lee, 1990).  To summarise, whilst 
defensive behaviour mostly aims at avoiding action, blame or change, opportunistic 
behaviour may also include the similar forms, although it mostly aims at direct or 
indirect gain.  
The chapter now turns to the discussion of various forms that opportunism in PPPs 
under investigation manifested.   
  
4.1.1a Opportunism in the form of the public sector partner's pressure 
 
This section discusses examples of opportunistic behaviour that manifest in the 
public sector partner's pressure on a private party.  The first subsection illuminates how 
the government and its private sector partner dealt with the public acceptance of a PPP 
project.  The second subsection delineates how the government used its pressure in a 
few partnerships to achieve faster results.     
  
Dealing with the public acceptance of a PPP 
Interviewees from the toll viaduct project in Russia highlighted an example where 
the government exerted significant pressure on the private sector partner in order to 
have the latter deal with the emergent issues related to public acceptance of a PPP 
project.  Interviewees asserted that an operator has to maintain an extensive Web site, 
which is a costly and labour-intensive effort, in order to enhance the public awareness 
and the public acceptance of the project, although the PPP contract did not explicitly 
specify this responsibility.  It is likely that the company's effort stems from the informal 
government pressure.  The following excerpt shows the interviewee's opinion:   
'We have tons of documents on the corporate Web site with all kinds of 
extensive explanations of why this project is necessary and how we are going 
to implement it.  Usually, companies don't do this.  But we even have a blog for 
those who want to make comments.  Can you imagine how much it costs us to 
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maintain a good Web site, read citizens' comments and reply to their 
concerns?'                  
                  RU-1-Alexander 
Additionally, the same respondent expressed his concerns regarding free services 
that the company has to provide for a few months after the service launch: 
'The country is building a market economy, and people need to pay for 
everything.  We are a private company making a large investment instead of 
the government.  Why do we need to provide the service free of charge?  Well, 
we can do it and we already agreed to it.  But not for long.  We just need to see 
how this all works.'   
 RU-1-Alexander 
One more excerpt highlights the reason underlying the decision to provide a free 
service:  
'Of course, the government wants to satisfy people with a new viaduct.  But 
they [the government staff] keep telling us that our company [an operator] 
implements the project and we will get paid in the future, and we have to deal 
with all the issues.  The government kind of supervises our work.'    
 RU-1-Victor 
The above excerpts are illustrative of government behaviour influencing the private 
sector partner in a certain way: the latter agreed to provide free services and absorb the 
cost.  In a trade-off between higher revenue and greater public acceptance of the project, 
the private party decided to give up some revenue.  However, it is unlikely that the 
private sector partner voluntarily engaged in this trade-off: the company's choice to 
publicise the toll facility and increase the public acceptance of the project was induced 
by the government, which opportunistically shifted the effort and its cost to an operator.   
 
Government external pressure to achieve faster results    
Another example that illustrates government pressure on a private party is 
associated with the quick results that the government planned to receive in the project 
aimed at the construction and operation of 11 kindergartens in Karaganda, Kazakhstan.  
The way the government designed this project was that the private sector partner must 
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undertake and complete the construction of all eleven kindergartens simultaneously, 
rather than one after another.  An interviewee shared his concerns regarding the 
government plan to undertake the simultaneous, rather than sequential, construction of 
all facilities: 
'The government is eager to report that it did something good for people.  The 
government does not spend any money right now as it is the private investment.  
And because it's not its own effort, the government wants us to complete the 
construction as soon as possible, and all kindergartens must be completed at 
once.' 
KZ-2-Darkhan 
The excerpt shows that the government-designed project structure leads to elevated 
costs and problems with knowledge transfer.  As all 11 kindergartens are to be 
constructed simultaneously during approximately one year, an operator cannot use the 
same equipment at each construction site, as would be possible in the case of sequential 
construction.  This increases construction costs because an operator has to purchase 
and/or rent the same sets of construction equipment and tools and hire a large number of 
workers for all 11 sites.  Additionally, the private sector partner will be unable to apply 
its own technical expertise gained during the construction process because construction 
of all 11 kindergartens will happen simultaneously.  The same applies to the inability of 
knowledge transfer to the kindergartens’ operation and maintenance: all kindergartens 
are scheduled to begin their operations simultaneously.  Thus, this PPP missed an 
opportunity for public sector cost reduction due to the project structure that involves 
simultaneous, rather than sequential, construction of 11 kindergartens.  In turn, the 
project structure stems from the government pressure to achieve quick results.   
Another respondent expressed his concerns of a similar nature, i.e., that the 
government tends to exert both formal and informal moral pressure attempting to 
achieve faster outcomes: 
'The government encourages us to complete the construction sooner than the 
planned deadlines.  We talk about this all the time.  But it costs money to do 
things faster.'    
RU-2-Vladimir 
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On the same project, another interviewee commented as follows: 
'The city government wants to show how it cares about people and because of 
this it keeps pushing us regarding the deadlines.  They [government staff] 
always ask: "When?  When will you finish this up?"  They keep saying that we 
need to hurry up and that a delay is not an option.  I know they realise that 
construction costs money but I don't think they care about our expenses.'    
 RU-2-Sergey 
The excerpts above are indicative of the problems that might arise where the 
government pushes to achieve results faster.  Although the project goals remain the 
same and the government does not expect anything different or additional from the 
private sector partner, government requests, if followed, impact work schedules and 
volumes, logistics schemes and may significantly alter (and even disrupt) the operator's 
established relations with workers and suppliers.  Hence, in this case the government 
opportunistic behaviour manifests itself in assigning heightened priority to achieve fast 
results by ignoring the private partner's efforts and costs that are required to achieve 
these results.         
Another interviewee has experienced the same kind of government pressure aimed 
at speeding up the project's progress as the following excerpt shows:   
'The government naturally wants to launch the service as soon as possible.  
And it wants to open all facilities at once.  But for us it means that we need to 
hire a lot of construction workers and then let them go after they are done with 
the job.  We could have moved the same workers from one site to another but I 
don't think it's possible in this project.  In essence, different workers will be 
doing the same kind of job at the same time at different construction sites.  I 
don't think that this is the best way of using workers but what can we do?  The 
government wants us to build all facilities within a year.'         
KZ-2-Talgat 
The above excerpt demonstrates the government's neglect of cost reduction 
opportunities.  It shows that the government's opportunistic intention to report results 
sooner, rather than later, undermines a natural (from the perspective of transaction cost 
economics) goal of ensuring low cost to the budget and, ultimately, the taxpayers.    
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To summarise the above experiences and perceptions, interviewees have articulated 
the point that the government agencies tend to exert considerable external pressure on a 
private partner regardless of the project context, organisational dynamics and overall 
project goals.  In those cases where the private sector partner is receptive to external 
pressure, the government push for its own agenda will likely result in an additional 
effort by a private party and related additional costs.      
In addition to the pressure that the public sector partner exerts on an operator, 
public agencies may exhibit opportunistic behaviour in another way.  An interviewee 
from the Russian PPP operator illuminates his experience as follows: 
'The construction goes on schedule.  Some issues exist here and there but all of 
them are minor.  However, this year [2012] all of a sudden the government 
delayed its payments.  It just stopped paying and it has lasted already for a few 
months.  We talk to them [government staff] almost every day but they can't 
say what happened and when the government will be able to pay.  All they say 
is that there are some budget issues and they will be resolved soon.  But 
when?'     
RU-2-Vladimir 
In this case, government opportunism manifests itself in the neglect of the private 
partner's need to receive payments in an orderly fashion, on schedule, in order to ensure 
stable cash flow.  As the private partner has to pay suppliers, pay wages and other 
capital and operating expenses, disregard for its needs essentially means a total 
disruption of the PPP operations, where a private party has to urgently borrow funds to 
cover its operating costs.  Furthermore, government failure to pay on time may 
seriously undermine an operator's borrowing ability because a lender will be unsure 
how and when an operator will be able to repay the loan.  Hence, government 
opportunistic behaviour manifests itself in the neglect of the PPP needs, which a private 
partner represents.  If such government neglect occurs repeatedly, the overall PPP 
success may be severely compromised.              
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4.1.1b Opportunism in tariff setting: Diverging partners' interests 
 
In contrast to government opportunistic behaviour demonstrated by public sector 
partner pressure, in another area of partner interaction – tariff setting – a private sector 
partner often behaves in an opportunistic way: operators persistently push for higher 
tariffs in order to earn larger revenue.  The following comment highlights the operator's 
aim: 
'We [an operator] want to raise tariffs in order to get more money as the 
project is not yet breaking even.  This is the only way to make the project 
profitable.  But the regulator rejects our applications...' 
        KZ-1-Damir 
In the above excerpt, an interviewee associates a tariff raise with the project's 
higher revenue and, ultimately, an opportunity to turn the current operating loss into 
profit.  Categorising an operator's behaviour as opportunistic depends on whether a 
private party acts in the interests of a PPP by applying for a tariff raise and whether the 
latter is the only available method for breaking even.  For an operator, an increase in 
tariffs means no additional effort involved in increasing the volume of service provision, 
making quality improvements or enhancing the customer base.  As it is an attempt to 
receive more revenue for the same service, it is unlikely that each tariff raise is in the 
common partnership interest.   
From the government’s perspective, a higher tariff means that a public service is 
becoming more expensive and less affordable to wider segments of customers.  If tariff 
raises occur repeatedly, the erosion of the public service affordability becomes evident.  
The government that is concerned with the price stability for the public services should 
perceive a tariff raise as a tool that undermines this stability.  Hence, the government 
perspective, which implies unfavourable treatment of applications for tariff adjustments, 
permits the society to receive the greater PPP value for money and, thus, serves the PPP 
interest as well as the interests of the taxpayers and the public.  On the contrary, 
opportunistic private sector partner behaviour, that pursues its own interest, rather than 
that of a partnership, diminishes the PPP value for money.  Instead of raising a tariff, an 
operator may look for ways of cutting costs and increasing the project’s efficiency.     
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The common reasons for a private partner's opportunistic behaviour, such as intent 
to raise a tariff, are the need to pay for cost overruns and/or to finance the newly 
transpired business needs.  The following example illuminates an interviewee's 
perception: 
'This is not an easy project.  In the past, project plans have changed a few 
times and the management has changed.  We have a lot of expenses that 
nobody thought of five or six years ago.  Also, energy costs went up quite a bit.  
Additionally, we need more money in order to deal with inflation, which is 
officially around 7 per cent a year.  In order to get compensated for all this, 
why can't we raise tariffs by 10 or 15 per cent?  Five years ago we didn't 
anticipate how much we would need to raise tariffs because our costs were 
different, they were much lower.'      
KZ-1-Aibol  
The excerpt highlights the operator's interest in using additional revenue from the 
higher tariff for paying expenses that the company management did not anticipate 
earlier.  Additionally, the interviewee attributed certain elevated costs to changes in the 
project and its management that were not part of an original project plan.  Although the 
operator's need to pay for additional costs is apparent, the partners in a project perceive 
each other's behaviour differently.  An operator views its own actions as legitimate, 
whilst it views the anti-monopoly's agency's behaviour as opportunistic because the 
latter strictly follows its own (i.e., the government-set) rules and declines most 
applications for a tariff raise.  To reiterate, from the operator's perspective, the 
regulator's behaviour is opportunistic because it does not take the project's context (i.e., 
the business need) into account.   
The government takes the opposing view as an interviewee from the National PPP 
Centre confirms: 
'They [PPP operators] use all kinds of reasons and excuses in order to justify a 
tariff increase.  The regulator often cannot figure out with confidence whether 
the reasons for an application [for a tariff increase] are valid but it still 
declines many applications.  The bottom line is that I don't think it is wise to 
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use the actual project costs as the main justification for tariff increases.  As 
costs go up, the service prices will be skyrocketing...'      
   KZ-GOVT-3 
The interviewee's comment illustrates the opportunistic nature of the operator's 
behaviour whilst the government pursues the goal of price stability for public services 
and, in essence, pushes a private party to look for ways of increasing the PPP efficiency, 
which contributes to greater PPP value for money.  The latter is clearly the common 
PPP goal.  Hence, comparing the operator's and the government's perspectives, one can 
conclude that the former is opportunistic, whilst the latter serves the public interest.       
The similar behaviour of both partners manifests itself in a toll viaduct concession 
in Russia.  The private sector partner is interested in a toll increase, whilst the 
government wants to keep the toll low and stable, as the following quote shows:      
'We [the operator] have to begin with a very low fee - it is going to be just 10 
rubles [i.e., about USD 32 cents].  Ten roubles is nothing, it's very low.  We 
know that many drivers are prepared to pay a lot more but we have to keep the 
promise.  However, of course, we will raise the fee in the future.  But we need 
to get the government’s consent.  I'm not sure how soon we can get it.  It may 
take a few years.'            
   RU-1-Konstantin 
The interviewee has shown the partners’ divergent interests similar to the 
Kazakhstani project: a private party shows its opportunistic intentions right from the 
project's beginning as it exhibits interest in a higher toll and greater revenue.  Since the 
project is in its early stage (as the facility's construction has not been completed at the 
time of a 2012 interview), the likely underlying reason behind the interest in raising a 
toll is the desire to earn higher profit.  In contrast to a private party's perspective, the 
government (even in the interviewee's perception) pursues the goal of ensuring the price 
stability for the citizens' benefit.      
To summarise, this section has discussed the private sector partner's opportunistic 
behaviour and showed commonalities in actions and intentions that private parties in 
both countries exhibited.   
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4.1.2 Short-term implications of partner opportunistic behaviour   
 
This section discusses two short-term implications of partner opportunistic 
behaviour, which interviews have identified: lack of flexibility in business management 
and cost elevation.    
 
4.1.2a Lack of flexibility in business management  
 
In all partnerships under investigation, a conflict of interests has emerged, namely, 
between tight government regulation and the need for greater flexibility in business 
operations.  Naturally, respondents who work for the government organisations 
emphasised regulation, whilst those who work for the private parties put much higher 
value on greater flexibility in decision-making.   
 
Overregulation 
The following example illuminates limitations imposed on the private sector 
partner's management flexibility:  
'Some government regulations look really strange.  It appeared that we [an 
operator] are not allowed to own a building that we bought a few years ago.  We 
used it as an office and a temporary housing for our staff.  The building is located 
very close to the facility, it is so convenient, and we really need it.  And now the 
government told us that we [a PPP project operator] do not have a right to own 
real estate according to some regulation.  So, now we must sell it, and then we 
will rent another building or perhaps exactly the same building.  This does not 
make any sense to me.'     
KZ-1-Aibol 
This example shows ineffectiveness of some government regulations that strip the 
private partner's operating power without proper justification.  Furthermore, the 
example illuminates neglect of the partnership's context and its business need.  Keeping 
in mind that the number of active PPP projects in Kazakhstan is as small as four (as of 
December 2012), the disregard of PPP needs, which limits the partnership’s success, 
 153 
may have significant detrimental influence on the overall partnership development in 
the country.  Hence, the example is indicative of insufficient attention paid to PPPs at 
the public policy level.  The government treats PPPs the same way as the public sector 
organisations, which results in overregulation of partnerships. 
 
Framing the private partner's management flexibility  
Another example illuminates a more complex case in which the government 
exhibited opportunistic behaviour.  In the following excerpt, an interviewee commented 
on a PPP operator that issued corporate bonds with a coupon value which exceeded the 
volume of a government guarantee:   
'We are now under huge pressure from the anti-trust agency: it wants us to buy 
back bonds.  But where can we get the money to buy back bonds?  Of course, we 
can take money from our current revenues, but this leaves very little money for 
development.'   
        KZ-1-Aibol 
The example shows how the government perceives its own and an operator's risk.  
As the government understands that an operator has to secure financing for its 
investment and operations, the government has agreed to issue a guarantee for a certain 
amount of bonds.  However, driven by a business need, an operator issued a larger 
volume of bonds to ensure uninterrupted investment.  Whilst the government perceives 
this kind of a bond issue as a high-risk endeavour that may adversely influence 
suppliers in the case of PPP default, it required an operator to buy back some bonds, in 
order to reduce the corporate debt exactly to the volume of a government guarantee.  
The interviewee asserted that a bond buyback would leave much less cash for business 
development.  Thus, the government has put itself in a less risky position in the case of 
potential project default: after the buyback, its financial liabilities are limited by exactly 
the value of bonds outstanding.  
At the same time, the government framed the operator's behaviour in a risk-averse 
way and significantly reduced its flexibility in business management during a few years 
of bond buyback.  In this case, the government exhibited opportunistic behaviour: 
whilst a private partner took additional business risk for the PPP benefit (i.e., by 
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receiving larger funds for uninterrupted investment), the government essentially slowed 
down partnership's business development by directing an operator to reduce the size of 
its debt.  The ultimate result is the curtailed private partner's management flexibility.  
Although one can interpret the government action as defensive or as risk mitigation, the 
government pursued its own interest, rather than that of a PPP, whilst the private sector 
partner pursued the common PPP interest, rather than its own.  Hence, overregulation 
represents the government opportunistic attempt to treat a partnership as the public 
sector organisation by minimising the private partner's opportunities to undertake 
business risk and by framing its management flexibility.     
 
The government-imposed risk of staff attrition   
Interviews showed that the government opportunistic behaviour manifested itself in 
a way that imposed the risk of staff attrition on the private sector partner, which also 
reduces its flexibility in business management.  In 2012, in the transportation project in 
Kazakhstan the public sector partners put forward the requirement that an operator must 
move its management office from the city where the office was located during seven 
years from the project inception to another city that is located close to the newly built 
facility.  As for the reason, the public partners' perception is that proximity to the 
facility will presumably permit the partnership to solve operational issues faster and 
more effectively.  The following excerpt shows an interviewee's perceptions: 
'We worked in the existing office seven years and things were okay.  Now they 
[the public sector partners] want us to move.  They say that it will help the 
business.  But I have a family, kids.  I lived here all my life.  How can I move to 
another place?  The idea just came out of the blue.'                                          
                                                                                                          KZ-1-Damir      
Another interviewee also confirmed the controversy involved in the government 
attempt to influence PPP operations.  The following excerpt illuminates this: 
'Why does the government want us to move the office to another city?  I think 
they [the government] are frustrated with the project's progress.  The larger 
part of the railroad has been constructed and is operational; however, another 
part of the railroad is yet to be constructed.  The government insists on the 
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faster completion of construction and the fully operational railroad.  But how 
will the move help this?  As far as I know, many staff will just quit as soon as 
the date for the move is set.  They are not going to leave their families here and 
move there for a few years.  It's much easier just to find another job.  And how 
will these massive departures help to make the project more effective?'         
 KZ-1-Rustam 
Another respondent reiterates the concerns regarding whether the office move may 
increase the project's effectiveness:  
'I know that about half of the employees have already refused to move.  So, the 
company will have to hire lots of people at its new location.  I don't think that 
it is going to be easy.  It is a much smaller city and qualified staff will be hard 
to find.'   
KZ-1-Azamat 
The three excerpts show that, by insisting on the office move, the government is 
unexpectedly putting pressure on the private sector partner by imposing a significant 
risk of key staff attrition.  As there is no empirical evidence that the office move will 
increase the operations' effectiveness, one can categorise the public sector partners' 
behaviour as opportunistic, one that reduces an operator's flexibility in management 
decisions, rather than the one that addresses the proven business need.    
To summarise, the government attempt to overregulate, the effort to reduce its own 
financial liabilities in the event of project failure, or the action that imposes additional 
risk on a private party, such as risk of staff attrition, are indicative of the government’s 
opportunistic behaviour that frames and curtails a private partner's management 
flexibility.    
 
4.1.2b Cost increases 
 
An additional implication of government opportunistic behaviour is the private 
sector partner's cost increases.  The following excerpts exemplify this. 
'After our office moves to another city, we [an operator] have to rent apartments 
for those who have decided to move along.  This is going to cost us quite a bit.  
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Perhaps, later on we will hire more local staff but not right away.  In fact, it 
would be best if we keep the existing workers because they know what's going on 
in the project quite well.  And the business travel expenses will rise for sure.  I 
just don't know whether we are doing the right thing with this move.  There are so 
many new things to pay for.'  
KZ-1-Azamat  
In the above excerpt, an interviewee stated that an operator incurs additional costs 
related to the office move.  The latter stems from the government pressure, rather than 
the operator's own initiative.  As there is no hard evidence that the move will result in 
greater project effectiveness, the operator's additional cost is the direct outcome of the 
government’s opportunistic behaviour.    
The next excerpt highlights the government disregard of cost-savings opportunities.      
'Ideally, we [an operator] could build one facility and learn a lot from our own 
experience - what materials are better, how many workers we need and how to 
use them better, what equipment is more reliable, what mistakes we can avoid.  
But the government is not interested in all that.  They just want new facilities 
as quickly as possible.'         
KZ-2-Darkhan 
As missed opportunities for cost reduction mean relatively higher budget expenses 
and a greater burden for the taxpayers, they are the equivalent of cost increases due to 
the government’s opportunistic behaviour, i.e., neglect of costs in favour of faster 
results. 
An interviewee observes the same kind of neglect in another project in Russia: 
'The city needs kindergartens and schools.  The way they [the government] 
think is this: we [the government] hired you [an operator] and we are going to 
pay big money.  So, we [the government] need to open these kindergartens and 
the sooner the better.  Just because we [the government] pay.' 
RU-2-Oleg 
In the above quote, the interviewee confirmed the government’s preference for a 
faster outcome, rather than cost reduction.  This implies the government’s opportunistic 
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behaviour for a relative cost increase in a PPP compared to what the cost could have 
been if the government and the PPP had pursued the cost reduction opportunity.  
In summary, although there are varying manifestations of government opportunistic 
behaviour, the interviewees asserted that cost elevation is its most common implication 
in all investigated PPP projects.     
 
4.1.3 Theme summary   
 
Table 4.2 summarises examples of opportunistic behaviour that the interviews have 
identified, the typical reasons and forms of partner opportunism and their implications 
in the short term.     
Chapter Five will discuss the implications of opportunistic behaviour in greater 
detail. 
 
 Table 4.2 Opportunistic behaviour of partners in a PPP: Summary of         
       examples, reasons, forms and implications  
Examples of opportunistic 
behaviour 
Reasons and forms  Short-run implications 
 An operator wants to raise 
tariffs;  
 
 An operator issued corporate 
bonds that exceeded the 
volume of government 
guarantees  
 
 The private sector partner 
opportunism occurs due to 
cost overruns and new 
business needs 
 Government opportunism 
intends to limit its liability 
in the case of project 
default 
 Lack of flexibility in 
business management 
 Cost increases as the 
regulator requires an 
operator to buy back bonds 
 Overregulation in the case 
of a bond issue 
  
 The government requires that 
an operator moves its office 
to another city 
 The public sector partner 
opportunism manifests 
itself in the form of 
government pressure due 
to unjustified reasons   
 Cost increases 
 Lack of flexibility in 
business management as 
benefits of new remote 
office location lack 
empirical evidence 
 The government exposes 
the private party to the risk 
of staff attrition   
 The government requires an 
operator to maintain an 
extensive Web site and 
address the citizens' concerns 
in order to create a positive 
public perception of a PPP;  
 
 The public sector partner 
opportunism in the form of 
government pressure 
results in the intention to 
shift an effort and costs to 
a private party   
 Cost increases 
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 The government requires an 
operator to provide the 
services free of charge 
during the beginning period  
 
 The government insists on 
the fast concurrent 
construction of all facilities;  
 The government exerts 
pressure to complete 
construction faster than it 
was planned 
 
 The public sector partner 
opportunism manifests 
itself in the form of 
government pressure due 
to the desire to achieve fast 
results   
 Lack of flexibility in 
business management 
 Cost increases as both 
partners missed the 
opportunities to use 
economies of scale and 
benefits of the operator's 
own construction 
experience 
 The government has delayed 
payments to an operator  
 
 The public sector partner 
opportunism manifests 
itself because of the 
government neglecting the 
private partner' and the 
PPP needs    
 Cost increases as an 
operator has to use 
borrowed funds to ensure 
stable cash flow and to 
make payments  
 
 Source: Compiled by the author 
 
 
4.2 Interaction between Partners in a PPP 
 
Interview results revealed an emergent theme about partner interaction in PPPs, 
which this section discusses.  The section begins by categorising partner interaction 
issues and providing examples.  It then informs partner interaction from the perspective 
of a PPP's organisational form.  Subsequently, the coverage considers the tools and 
techniques of dispute resolution, as the study participants experienced and perceived 
them.  The section concludes with the summary.  Figure 4.3 outlines the theme's 
structure.  
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 Figure 4.3 Partner interaction: Theme structure 
             
4.2.1 Partner interaction issues: 
categories and examples
4.2.2 PPP' organisational forms and their 
implications for partner relations
4.2.3 Tools and methods for dispute 
resolution between partners
4.2.4 Theme summary
4.2 Interaction
between 
partners
in a PPP
 
           Source: Compiled by the author 
 
 
4.2.1 Partner interaction issues: Categories and examples    
 
This study has grouped issues regarding the nature and forms of partner interaction 
in PPPs thematically as follows:   
 Interaction regarding securing project financing;  
 Interaction regarding construction of a facility;  
 Interaction regarding tariff setting; and 
 Interaction regarding other operational issues. 
 
4.2.1a Partner interaction regarding securing project financing 
 
The interaction field regarding various aspects of project financing includes issues 
where an operator needs:   
- government financial support, such as government guarantees for obtaining a 
bank loan, or 
- a loan directly from the government, or 
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- payments from the government as per mutually agreed schedule.   
The following examples illuminate this field of partner interaction.  
In the kindergartens' PPP in Kazakhstan, the private sector partner won a PPP 
contract claiming that it would use its own, rather than borrowed funds.  However, later 
the company changed its original intention and aimed to obtain loan financing from the 
banks outside of Kazakhstan.  An interviewee describes his experience the following 
way:  
'We approached the government [in Kazakhstan] in order to get documents 
showing the government guarantees for our investment in Kazakhstan.  We 
needed to show these documents in Turkish banks where we arrange financing.  
The government supported us, no problem.  But it appeared that the matter is a 
lot more complicated than anyone thought.'    
KZ-2-Talgat 
The interviewee pointed to the complexity in arranging loan financing from a 
foreign bank that is located outside Kazakhstan: a letter of support issued by the 
regional government did not suffice for a foreign bank to give a loan.   
Another PPP project in Kazakhstan experienced problems with operating losses for 
a number of years in a row.  In 2012, the company management applied for a 
government loan in order to cover its operating loss in 2013: 
'Borrowing and paying interest may not be a great thing, but what's good is 
that the government has been responsive and we got the loan.  Anyways, it's 
much better and cheaper to borrow from the government than from a 
commercial bank.'  
KZ-1-Damir 
Both excerpts are indicative of the government’s willingness to extend its support 
and the positive perception of collaborating with the government that interviewees from 
the private organisations have formed.  An example from a PPP project in Russia also 
demonstrates tight partner collaboration and an overall positive experience working 
with the municipal government:  
‘We have full support from the government.  They [the government officials] 
are truly interested in helping us with all kinds of problems, so that the project 
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begins as swiftly as possible.  This is a great approach.  We keep things simple 
and all problems are solved quickly.’   
RU-1-Victor      
 In another project, the Russian operator has a negative experience interacting with 
the city government when the latter suspended its payments to a concessionaire for an 
unspecified period and without an apparent reason: 
'It was just impossible to get any kind of information from them [the 
government staff].  Clerks kept saying that they don't know anything about the 
reasons [for payment delay], and their bosses were simply unavailable.  It 
lasted weeks and weeks...' 
RU-2-Sergey 
In summary, participants reported a positive experience of collaboration with the 
government in those cases where the latter clearly expressed an interest in a PPP project, 
specifically, in a quick service launch.  This explains the government’s motivation that 
backs its willingness to cooperate and achieve quick results.  One can attribute the 
negative experience of working with the government to the lack of knowledge within 
the government organisation itself regarding the source of the problem and how long it 
may last, although even in this case government clerks could have demonstrated much 
greater willingness to cooperate for the common benefit.   
  
4.2.1b Interaction regarding construction of a facility 
 
Interviewees reported mixed experiences in collaborating with government 
agencies regarding issues that arose during the construction process.  These issues range 
from obtaining various permits, approvals and certificates for selected elements of 
construction to connecting a facility to municipal water and electricity networks.  
Whilst some participants had a good experience and formed a positive perception of 
collaborating with the government organisations, other participants have an opposite 
perception based on their negative experience (e.g., 'red tape' and lengthy approval 
time).  The principal perception that interviews have revealed is that in any participants' 
experience, whether positive or negative, respondents asserted that government 
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agencies tended to view collaboration with a PPP much like a collaboration with any 
private contractor.  To reiterate, the government staff did not distinguish between a PPP 
and a private contractor and tended to treat a partnership (including its requests and 
applications) the same way as it would treat a private company that the government 
simply hired to do a certain job.  The following excerpt illuminates this: 
'We waited for an approval [of a construction permit] for a long time.  The 
process kept dragging on and on.  Then, when we said that we need this permit 
right away because we do the job for the government, the answer was: 'so 
what?'  
RU-2-Vladimir  
Participants attributed their government interaction experience, whether positive or 
not, exclusively to the qualities of staff in the government offices.  Those staff who 
were more friendly and proactive provided more effective treatment to PPP requests and 
applications than those who tended to exhibit bureaucratic behaviour and lack of work 
ethics.  As an interviewee commented: 
'It's critically important to keep good relations with clerks who actually do the 
job.  They can get things done faster or they can be very slow.  We pay a lot of 
attention to this.'    
KZ-1-Azamat 
Study participants recognise that there is a different level of partner interaction 
when the government tends to exert pressure on an operator in order to complete the 
construction sooner.  This kind of interaction happens between senior government 
officials and operators' senior managers.  Interviewees asserted that this kind of 
interaction happens during formal and, more often, informal conversations and is 
accompanied by vague promises to support a PPP in the future.  Most often, 
respondents recognise the need to treat this pressure seriously.  However, they 
acknowledged that speeding up the construction or renovation is an extremely difficult 
endeavour, which may incur large costs.  An interviewee provides the following 
comment: 
'Keeping the construction on schedule is very difficult.  Delays in construction 
are a norm, not an exception. And then, when asked to speed up the 
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construction, we are usually puzzled: how is that possible?  Do I have to hire 
another hundred  construction workers or what?  I usually say that I will do 
everything to be on schedule.  I need to patiently explain what happens at the 
construction site, why there are delays, and how we are working on all that.'       
  RU-1-Alexander 
To summarise, formal and informal interaction between partners in a PPP, as 
perceived by the study participants, lacks established processes and effectiveness.  
Much interaction occurs informally, with unpredictable outcomes for either party.   
 
4.2.1c Interaction regarding tariff setting   
 
A typical field of partner interaction includes issues related to an operator's 
applications for raising fees and tariffs for its services.  This kind of interaction 
manifests itself in formal rather than informal ways because an application requires a 
formal approval by the government agency.  Interviewees from two out of four studied 
PPP projects experienced interaction with public organisations regarding tariffs and 
their opinions are diverse1.  Although interviewees from both projects claimed that 
bureaucracy involved in the application process is excessive and tariff increases need to 
be thoroughly justified, one interviewee asserted that there is a convenient loophole: the 
government can approve a new tariff easier and faster if the latter has a temporary status.  
After some time, such as a year, the government can approve a new tariff, also as 
temporary. 
'We can use temporary tariffs for a long time, one after another.  The 
government seems to care a lot less about temporary tariffs, rather then 
permanent.  Of course, for us it is a lot of work to apply again and again [for a 
new temporary tariff] and we never know if a new tariff is going to be 
approved.  But the reality is that they approved all our requests.'   
KZ-1-Rustam        
An interviewee from the government agency commented on tariffs as follows: 
                                               
1 Interviewees from two other projects noted that they are not involved in tariff setting because the 
government, not an operator, receives a fee, such as a childcare fee, from citizens. 
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'They [a PPP] have to set a permanent tariff.  This is how it should be.  
Temporary tariffs are for some special situations, they should not be used 
continuously.  But we are aware that their construction is still unfinished.  So, 
they may use a temporary tariff for a while.'   
KZ-GOVT-2   
The above excerpts show some imperfections in government regulations that, in 
turn, influence partner interaction in a PPP: although the government is interested in 
setting permanent tariffs, its own rules allow an operator to legally bypass the 
requirement and receive a government approval for a temporary tariff much easier and 
faster.   
An interviewee from another project shared his perception of interacting with the 
government in a less optimistic way pointing out the bureaucratic procedures and heated 
debates that tariff setting is likely to involve: 
'We will need to run our proposal through all kinds of committees in the city 
government, then get it approved by the city council, and then by the mayor.  
Some people in the government and ordinary citizens don't like what we are 
doing because we charge a fee for the service [railroad crossing] that used to 
be free.  If we want to raise the fee, I'm sure somebody will be screaming...' 
RU-GOVT-2 
In summary, interaction between partners regarding tariff setting has proven to be 
difficult, in the opinion of interviewees.  The established procedures are bureaucratic, 
lengthy and often are not streamlined.    
 
4.2.1d Interaction regarding other operational issues  
 
Three categories of issues that require partner interaction and that this chapter 
discussed above (project financing, facility construction and tariff setting) fall in a 
broader category of strategic choices.  In contrast to this, partner interaction regarding 
other PPP aspects typically involves operational issues.  An example of the latter is the 
pressure on an operator to move its office from a major city where it was located for 
seven years to another city, which is closer to the project's facility and operations.  The 
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pressure came from two public sector partners, both in informal and formal (i.e., 
decision of the Board of Directors) ways.   
'The office move was kind of a condition for getting a job in this company [a 
PPP].  We [an operator's manager and representatives of the public sector 
partners] discussed it a few times because I was hired in..... [a major city] and 
would have to move soon to a new location, which is quite far away.  Of course, 
every new manager knew what was going to happen and we [a new 
management team] were prepared for that.  But I'm still wondering whether it 
is the right decision for the project.'    
 KZ-1-Assem 
Other managers also asserted that the decision regarding the office move took the 
form of an ultimatum: the public sector partners put it forward as a condition for 
employing a new management team.   
'It [the office move] goes with the territory.  'A new management team must be 
close to the facility in order to quickly solve all operational issues', – that's 
what I was told.'    
 KZ-1-Damir 
To summarise, the way that the partners handled this operational issue highlights 
the public sector partners' dominance in a PPP and their unwillingness to have an open 
discussion with the private sector partner or to give the latter flexibility in decision-
making.    
Such a lack of a private partner's flexibility manifests itself in an additional 
example.  In fall 2012, the anti-monopoly agency directed a PPP operator to sell a 
building that it had owned for a few years and that it used both as an office and 
temporary housing for its staff in the area located in close proximity to the facility.  
According to the anti-monopoly agency, the reason was that an operator does not have a 
right to own real estate.  This stems from Kazakhstan's laws and regulations that 
prohibit daughter firms of government companies (the operator's legal status) to 
permanently own a property.  After the sale of the building, an operator will have to rent 
the same building and continue to use it exactly the way it used the building earlier.  
This will result in additional costs (e.g., real estate agent commission fees, legal fees 
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and rental expenses).  Assuming that rental costs become an ongoing expense for many 
years ahead, i.e., for the project length until 2028, the operator's additional outlays may 
become significant.  The following excerpt highlights the operator's lack of flexibility: 
'I don't know what's wrong with our ownership of this building, and what the 
benefits of renting a building during many years are.  It seems that the logic is 
kind of broken here.  Well, we have to comply with the law and we will.  But 
it's really strange.  Who needs all that?'    
KZ-1-Aibol 
This sub-section concludes by highlighting what respondents did not note during 
interviews.  There was not a single comment regarding partner interaction about the 
service quality.  In two studied projects, the service has not been launched yet and the 
projects are at the construction stage.  Two other studied projects began the service 
provision.  However, interviewees did not share a single statement or concern about the 
ongoing service provision or the quality of future services.  The interviewees did not 
note any discussion with the public sector partners on these matters.  One can interpret 
this in two ways: that quality is the least of the participants' concerns or it is not a 
concern at all as long as the service is provided up to predetermined standards.         
 
4.2.2 PPP organisational forms and their implications for partner  
  relations  
 
Partnerships may take different organisational forms with varied consequences for 
partner relations.  This section discusses the organisational forms that the study has 
identified.  Interview data revealed a variety of PPP organisational forms including: 
 a project company that partners jointly formed as a stand-alone corporation and 
in which they jointly invested funds (KZ-1); 
 the private sector partner's company that itself (without a special purpose 
vehicle - SPV) implements a project (KZ-2); and 
 an SPV that the parent company (i.e., the private sector partner) formed 
specifically for the purpose of project implementation and in order to shield the 
parent company's assets and financial flows (RU-1 and RU-2).     
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4.2.2a A jointly formed project company  
 
From the perspective of partner interaction, the first type of an organisational form 
– a project company – features the following characteristics: (a) the public sector 
partners have tangled relations between themselves as one of them owns almost 49 per 
cent of stocks whilst another owns 46 per cent, and the degree of their influence on the 
operator is subject to an ongoing debate; (b) two private sector partners have zero 
influence on the operator due to their small stock ownership - 5 per cent; (c) interaction 
between an operator and the public sector partners is episodic, not continuous (i.e., 
mostly it happens during the Board of Directors' meetings); (d) interaction between an 
operator and the private sector partners is virtually non-existent; and (e) there are no 
governance structures in place other than the Board of Directors.     
An interviewee comments on the above organisational features as follows:  
'We hold frequent Board meetings - on average once a month.  I don't think we 
need anything else to run the company [a PPP operator].  The problem, though, 
is that sometimes not all Board members can participate in a meeting and a 
meeting is cancelled.  So, we need to call a meeting again and again, and this 
means delays.'        
KZ-1-Azamat 
Another interviewee highlights the interaction with the public sector partners: 
'We [an operator] have difficult relations with one of the public partners.  We 
[an operator and the public sector partner] have opposing points of view - one 
after another.  As far as I know, this goes on for years.  I don't really 
understand why this happens and what is it that they [two Board members that 
represent this public sector partner] want.'  
KZ-1-Aibol 
When reflecting upon the relations with the private sector partners, another 
interviewee states that: 
'I don't know who they [representatives of the private investors] are, I never 
met them.' 
KZ-1-Rustam 
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The comments above are indicative of the tangled and often ineffective relations 
between PPP partners.  Such relationships highlight a lack of formal procedures that 
would permit faster and more effective partner communication and would result in well-
informed and improved decision-making.  Figure 4.4 shows the complex partner 
interaction scheme that this organisational form implies. 
 
 Figure 4.4 Partner interaction scheme in a PPP implemented by a jointly 
                     formed project company 
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Board of
Directors
 
Source: Compiled by the author from the interview data 
 
In Figure 4.4, the direct link between a PPP operator and the public sector partner 
two denotes the customer–supplier relationship, in which the national railroad company 
is a customer, whilst an operator is a provider who carries cargos for a fee.  At the same 
time, the national railroad company is an investor in this PPP, as it owns 46 per cent of 
the operator's shares of stock.  The direct link between an operator and the 'Samruk-
Kazyna' government holding (which fully owns the national railroad company) denotes 
a considerable amount of reporting that the government umbrella organisation requires 
from an operator.  All these tangled relations and multiple interdependencies make 
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partner interaction in the PPP quite complicated and often ineffective, as interviewees 
have confirmed.     
 
4.2.2b A project management structure without an SPV 
 
The second type of a PPP organisational form that interviews have identified is 
where a PPP contract winner carries out a project without an SPV.  In the study, this is a 
Turkish company that won a PPP contract in Kazakhstan.  Although the relationship 
between partners (i.e., regional government and an operator) seems straightforward, in 
reality substantial interaction between an operator and the municipal government is also 
required, for example, regarding connecting newly built facilities to the city's power, 
natural gas, water and sewer networks.  Additionally, both regional and municipal 
education departments will be involved in providing educational services in 
kindergartens.  Figure 4.5 illuminates partner interaction in this organisational form. 
As Figure 4.5 shows, an operator is involved in interacting with both PPP centres, 
national and regional, as it has to comply with various monitoring and reporting 
requirements.  An interviewee highlights this as follows: 
'We [an operator] have to provide quite a bit of reports regarding the project's 
status.  We [an operator] are a private company, but because the government 
money is involved, the PPP centres collect a lot of reports.'     
KZ-2-Kairat 
Reflecting upon the government perspective on communicating with a PPP, an 
interviewee from the public agency provides the comment on monitoring and reporting 
requirements: 
'The only way to monitor how a project is implemented is to request some 
documents.  The list of documents is approved.  We [national PPP centre] are 
not requesting anything additional.  I don't think that the reports and our 
monitoring are so overwhelming.'    
KZ-GOVT-3 
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Figure 4.5 Partner interaction scheme in a PPP project implemented by a 
     private operator without an SPV   
PPP operator
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government
Regional
government
Regional
PPP Centre
National
PPP Centre
 
 Source: Compiled by the author from the interview data 
 
The two excerpts above show the interviewees' contradictory perceptions of 
reporting requirements.  Those who work in a project tend to perceive this reporting as 
excessive, whilst those who work for the government perceive reporting as a fairly 
simple, routine activity.   
 
4.2.2c A project management structure with an SPV 
 
The third organisational form of a PPP that both studied projects in Russia use is an 
SPV that is formed exclusively for the project implementation purpose: as a stand-alone 
organisation, an SPV shields a parent company from financial claims and possible 
losses.  Figure 4.6 depicts the partner interaction scheme in the Russian PPP.   
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Figure 4.6 Partner interaction scheme in a PPP project with an SPV,  
    option one 
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government
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Source: Compiled by the author from the interview data 
 
One can compare this structure with another Russian partnership project which has 
a simpler organisational form and more streamlined partner interaction, as Figure 4.7 
shows.  This project is carried out only in St Petersburg, whilst the latter, as well as 
Moscow, are the only two Russian cities that have the status of a region (i.e., oblast').  
Hence, instead of two government levels (i.e., regional and municipal), in this case a 
PPP involves just one – the city government.     
An interviewee asserts that the organisational form that employs an SPV provides a 
successful structure for partner interaction with minimal bureaucracy and reporting: 
'The city government is fully aware of the project status.  We keep them 
informed regarding what's going on, especially if there is some trouble or 
unanticipated delay in construction.  And they [the city government] don't 
request a lot of documentation; very little, in fact.'      
RU-2-Vladimir 
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Figure 4.7 Partner interaction scheme in a PPP project with an SPV,  
    option two 
City 
government 
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Source: Compiled by the author from the interview data 
 
In summary, the organisational form involving an SPV in Russia appears, as 
perceived by the interviewees, much more streamlined from the perspective of reducing 
bureaucratic interaction, minimising reporting and permitting greater effectiveness in 
management decision making.     
 
4.2.3 Tools and methods for dispute resolution between partners  
 
Interviews revealed the following methods that participants employ for dispute 
resolution during their interaction in a PPP.  They use: 
 good informal relations with lower-level government staff; 
 good informal relations with senior government officials; 
 a governance structure such as the operator's Board of Directors; and 
 citizens' involvement in partner relations.  
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4.2.3a Informal relations 
 
Many interviewees pointed out the need to keep good informal relations with 
lower-level staff in the public agencies and with senior officials in municipal and 
regional governments.  An interviewee expresses his view as follows: 
'Sometimes there is just misunderstanding [between an operator and the 
government].  And one phone call, one friendly talk may resolve it easily.  
Instead of writing tons of letters, I can solve a problem within five minutes.  
But you need to know the right person and know him or her well.'   
RU-2-Vladimir   
Another informant recognises the importance of communicating with government 
clerks at the informal, rather than formal, level: 
'You got to show that you are a good man, bring them candies sometimes, tell 
them couple funny jokes.  And things will go a lot better than without all this.  
Sometimes it's the only way to get something done quickly, rather than 
complaining or going to their boss.'     
RU-1-Konstantin 
An interviewee from another project reinforces the importance of informal relations 
with government staff at all levels: 
'Everything is being done by human beings.  When you have some good access 
to someone, this person is likely to do a good job for you.  Nourish the 
relationship and it will pay off.'     
KZ-1-Rustam   
When reflecting upon formal and informal relations with government senior 
officials, another interviewee sums up the perceptions regarding informal connections at 
the top level of government agencies:  
'The boss's opinion makes a huge difference.  I've seen people who used to 
come to a meeting with strong ideas set in their minds.  But after they heard 
what the boss says, they changed their opinions quickly.  Many officials vote 
how the boss votes, they just need to understand where the wind blows.  So, we 
[a PPP operator] want to keep the good relations with the boss.'   
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KZ-2-Darkhan   
The comment above is indicative of the high value that an interviewee places on 
good informal relations with the organisation's managers, which may also influence 
other staff for the benefit of the private sector partner.   
 
4.2.3b Governance structures 
 
Interviewees did not elaborate on the use of PPP governance structures as a method 
for dispute resolution.  In the four PPP projects under investigation, interviews revealed 
no governance structures that are used for general management or specifically for 
dispute resolution other than the operator's Board of Directors and its meetings.  To 
reiterate, three out of four PPP projects under investigation do not have any governance 
structures that reflect their partnership nature.  Interviewees recognised in many 
different ways that the government and its agencies treat a PPP in exactly the same way 
as they interact with any private contractor: the government does not attach greater 
importance to interaction with a PPP on any issue including disputes.  As an 
interviewee described: 
'We [a PPP operator] are one of many private companies working for the 
government.  I don't think that it needs to pay more attention to us.  And it looks like the 
government thinks the same way.'         
RU-1-Alexander 
This perspective – that a PPP is much like any private contractor for the 
government – is dominant among respondents from both the private and the public 
sectors.  An interviewee from the National PPP Centre argues that: 
'They [PPP operators] have a lot of flexibility in what they are doing.  They 
never come to us for an advice or anything else.  They are constrained by some 
laws because some operators are natural monopolies.  We [the national PPP 
centre] have no power over them [PPP operators].  The only thing that we can 
do is to request some documents.  That's about it.'      
KZ-GOVT-3 
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An interviewee from another government organisation reiterated the same point 
about a private operator's substantial flexibility and lack of governance structures: 
'It's not like I can give them [the staff at a PPP operator] some executive orders.  
I can always talk to them but we don't always agree and we have some debates.  
This is okay.  After all, what we [the government] need are good results.  In the 
past, we had some big difficulties and disagreements in the project.  And then 
the time has come to change the management team.  And that's what we did.'   
KZ-GOVT-4 
The above excerpt reinforces the point made earlier about the importance of good 
relations at both formal and informal levels from the perspective of the government 
officer.  It also underscores the point that the absence of effective governance structures 
may lead to lengthy disputes that are resolved by such dramatic actions as replacing the 
operator's management team.           
When providing his comments regarding the effectiveness of the operator's Board 
of Directors, another interviewee asserts the following: 
'Of course, the Board has some power.  But its influence is quite limited.  It 
considers issues that we [a PPP operator] put on the agenda.  Often some key 
Board members are absent and the rest just approve what we propose.  The 
Board has to approve some required items such as the annual budget or the 
date of the shareholders' meeting.  But I don't think that the Board sets some 
significant rules or guidelines for us [a PPP operator].'  
KZ-1-Damir 
Another interviewee comments on the limited influence that the Board has on a 
PPP operator: 
'Most of the time they [the Board members] just don't know what we [a PPP 
operator] are doing.  Only at meetings, they look through the documents, and 
this is how they find out our news.'     
KZ-1-Azamat 
The Board's effectiveness is a concern for yet another respondent who commented 
on the Board's composition and the effectiveness of its meetings as follows: 
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'Two persons on the Board represent one public sector partner, and two other 
persons represent another public sector partner.  Then there are two 
independent directors because the law on corporations requires this.  But as 
they don't represent any party, they may just not show up.  On top of that, some 
Board members also show up at a meeting not very often. And even if a person 
shows up once in a great while, how can he make an informed decision?   
KZ-1-Aibol 
The latter excerpt is indicative of some irregularities in the work of the Board, such 
as the inability to make informed decisions.  Additionally, its composition does not 
reflect the participation of two private sector partners who jointly own 5 per cent of the 
operator's shares.  Furthermore, those two Board members who represent one of the 
public sector partners reported that their public agency beforehand determines the way 
that they vote in a meeting: 
'A week before the meeting [of the Board] we receive an agenda and the 
relevant documents.  Then we study the documents and discuss them in our 
own meeting at our agency.  The agency makes a decision regarding each 
agenda item and we must vote later on [in the Board meeting] how the agency 
has decided.  We just can't change out opinion during a meeting.'     
KZ-GOVT-1 
The highlighted irregularities in the Board's work (e.g., poor meeting attendance; 
meeting cancellations because key Board members are missing; lack of flexibility of 
selected Board members in decision-making and lack of continuous information about 
the project progress) show considerable room for improvement in the Board's ability to 
effectively perform strategic management of a PPP project. 
In summary, interviewees do not attach any significance to governance structures in 
a PPP: not only do participants pay insufficient attention to the structure that is already 
in place (the operator's Board of Directors), but they also neglect opportunities to form 
the structures and employ them as an effective PPP management tool.  Another 
improvement opportunity for PPP management, which interviewees also disregarded, 
includes effective dispute resolution.  The latter may include the employment of better-
organised and streamlined procedures, such as that for tariff adjustments, for dealing 
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with customer complaints or for formal handling the issues regarding which PPP 
partners express varying opinions.      
 
4.2.4 Theme summary  
 
Partner interaction in a PPP occurs principally with regards to three categories of 
issues including project financing, facility construction and tariff setting.  Although the 
operators' experiences are mixed and include both positive and negative aspects, most 
interviewees expressed their criticism and negative perceptions formed after interacting 
with the public agencies.  Specifically, interviewees pointed out the lack of effective 
communication (especially regarding tariff setting), lack of established procedures (e.g., 
for applications) and that the government tended to not distinguish a PPP from any 
other private contractor that the government hires.  Additionally, whilst interacting with 
a PPP operator, the public sector partner tended to demonstrate its dominance in 
decision-making and in the way that the government handled PPP requests.      
In the opinion of the interviewees, two areas of partner interaction are largely 
neglected: (a) service quality and (b) governance structures and administrative 
processes.  PPP managers and government officers did not share any experiences or 
perceptions showing their concerns regarding the service quality or improvements in 
PPP governance.   
Among organisational forms that partnerships use, a jointly formed project 
company features, in the interviewees' opinions and perceptions, considerably more 
bureaucracy and ineffectiveness in governance than a PPP management structure that 
employs a special purpose vehicle.  Another effective governance structure is where a 
PPP contract winner implements the project without an SPV.  In both options, partner 
interaction, communication and reporting are much more streamlined as opposed to a 
jointly formed project company.   
Interviewees' experiences and perceptions of dispute resolutions in PPPs show a 
marked neglect for formal dispute resolution mechanisms, whilst participants from the 
private sector heavily emphasise informal friendly relations with government staff that, 
in their view, may significantly facilitate the project work.  Hence, dispute resolution is 
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yet another area in PPP management that may significantly benefit from adoption of 
effective governance mechanisms and administrative procedures.  From the perspective 
of partner interaction, Table 4.3 highlights certain aspects of PPP management, in 
which interviewees identified problems and improvement opportunities.                
 
Table 4.3 Partner interaction in a PPP: Summary of issues and improvement    
         opportunities 
Aspects of partner interaction What is the problem? 
Administrative processes  Lack of established well-designed    
procedures 
 Ineffective communication between 
partners 
 The public sector partner dominates in 
decision-making 
 The government treats a PPP as it 
treats any private contractor (i.e., 
public sector partners show little 
commitment to a PPP)  
PPP governance structures   Joint venture exhibits ineffective 
governance 
 Organisational form that employs an 
SPV shows greater effectiveness 
Dispute resolution methods  Operators put significant emphasis on 
keeping good informal relations with 
the government staff  
 Partners from both sectors show 
neglect for formal dispute resolution 
mechanisms 
Neglected subjects of partner interaction  Service quality 
 Improvement of PPP governance 
structures and administrative 
procedures  
 
Source: Compiled by the author from the interview data 
 
4.3 Risk Management in a PPP 
 
This section presents an analysis of the interviewees' experiences and perceptions 
in the risk management field.  The theme highlights three dimensions of risk 
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management - what kinds of risk the PPP participants faced, how they handled the risks 
and how they perceive risk mitigation methods and tools.  The analysis is organised by 
the kind of risk, rather than by a range of risks that each PPP project faces.  This permits 
the contrast and comparison of experiences, opinions and perceptions that respondents 
from different projects described regarding each kind of risk.  In the chapter that 
follows, this categorisation allows for drawing insights with reference to commonalities 
and differences in PPP risk management in the two countries under investigation.  
Figure 4.8 outlines the theme structure.      
    
 Figure 4.8 Risk management: Theme structure 
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4.3.1 Technical risk 
 
Only one PPP project out of the four studied has experienced technical risk, such as 
flaws in the engineering project design at earlier construction stages.  This has led to a 
revision of construction plans by an operator and re-doing some project work.  As the 
scope of technical errors and omissions was quite extensive, the operator's departures 
from the projected expenses were also significant.  Not only were additional costs 
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extremely high, but they also lasted for many years.  When reflecting upon the 
magnitude of the technical risk, an interviewee claims the following: 
'We had massive cost overruns for many years in a row.  And construction 
should have been completed a few years ago.  All this is a direct consequence 
of technical problems that cropped up right after construction began.  The 
project should've been designed differently and with significantly greater 
financing.  We can't even say for sure when exactly the construction will be 
completed.'   
KZ-1-Rustam 
The above excerpt also shows that the interviewee perceives the technical risk as 
unavoidable and does not indicate any possible ways of risk mitigation. 
 
4.3.2 Construction risk   
 
This risk includes errors in construction, inappropriate construction techniques 
and/or flaws in the construction materials.  All interviewees denied that this risk has 
ever occurred in their projects; however, all of them pointed out that the chance of its 
occurrence should be driven to zero at the engineering design stage, i.e., prior to the 
beginning of construction.  As a respondent noted: 
'Construction has been done according to specifications.  We don't change 
anything at this stage. We just can't.  But the engineering design and all 
construction documentation must be correct.  We work strictly by these 
documents.' 
KZ-1-Aibol 
 
Another respondent reiterates the need not only to minimise the risk, but to 
completely eliminate it: 
'This risk may transpire only if somebody stole some materials or replaced 
them with some cheap stuff.  Other than that, how can it happen?  We have 
engineers on site and they carefully watch and guide the construction process.  
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Perhaps, due to negligence?  But, again, engineers are there to make sure that 
everything is right.  They are responsible persons, I'm sure.' 
RU-1-Victor   
Another interviewee explains why his operator is interested in zero exposure to 
construction risk: 
'We must completely take it [construction risk] out because we are going to 
maintain this facility for many years.  If it is built neatly, then maintenance will 
include just minor repairs.  And that's cheap compared to a major renovation.'   
RU-2-Sergey 
To summarise, all respondents realised the direct link between the high quality of 
construction and low maintenance costs, although interviewees did not note anything 
about service disruption in case a facility requires major renovation.  No concerns about 
the continuity of service are indicative of the profit motive that has a higher priority to a 
private operator, rather than the service provision.  Also, respondents view risk 
mitigation in a radical way, i.e., the risk must be completely eliminated in order to 
minimise maintenance costs.      
  
4.3.3 Operating risk    
 
Operating risk involves higher than planned operating and maintenance costs 
(Grimsey and Lewis, 2002).  A respondent provides an example of a recent event that 
occurred outside of the project, which raised operating costs: 
'The national railroad company has just approved new wage rates for its staff.  
You know what it means for us?  We operate a segment of a railroad.  We need 
to raise wages too, and perhaps make them even higher.  Otherwise, our staff 
will just quit and go to work there.  They will switch to higher paying jobs.  We 
did not know about this change in the national railroad company until just a 
few weeks ago.'   
  KZ-1-Damir 
Another interviewee from the same company was concerned with another event 
driven by external factors, namely the office move from the city where it existed seven 
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years to the city that is close to operations.  This inevitably, in the interviewee's opinion, 
would result in additional costs (e.g., an operator has to rent apartments for relocated 
staff and incur additional expenses involved in travel to major cities in the country).  
Additionally, the interviewee has growing concerns regarding the availability of 
qualified staff, such as engineers and managers, at the new office location, and the 
company's need to offer higher wages in order to fill the vacancies, as the following 
excerpt shows: 
'We don't have a financial director at the moment.  It is fairly easy to find a 
good candidate here [major city in the country].  But I'm not sure what kinds of 
candidates we may get over there [in the city where the new office is].  If it 
comes to the worst, we will have to hire a person here, pay him good money 
and then move him to the new office.  But we will need to rent a flat for him 
and pay more.'      
KZ-1-Assem 
The same interviewee points out that severe climate conditions are an ever-present 
operating risk factor that may result in higher costs:   
'A couple years ago there was so much snow on the railroad tracks - it's 
unbelievable!  Snow was as high as six metres!  You can imagine that in these 
conditions snow removal equipment just doesn't work.  Then, in spring, when 
the snow melts, there is [huge quantities of] water.  It is a costly problem as 
well [protection from strong water streams].  Of course, we budget the money 
for snow and water protection.  But we never know how much snow we may 
get in winter.'      
KZ-1-Assem 
In all three examples that were provided above participants did not indicate any risk 
mitigation tools as a company has no control over the external environment, both 
societal and physical.  There was no indication of the company's intention to budget a 
contingency fund for these kinds of events.   
Interviewees from two different operators have identified similar sources of 
operating risk, namely, utility payments that may increase total maintenance costs as 
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opposed to planned expenses and escalating tariff increases which may lead to operating 
costs overruns: 
'You know that tariffs for water, electricity and natural gas go up every year.  
In fact, tariffs tend to jump quite high.  Everybody knows that tariff hikes of 
about 15 per cent became the norm.  But the government can raise them even 
higher and all at once.  We have no idea how high tariffs will be, say, in three 
years from now.'   
RU-2-Oleg 
Another participant reiterated the uncontrollable character of annual tariff increases 
for utilities. 
'We all know that tariffs are getting higher very fast.  Of course, this is a 
concern.  All we can do is to budget more money for utilities to make sure that 
we can pay the bills on time.'     
KZ-2-Darkhan 
Hence, the latter participant noted the natural risk mitigation tool in this situation: 
budgeting larger funds to allow for unforeseen tariff increases.   
In summary, considering the sources of operating risk, participants pointed 
exclusively to external factors, i.e., those factors that are beyond the influence of the 
operator's management.      
 
4.3.4 Revenue (demand) risk 
 
Revenue risk stems from insufficient demand for PPP services and from volatility 
of prices for services (Grimsey and Lewis, 2002).  Participants of three out of the four 
studied PPPs viewed the demand for their services as high and stable, whilst a 
respondent from one PPP pointed out that his project was exposed to this kind of risk.  
In his project, if the actual traffic volume fell short by more than 10 per cent of the 
projected traffic after the first year of operations, the municipal government agreed to 
purchase the facility.  The following excerpt illuminates this:   
'Our estimations are based on the number of cars that used the older facility 
[i.e., before the PPP launch].  Our forecast shows that after we open a new 
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facility the traffic volume is going to increase.  But you never know.  If for 
some reason drivers would prefer to use alternative routes or another railroad 
crossing, then we are in trouble.  Then we will go to the city government.' 
KZ-1-Azamat   
The excerpt above not only demonstrates the demand risk, but also outlines how 
partners handle this risk: the government has consented to buy out the facility from a 
private investor in case the risk materialises.  From the private operator's perspective, 
the way in which parties handled the risk is a risk mitigation tool.  However, from the 
public sector partner's perspective, there is no risk mitigation: the city government bears 
all the risk.  
The same operator was exposed to revenue risk from another source.  The company 
had produced its annual budget based on the tariff increases for its own services, 
although the new tariffs were not yet approved.  Hence, if the government did not 
approve the proposed new tariffs, complete or partial revenue risk might result: 
'All tariffs go up every year.  Of course, we don't know whether the anti-
monopoly agency approves our proposal.  It is not yet prepared.  But we will 
work with them [the national anti-monopoly agency] and will try to justify 
higher tariffs.'   
KZ-1-Assem 
Taking into account that the company approved its annual budget just a week 
before the beginning of a new year, hence, leaving no time for further adjustments, the 
interviewee did not note the employment of any risk mitigation tools in this case.   
Another respondent, who denied demand risk in his PPP, provided the following 
comment:  
'We will be getting payments from both the government and parents [for 
childcare].  I'm sure there will be a long waiting list for a place in our 
kindergartens because people just can't afford private kindergartens.  So, I 
think there will be no vacancies for children after we complete the enrolment.  
I'm positive.  Perhaps, we can even exceed the enrolment limits a little bit.'     
KZ-2-Kairat    
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This comment shows that anticipated capacity utilisation may even exceed 100 per 
cent and, under such circumstances, demand risk mitigation is unnecessary.  An 
interviewee from another project also asserted that capacity utilisation in his PPP is 
likely to be at or above 100 per cent throughout the concession term.   
'Our facilities [kindergartens and schools] are located in a brand new city 
district.  As far as I know, there are no private kindergartens there and no 
private schools.  And, of course, parents want to send their children to a 
kindergarten and school close by.  So, that's us [a PPP that builds schools and 
kindergartens in the area].  At this point, we don't have any competitors in the 
area.  I'm not even sure whether people are interested in a private school or a 
private childcare centre.'     
RU-2-Vladimir 
Hence, in this project there were no concerns regarding demand risk and, 
consequently, the interviewee's perception is that there is no need for risk mitigation.      
   
4.3.5 Financial risk 
 
Financial risk stems from errors in the estimation of project revenue streams and 
project financing costs (Grimsey and Lewis, 2002).     
When reflecting upon project revenue streams, an interviewee highlighted an 
unusual design of revenue flows in a project, which depicted an operator's risk: 
'The government project proposal included the revenue stream from non-core 
PPP services.  So, the government believes that we should make some money 
not only from what it hired us for, but also from some kind of additional 
business.  They [the government] designed the project as if this additional 
revenue is guaranteed.  But it's a separate business.  I'm not even sure what 
exactly business we can do. And what if we spend more money than this 
business will bring?' 
KZ-2-Talgat 
The comment above shows that in the project's financing scheme the government 
has included revenue from non-core services in the total project's revenue, alongside 
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government payments and childcare fees that the private sector partner receives from 
parents.  When asked about the nature of non-core PPP services, the interviewee noted 
that they might include any business unrelated to childcare.  However, what the 
government staff had in mind was the fee-generating use of kindergartens' premises 
(e.g., classrooms) for providing all kinds of training, such as English language tutoring, 
to the public.  In the above excerpt, the respondent articulated the point that non-core 
services may be risky and that revenue from their provision is not guaranteed in any 
way.  Hence, the interviewee identified the need for risk mitigation, although he did not 
outline any risk mitigation tools.        
Another interviewee recognises financial risk stemming from incomplete 
construction: 
'We need to complete the construction as soon as possible.  But a lot of 
technical documents have to be approved first.  We are not receiving sufficient 
money [revenue from services] because the railroad is not fully operational.  
Now, it's very difficult to count on revenue that we need to earn later this year 
[with the use of a completed facility] because we haven't yet started the 
construction of this segment.'       
KZ-1-Rustam 
 
The above excerpt highlights financial risk not only for the construction year, but 
also for subsequent years depending on when exactly an operator will complete the 
construction.  This interviewee, much like a respondent noted earlier in this section, has 
not outlined any methods that may mitigate the risk.  
An interviewee from a different studied project elucidated another type of financial 
risk in a PPP.  In his project, the city government put its payments to the concessionaire 
on hold for an unspecified period claiming temporary difficulties with the availability of 
the budget funds.  The interviewee described the difficulties that this event caused: 
'We are lucky that my company is part of a holding.  So, my company just 
borrowed some money for a short term from other companies so that we can 
pay salaries and all other operating expenses.  But what if the government 
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stops paying us again in the future?  These kinds of events totally ruin all our 
financial flows.'     
  RU-2-Vladimir 
Although the interviewee expressed a clear concern regarding financial risk, he did 
not identify any ways to mitigate it.  Furthermore, he admitted a possibility that this risk 
may materialise again in the future.  He associated financial risk with the way in which 
the government treats a PPP: 
'Well, the government kept paying salaries to school teachers, doctors in 
public clinics, all staff in municipal agencies.  However, we [a PPP] didn't 
receive the payments for a few months.  So, it's just us.'  
  RU-2-Vladimir 
 
Hence, in the interviewee's view, the government treatment of a partnership is 
different from the government treatment of the public sector organisations.  The 
government showed that a payment to a PPP is not its priority as opposed to paying 
salaries to staff at schools, public clinics, hospitals and all kinds of municipal agencies.     
 
4.3.6 Environmental risk 
 
Environmental risk stems from the adverse impact of both the project on the 
environment and the changing environmental conditions on the PPP operations 
(Grimsey and Lewis, 2002).  Interviewees did not highlight any detrimental impact that 
their projects might have on the environment.  Respondents from only one studied 
project expressed their views regarding how severe and unpredictable environmental 
conditions influence the project work:   
'Snow removal from [railroad] tracks may not be as trivial as it seems.  It 
depends on how much snow we got.'   
  KZ-1-Aibol    
 
'We need to budget expenses for snow removal and for protection from water 
in spring.  Sometimes these expenses exceed what we included in the budget.  
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This is because the amount of snow [that covers railroad tracks] in some years 
is just unbelievably huge.'  
KZ-1-Aibol    
Environmental risk in this case overlaps operating risk as weather conditions exert 
significant influence on the project work and related operating expenses.  In the same 
PPP project, another interviewee outlined the risk mitigation tool that the company has 
designed.  He described a company's plan to construct a wall in order to protect - from 
one side - the newly built railroad from snow drifting due to strong wind that blows in 
winter.  At the time of the project inception, partners did not foresee this risk, which 
later materialised in the impediments to transportation due to the high volume of snow 
(e.g., a few metres high) that covered railroad tracks in winter.  In order to cope with 
this risk, an operator will have to incur a high construction cost.  As the railroad's length 
is 120 km (as of 2012), the wall construction is an expensive undertaking that may take 
a few years and may significantly increase the company's capital costs, as well as 
maintenance costs.  Although expensive, the protective wall construction aims at 
effective environmental risk mitigation, which the following excerpt shows: 
'There is no other way to get protected from the snow.  We have to build the 
wall.'   
KZ-1-Azamat  
 
4.3.7 Regulatory/political risk 
 
This risk stems from changes in laws, regulations and public policies that are 
relevant to PPP operations and asset ownership (Grimsey and Lewis, 2002).  
Participants in all projects expressed concerns about elements that, in their view, were 
indicative of political uncertainty and consequent changes in PPP policy and regulations.  
In one project, an interviewee identified significant political support from the national 
government that the city government enjoyed, including support in PPP development: 
'There is no federal PPP law.  But we have our own [city] law.  Why are some 
regions and cities very active in PPP formation and others don't do much?  I 
can understand those officials in regions who are kind of slow.  They may be 
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just afraid of pushing for PPPs because the legislative base is vague.  What if 
somebody from the federal government comes and says: 'Why did you form a 
partnership?  We don't have a law that allows that.'  Everyone is aware that 
our city [St Petersburg] is different.  The federal government supports 
everything that we do here.'        
RU-2-Sergey   
This interviewee emphasised the strong links between the national government and 
the city government, which resulted in political sponsorship of the city-level policies 
and activities, including the PPP development.  At the same time, the interviewee 
recognised the limitations of these links: 
'Look at what's happening in the country [Russia].  People are protesting 
against the government on the streets, we see this on TV almost every week.  It 
was nothing like that two or three years ago.  What if the [national] 
government changes?  Will we keep our business [a PPP]?  I don't know.  
Nobody knows.'  
RU-2-Sergey   
The above excerpt illustrates concerns regarding future changes in political 
leadership at the national level and, subsequently, at sub-national levels, which may 
trigger changes in laws and regulations surrounding PPPs.  A contextual feature that 
adds to Russia's political uncertainty is a newly adopted system of regional governors' 
elections: from 2013, instead of appointment by the country's president, a governor will 
be elected by popular vote in a region.  Hence, interviewees’ perceptions of 
regulatory/political risk reflect a valid concern for the whole country, not only regarding 
the PPP policy and regulations, but also regarding many other public policy aspects.  
Another interviewee reiterates the view of a PPP's extensive exposure to 
regulatory/political risk:  
'We have very good working relations with the regional and municipal 
governments.  If a new regional governor is elected, we can only hope that 
good relations will continue.  But the new government may start implementing 
new policies.  It's entirely possible.'   
RU-1-Konstantin 
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Hence, interviewees perceive changes in national leadership as a likely scenario 
that might lead to the changes in regional and municipal policies.  Interviewees 
admitted a possibility that, in a worst-case scenario, governments might stop payments 
to private sector partners.  Another excerpt, by an interviewee from a Kazakhstani 
project, reinforced the point of high political/regulatory risk: 
'We [the private sector partner] have a contract with the government.  The 
contract and the law say that we must transfer the property ownership to the 
government upon completion of construction.  This means we don't own the 
buildings, we just maintain them.  If the government stops paying us due to 
changes in the policy or laws, we probably can go to the court.  But I have 
doubts that we can win.  Realistically, our chances [to win the court trial] are 
zero.'             
KZ-2-Talgat 
 
To summarise, in both countries, political/regulatory risk is associated with the 
possible future changes in political leadership at all levels.  New pro-market leadership 
may push for extensive and accelerated PPP employment as opposed to their opponents 
who may push for discontinuing PPPs and a greater government role in public service 
provisions. 
Mitigating this kind of risk is hardly possible because of power struggles at all 
government levels, which are beyond the scope of PPP influence.  However, in one 
studied project the partners have identified a risk mitigation tool, i.e., a shorter 
concession term.  Whilst the government was prepared to approve a concession for up 
to 20 years, among the bidders competing for a PPP contract, the government selected 
the one with which it signed an agreement for 14 years.  The following excerpt 
illustrates this:       
'We [the private sector partner] preferred a shorter concession term, and it 
appeared that the government wanted the same.  A shorter term just 
streamlines the project, reduces the risk of inflation and generally makes both 
parties responsible for what each party should do.  A shorter term leaves much 
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less room for renegotiation.  Each party needs stability.  Who knows what may 
happen in ten years?' 
KZ-2-Darkhan 
The above excerpt highlights the mutual interest of partners from both sectors to 
reduce the project's exposure to future unfavourable fluctuations, including shifts in the 
political agenda and possible changes in the legal and regulatory PPP environment.  In 
this project, based on the interviewee's perception, partners attached much higher value 
to the political/regulatory risk reduction as opposed to parties in other projects.      
 
4.3.8 Public acceptance risk 
 
An interviewee from only one project (out of the four studied) recognised public 
acceptance risk for his PPP, as the following excerpt shows: 
'We are working with citizens all the time – through the forum on our Web site, 
answering journalists' questions, phone calls.  It's not easy, believe me.  It 
takes lots of time and energy.  Sometimes we have very heated debates and 
have to be very patient to strong criticism.  I'm sure much of this will 
disappear once we open the facility and people will be able to see the benefits.  
But at this point quite a few people are concerned that we are going to charge 
a fee.  They just got used to a free service.'        
RU-1-Victor  
Another interviewee from the same project (a toll viaduct) also confirmed the need 
to effectively deal with public acceptance risk.  He also delineated a perceived risk 
mitigation tool.  If the public largely refuses to use the toll viaduct and the traffic 
volume during the first year of operation significantly (e.g., more than 10 per cent) falls 
short of the planned volume, the municipal government, in accordance with the PPP 
contract, will have to buy out the facility at a predetermined price: 
'We [the private sector partner] really wanted to include this provision in the 
contract.  We need to have some guarantee.  And the government was so 
confident that everything would go smoothly that it easily agreed to include the 
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provision.  However, they [the city government] heavily push us to work with 
the citizens in order to have a good public image of this project.'     
RU-1-Konstantin 
The above excerpts show that the government largely shifted risk mitigation as a 
process to the private sector partner.  The latter fully bears the cost as it deals with the 
public and tries to promote the project positively at its own expense.  However, the 
ultimate responsibility for the risk is with the municipal government as it has agreed to 
pay the full cost of a newly built facility.   
To summarise, there is a tangled and contradictory situation with risk management 
in this PPP project.  The government's consent to buy out the facility is a risk mitigation 
tool exclusively from the private partner's perspective.  For the government, risk 
mitigation includes the private partner's actions, for which the government does not pay.  
The private sector partner pays for the public acceptance risk mitigation; however, the 
private party is not responsible for the ultimate outcome, as it is protected by the buyout 
provision.      
 
4.3.9 Project default risk  
 
This risk refers to overall project failure that may result from a mix of any other 
kinds of risk (Grimsey and Lewis, 2002).  In the construction and operation of a toll 
viaduct project (that Section 4.3.8 discussed in detail) public acceptance risk fed 
operating and financial risk and, in turn, project default risk.  If the municipal 
government bought out the facility after the first year of operation, this would signal a 
termination of the partnership or project default.  In addition to this possibility, an 
interviewee expressed concern about another aspect of project default risk.  He 
emphasised that the government might not have enough funds for the buyout: 
 'Where will the city government get the money? I doubt that the city would budget 
the required amount just in case the project fails.  Furthermore, it may need to get 
explicit approval from the regional government for the buyout, and it's not guaranteed 
in any way.'   
RU-1-Alexander 
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This excerpt highlights not only project default risk, but also the possibility of 
government failure to pay in the case of project default.  The interviewee articulated the 
difficulties in the local government's finances: a city in Russia does not have its own 
taxes other than the property tax and selected fees (e.g., for issuing construction permits 
and various licences).  The city budget (except Moscow and St Petersburg) is financed 
by the region, which means that the latter has to explicitly approve what expenses and 
how much a city may include in its budget.  Although the municipal government has 
accepted an obligation to buy out the facility in case the actual traffic falls short of the 
forecasted traffic, there is no guarantee that the city government will ever be able to 
include the required funds in its budget, which may significantly deepen the project 
default ramifications.  Due to the highly centralised nature of Russia's fiscal system, 
PPP partners from either sector are unable to mitigate this aspect of project default risk.  
Another PPP project (railroad concession in Kazakhstan) also is exposed to default 
risk.  Due to massive cost overruns and the need to finance additional project expenses, 
an operator issued corporate bonds backed by the government guarantees.  However, 
the bonds’ coupon value has exceeded the volume of government guarantees by 20 per 
cent.  Pursuing a goal of eliminating the negative snowball effect on bondholders in the 
case of a project failure, the Agency for Regulation of Natural Monopolies mandated an 
operator to reduce its debt (i.e., the value of bonds outstanding) by buying back bonds.  
The government insisted that the value of bonds outstanding should not exceed the 
volume that the government guarantees.  The ultimate goal was to make sure that the 
government payments would not rise if an operator closed down for any reason, so that 
the bondholders would be able to receive their investment in full.  The following 
excerpt outlines government concerns regarding project default risk: 
'The previous management team has issued bonds as they didn't have much 
choice.  They had to finance the project work.  And then we got so much heat 
from the anti-monopoly agency.  It claimed that it was against the law and 
proved it.  Now we have to buy back our own bonds, but it seems too early to 
do this.  We still don't have enough revenue in the project.'      
KZ-1-Damir 
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The government is aware of financial difficulties in this PPP and of the operating 
loss stemming from insufficient revenue.  However, the fact of government insistence 
on bond buyback shows that it does not fully exclude project default risk and mitigates 
it by administrative actions aimed at reducing the company debt.    
Interviewees from two other studied projects, both in the social sphere of 
Kazakhstan and Russia, denied project default risk, or perceived it as negligible due to 
the simplified project financing scheme in which the government, rather than citizens, 
makes most payments to a concessionaire.  An interviewee highlighted this as follows:  
'We have arranged financing of construction.  This part is done.  The facilities 
will be completed next year.  The only dramatic thing that may happen in the 
future is that the government stops paying us.'   
RU-2-Oleg 
Counting on the signed PPP contract, a concessionaire anticipates that the 
government will keep paying it fully and according to the pre-determined schedule.  
Hence, an operator does not perceive the possibility of government non-payments as 
default risk and is not concerned with mitigating it.   
 
4.3.10 Foreign exchange risk 
 
Only one PPP operator out of the four studied (a Turkish company that constructs 
kindergartens in Karaganda, Kazakhstan) has significant exposure to foreign exchange 
risk.  A foreign investor undoubtedly would be interested in exchanging its profits, 
received in local currency, for U.S. dollars, euros or another major world currency, 
unless it finds opportunities for investment of all its profits locally.  If the exchange rate 
between the local currency and the dollar changes unfavourably, a company would be 
able to purchase fewer dollars and the company’s profit in dollars would be smaller.  
However, if the exchange rate changes in the opposite direction, a foreign investor may 
buy more dollars for the same amount of local currency and its profit will rise.  The 
following excerpt highlights an interviewee's interpretation of this risk: 
'We will be converting money in dollars because we need to take profit out of 
the country.  Hopefully, in the future the exchange rate stays about the same as 
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now.  We budgeted extra funds if dollars become more expensive.  But, of 
course, nobody knows what the exchange rate might be in ten years from now.'   
 KZ-2-Kairat     
The exchange rate risk in this PPP applies only to future profit, rather than 
operating expenses, as construction of facilities and their future maintenance do not 
require any unique materials that a private partner would have to purchase from a 
foreign supplier.  Additionally, the exchange rate risk is not unique to a certain country: 
a foreign investor always faces this kind of risk, especially in a transitional country, due 
to the need to move profits to another nation.  A private partner should not exclude the 
exchange rate risk from its forecast although ways and methods of assessing this risk 
and mitigating it are not easily available.  Kazakhstan provides an example of an 
overnight adjustment in the exchange rate when, in February 2009, the National Bank 
(i.e., the country’s central bank) altered the rate of the U.S. dollar from 120 tenge to 150 
tenge (a 25 per cent change) (Mouraviev, 2011).  An interviewee revealed the natural 
tool for coping with this risk – adding a risk premium to the project costs, although the 
tool is unable to fully mitigate it.   
   
4.3.11 Risk involved in the choice of a private sector partner 
 
This risk may exist because of a private partner’s lack of experience or 
commitment to a PPP project.  The project that Section 4.3.10 discussed (the 
kindergartens' PPP that a Turkish company implements) is also exposed to this kind of 
risk.  The government bears this risk with regards to any unknown bidder.  In the case 
of a prospective private sector partner from a foreign country, the risk is much higher as 
there are limited possibilities to find out details about a company’s past performance or 
financial position.  Additionally, the government should be concerned where a foreign 
investor has no local business experience.  Lack of experience may result in an 
operator’s higher cost of construction and labour and may decrease a company’s net 
revenue.  In addition, a foreign investor may underestimate the level of bureaucracy 
involved in running a business in Kazakhstan or Russia and overestimate opportunities 
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for earning additional income.  An interviewee from a government organisation 
identified some concerns and the possibility of mitigating this risk: 
'We [the government] would love to do thorough screening of foreign investors.  
But there is no way to do it.  We cannot even check the accuracy of financial 
documentation [of a foreign bidder].  And, after all, there is the law that allows 
foreign companies to participate in bidding, so we should accept all bids as 
long as they meet the criteria.'          
KZ-GOVT-1 
     
4.3.12 Hidden protectionism 
 
Hidden protectionism refers to the risk of creating a private monopoly that the 
government protects from competition (European Commission, 2003).  A project that 
aims at constructing and operating a toll viaduct is exposed to this risk.  An interviewee 
asserts that: 
'We have to provide a choice to a driver – to use a toll viaduct or a traditional 
free railroad crossing.  The law requires this and we surely will provide this 
choice.  I don't think that we monopolise the service as the choice is available.'   
 RU-1-Alexander           
Although it seems that the government and the PPP project took care of providing a 
choice to consumers, the implications of this 'choice' are twofold.  First, a newly built 
toll viaduct becomes a monopoly as there is no other speedy railroad crossing anywhere 
close.  After constructing a toll viaduct, a private investor or the government have no 
incentive to build another viaduct nearby, as an additional speedy railroad crossing may 
divert traffic and significantly decrease the first viaduct’s revenues.  Second, an 
outdated railroad crossing facility has to remain in place for another 20 years (i.e., the 
concession term) resulting in higher costs to citizens in the form of waiting time, slow 
crossing and lack of innovation.  Hence, the risk of creating a private monopoly is quite 
high.   
Another project that aims at constructing and operating a railroad segment in 
Kazakhstan also features the risk of hidden protectionism.  However, the risk is much 
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smaller as the PPP railroad faces competition from the national railroad company and, 
additionally, from Russian railways.  Alternative routes and alternative operators are 
available for customers.  As an interviewee states: 
We [a PPP railroad operator] want to set our tariffs at the level of the national 
railroad company or, perhaps, even lower.  This way a customer will have a 
real choice.  However, our delivery time is much shorter and this is how we 
will get a lot of business.   
KZ-1-Rustam 
Hence, there are no reasons to consider the railroad segment, which a PPP operates, 
a government-protected monopoly.          
 
4.3.13 Theme summary 
 
Table 4.4 summarises interviewees' experiences and perceptions of risk mitigation 
as per the interview data.  
  
 Table 4.4 Summary of risks and risk mitigation methods 
Kinds of risk  
 
Tools and methods used for risk 
mitigation 
Project country   
Technical risk 
 
 None, although the risk exists Kazakhstan  
Construction risk   
 
 Risk elimination at the engineering 
project design stage 
Kazakhstan, Russia 
Operating risk    
 
 Budgeting larger funds to allow for 
unforeseen expenses  
 
Kazakhstan, Russia 
 
Revenue (demand) risk 
 
 The government has agreed to buy out 
the facility at a predetermined price if 
traffic volume falls 10 per cent short of 
the target level  
 High capacity utilisation due to lack of 
competition 
Russia 
 
 
 
Kazakhstan, Russia 
Financial risk 
 
 None  Kazakhstan, Russia 
Environmental risk 
 
 Budgeting contingency funds 
 Building an additional protective 
facility  
Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan 
Regulatory/political risk 
 
 Shortening the concession term Kazakhstan 
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Public acceptance risk 
 
 Positive project promotion via a Web 
site, extensive communication with 
citizens and mass media  
Russia 
Project default risk 
 
 Reduction of corporate debt by bond 
buyback  
Kazakhstan 
 
Foreign exchange risk 
 
 Adding risk premium to the project 
costs     
Kazakhstan 
 
Risk involved in the 
choice of the private sector 
partner 
 
 None, although the risk exists   Kazakhstan 
 
Hidden protectionism 
 
 Provision of an alternative free facility Russia 
Source: Compiled by the author from interview data 
 
4.4 Constraints and Impediments to Effective PPP Governance 
 
A further theme to emerge from empirical data includes the barriers, limitations and 
impediments to effective PPP governance.  The researcher has categorised the barriers 
and impediments as, first, legal and regulatory barriers; second, institutional and 
managerial impediments; and third, financial constraints to effective partnership 
management.  Figure 4.9 illustrates the structure of this section. 
 
 Figure 4.9 Constraints to effective PPP governance: Theme structure                 
4.4.1 Legal and regulatory barriers
4.4.2 Institutional and managerial 
impediments
4.4.3 Financial constraints
4.4.4 Theme summary
4.4 Constraints 
and 
impediments
to effective
PPP
governance
 
    Source: Compiled by the author  
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4.4.1 Legal and regulatory barriers 
 
Respondents identified a number of legal and regulatory barriers to effective PPP 
governance.  These included irregularities in the PPP legal framework; discrepancies 
between national and regional PPP legislation; complex PPP tender procedures; 
ambiguity in the regional government's privileges and responsibilities; complex and 
bureaucratic tariff and wage-rate setting and public, as opposed to private, asset 
ownership.  The discussion of each of these follows.  
 
4.4.1a Irregularities in PPP legal framework and discrepancies between 
  national and regional PPP legislation 
 
Interviewees pointed to irregularities in the legal framework governing PPPs.  In 
both Kazakhstan and Russia, there is no general law that defines a PPP, its legal status 
and the principal legal provisions governing PPP employment in a country.  The law on 
concessions that each nation has adopted in 2005-2006 fills the legal gap only in part.  
Interviewees asserted that the law on concessions is incomplete and is not harmonised 
with other national laws.  In Russia, a respondent identified the following contradiction 
between the law on concessions and the budget law: 
'Many are wondering which law actually prevails.  The law on concessions 
permits setting a PPP for 20 or 30 years.  However, the [federal] budget code 
allows the government to extend the payment guarantees for no longer than 
three years.  How to combine all this?  Does it mean that the government signs 
a concession contract for 20 years, but it does not guarantee that it will pay a 
concessionaire?  Who needs this kind of contract?  Is it really legally binding?'   
RU-2-Oleg 
A lawyer from a Russian law firm reiterated the concerns regarding the validity of 
PPP long-term contracts that government agencies sign: 
'Some regions [in Russia] are deeply in debt and their budget deficits are 
chronic, year by year.  The budget law asserts that the region's debt should not 
exceed 15 per cent of its budget.  But some regions persistently run deep 
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budget deficits and have little revenue.  Their budget situation is not improving 
at all.  When a regional government signs a contract for a long term, what 
does it count on?  How and from what sources will it receive the larger funds?'   
RU-Lawyer-2 
These excerpts show that the commitment of public organisations, especially at the 
regional level, to extend payments to a PPP during the long period is highly 
questionable.   
In Kazakhstan, an interviewee highlighted a similar contradiction between the 
national law on concessions and budgetary guarantees: 
'When a regional government grants a concession for many years, how can it 
guarantee that it will actually pay?  It gives it guarantee in writing, but where 
can it get the money in the future?  The regional government gets funds from 
the national government, but the national government does not give any 
guarantee.  This is confusing, isn't it?'   
 KZ-2-Kairat 
In both countries, contradictions within the PPP legal framework also exist between 
national legislation and regional.  A lawyer from a Russian law firm described the 
problem as follows: 
'Many regions [in Russia] have adopted their own PPP laws.  However, the 
civic law is the federal government's privilege.  Hence, the legitimacy of 
regional PPP laws in the absence of the federal PPP law is debatable.'   
 RU-Lawyer-1    
The comment above is echoed by a similar opinion that an interviewee in 
Kazakhstan provided: 
'Some regions [in Kazakhstan] have formed their own PPP centres and 
adopted regional rules and regulations.  I'm not sure that these regulations are 
really helpful.  Kazakhstan has a unitary system.  Everything is prescribed by 
the national government.  Regional regulations may simply repeat the national 
laws, but the former may not replace the latter, and may not fill some existing 
gaps in national legislation.  For example, the national law does not specify 
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what a PPP means or what an asset life cycle contract means.  So, a regional 
law cannot help here at all.'   
KZ-1-Damir    
 
4.4.1b Tangled PPP tender procedures  
 
Interviewees highlighted a number of irregularities in PPP tender procedures.  The 
government has to organise separate tenders, rather than one, in order to finalise a PPP.  
The first is a PPP tender itself, the second is a tender regarding granting of land for a 
PPP project and the third is a tender regarding the procurement of services from a 
private company as Russia's federal law on government purchases requires.  The 
following excerpt illuminates this complexity: 
'Land cannot be transferred from the government to the private sector partner 
in the framework of a PPP tender and a subsequent PPP contract.  The law on 
land requires that, in order to give land to private hands, the government must 
announce a separate tender and must subsequently issue a separate contract 
for the land use to the winner. What if some other company, not the PPP 
winner, wins the land tender?'   
RU-2-Vladimir 
When reflecting upon the complex PPP tender procedures, another participant 
recognised contradictions between existing Russia's federal laws: 
'When the government wants to use the services of private firms or individuals, 
it has to comply with the law on government procurement.  This means that the 
government has to run a separate tender, and then issue a contract [separate 
from the PPP contract] to the best bidder.'  
RU-2-Oleg 
This interviewee stated that in reality, a partnership becomes a set of different 
contracts, each with their own regulations.  A set of regulations may include all or some 
of the following:    
 A contract regarding the use of land; 
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 A separate contract regulating a government-owned facility’s rent or free-of-
charge use;  
 A contract for government property use such as equipment in a recreational 
facility; and  
 A separate PPP contract.   
When commenting on the possibility of organising a unified PPP tender that would 
embrace all separate tenders (or would eliminate the need for at least some of them), an 
interviewee articulated the point that: 
'It is impossible to synchronise these tenders, and one tender cannot replace 
another.  The law requires the government to run all the tenders.  Of course, 
this leads to longer time involved in closing the PPP contract.  And additional 
bureaucracy is truly significant.  I know cases where the bureaucracy has lead 
first to lengthy delays, and then even to cancelling an original intent to form a 
partnership.'   
RU-2-Oleg 
The latter comment summarises the downsides of the tangled PPP tender 
procedures – considerable bureaucracy, lengthy delays and overall ineffectiveness 
involved in the PPP formation.     
 
4.4.1c Ambiguity in the regional governments’ privileges and            
  responsibilities 
 
Interviewees expressed their concerns regarding a lack of understanding of what 
the government, specifically at the regional level, can do in the field of PPP governance.  
One interviewee described the chief reason for this ambiguity: 
'As there is no common definition of a PPP, each region [regional government] 
decides on its own what a PPP is.'   
RU-1-Konstantin 
As a consequence of varying meanings attached to a PPP, each regional 
government makes its own decisions regarding what forms of support the government 
can extend to a partnership.  Some regional governments set a reduced corporate 
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income tax rate for a PPP and/or give an extension of time to pay the corporate income 
tax.  Other regional governments give an operator a subsidy to pay part of the project 
cost.  In regards to forms of government support, an interviewee provided the following 
comment: 
'I know that in [...] region, the government gives a subsidy in order to 
compensate a partnership for its use of a quite high interest rate for a 
commercial bank's loan.  We [a PPP] receive nothing like that.  I don't know if 
it is a subject for negotiation with the government, or the government just 
forgot to offer us this subsidy, or we were supposed to ask for it and insist on 
getting it.  What if the loan interest rates sharply rise in the future?  Can we 
renegotiate the PPP contract with the government and get this subsidy?'  
RU-2-Sergey 
In Kazakhstan, another interviewee stated that the government tools and 
possibilities for supporting and/or penalising a PPP are vaguely defined and their 
implementation lacks procedures and guidelines. 
'I think government staff sometimes simply don't know what [legal provisions] 
they can apply to a PPP and what they can't apply.  They always refer to the 
law, but there is more than one law governing partnerships.  They point to one 
law for some reason and then they say about another one: 'No, we cannot use 
these terms'.  Normally – unfortunately – there are no explanations.'   
KZ-1-Rustam              
 In summary, the range of a regional government's privileges and responsibilities 
regarding PPP formation and management remains ambiguous.  These privileges and 
responsibilities are even less clear at the municipal government level: not only the 
municipal rules and regulations should align with the regional PPP legislation (which is 
often vague or non-existent), but the latter should also align with the national PPP 
legislation, which has significant gaps and limitations, which Sections 4.4.1a and 4.4.1b 
have discussed.        
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4.4.1d Complex and bureaucratic tariff and wage-rate setting 
 
Among legal and regulatory barriers to effective PPP governance, interviewees 
identified their experiences of bureaucratic tariff regulation.  The latter often falls 
within the domain of the country's anti-monopoly agency.  Interviewees believed that 
tariff setting was lengthy, the criteria for approval were blurred and the procedures were 
cumbersome.  An interviewee suggested the following: 
'There should be a totally different process for tariff setting.  The anti-
monopoly agency may need to monitor tariffs.  However, the tariff setting 
should not be between an operator and the anti-monopoly agency.  It should be 
between a service provider and customers.  At this point, there are no 
negotiations between a supplier and a customer.  So, how does the anti-
monopoly agency know what tariff level it should deem acceptable and what 
level is unacceptable?'   
KZ-1-Assem 
Another interviewee from Kazakhstan reinforced the importance of direct tariff 
setting between a PPP operator and a customer: 
'We [a PPP operator] formed a tariff that is much higher than the allowed limit.  
But we are convinced that this is the right tariff.  However, the anti-monopoly 
agency allows an actual tariff to exceed what it considers a 'target tariff' by no 
more than 5 per cent.  Well, we got a fine from the agency for exceeding the 5 
per cent limit.  I don't really understand who needs these 'target tariffs' and 
why we [an operator] have to pay the fine.  What company will want to be in 
business like that, where some government agency regulates its prices?'      
KZ-1-Azamat 
An interviewee from Russia commented on tariff setting as follows: 
'Luckily, we are not subject to tariff regulation by the anti-monopoly agency.  
We had to negotiate our current tariff with the city government, but that was 
about it.  If we had to get a tariff approval from the anti-monopoly agency, 
forget about it.  I personally don't want to be in this business.  The process [of 
granting approvals for a new tariff] is slow, we would have to submit a pile of 
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documents and we will never find out the real reasons why they would want to 
see a different tariff level.'      
RU-1-Konstantin 
The above excerpt by the interviewee from Russia shows a clearly negative view of 
governmental bureaucratic tariff regulation in those cases where tariff setting is a part of 
anti-trust policy and is the public anti-monopoly agency’s responsibility.  The same 
interviewee described his own experience of collaborating with the local government 
regarding tariff setting as positive and effective.  This is because an operator negotiated 
a tariff directly with the municipal government, hence, avoiding excessive bureaucratic 
procedures.   
In Kazakhstan, another area that the national agency for regulation of natural 
monopolies keeps under its tight control is wage rates.  The latter are subject to 
regulation because a national government-owned company formed, in part, a PPP 
operator (of a railroad concession).  Although a public company owns a large 
percentage of the operator's stock, it remains unclear why the government needs to 
regulate the operator's wage rates.  An interviewee provided the following comment: 
'If we set our wage rates ourselves, what's wrong with that?  With or without 
government regulation, we have to pay people at market rates; otherwise no 
one would want to work for us.  We may pay bonuses for good performance.  
Again, nothing is wrong with that because it's a standard practice.  So, why 
government regulation?  How does it help? And whom?'   
KZ-1-Aibol 
The excerpt indicates a lack of support for government regulation and perceives it 
as an impediment to an operator's flexibility regarding hiring and retaining a qualified 
workforce.  The interviewee's comment implies that the wage rate–setting power should 
belong to an operator.           
 
4.4.1e Public versus private asset ownership 
 
In both countries, another barrier to effective PPP governance is the legal 
requirement that an operator must transfer a property ownership of a newly constructed 
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facility to the government upon completion of construction.  Hence, an asset ownership 
as a tool that motivates an operator to provide better facility management and 
maintenance is non-existent (except with a Kazakhstani railroad project that was 
approved prior to the adoption of current regulation).  In the following excerpt, an 
interviewee asserts that private asset ownership would benefit a PPP project:    
'If we had an opportunity to own a facility for 10 to 15 years or longer, I'm 
sure we would maintain it with greater care, which is natural in a long-term 
project.  And it would be best if we transfer the facility to the government only 
after we get the final payment from the government.  This is just to make sure 
that all payments are settled and neither party owes anything to another party.'     
RU-2-Vladimir 
The above excerpt indicates that, due to legal restrictions, the private sector partner 
does not have an opportunity to own an asset until the projects terminates and the 
government pays an operator in full, less fines and other penalties, such as for missed 
deadlines.  Hence, the public asset ownership during the project implementation 
significantly reduces the motivation of partners in both sectors to properly fulfil their 
contractual obligations.  Additionally, it does not shield a private partner against the risk 
of government default or incomplete government payments.              
 
4.4.2 Institutional and managerial impediments          
  
Interviewees identified the institutional and managerial barriers to effective PPP 
governance.  They included the private partner's lack of flexibility in decision-making; 
procurement restrictions set for the private sector partner and lack of government 
commitment to a PPP, which leads to shifting responsibilities between partners. 
 
4.4.2a Private partner's lack of flexibility in decision-making 
 
Lack of flexibility in decision-making manifested itself in three out of four PPP 
projects under investigation.  In two social infrastructure projects - one in each country - 
interviewees highlighted similar restrictions imposed by the public sector partner on a 
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private party.  In both projects, the government insisted on the simultaneous 
construction of facilities, such as kindergartens, as opposed to sequential construction, 
where a contractor first builds one facility, then begins and completes the construction 
of another facility and then moves on to the next one.  An interviewee describes this 
approach as follows:    
'I don't really understand why we have to begin construction at a few sites at 
the same time.  In this case, we have to hire a large number of construction 
workers at once and rent a lot of construction equipment and machines.  It 
would've been much easier if we used the same construction team and 
equipment at one site, and then moved them to another site, and then to the 
next one.'  
RU-2-Sergey 
Another interviewee (from Kazakhstan) experienced a similar situation.  He 
reiterated an idea about a lost opportunity of moving an operator's construction team 
and equipment from one site to another: 
'I think the government simply wants to report that so many new facilities have 
been opened in the city in a certain year.  But what difference will it make if 
construction lasts a few months longer?  It is much easier and cheaper for us 
to organise work at one construction site at a time, rather than on a few sites 
simultaneously.'      
 KZ-2-Talgat 
Both interviewees emphasised their strong preference for sequential construction as 
opposed to simultaneous construction, and expressed their concerns that, by inhibiting 
the flexibility of a private party, the public sector partner neglects an opportunity to 
receive economies of scale.  Interview data reveal that the private sector partners are 
significantly more concerned with construction costs than the government.  However, 
pursuing its own agenda, the latter insists on simultaneous construction of all facilities 
in a project, hence, giving a private partner no flexibility in decision-making and, 
consequently, reducing the project's efficiency.          
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4.4.2b The private sector partner's procurement restrictions  
 
Another barrier to effective PPP management was procurement restrictions with 
which the private sector partner has to comply.  An interviewee commented on his 
company's procurement experience as follows: 
'As a national government-owned company formed my firm [a PPP operator], it 
automatically became the subject to rules and regulations governing the public 
sector organisations.  This means we have to do all purchasing by tenders.  
Can you imagine how much time and effort we are spending for running the 
tenders?  I do not think it makes us more efficient in any way.'   
KZ-1-Damir 
Another interviewee shared a similar opinion as follows: 
'Why do we need to organise a tender in order to buy pens or paper clips?  It is 
true that a government-owned company is our major shareholder, but why 
does this fact have to influence our purchasing?  Tenders are so time-
consuming.  In addition, I am not sure that we are seeing lower vendors' prices.  
Actually, sometimes it looks exactly the opposite.'   
KZ-1-Aibol   
When reflecting upon the operator's lack of flexibility in making its own 
procurement decisions, both interviewees pointed out inefficiency and delays involved 
in organising purchasing through competitive bidding.  They also expressed a concern 
whether competitive bidding is a necessary condition for running an operator's business 
and whether tenders bring the intended results (i.e., whether they permit avoiding 
corruption and receiving lower prices).  Hence, interviewees perceived purchasing 
restrictions imposed on a PPP as a bureaucratic impediment to greater efficiency.       
 
4.4.2c Lack of government commitment to a PPP  
 
Interviewees highlighted the public sector partner's tendency to shift 
responsibilities related to the project work to an operator.  An interviewee from the 
Russian PPP (a toll viaduct) asserted that, despite the need for both partners to show 
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mutual commitment to a project, in reality the public sector partner shifted most of the 
work to an operator.   
'It would be kind of nice if the government accepts some responsibility for 
dealing with citizens' complaints.  I think they [government staff] need to talk 
to people more often, run some events, such as a talk show on local radio or 
TV channel.  But they do little.  They just send people to us [an operator] and 
we need to answer phone calls, put materials and explanations on our Web site, 
maintain the blog.  In all this work, what is the government role?'     
RU-1-Victor 
This interviewee recognised that in reality the government undermined its own 
commitment to the project by shifting responsibility for communicating with the 
population to the private sector partner. 
Respondents from other studied projects shared similar concerns about the lack of 
the government commitment to a PPP.  For example, an interviewee from Kazakhstan's 
project (railroad concession) describes her perception of the government commitment to 
a PPP as follows: 
'Sometimes I feel that there is no [government] commitment.  The way they 
[government staff] walk and talk shows that for them a PPP is like an 
additional burden for many years ahead.  I'm sure that many of them think this 
way: 'The project is approved, and now you [an operator] do the job'.            
KZ-1-Assem  
Hence, interviewees articulated their perceptions that the government staff do not 
demonstrate any noticeable degree of commitment to a partnership, which results in 
shifting all kinds of project work from the public sector partner to an operator.    
 
4.4.3 Financial constraints 
 
Interviewees expressed their concerns regarding financial barriers and impediments 
to effective PPP governance including concerns about validity of the public sector 
comparators used for the PPP formation; difficulties with obtaining the bank financing; 
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and constraints to effective risk management in those cases where the government 
suspends its payments to a concessionaire and taxation issues.  
 
4.4.3a Lack of validity of the public sector comparators  
  
In both countries, respondents questioned the public sector comparators’ accuracy 
and usefulness that the government previously had used for determining the value of a 
partnership project.  For example, the government in St Petersburg, Russia, used the 
construction costs of a public school and a public kindergarten as benchmarks for cost 
determination in a PPP.  The government in Karaganda, Kazakhstan, used the same 
approach for designing a kindergarten’s construction project in the PPP form.  
Additionally, the government in Kazakhstan used the public sector comparator in the 
field of railroad construction for forming a railroad concession.  Interviewees were 
concerned with how accurate, from the cost perspective, the public sector comparators 
were.  The following excerpt illuminates this: 
'How do we know whether the construction cost figures reflect what the 
government wanted to receive, in terms of the quality of the final product?  
What happens often in construction is that some part of the facility was built 
poorly and requires immediate replacement.  However, the replacement cost 
becomes part of the operating, rather than the capital, cost.' 
RU-2-Vladimir 
Another interviewee also questioned government benchmarks. 
'In construction, a lot of things depend on technology and equipment.  Perhaps, 
the government gave us the numbers that reflect the extensive use of cheap 
labour from neighbouring countries, but we may need to employ different 
construction methods.  The two construction projects may look similar, but in 
fact, they are never alike unless the same company does the construction of 
two facilities at the same time.'   
KZ-1-Damir  
An interviewee from another Kazakhstani project also recognised the limitations of 
government cost benchmarks: 
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'I don't think the government cost estimate [for a prospective PPP] tells us 
much.  The government refers to its own experience, but we really don't know 
under what conditions and using what resources the construction company did 
the job.  Was that company highly efficient or was it wasteful?  Did it have 
much bureaucracy in its management or did it have a lean structure?  Also, we 
have no idea what problems they faced during the construction and how these 
problems influenced the costs.  The government has to look at cost estimates 
differently, I think.  Perhaps, by inviting the bids ...' 
KZ-2-Darkhan    
 
To summarise, respondents articulated their concerns regarding the validity of 
public sector comparators that the government employed in selected projects.  
Interviewees pointed out the lack of a reliable methodology for assessing the PPP 
project value (cost).  Consequently, as interviewees highlighted, no valid methodology 
existed for determining the volume of government payments and/or subsidies to an 
operator.  The result was that there was no evidence that public sector comparators gave 
a valid and accurate benchmark for the PPP project costs.   
 
4.4.3b Difficulties with securing PPP financing 
 
When reflecting upon PPP financing issues, all respondents pointed out difficulties 
with obtaining bank loans.  A measure that can help to expand bank financing for 
partnerships is using a newly build facility as collateral for a loan.  However, the 
existing regulations in both countries require a private contractor to transfer an asset 
ownership to the government upon completing construction.  An interviewee described 
the problem as follows: 
'If we [an operator] own a facility, we can use it as collateral for a bank's loan.  
Financing of both capital expenditure and operating costs would be much 
easier.  But at the moment the law permits just one model – build–transfer–
operate.  I know that private companies want a different model – build–own–
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operate–transfer.  The private ownership would make a huge difference for 
easier loan financing and more efficient maintenance.'   
RU-2-Oleg 
Hence, the interviewee concluded that the private sector partner should have an 
opportunity to own an asset that it builds or renovates in the PPP framework, so that it 
can use it for securing bank financing. 
In addition to bank loans, in Russia the government designed a financing channel 
via Vnesheconombank, which is the federal government's investment bank.  Financing 
that its PPP Centre extends attracts many public agencies, regional governments and 
private firms.  However, although funds are available, Vnesheconombank offers limited 
financing opportunities because it only targets large-scale projects with minimum 
investment of two billion rubles (about $64.5 million), which is a very large amount in 
Russia.  The following comment illustrates the constraint and a possible solution: 
'It is probably easier for Vnesheconombank to work with very large projects.  
But regions have a lot of smaller projects.  For larger projects they need to 
team up with other regions and that's difficult.  Also, it may be challenging to 
find a private investor for a large-scale project.  Regions can undertake 
smaller projects faster and easier.  It would be best if Vnesheconombank 
reduces its requirement for a minimal project cost.' 
RU-1-Konstantin    
Hence, interviews confirmed the interest among potential PPP participants and 
investors in receiving smaller loans via the federal government's investment channel in 
order to ensure a wider reach and broader suitability of Vnesheconombank's financing.    
 
4.4.3c PPP's financial flows: Constraints to effective risk management 
 
With regards to the projects’ financial flows, interviewees expressed concerns 
about a specific risk, namely, where the government does not follow the agreed-upon 
schedule of payments to a concessionaire and payments may stop for an unspecified 
time.  Interviewees asserted that, as this risk is inevitably unanticipated, its mitigation is 
hardly possible.  However, the effective risk management calls, in the respondents' view, 
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for implementation of such tools as assignment of financial penalties to the government 
and interest accrual on an unpaid (or delayed) amount.  The following comment 
highlights this concern: 
'When the government stopped its payments, we [an operator] were in a 
quandary.  When will the payments resume?  Will they ever resume?  When the 
project began, we did not think that the government might ever suspend its 
payments.  But it happened.  I think the government needs to accept 
responsibility for what it is doing or not doing.  So, financial penalties, late 
fees and interest must be spelled out in a PPP contract for both partners, not 
just for an operator.'   
RU-2-Sergey 
Hence, the interview data identified the lack of incentives for ensuring timely 
government payments as a constraint to effective risk management in a PPP whilst the 
proposed tools may remedy the situation.     
 
4.4.3d Taxation issues 
 
Respondents highlighted concerns related to two taxes levied on a PPP - the 
property tax and value-added tax (VAT).  Interviewees perceived both kinds of taxes as 
an unnecessary burden on a partnership.  With regards to the property tax, the main 
concern was that a PPP has to pay this tax to the government on property that already 
belongs to the public sector.  An interviewee provided the following comment: 
'We don't own a facility as my company is an operator.  So, it's a government-
owned facility.  But since we use it, we have to pay the property tax to the 
government for the privilege to maintain the facility.  This is strange because if 
the government maintains it itself, then it pays no tax.  Why is this tax 
necessary at all?'          
RU-2-Vladimir 
A similar issue exists with regards to value-added tax.  During asset construction 
and maintenance, an operator pays VAT as any other private contractor.  However, 
when the project terminates, an operator transfers a facility to the public sector.  PPP 
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participants share a perception that the government needs to refund the full amount of 
VAT that an operator has paid during the project term.  An interviewee believes that: 
'The government assumes the facility's ownership right after we [an operator] 
have completed the construction.  Of course, we [an operator] paid VAT on 
construction materials and everything else.  This is a burden for the project, 
but at the end, the tax is fully shifted to consumers.  Perhaps, we can get a 
refund after the project is completed.' 
KZ-1-Azamat   
            
Another respondent also shares a view that VAT increases the project's cost and, 
consequently, reduces the project's value for customers: 
'We [an operator] included VAT in our financial plans.  Due to VAT, the 
project costs more to us [an operator] and the government.  But our prices 
surely depend on our costs.  The higher the VAT, the higher the prices.  So, the 
government regulation drives our prices up.'     
KZ-2-Talgat  
 
To summarise, interviewees perceived some kinds of taxes, such as the property tax 
and VAT, unnecessary and believe that this tax burden leads to higher prices for PPP 
services.  Interviewees asserted that the government does not seem to be concerned with 
PPP financial effectiveness from the perspective of keeping the prices for the public 
services low.      
 
4.4.4 Theme summary 
 
Table 4.5 illustrates three categories of PPP barriers and impediments that this 
theme has discussed.   
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Table 4.5 Summary of barriers and impediments to effective PPP governance 
Barriers and impediments to 
effective PPP governance, by 
category 
 
Components and details  
Legal and regulatory barriers 
 
 Irregularities in PPP legal framework 
 Discrepancies between national and regional PPP 
legislation 
 Tangled PPP tender procedures  
 Ambiguity in regional government's privileges and 
responsibilities 
 Bureaucratic tariff and wage-rate setting 
 Public versus private asset ownership 
 
Institutional and managerial 
impediments 
 
 Private partner's lack of flexibility in decision-making 
 The private sector partner's procurement restrictions  
 Lack of government commitment to a PPP  
 
Financial constraints 
 
 Lack of validity of the public sector comparators   
 Difficulties with securing PPP financing 
 PPP's financial flows: constraints to effective risk 
management 
 Taxation issues 
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
4.5 Chapter Summary  
 
The chapter discussed four themes that emerged during the in-depth interviews 
with respondents from partnerships, government agencies, law firms and national and 
regional PPP centres.  The four emergent themes focused on PPP management issues 
and included:  
 Opportunistic behaviour in a PPP, it reasons, forms and implications; 
 Partner interaction issues including those related to PPP organisational forms 
and methods for dispute resolution;  
 Risk management in a PPP and  
 Constraints and impediments to effective PPP governance.   
The chapter presented an analysis of the interview results.  The author has captured 
the data using interviewees' own words that express their experiences, opinions and 
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perceptions.  The thesis moves on to a more detailed discussion of the research results, 
which the next chapter outlines.       
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION 
 
5.0 Chapter Introduction    
 
The chapter discusses four themes that emerged during interviews and that the 
interview analysis chapter has highlighted.  These themes include:  
 opportunistic behaviour in a PPP; 
 interaction between partners;  
 risk management in a PPP; and 
 constraints and impediments to effective PPP governance. 
The chapter begins by providing insights into the nature and meaning of 
opportunistic behaviour in a PPP.  This section draws on the available literature sources 
and gives an operational definition of opportunism in a partnership.  The chapter then 
discusses a number of situations in which partners in the studied projects exhibited 
opportunistic behaviour and highlights the underpinning reasons.  A separate section 
elucidates the implications of partner opportunistic behaviour such as overregulation 
and a framed private partner's management flexibility.   
The chapter moves on to illuminate partner interaction issues and advantages and 
disadvantages of PPP organisational forms that the study has identified.  The following 
part discusses interviewees' perceptions of risk management in partnerships.  The author 
pays special attention to emergent guarantee culture among private investors who are 
interested in PPPs.  The concluding section focuses on impediments to effective PPP 
governance including legal, regulatory, institutional, managerial and financial 
constraints.    
 
5.1 Opportunistic Behaviour in a PPP    
 
This section's structure is as follows.  It begins by conceptualising opportunistic 
behaviour in a partnership and by drawing an operational definition of opportunism in a 
PPP.  As this conceptualisation stems from the nature of a PPP, the next part discusses 
the meaning of a partnership as a set of multiple tangled relationships and arrangements.  
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The following part moves on to highlight partners' opportunistic behaviour in their 
collaboration in three areas: regarding public acceptance of a PPP project, regarding 
achieving results faster than contracted and regarding tariff setting.  The concluding part 
discusses implications of partners' opportunistic behaviour, such as overregulation, 
framed private partner's management flexibility and increased costs.   
The study participants perceive each other's behaviour as opportunistic in a variety 
of ways.  The study has identified two main forms of a partner's opportunism: (a) the 
public sector partner's pressure on a private party and (b) the push of the private sector 
partner for higher tariffs for its services.  The following two quotes highlight the 
findings: 
'I don't think that the government behaves like our [a PPP operator's] true 
partner.  It behaves like a boss.  It behaves like a boss who has decided 
something and believes that this is going to be best for a PPP.  And then the 
boss pushes for his own decision no matter what, without listening much to its 
so called private sector 'partner'.  Is this really a partnership?  To me, it's 
more like a traditional the 'boss-subordinate' relationship.'  
  KZ-1-Damir 
'The operator's emphasis on getting new tariffs approved as soon as possible is 
clearly excessive.  They [the operator's staff] talk about new tariffs all the time 
as if there are no other ways to improve financial performance.  They need to 
think about an overall project efficiency and keeping their costs low.  And a 
new tariff is just an easy way to get more revenue, without much effort.'   
KZ-GOVT-3  
Although the study participants who represent two different sectors stayed away 
from directly blaming each other for certain actions or non-actions, the spirit of their 
views illustrated opportunism that an interviewee attached to an opposing party’s 
behaviour.  This raises an issue regarding how to categorise partner behaviour in a PPP.  
The fundamental question is: what kind of party's behaviour should one deem 
opportunistic?  The discussion of the nature and specifics of opportunistic behaviour has 
multiple dimensions, and the beginning point is revisiting the ontological position that 
the author adopted in this thesis.  
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5.1.1 Conceptualising opportunistic behaviour: Drawing on the  
  ontological position    
 
As the author takes the phenomenological stance in this study, the author believes 
that the world is socially constructed and subjective (Collis and Hussey, 2003; 
Sarantakos, 2005).  The author's stance is in contrast to the positivist view that reality is 
objective and singular (Tsoukas and Hatch, 2001).  In the phenomenological view, 
reality has multiple dimensions (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997; Sarantakos, 2005).  It is 
based on ideas and perceptions, rather than on objective facts and factual reality 
(Neuman, 2007).  The study's phenomenological perspective has clear implications: it 
captures interviewees' experiences and perceptions, whatever these experiences and 
perceptions are, whilst there is no 'correct' or 'incorrect' experience or perception.  
Hence, capturing participants' experiences and perceptions implies their equal treatment: 
even if one participant's perception is very different from others and is far from other 
experiences and empirical data, the researcher should give it equal treatment, much like 
the treatment of any other perception.   
Connecting the phenomenological perspective with the perceptions of opportunism, 
it is worth noting that the study's methodological approach permits the researcher to pay 
much attention to the participants' individual experiences and views, as well as to 
contextual details of PPP management in Kazakhstan and Russia.  This is in line with 
the exploratory nature of qualitative study in this thesis, as opposed to quantitative 
research (Easter-Smith et al., 1994; Sarantakos, 2005).  The richness of contextual 
details and the multi-dimensional perceptions, in the interviewees' own words, ensures 
the qualitative research’s depth, which is a distinct advantage of the phenomenological 
stance.  However, the latter is not free from drawbacks, namely, that generalisations are 
hardly possible in this research approach.  Whilst the contextual specifics and individual 
perceptions ensure the richness of detail, the same research design features make the 
findings truly unique, especially as far as the country-specific results are concerned.  
Even if the results carry some similarities in both countries, one must make conclusions 
with care to ensure that contextual details are preserved rather than neglected. 
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To conclude the discussion of the ontological position adopted in this thesis in 
relation to opinions and perceptions about opportunism, the author does not aim to 
judge whether one form or instance of a partner's behaviour in a PPP is opportunistic as 
opposed to another.  The author's goal is to capture all kinds of partners' opportunistic 
behaviour by adopting a proper operational definition, which the following section 
delineates.   
 
5.1.2 Conceptualising opportunistic behaviour in a PPP: An operational 
  definition  
 
With regards to defining opportunistic behaviour in general and a partner's 
opportunistic behaviour in a PPP in particular, the literature lacks the elaborate 
discussion, which results in conceptual ambiguity.  There is no agreed upon definition 
of opportunistic behaviour.  The simple conceptualisation of opportunism is that it 
refers to the self-interest of actors (Williamson, 1993).  In his article devoted to 
economic opportunism, Williamson (1993) has made a significant contribution to 
understanding opportunism and offered a number of definitions and essential details, 
such as:  
 Opportunism is where 'economic actors will break promises when it suits their 
purposes';  
 Opportunism means 'self-interest seeking with guile'; and  
 'Opportunism corresponds to the frailty of motive which requires a certain degree 
of circumspection and distrust in the transaction cost economics scheme of things' (pp. 
100-101). 
Conceptualising opportunism, Williamson argues that: 
'The possibilities that economic agents will lie, cheat and steal are admitted.  
The possibility that an economic agent will conform to the letter but violate the 
spirit of an agreement is admitted. The possibilities that economic agents will 
deliberately induce breach of contract and will engage in other forms of 
strategic behaviour are admitted' (1993: 101). 
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The above shows that opportunistic behaviour may manifest itself in an unlimited 
variety of ways and forms.  Due to the multiplicity of potential forms of opportunism, a 
researcher, defining the latter, has to determine the significance of a key feature, namely, 
whether opportunism involves guile.  The author's stance is that guile is unimportant as 
opportunism's key feature: the complex nature of a PPP as a set of long-term 
arrangements makes the relationships in a partnership multifaceted and 
multidimensional, and it is not an easy task to determine what exactly guile is and 
where it takes place.   
In order to overcome conceptual ambiguity for the PPP research, the author adopts 
the following operational definition of opportunism:  
In a PPP, opportunism is a partner's method of pursuing self-interest with or 
without guile, whilst a partner directly or indirectly gives up, forgets or 
neglects the common partnership's interests, goals or values.  
The above definition rests on the nature of a PPP as a complex set of arrangements 
and relationships, which is in the core of a partnership's understanding.  The following 
section provides insights into the PPP's nature and then establishes the links between the 
PPP nature and partner behaviour. 
 
5.1.3 A PPP as a set of arrangements1  
 
This section aims to discuss why guile is unimportant as a potential defining feature 
of opportunistic behaviour in a partnership.  In order to demonstrate this, a closer 
investigation into the nature of a PPP is required.  A PPP refers to the set of multiple 
organisations, stakeholders and relationships between them (Akintoye et al., 2003; 
Grimsey and Lewis, 2004).  However, a PPP contract is between a government agency 
(or a number of agencies) and a private company (or a number of companies).  
Although customers, naturally, form an important group of stakeholders, they are not 
                                               
1 The text of this section has been included in the article that the author wrote together with Nada 
Kakabadse, which Public Management Review plans to publish in 2013 (Mouraviev and Kakabadse, 2013, 
in press).  The author certifies that the text in this section is his original contribution to the thesis.    
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involved in any contractual obligations related to a PPP.  A private company often 
forms a new company, to which researchers commonly refer as a special purpose 
vehicle for asset construction, its maintenance and service delivery (Yescombe, 2007).  
An SPV, which often becomes a PPP project operator, shields the private partner's 
assets from potential losses, i.e., protects the parent company in those cases where an 
SPV has to bear unplanned expenses stemming from unforeseen risks.  Although in 
exceptional cases a private partner (i.e., a contractual party) assumes the operator's role, 
as a norm, an operator is an SPV.  Figure 5.1 highlights typical PPP arrangements. 
 
 Figure 5.1 Typical PPP arrangements: Contractual dependencies and a 
          special purpose vehicle     
  
 
           
 
        Source: Compiled by the author   
 
As Figure 5.1 illustrates, typically neither the government nor banks have 
contractual relations with a PPP operator.  This is because an operator does not have 
any assets other than those which a parent company provides.  Therefore, lenders and 
other parties are unlikely to succeed in holding an SPV responsible for loans and any 
other contractual obligations as SPVs have limited or no assets as opposed to their 
parent companies.  In some cases, financial organisations may be a part of the general 
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PPP agreement that includes the government and the consortium of private companies 
and lenders.  However, banks will have their loan agreements with the private sector 
partner.  An operator is not involved in any borrowing or other contractual relations as 
the SPV is a daughter organisation formed specifically for implementing the parent 
companies' obligations. 
When one considers a PPP, most often the discussion does not focus on the SPV, 
although it conducts all the project work.  The focus is usually on PPP arrangements 
and relationships that include multiple organisations and stakeholder groups 
(Fischbacher and Beaumont, 2003; Mouraviev and Kakabadse, 2012).  The SPV 
management issues and its performance as a stand-alone firm may also require the 
researcher’s attention.  For example, researchers have not sufficiently explored the 
question of whether an operator effectively meets the construction deadlines and 
achieves other performance benchmarks.  However, the SPV's performance heavily 
depends on a parent company as the latter borrows money for the PPP project, channels 
funds, technology and human resources to its SPV, and ultimately carries the 
responsibility for the PPP’s contractual obligations (Yescombe, 2007).  To summarise, 
a PPP typically means a set of relationships and arrangements, not a PPP operator.   
Stemming from and reflecting a more complex partnership environment as opposed 
to that of a single business firm, the author adopts a view on the nature of PPP 
arrangements as a cooperative effort to jointly create value for its stakeholders 
(Freeman, 1984; Jones, 1995; Jensen, 2000; Jiménez and Pasquero, 2005; Freeman et 
al., 2007; Freeman et al., 2010), although created value may benefit stakeholders 
unequally due to inevitable trade-offs.  A principal merit of this view is that it provides 
a framework for analysing whether value creation happens within the PPP arrangement 
because what the PPP creates must align with common stakeholder values.  In contrast 
to value creation, a partner's action, non-action or neglect may undermine the common 
partnership's interests, goals or values in the pursuit of self-interest, which exactly 
defines opportunistic behaviour.  Whether a partner's action, non-action or neglect 
happen with or without guile is, first, extremely difficult to determine due to long-term 
cooperative arrangements, rather than in merely contractual bilateral obligations, and, 
second, unimportant for categorising partner's behaviour: if partner's self-interest 
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supersedes the common value creation for a partnership (whether with guile or without 
it), the behaviour is opportunistic.   
The following excerpt illuminates an interviewee's perception of the government's 
behaviour to which an interviewee does not attach any guile: 
 
'The government kind of routinely rejects our applications for new tariffs.  It 
has been going on like that for more than four years.  It does not look like 
every time we submit a new application, someone is thinking hard whether to 
approve it or not.  Rejection just became a routine...' 
KZ-1-Rustam        
To conclude, guile as a possible defining feature of opportunism appears 
unimportant, owing to the complexity of long-term relationships between partners in a 
PPP.  The implication of this conclusion is that the current study has successfully 
resolved opportunism's conceptual ambiguity by incorporating in the analysis 
interviewees' perceptions that describe how a partner pursues self-interest at the expense 
of common partnership interests, goals or values.          
 
5.1.4 Opportunistic behaviour in a PPP: Diverging partners' interests 
 
The interview data revealed opposing partners' perspectives on three areas: with 
regards to the public acceptance of a PPP project; with regards to achieving results 
faster than the contracted dates and with regards to tariff setting.  This section discusses 
each identified area of diverged partners' interests.    
  
5.1.4a Opposing perspectives regarding public acceptance of a PPP project 
 
In a trade-off between higher revenue and greater public acceptance of the project 
(a toll viaduct), the private party decided to forfeit some revenue.  However, it is 
unlikely that the private sector partner had voluntarily engaged in this trade-off: the 
government induced the company's choice to publicise the toll facility and increase the 
project’s public acceptance, which means that the government opportunistically shifted 
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the effort and its cost to an operator.  Although both partners were interested in the 
greater project's public acceptance, the government's behaviour appeared opportunistic: 
not only did the government not want to accept any responsibility for dealing with the 
public acceptance, but it also exerted pressure on the private sector partner, so that the 
latter carried out all the work and incurred related costs.  The following excerpt 
highlights the government's behaviour: 
'The city government diverts all phone calls, written inquiries, complaints and 
suggestions to us.  From what I know, when an office in the city government 
receives a call regarding a PPP project, they [government staff] simply say: 
'Please contact a contractor.  A contractor handles all this.'       
RU-2-Michael 
Another interviewee elucidates the involuntary nature of the trade-off to which the 
private sector partner is exposed: 
'We [the operator] realise that the government resources are limited and for 
the government it is easier to assign all communication with citizens 
[regarding the PPP project] to us.  We sort of anticipated that we would be 
engaged in this work.  But we didn't realise that the government would shift all 
the work to us.  It would be fair if the city itself handles at least part of this 
work.'    
        RU-2-Anna 
Naturally, the city government is no less interested in the public acceptance of the PPP 
than the private sector partner.  The project failure would undoubtedly backfire the 
government: the latter has agreed to buy out the viaduct at a predetermined price, 
should the traffic volume fall more than 10 per cent short of the projected traffic by the 
end of year one.  Despite the safeguard against the project's low acceptance level, which 
benefits the private partner, rather than the government, the excerpts above indicate that 
the municipal government pays lip service to the public acceptance issue.  It shifted all 
work and expenses to the private party by exerting all kinds of pressure.    
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5.1.4b Opposing perspectives on achieving results faster than contracted 
 
The data revealed a range of cases where partners manifested their opposing 
perspectives with regards to the public agency's strong preference for achieving results 
faster than a PPP contract specifies.  The outcomes of opposing perspectives transpire in: 
(a) lost opportunities for economies of scale; 
(b) lost opportunities for knowledge transfer; and   
(c) rising project costs.    
These outcomes are the direct result of two factors: the certain project design that 
involves simultaneous construction of a few facilities with the same target completion 
date and the government behaviour where the latter pushes the private sector partner for 
achieving results faster than contracted.  The following excerpt highlights these two 
factors: 
'We [a PPP contractor] didn't design the project.  From the very beginning, it 
was the government idea that all kindergartens must be constructed at the 
same time, and they should launch their operations all at once on a certain 
date.  This is kind of traditional, Soviet-style reporting of what the government 
has done for the population.  Reports must be cheerful and exciting, rather 
than mundane.  Honestly, I don't know what is wrong with opening five or ten 
facilities one after another, not on the same day.  Is it really so bad?  
Moreover, once the opening date has been set, the government persistently 
talks whether we can open the facilities sooner.'   
KZ-2-Aliya       
In two projects (out of the four under investigation) the government insists on 
simultaneous, rather than sequential, construction.  This project design puts a contractor 
in a position where it has to undertake construction at more than one site at a time (e.g., 
to construct eleven kindergartens in a project in Karaganda, Kazakhstan, and to 
construct three kindergartens and two schools in a project in St Petersburg, Russia).  To 
undertake simultaneous construction, a PPP operator has to hire a construction team for 
each site, buy or rent equipment for each site and provide procurement, engineering and 
management services for each site.  In this case, an operator loses the opportunities to 
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take advantage of economies of scale.  Furthermore, an operator loses an opportunity to 
learn from its own construction and management experience as each team works at one 
site only, rather than moves from one site to another.  The latter means that the operator 
loses opportunities for knowledge transfer and, ultimately, for increases in labour 
productivity, from one site to another in the course of the same project.   
Lost opportunities for capitalising on economies of scale and knowledge transfer 
mean that the PPP project cost is higher than what it could have been.  In turn, this 
inevitably means that a PPP carries a smaller value for money for the government, the 
taxpayers and for society in general.  As most often economic efficiency and 
effectiveness are the main and the only criteria for PPP employment (Hofmeister and 
Borchert, 2004), the government disregard of the cost-saving opportunities is not in line 
with what the literature argues regarding the reasons for partnering.  It is worth noting 
that this disregard applies to both Kazakhstan and Russia and there are no cross-country 
discrepancies in the data received during interviews.  In PPP projects in both countries, 
the government neglects the overarching aim of obtaining a good deal for the taxpayer 
(Colman, 2000).  
The PPP value for money concept also implies opportunities for the public sector to 
take advantage of the private partner's innovation in service delivery, technology used 
and project management (Morallos and Amekudzi, 2008).  However, in the two projects 
under investigation it is unclear how a private partner can be innovative once the 
government essentially has stripped of (by the project design) a private partner's 
opportunity to learn from its own experience and to transfer accumulated knowledge 
from one construction site to another within the same project.  Hence, another aspect of 
the PPP value for money is also neglected.           
To conclude, in the cases where the government insists on simultaneous, rather 
than sequential, construction of multiple facilities, the government's opportunistic 
behaviour manifests itself in assigning heightened priority to achieving fast results by 
ignoring the opportunities to make the private partner's efforts more efficient.  
Yet an additional aspect of the government's opportunistic behaviour is where the 
public agency pushes the private sector partner for achieving results faster than 
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contracted.  The government tends to exert both formal and informal moral pressure 
attempting to receive faster outcomes. The following excerpt exemplifies the latter.    
'The government officials often remind us [the operator] of the due date and 
also ask whether we can complete the construction sooner.  They always say 
that citizens need the services as soon as possible.'    
RU-2-Konstantin 
By exerting pressure to receive faster outcomes, i.e., by trying to move the 
completion deadlines sooner than contracted, the government disregards the private 
partner's planned efforts and costs as the government pressure may disrupt the 
construction schedule and payments to workers, suppliers and subcontractors and may 
result in significant unanticipated expenses.  It is no surprise that contractors strongly 
resist to moving the construction completion dates.  By pushing the due dates of various 
construction stages sooner, the government not only disregards the cost reduction 
opportunities stemming from the planned construction phases and costs, but also 
disregards the natural goal set by transaction cost economics, i.e., to ensure the lower 
costs to the taxpayers (Morallos and Amekudzi, 2008; Vining and Boardman, 2008a).  
The reason is that an accelerated construction schedule is likely to cost significantly 
more money than the one that the partners originally planned.   
To summarise, interviewees have articulated the point that the government agencies 
tend to exert considerable pressure on a private partner regardless of the project contract, 
context, organisational dynamics and overall project goals.  In those cases where the 
private sector partner is receptive to pressure, the government's push for its own agenda 
(e.g., achieving the outcomes faster) will likely result in an additional effort by a private 
party and related additional costs.   
The diverging partners' perspectives on achieving results faster than contracted 
manifest themselves even brighter in yet another episode of government opportunistic 
behaviour where the government unexpectedly stopped its payments to a contractor in 
the course of a project without a clear reason, perhaps due to the budget constraints.  
This episode shows the government disregard of the PPP needs, such as a need to pay 
workers, subcontractors and suppliers fully and on time.  The episode also elucidates 
the contradictory government policies with regards to a PPP: on the one hand, the 
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government pushes an operator to achieve results faster, for which an operator may 
incur additional costs, whilst, on the other hand, the government abruptly stopped 
paying a PPP for an unspecified period.        
Figure 5.2 summarises the logical connections between government opportunistic 
behaviour, its implications for a partnership in terms of costs and cost reduction 
opportunities and the PPP value for money.    
 
Figure 5.2 Links between government opportunistic behaviour and the PPP’s 
    value for money 
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  Source: Compiled by the author 
 
Figure 5.2 depicts the critical link that exists between the government’s 
opportunistic behaviour and the PPP’s value for money: the more extensive the 
government disregard of the private partner's interests, goals and needs, the smaller the 
PPP’s value for money becomes for the taxpayers and the whole society including the 
government itself.     
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 5.1.4c Opportunistic behaviour regarding tariff setting 
 
The interview data elucidated the range of situations where the partners in the 
studied PPP projects exhibited opportunistic behaviour regarding tariff setting.  In most 
cases, opportunistic behaviour transpired in the private sector partner's attempts to set a 
new, higher tariff that often a public agency rejected.  Table 5.1 summarises the reasons 
underpinning each partner's behaviour. 
 
Table 5.1 Reasons underpinning partners' opportunistic behaviour in the field 
  of tariff setting 
A private partner pushes for higher tariffs 
because: 
A public agency acts to keep the 
operator's tariffs low because: 
 the PPP project is not yet profitable 
 there is a need to pay for earlier cost 
overruns 
 there is a need to finance new 
business projects or changes in 
original project plans 
 
 the government is concerned with the 
general price level stability and with 
avoiding the cost-push inflation 
 the government is interested in 
keeping the prices specifically for the 
public services low as these services 
often are monopolistic  
 presumably, the government wants to 
ensure greater PPP value for money   
         Source: Compiled by the author 
  
From the government’s perspective, a higher tariff means that a public service is 
becoming more expensive and its affordability to wider segments of customers is 
decreasing.  If tariff increases occur repeatedly, the erosion of the public service 
affordability becomes evident.  The government that is concerned with the price 
stability for the public services should inevitably perceive a tariff increase as a tool that 
undermines this stability.  Hence, the government’s perspective, which implies 
unfavourable treatment of applications for tariff adjustments, permits it to receive a 
greater PPP value for money and, thus, serves the PPP’s interest, as well as the interests 
of the taxpayers and the public.  On the contrary, the opportunistic private sector 
partner's behaviour, in pursuing its own interest, rather than that of a partnership, 
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diminishes the PPP’s value for money.  Instead of raising a tariff, an operator must look 
for ways of cutting costs and increasing project efficiency.     
 
5.1.5 Short-term implications of a partner’s opportunistic behaviour   
 
The chapter moves on to discuss two short-term implications of a partner’s 
opportunistic behaviour which the interviews have identified: lack of flexibility in 
business management and cost increases.  The chief reason behind the lack of flexibility 
is the government excessive regulation of private operators, which the next section 
highlights.        
 
5.1.5a Overregulation as a principal reason for lack of flexibility in  
  business management 
 
The following example illustrates limitations imposed on the private sector 
partner's management flexibility:  
'Some government regulations look really strange.  It appeared that we [an 
operator] are not allowed to own a building that we bought a few years ago.  
We used it as an office and temporary housing for our staff.  The building is 
located very close to the facility, it is so convenient and we really need it.  And 
now the government told us that we [a PPP project operator] do not have a 
right to own real estate according to some regulation.  So, now we must sell it, 
and then we will rent another building or perhaps exactly the same building.  
This does not make any sense to me.'     
KZ-1-Aibol 
This excerpt showed inappropriateness of some government regulations that strip 
the private partner's operating power without proper justification.  Furthermore, the 
quote illustrated neglect of the partnership's context and its business need.  Keeping in 
mind that the number of active PPP projects in Kazakhstan is as small as four (as of 
December 2012), the disregard of PPP needs may have significant detrimental influence 
on the overall partnership development in the country.  Hence, the example shows the 
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insufficient attention that the government pays to PPPs at the public policy level.  The 
government treats PPPs the same way as the public sector organisations, which results 
in overregulation of partnerships. 
 
5.1.5b Framed private partners’ management flexibility  
 
In all four studied partnerships, a conflict of interests has emerged between tight 
government regulation and the need for greater flexibility in business operations.  
Naturally, respondents who work for the government organisations emphasised 
regulation, whilst those who work for a private party attached much higher value on 
greater flexibility in management decision-making.   
The following example illustrates a case in which the government exhibited 
opportunistic behaviour regarding an operator's bond issue.  An interviewee made a 
comment regarding a PPP operator that issued corporate bonds with a coupon value 
which exceeded the government guarantee’s volume:   
'We are now under huge pressure from the anti-trust agency: it wants us to buy 
back bonds.  But where can we get the money to buy back bonds?  Of course, 
we can take money from our current revenues, but this leaves very little money 
for development.'   
        KZ-1-Aibol 
The quote shows how the government perceives its own and an operator's risk.  As 
the government understands that an operator has to secure financing for its investment 
and operations, the government has agreed to issue a guarantee for a certain value of 
bonds.  However, driven by a business need, an operator issued a larger volume of 
bonds to ensure uninterrupted investment.  Whilst the government perceives this kind of 
a bond issue as a high-risk endeavour that may adversely influence suppliers in the case 
of PPP default, it required an operator to buy back some bonds, in order to reduce the 
corporate debt exactly to the volume of a government guarantee.  In the quote above, 
the interviewee asserted that a bond buyback would leave much less cash for business 
development.  Thus, the government has put itself in a less risky position in the case of 
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potential project default: after the buyback, its financial liabilities are limited by exactly 
the outstanding bonds’ value.  
At the same time, the government has framed the operator's behaviour in a risk-
averse way and significantly reduced its flexibility in business management during a 
few years of bond buyback.  In this case, the government exhibited opportunistic 
behaviour: whilst a private partner took additional business risk for the PPP benefit (i.e., 
getting larger funds for uninterrupted investment), the government essentially slowed 
down the partnership's business development by directing an operator to reduce the size 
of its debt.  The ultimate result is curtailed private partner's management flexibility.  
Although one may interpret the government action as defensive or as risk mitigation, 
the government pursued its own interest, rather than that of a PPP, whilst the private 
sector pursued the common PPP interest, rather than its own.  Hence, overregulation 
represents the government’s opportunistic attempt to treat a partnership as the public 
sector organisation by minimising the private partner's opportunities to undertake 
business risk and by framing its management flexibility.     
Interviews showed that the government’s opportunistic behaviour manifested itself 
by imposing the risk of staff attrition on the private sector partner, which also reduces 
its flexibility in business management.  In 2012, in Kazakhstan's railroad project, the 
public sector partners put forward the requirement that an operator must move its 
management office from the city, where the office was located for seven years from the 
project's inception, to another city that is located close to the newly built facility.  As for 
the reason, the public partners' perception was that close proximity to the facility would 
allow the contractor to solve operational issues faster and more effectively.  However, 
interviewees from the operator's staff perceived the office move differently, as the 
following excerpt illustrates: 
'We worked in the existing office seven years and things were okay.  Now they 
[the public sector partners] want us to move.  They say that it will help the 
business.  But I have a family, kids.  I lived here all my life.  How can I move to 
another place?  The idea just came out of the blue.'           
KZ-1-Damir 
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Another interviewee also confirmed the controversy involved in the government 
attempt to influence PPP operations.  The following excerpt illuminates this: 
'Why does the government want us to move the office to another city?  I think 
they [the government] are frustrated with the project's progress.  The larger 
part of the railroad has been constructed and is operational; however, another 
part of the railroad is yet to be constructed.  The government insists on the 
faster completion of construction and the fully operational railroad.  But how 
will the move help with this?  As far as I know, many staff will just quit as soon 
as the date for the move is set.  They are not going to leave their families here 
and move there for a few years.  It's much easier just to find another job.  And 
how will these massive departures help to make the project more effective?'         
 KZ-1-Rustam 
Another respondent reiterated the concerns regarding whether the office move may 
increase the project's effectiveness:  
'I know that about half of the employees have already refused to move.  So, the 
company will have to hire lots of people at its new location.  I don't think that 
it is going to be easy.  It is a much smaller city and qualified staff will be hard 
to find.'   
KZ-1-Damir 
The three excerpts above show that, by insisting on the office move, the 
government exerts pressure on the private sector partner by imposing a significant risk 
of key staff attrition.  As there is no empirical evidence that the office move would 
increase the operations' effectiveness, one can categorise the public sector partners' 
behaviour as opportunistic.  It implies reducing an operator's flexibility in management 
decisions, rather than addressing the identified business need.    
To summarise, with the government attempts to exercise excessive regulation, its 
efforts to reduce its own financial liabilities in the event of project failure or the action 
that imposes additional risk on a private party, such as risk of staff attrition, are 
indicative of the government’s opportunistic behaviour that frames and curtails the 
private partner's management flexibility.    
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5.1.5c Cost increases 
 
An additional implication of the government’s opportunistic behaviour is the 
private sector partner's cost increases.  The following excerpts exemplify this. 
'After our office moves to another city, we [an operator] have to rent apartments 
for those who have decided to move along.  This is going to cost us quite a bit.  
Perhaps, later on we will hire more local staff, but not right away.  In fact, it 
would be best if we keep the existing workers because they know what's going on 
in the project quite well.  And the business travel expenses will rise for sure.  I 
just don't know whether we are doing the right thing with this move.  There will 
be so many new things to pay for.'  
KZ-1-Azamat  
In the above excerpt, the interviewee stated that an operator would incur additional 
costs related to the office move.  The latter stems from the government’s pressure, 
rather than the operator's own initiative.  As there is no hard evidence that the move will 
result in greater project effectiveness, the operator's additional cost is the direct outcome 
of the government’s opportunistic behaviour.    
The next excerpt highlights the government’s disregard of cost-savings 
opportunities.      
'Ideally, we [an operator] could build one facility and learn a lot from our own 
experience - what materials are better, how many workers we need and how to 
use them better, what equipment is more reliable, what mistakes we can avoid.  
But the government is not interested in all that.  They just want new facilities 
as quickly as possible.'         
KZ-2-Darkhan 
As missed opportunities for cost reduction mean relatively higher budget expenses 
and a greater burden for the taxpayers, they are the equivalent to cost increases due to 
the government’s opportunistic behaviour, i.e., where the government neglects efforts to 
reduce PPP costs as opposed to achieving faster results. 
An interviewee observes the same kind of disregard in another project in Russia 
(kindergartens and schools' PPP): 
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'The city needs the kindergartens and schools.  The way it [the government] 
thinks is this: we [the government] hired you [an operator] and we are going to 
pay you big money.  So, we [the government] need to open these kindergartens, 
and the sooner the better.  Just because we [the government] pay.' 
RU-2-Oleg 
In the above quote, the interviewee confirmed the government’s preference for a 
faster outcome, rather than for keeping expenses low.  The implication of this kind of 
government opportunistic behaviour is relative cost increases in a PPP compared to 
what the cost could have been if the government and the PPP had pursued the cost 
reduction opportunity.  
In summary, although there are varying manifestations of the government’s 
opportunistic behaviour, interviewees asserted that cost increases are its common 
implication in all investigated PPP projects.     
 
5.1.6 Theme summary 
 
The discussion of a partner’s opportunistic behaviour in a PPP has highlighted its 
principal implications for PPP governance: opportunistic behaviour results in the 
bounded private operator's initiative.  The latter transpires in two aspects: (a) lack of a 
private partner's flexibility in business management due to government excessive 
regulation and (b) cost elevation, which stems from the risk-averse opportunistic 
behaviour.  One can explain the latter by the overregulation that reduces a private 
party's incentives to undertake business risk, e.g., by implementing productivity 
enhancement measures.   
Figure 5.3 summarises the principal implications of partners' opportunistic 
behaviour in a PPP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 237 
 Figure 5.3 Opportunistic behaviour in a PPP: Forms and implications 
Public sector partner
exerts formal and
informal pressure on a 
private partner
Private partner’s 
risk-averse 
opportunistic behaviour
that results in 
cost increases
Overregulation of the 
private sector partner
Private sector partner
lacks flexibility in business
management
 
  Source: Compiled by the author 
 
As Figure 5.3 depicts, one kind of opportunistic behaviour by either party feeds 
another kind of opportunistic behaviour.  Together, various kinds of behaviour and their 
implications result in a vicious circle in which each element feeds another.  Although 
the study did not focus directly on overall PPP operation efficiency, interviewees' 
indirect comments have highlighted a large number of details that are indicative of 
compromised PPP efficiency owing to the vicious circle of opportunistic behaviour and 
its implications.  
 
5.2 Interaction between Partners in a PPP      
 
5.2.1 Partner interaction issues - varying perceptions 
 
The study captured four groups of issues regarding which partner interaction 
typically takes place.  They include issues of: 
 PPP project financing; 
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 facilities construction; 
 tariff setting; and 
 operational issues.   
With regards to partner interaction, respondents have mixed perceptions - negative 
and positive - on the range of issues.  Interviewees expressed most criticism and 
described their negative experiences regarding interaction about facilities construction, 
tariff setting and operational issues.  At the same time, data revealed that interviewees 
formed a positive perception of interaction regarding PPP project financing where a 
private partner receives government financial support.  Table 5.2 summarises themes 
and perceptions of partner interaction. 
 
  Table 5.2 Partner interaction: Themes and perceptions   
Themes Perceptions of partner interaction 
 
PPP project financing (i.e., government 
financial support to PPPs) 
 
Mixed, whilst mostly positive 
Facilities construction 
 
Mixed, whilst mostly negative 
Tariff setting 
 
Negative 
Operational issues 
 
Negative 
  Source: Compiled by the author from the interview data 
 
5.2.1a Partner interaction issues - positive perceptions 
 
As Table 5.2 shows, collaboration regarding PPP project financing is the only 
theme of partner interaction that brings positive experiences and forms positive 
perceptions.  There are certain reasons for that as follows.   
In both Kazakhstan and Russia, financial support that the government can extend to 
partnerships is the area that is well defined by the legislation.  The relevant national 
laws in each respective country define in a very detailed way the forms that the 
government financial support may take.  In Kazakhstan, it is the 2006 'Law on 
Concessions' and in Russia it is the federal law 'On Concessional Agreements' that the 
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government adopted in 2005.  It is worth noting that in both nations the governments 
deem extensive government financial support to partnerships necessary.  This is because, 
as the literature argues, for private investors PPPs are often unattractive because they 
cannot generate profit (Pankratov, 2010; Varnavskiy et al., 2010; Firsova, 2012).   
In line with this thinking, the governments in Kazakhstan and Russia have passed 
laws and regulations that permit various forms of government financial contribution to a 
PPP.  For example, in Russia they include: a subsidy that the government can extend to 
a concessionaire; assets such as land that the government may contribute to a 
partnership; a tariff subsidy where the government pays part of a tariff whilst customers 
pay another part; government guarantees for private partner loans; government 
exemptions of a private partner from fines and fees.  Kazakhstan has similar forms of 
government financial support to partnerships.  Section 6.4.3 discusses the forms of 
government financial support to PPPs more fully.     
As the list of possible forms of government support to a partnership is quite 
extensive, it promotes rising expectations among private investors regarding 
government payments and other direct and indirect financial benefits that they may 
expect from the public agencies.  In addition to elevated government costs, this 
increasingly creates a guarantee culture among private investors (Pankratov, 2010: 80, 
88; Varnavskiy et al., 2010: 26) that may view the government as their source of 
financial gain regardless of the project’s context.  
In summary, interviewees most often perceive partner interaction regarding PPP 
project financing in a positive way because they know the 'rules of the game' and both 
partners 'play by these rules'.  Naturally, the structured and clear environment fosters 
more effective communication between partners and adds to the transparency regarding 
benefits that each party can give or receive.  The following excerpt highlights how an 
interviewee from a private party perceives partner interaction in this field: 
'Whilst talking to some government employees, I was under the strong 
impression that the government is very interested in giving us what the law 
permits.  I think they [the government] really wanted to launch a partnership 
and to make it successful by giving it as much as the laws allow to give, no 
matter whether it was really necessary.  And, of course, we, as a private 
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investor, were eager to get as much as we could from the government in order 
to make sure that we are going to make profit in this project.'    
KZ-2-Akylbek 
Hence, the government regulations and guidelines regarding its own forms of 
financial support to a PPP not only make the 'rules of the game' clear, but also 
encourage both parties to completely use up all available public resources, thus 
contributing to the guarantee culture among private investors.     
 
5.2.1b Partner interaction issues - negative perceptions 
 
In contrast to the positive perception of interaction regarding PPP project financing 
issues, interviewees formed mostly negative perceptions of other partner interaction 
topics.  Interviewees asserted that the government does not distinguish a PPP from any 
other private contractor that a public agency hires.  This means that the government 
treats a partnership's requests, applications and inquiries in the same way as requests by 
any other contractor.  Although interviewees from private parties did not ask for any 
favours for a PPP, they emphasised that a PPP carries out a project for the government 
and instead of the government, i.e., a partnership delivers a public service, rather than 
merely sells some private goods or services to the government like most contractors.  
This means, from the interviewees' perspective, that a PPP service - and a PPP itself - 
should be more significant to the government than another private contractor and its 
services.  The following excerpt illustrates this perception: 
'This is strange that the government does not see any difference between my 
company [a private PPP operator] and any other private company that the 
government hired to do a certain job.  We [a PPP operator and the government] 
have common goals, we have shared responsibility. There are some risks that 
we need to handle all together.  But the government behaves as if all these do 
not exist.  They behave as if it's our [operator's] business and all these 
problems are just our headache, not theirs.'  
RU-2-Vladimir 
Another interviewee shares the above perception of the government's role:  
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'It seems that the government assumed the following role in the PPP: supervise 
and pay.'  
 KZ-2-Azamat      
Hence, both comments illustrate three aspects that characterise the government's 
role in a PPP: 
- the government has assumed a narrow role of more like a boss, rather than a 
partner;  
- the government does not understand the PPP's business and does not acknowledge, 
by the way it interacts with a private partner, that the latter implements a job instead of 
the government, i.e., delivers a public service; and  
- the government is not interested in closely interacting with the private sector 
partner and supporting a PPP by effectively managing a public-private relationship.     
With regards to the lack of interaction between partners, interviewees also formed 
negative perceptions about formal and informal interaction.  Interviewees asserted two 
things: that much interaction occurs informally and that both formal and informal 
interaction lacks established procedures and effectiveness.  An excerpt highlights this as 
follows: 
'Small issues evolve all the time, here and there, and many of them are 
repetitive.  They are kind of annoying, but we need to tackle them again and 
again, mostly in an informal way.'   
KZ-1-Rustam     
Interviewees from the private operators were highly critical of another partner 
interaction area - tariff setting.  Most criticism was about lack of established and clear 
application procedures for tariff increases, about lengthy application processes and 
tangled approval criteria.  The common opinion was that government procedures for 
handling applications must be significantly streamlined, as the following excerpt 
illuminates: 
'Who needs all this bureaucracy involved in bulky applications, with tons of 
supporting documentation?  I don't think that the government agencies have 
human resources to read and analyse these applications as thoroughly as they 
 242 
should.  Basically, I think they [government staff] are playing by ear, rather 
than carefully examining all these numbers.' 
KZ-1-Assem 
Interviewees also have formed strong negative perceptions in another area of 
partner interaction - operational issues.  One example of these issues is the case where 
the public sector partners insist on the office move from the central city to a smaller 
remote town that is located closer to partnership operations.  Another example is the 
case where the government enforced its own regulation regarding mandatory sales of 
the office building that the PPP used for the project work: according to the government 
regulation, a PPP operator was not eligible to own the building because an operator was 
formed, in part, by the government organisation.    
Regarding both cases, interviewees from private operators asserted that they have 
experienced: 
(a) significant public sector partner dominance, and, consequently,  
(b) framed, reduced operator flexibility in business management.   
The following excerpt confirms these experiences: 
'Somebody in the government got this idea that the office move to another town 
will allow resolution of many operational problems.  But it will definitely 
create new ones, particularly, with staff recruitment and retention, and with 
attrition of existing staff.  The office move requires a thorough discussion and 
understanding of all the pros and cons, but we [the operator] were stripped of 
the opportunity to have this discussion.  The office move was kind of imposed 
on us [the operator].'  
KZ-1-Assel             
In this and other excerpts, interviewees stated that the public sector partner tended 
to exhibit its dominance in those situations where the nature of the issue lacked an 
established structure or known guidelines for resolution.  In situations of uncertainty, 
the government normally insisted on its own ways of solving the problem, rather than 
giving flexibility to a private party in decision-making.  One can explain this not by a 
high degree of the government's accountability for PPPs, but by the government's fear 
that the private sector partner made a decision on its own.  To reiterate, a public party 
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takes the lead in making a decision in the situation of uncertainty not because of the 
business need, but because of the fear of penalty for non-action.  The following excerpt 
by a government employee elucidates this: 
'Whenever some issue catches the manager’s attention [in the public agency], 
we [the public agency] feel that it's time for action.  We don't know how strong 
the need for action is, but there is an understanding that an operator should 
not bring up small things to our attention.' 
         KZ-GOVT-3 
An interviewee from a private company in a similar way highlights the reasons 
underpinning the government’s logic: 
'It seems that sometimes the government officials just want to show that they 
have the power and that they can do a lot of things to a partnership.  They 
select an issue no matter if it is important or not, and push for a decision no 
matter whether it is truly necessary.'   
KZ-2-Sholpan  
In this section, an issue that has not caught any attention of partners – the service 
quality – deserves a concluding remark.  Some clarifying questions to interviewees 
confirmed the simplistic partners' thinking about quality.  Interviewees expressed no 
concerns regarding the quality based on a simple notion: prior to a PPP, the service was 
unavailable, non-existent; so, once a PPP provides a service and satisfies a need, almost 
any acceptable service quality will suffice.  Although the range of acceptable quality 
parameters may be quite broad, its normal understanding, in the interviewees' opinions, 
is that 'it is much like the service quality of other providers'.  The interviewee 
commented on the service quality as follows: 
'Our railroad provides the service like many other railroads.  I don't think that 
we need to be different from other operators.  As long as we provide a similar 
quality, we should be okay.'   
KZ-1-Azamat        
To conclude, the service quality has not yet become a concern for partners in a PPP 
in either country, nor did it become an issue regarding which partner interaction evolves.   
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5.2.2 PPP organisational forms: Advantages and disadvantages    
 
Interview data revealed advantages and disadvantages of various PPP 
organisational forms, which Table 5.3 summarises. 
 
Table 5.3 PPP organisational forms: Principal features    
PPP organisational form Features, advantages and drawbacks 
 
Joint venture formed by the 
public agencies and private 
investors 
 
 
 
 tangled power relationships between partners 
 the operator's Board of Directors is the only 
governance structure 
 private investors play no significant role 
 lack of formal governance structures and 
procedures 
 multiple interdependencies make partner 
interaction ineffective   
 
An operator without an SPV 
 
 
 
 more effective interaction between partners 
 streamlined communication 
 streamlined power relations 
 extensive monitoring by the local and regional 
governments 
 extensive reporting to the national and regional 
PPP centres 
 
A special purpose vehicle  
 
 
 
 
 considerably streamlined partner interaction 
 reduced bureaucracy 
 minimal reporting 
 greater flexibility and larger effectiveness in 
decision-making 
 clear SPV's accountability 
 
 Source: Compiled by the author from interview data 
 
As Table 5.3 shows, an organisational form that employs an SPV provides a better, 
more effective platform for partner interaction in a PPP.  The two studied projects in 
Russia use this organisational form.  However, in Kazakhstan, a joint venture company 
has implemented one of the projects (a railroad concession).  This is characterised by 
significantly tangled power arrangements, extensive reporting requirements and a 
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constrained private operator's flexibility in business management (e.g., all purchasing 
must take place through competitive bidding, whilst it takes between two and six 
months to run a tender).  Another project in Kazakhstan (kindergartens' PPP) employs a 
form in which a tender winner itself carries out construction and operations, without an 
SPV.  This form also provides, in the interviewees' perception, a more effective 
structure for partner interaction as opposed to a joint venture that the public agencies 
and private investors formed.  The following excerpt highlights the effectiveness of an 
operator that does not employ an SPV: 
'We [the operator] know our reporting requirements, we know that we are 
being monitored by the city government and the regional government and we 
need to work with them anyways, but other than that, there is not much 
bureaucracy.'          
KZ-2-Kairat 
To summarise, interviewees from an operator that does not employ an SPV and 
interviewees from the two projects carried out by SPVs did not express any serious 
concerns about lack of clarity in power arrangements between partners or about 
excessive reporting and monitoring.  Their only concern was about the lack of well-
established governance procedures.  On the contrary, interviewees from a joint venture 
expressed deep criticism of the tangled power relations, ineffective governance 
structure and the lack of well-designed management procedures.       
 
5.2.3 Tools for dispute resolution between partners  
 
Interviewees paid limited attention to techniques for dispute resolution and largely 
disregarded this area of PPP governance.  Table 5.4 summarises interviewees' 
perceptions of tools for dispute resolution and their importance.  
Table 5.4 shows significant disregard of the formal dispute resolution mechanisms 
by PPP governance in Kazakhstan and Russia.  Dispute resolution as a sub-field of PPP 
governance does not yet exist in the two nations as a recognised area of partner 
interaction, with established and elaborate tools, procedures and governance structures.   
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Table 5.4 Tools for dispute resolution in PPPs: Perceptions and practice  
Tools and methods Perceived 
importance 
Existing practice 
 
Formal dispute 
resolution 
mechanisms 
Low importance  Not used 
 Interviewees disregarded formal 
mechanisms in PPP governance 
 
Good informal 
relations 
 
High importance  Used often 
 Interviewees emphasised their use 
 
Governance structures Moderate importance  In three out of four studied PPPs, 
partners do no use any governance 
structures for dispute resolution 
 In one studied PPP, the operator's 
Board of Directors works  
The operator's Board 
of Directors 
Moderate importance  The Board of Directors' influence 
on the operator is highly limited 
due to the occasional nature of 
interventions 
 There are serious irregularities in 
the Board's work 
 Presently, the Board is an 
ineffective tool for dispute 
resolution 
 
Preferential treatment 
of a PPP as a joint 
public-private project 
 
High importance  No special treatment 
 The government treats a PPP in the 
same way as it treats any other 
private contractor 
 No indication of government 
commitment to a PPP project  
 
Source: Compiled by the author from the interview data 
 
5.2.4 Theme summary      
 
The discussion of partner interaction issues has elucidated certain PPP governance 
aspects, in which interviewees identified problems and improvement opportunities.  
Table 5.5 summarises these governance issues.    
As Table 5.5 shows, interviewees' experiences in partner interaction are mixed and 
include both positive and negative aspects.  Most often interviewees were concerned 
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with the ineffectiveness of established procedures and existing organisational forms.  
Additionally, they criticised the lack of government commitment to a PPP and 
ineffective communication between partners.  In part, good informal relations between 
the operators' staff and government staff could substitute the ill-designed governance 
structures and the lack of formal administrative procedures, such as dispute resolution 
mechanisms.  However, the overall disregard by both partners of the formal 
management tools significantly reduces the opportunities for more effective PPP 
governance.  In addition to the service quality, participants clearly disregard another 
area of partner interaction – governance structures and administrative processes.     
 
Table 5.5 Partner interaction in a PPP: Summary of issues and improvement    
          opportunities 
Aspects of partner interaction Issue  
Administrative processes  Lack of established well-designed    
procedures 
 Ineffective communication between 
partners 
 The public sector partner dominates in 
decision-making 
 The government treats a PPP as it 
treats any private contractor (i.e., 
public sector partners show little 
commitment to a PPP)  
PPP governance structures   Joint venture exhibits ineffective 
governance 
 Organisational forms that employ an 
SPV show greater effectiveness 
Dispute resolution methods  Operators put significant emphasis on 
keeping good informal relations with 
government staff  
 Partners from both sectors show 
disregard of formal dispute resolution 
mechanisms 
Neglected areas of partner interaction  Service quality 
 Improvement of PPP governance 
structures and administrative 
procedures  
 Source: Compiled by the author from the interview data 
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5.3 Risk Management in a PPP     
 
The interview data on risk management in a PPP have permitted the researcher to 
investigate perceptions of twelve kinds of risk.  The list of risks is in agreement with 
existing risk categorisation by scholars (e.g., Grimsey and Lewis, 2002; Hardcastle and 
Boothroyd, 2003) and international organisations, such as the European Commission 
and the United Nations (e.g., European Commission, 2003; United Nations, 2008).  
Table 5.6 summarises the interviewees' experiences and perceptions of risks and risk 
mitigation tools.  
  
Table 5.6 Summary of risks, perceptions and risk mitigation methods 
Kinds of risk  
 
Perception of risk Tools and methods used for 
risk mitigation 
Project 
country   
 
Technical 
risk 
 
 Unavoidable  None, although the risk 
exists 
Kazakhstan  
Construction 
risk   
 
 Must be avoided at the 
engineering design stage 
 Risk must be eliminated at 
the engineering project 
design stage 
Kazakhstan, 
Russia 
Operating 
risk    
 
 Underpinning reasons for 
this risk are beyond the 
operator's control 
 An operator must budget 
larger funds to allow for 
unforeseen expenses  
Kazakhstan, 
Russia 
 
Revenue 
(demand) risk 
 
 Three out of four studied 
PPPs are risk-free 
 In one studied PPP, the 
government bears all the 
risk, although it shifted 
all risk mitigation effort 
to a private party 
 The government has agreed 
to buy out the facility at a 
predetermined price if 
traffic volume falls 10 per 
cent short of the target level  
 Lack of competition 
ensures high capacity 
utilisation   
 
 
 
Russia 
Financial risk 
 
 In three projects, private 
partners associate this 
risk with how the 
government treats a PPP 
(i.e., much like any 
private contractor) 
 This risk overlaps 
operating risk 
 None  Kazakhstan, 
Russia 
Environment
al risk 
 
 Only one studied project 
is exposed to this risk 
 This risk overlaps with 
the operating risk 
 An operator must budget 
contingency funds 
 An operator must build an 
additional protective 
Kazakhstan 
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facility  
Regulatory/ 
political risk 
 
 In all studied projects 
interviewees attach high 
importance to this risk 
 The principal reason for 
operators' concern is that 
they do not own facilities 
that they manage 
 Partners have shortened the 
concession term 
Kazakhstan, 
Russia 
Public 
acceptance 
risk 
 
 Only one studied project 
is exposed to this risk 
 
 An operator must promote 
the project via a Web site, 
extensively communicate 
with citizens and mass 
media  
Russia 
Project 
default risk 
 
 Two studied projects are 
highly exposed to this 
risk 
 
 An operator must reduce its 
corporate debt by bond 
buyback  
 The government consented  
to buy out a facility 
Kazakhstan, 
Russia 
 
Foreign 
exchange risk 
 
 Only one studied project 
is exposed to this risk 
because of the foreign 
investor 
 Risk premium adds to the 
overall project costs 
 An operator added risk 
premium to the project 
costs     
Kazakhstan 
 
Risk involved 
in the choice 
of the private 
sector partner 
 
 High risk in one project 
because of a foreign 
bidder 
 The risk materialised and 
resulted in a delay with 
the project launch  
 None, although the risk 
exists   
Kazakhstan 
 
Hidden 
protectionism 
 
 Very low importance 
 In three studied projects, 
the risk does not exist 
 In one project, the risk 
was effectively handled 
 Partners must provide an 
alternative free facility 
Russia 
 Source: Compiled by the author from the interview data 
 
 
As Table 5.6 shows, some kinds of risk are common for projects in both 
Kazakhstan and Russia.  They include construction risk, operating risk, financial risk, 
regulatory and political risk and project default risk.  Other kinds of risk are unique to a 
specific project.  Some of the risks interviewees perceive as low, whilst others they 
perceive as high.  The next section discusses risk that respondents perceived as high, i.e., 
financial risk.  The section that follows discusses risk that interviewees perceived as low, 
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i.e., revenue (demand) risk.  Then the chapter highlights implications of risk perceptions 
for the emergent guarantee culture in PPPs.         
 
5.3.1 Perceptions of financial risk   
 
Most interviewees perceived this risk as high.  Only in one out of the four studied 
projects - a toll viaduct in Russia - interviewees stated that the probability of financial 
risk occurrence is low, although they did not exclude it completely.  An excerpt 
illustrates this as follows: 
'Financially, we [an operator] will be in good shape as long as drivers use a 
viaduct.  We know that there is a public acceptance issue because a toll 
viaduct is something new for most people as it's going to be the first toll 
viaduct in the country.  But we are working on increasing public acceptance 
and we are confident that the demand for the service will be huge.  We just 
need to show how effective a viaduct is, so that a driver can cross the railroad 
using a viaduct within a minute.'     
  RU-1-Konstantin 
The interviewee justifiably connected three overlapping kinds of risk - public 
acceptance risk, operating risk and financial risk.  When the first risk materialises, this 
inevitably triggers the occurrence of the other two.   
In three other out of the four studied PPP projects, interviewees from the private 
sector partners associated financial risk with how the government treats a PPP (i.e., 
much like it treats any private contractor, with no commitment to the latter).  This 
means that the government did not manifest its commitment to a partnership, and 
mutuality as a principal feature of cooperation in the PPP form (Brinkerhoff and 
Brinkerhoff, 2004) is missing.  In this thesis, the literature review has identified certain 
critical PPP characteristics, including commitment above and beyond contracts 
(Bovaird, 2004), culture of engagement (Sedjari, 2004), solidarity (Sedjari, 2004), 
mutuality (Haque, 2004) and shared responsibility for a product, risk, costs and benefits 
(Klijn and Teisman, 2000, 2003).  Hence, interview data revealed that the government 
agencies in the studied projects in both Kazakhstan and Russia failed to commit 
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themselves to a partnership by demonstrating clear support of PPP operations.  
Although the government extended significant financial support to PPPs at the time of a 
partnership formation, i.e., at the strategic management level, interviewees did not 
observe government commitment to a project during everyday operations management.  
The following excerpt illustrates the lack of government commitment when the 
government suspended its payments to an operator unexpectedly: 
'The government has just stopped its payments to us [an operator] without an 
apparent reason.  It was like a shock.  How can we continue working without 
the money?  There were no explanations, no indication of when the 
government may resume paying and almost no communication with 
government staff.  I thought that in a partnership we [an operator] should be 
working together with the government, but it surely doesn't look like that.'   
RU-2-Vladimir    
 
In another project (railroad concession), an interviewee highlighted the 
government's lack of commitment in connection with operating and financial risk as 
follows:  
'We [an operator] have prepared a plan that includes more than last year's 
volume of services.  But the larger volume depends on whether the national 
[i.e., government-owned] company is going to purchase more services from us.  
The plan was approved, but the buyer has not signed any contracts with us for 
additional purchases.  So, our plan is, in fact, not real.  We just don't know 
how many services we will sell.  As far as I remember, this happens every 
year.'     
KZ-1-Damir 
In the third studied PPP project (kindergartens' partnership), an interviewee also 
connects operating risk with financial risk and questions whether both risks are aligned 
with the government’s commitment to the project.  The following excerpt illustrates this: 
'Why do we need to undertake the construction of all eleven kindergartens at 
once, simultaneously, and complete the construction of all of them at the same 
time?  This is just because the government wants to open them at the same time.  
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Can you imagine the construction of eleven facilities simultaneously as 
opposed to construction of one facility at a time?  The effort is huge; it's going 
to be very stressful and costly.  If there is some error in the project design, 
there will be no time to correct it.  If there is a delay with some materials or 
equipment, all eleven sites may experience a subsequent delay.  Financially, it 
is so costly to run eleven construction sites rather than one at a time.  But it 
does not look that somebody in the government is concerned with this.'   
KZ-2-Kairat 
Another interviewee from the same Kazakhstani project (kindergartens' PPP) also 
questions the genuineness of the government’s commitment to the PPP:     
'It [the government] has its own goal, which seems more important for them 
[government staff] than anything else - to open all kindergartens at once, 
better yet the same day.'          
    KZ-2-Darkhan   
To summarise, in three out of the four studied projects interviewees (a) justifiably 
connected financial risk with operating risk and (b) associated financial risk with the 
lack of government commitment to a PPP, which had various manifestations depending 
on a specific project.  Contrary to the findings, the literature argues that commitment, 
solidarity, mutuality and shared responsibility for the service, risk and costs form the set 
of defining PPP features, which are missing in the studied projects in the two countries.  
Furthermore, with regards to risk mitigation, interviewees have not identified any tools 
and methods that may permit partners to effectively mitigate financial risk.  One may 
argue that mitigation stems from the public partner's commitment, which is lacking in 
the studied projects, and this explains why risk mitigation tools are missing from the 
discussion.       
 
5.3.2 Perceptions of revenue (demand) risk   
 
Revenue (demand) risk is unique to only one project in Russia (a toll viaduct) 
because in three other studied PPPs the high demand for partnership services is 
essentially guaranteed.  In three projects quantity demanded exceeds quantity supplied 
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because the PPP's service volume is insufficient to satisfy consumer needs: a PPP 
satisfies the need only in part.  The following excerpt confirms the typical situation with 
no demand risk in a PPP: 
'I know that the waiting line for childcare is huge.   And I don't think that the 
newly built kindergartens [the kindergartens' PPP] will be able to eliminate the 
waiting line totally and completely.  It looks like we [the kindergartens' PPP] 
will have to enrol more children in each group than our planned capacity 
suggests.  And the waiting line still will be there.  Sometimes parents are 
waiting for a place in a public kindergarten for years.'  
KZ-2-Darkhan 
The same kind of situation with no demand risk is in a PPP project in Russia 
(kindergartens and schools' partnership), as an interviewee highlighted: 
'We are building schools and kindergartens in a brand new development of the 
city.  There are many new apartment buildings here, people just moved in, but 
there are no schools and kindergartens.  We intend to satisfy an acute need.  
You can't call it 'a shortage'; it's wrong.  As of today, educational facilities 
simply are unavailable for the population.  We are not even sure that the 
capacity of what we are building is going to suffice; perhaps there will be a 
shortage of places after we finish the construction.'      
RU-2-Sergey   
Hence, in three out of the four studied projects, interviewees did not identify 
revenue (demand) risk.  As private operators' exposure to this major kind of risk that 
may lead to project default is non-existent, this means that PPP projects in Kazakhstan 
and Russia generally are low-risk.  It is no surprise that the government formed PPPs 
exactly in the fields that experience an acute shortage of services, such as educational 
services at schools and kindergartens or transport infrastructure, such as a railroad or a 
railroad viaduct.  The literature confirms this finding by arguing that in transitional 
countries the governments traditionally form partnerships in the transportation field and 
in the social sector including hospitals, spas, recreational facilities, schools, 
kindergartens and stadiums (see, for example, Pongsiri, 2003; Jamali, 2004; Bult-
Spiering and Dewulf, 2006; Urio, 2010).      
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At the same time, the finding about demand risk that is close to zero as a distinctive 
feature of the PPP projects in Kazakhstan and Russia suggests that the government is 
interested in keeping the PPPs' exposure to risks low, thus inevitably enhancing the 
private operators' risk-averse behaviour.  This behaviour rests on the preference for risk 
avoidance and on various government guarantees, including those that ensure stable, 
risk-free revenue stream to a contractor (Siemiatycki and Friedman, 2012). 
The analysis of secondary sources, such as the project data, also confirmed the 
findings about no demand risk in a PPP and operators' risk-averse behaviour.  The 
following example from the kindergartens' PPP in Karaganda, Kazakhstan, illustrates 
this.  Table 5.7 summarises the government forecast of the private partner’s revenue 
over the course of the project.     
 
 Table 5.7 Private partner’s forecasted revenue during the concession term 
       of 14 years in the PPP project in Karaganda 
 Source: Kindergartens' PPP, 2011  
 
As Table 5.7 shows, the risk stems from the third revenue source, as commercial 
activity has to yield at least $11 million of net revenue to the private partner, or 14.38 
per cent out of the total of $76.49 million.  A commercial activity has not yet been 
 Source of revenue Amount  
(US dollars, in 
nominal values)  
Percentage of 
total revenue 
Comments 
1 Government payments 
to a concessionaire  
$35.84 million 46.86% 
Government agreed 
to pay over the course 
of 13 years or less 
2 
 
Childcare fees  
 
$29.65 million 38.76% 
Parents’ payments are 
deemed guaranteed 
and may rise due to 
excess demand for 
childcare  
3 Concessionaire’s 
commercial activities 
$11 million 14.38% 
This is the 
government estimate; 
revenue is not 
guaranteed in any 
way 
 
 
Total: $76.49 million 100% 
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defined and can include anything that the law permits.  However, both partners entertain 
an idea that an operator may run some training courses using the kindergartens' 
premises.  The government methodology raises concerns because it rests on the forecast 
of revenue per child.  However, PPP commercial activity is largely unrelated to the 
number of children in a kindergarten.  In fact, the revenue risk for the whole PPP 
project is linked exclusively to the demand for the PPP’s commercial activities.  As this 
revenue requires a creative business approach, marketing efforts and all other tools for 
setting up and running a business, there is no guarantee of success.  The private sector 
partner will have to form a business in each of the 11 kindergartens, or 11 branches of 
the same business venture, or a few businesses with a few branches for each.  It remains 
unclear what exact revenue generating activities a private partner plans to select, how 
much revenue they may bring and what the costs will be.  In the case of unsuccessful 
commercial activities, the losses will decrease revenues from other sources.  This poses 
an additional revenue risk.  Neither the government nor the private sector partner can 
mitigate this risk. 
To summarise, a relatively small part of revenue risk (14 per cent) transfers to the 
private partner, whilst the government guarantees a much larger revenue part (47 per 
cent).  Additionally, an extremely high and stable consumer demand essentially 
guarantees another 39 per cent of revenue.  This revenue risk allocation is highly 
favourable to the private sector partner.  Naturally, commercial activities are associated 
with certain risks that one should not neglect; however, they also give a PPP operator an 
opportunity to generate net revenue that is even higher than forecasted.   
The study's findings confirm that the government has acted – for the most part, 
although not always – in line with the theory underpinning risk allocation in a PPP, i.e., 
that risk should be allocated to the party best able to manage it at the least cost 
(Akintoye et al., 2003).  The findings show that the private sector partner bears most 
risks, which is in line with the extant literature.  The latter emphasises that effective risk 
transfer will facilitate investment in critically needed infrastructure objects, whilst 
protecting the taxpayers from cost overruns (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Chung et al., 2010).   
In the area of risk transfer to the private sector, the most controversial element is a 
proposed revenue stream that an operator is supposed to receive from the provision of 
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services unrelated to childcare.  The government and the private sector partner are 
unable to mitigate this revenue risk.  For a private operator, there are no performance 
incentives that are linked to revenue from non–core services other than a need to start 
some unspecified business that is, like any business, risky by itself.  Hence, the 
effectiveness of this government method of revenue risk transfer is debatable.   
In the kindergartens’ PPP, the government has achieved almost a complete transfer 
of risks to the private sector partner.  However, the costs of transfer are extensive 
government financial outlays to the partnership, which seriously compromises the PPP 
value for money.  This finding is in agreement with the literature that argues that 
partnerships often carry little value for money (Hodge and Greve, 2007; Mouraviev, 
2012; Mouraviev et al., 2012; Siemiatycki and Friedman, 2012).   
 
5.3.3 Low risk and the guarantee culture in PPPs   
 
The study shows that the interviewees perceive some risks as low thanks to the 
government's efforts.  One indication of this kind of government action is the fact that 
the government in either country designs for itself a PPP project proposal and then puts 
it out to tender, rather than inviting bidders to submit their own proposals, for example, 
regarding how to construct a set of kindergartens, or a segment of a railroad, or a tunnel.  
This implies that at the project design stage the government is able to purposely form a 
project as low-risk.  The principal reason for this is the need to attract private investors, 
otherwise there may be no investors at all.  The following excerpt illustrates these 
government intentions and actions. 
'I'm aware that the government announced the tender for the construction of 
kindergartens in another city more than once as during the first round no 
investors were interested.  Finding qualified investors is not an easy task, and 
the government had to change the project terms and conditions in order to 
make them more attractive.' 
KZ-2-Talgat         
Although the government's desire to find private investors is easily understandable, 
by reducing investors' exposure to risks, the government encourages their risk-averse 
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behaviour and furthers a guarantee culture.  As the current study shows, at the project 
implementation stage the government often exhibits disregard of higher PPP costs, for 
example, where the government exerts pressure to achieve results faster than contracted.  
This creates a vicious circle which links private operators' risk-averse behaviour to 
extensive government financial support to a PPP.  The latter explains the government's 
self-assumed right to push contractors for faster results, for which operators demand 
even greater financial support.  Figure 5.4 depicts the links between partners’ behaviour 
in a PPP.   
 
Figure 5.4 Links between partners' behaviour in a PPP: Reinforcing a 
guarantee culture  
     
Private sector partner:
• receives extensive government
guarantees
• enjoys low risk 
Public sector partner:
• attracts private
investment 
• provides extensive 
financial support
• Pressure to achieve fast results
• Disregard of higher cost
• Low government commitment to a PPP 
• Risk-averse behaviour
• Price-increase efforts
 
   Source: Compiled by the author 
 
As Figure 5.4 shows, opportunistic behaviour of both parties reinforces and 
enhances a guarantee culture, which becomes a prevailing set of rules for partnerships 
in both Kazakhstan and Russia.     
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5.3.4 Theme summary  
 
This theme discussed interviewees' perceptions of risks to which PPPs in 
Kazakhstan and Russia are exposed.  Additionally, the theme highlighted the 
interviewees' experiences and views regarding risk mitigation tools and their availability.  
The theme focused on two of the most common kinds of risk - financial risk, which 
interviewees perceived as high in three out of the four studied PPP projects, and 
revenue (demand) risk, which interviewees perceived as low.   
The discussion of financial risk revealed that interviewees associate it with the way 
the government treats a private partner, i.e., in the same way as any private contractor.  
The discussion found that the government’s treatment of a private partner stems from 
the lack of government commitment to a PPP, which the private sector partner is unable 
to mitigate.   
Highlights of revenue risk showed that this risk is virtually non-existent in three out 
of the four studied projects.  Hence, by providing extensive financial support to a PPP at 
the time of the partnership formation, the government advances a guarantee culture 
among private investors who view the government as a source of financial gain 
regardless of the project context.  The government’s own actions, such as disregard of 
higher costs when the public agency pushes for faster than contracted results, reinforce 
and enhance a guarantee culture and encourage private operators to exhibit risk-averse 
behaviour.  It is worth noting that interviewees' perceptions and observations were 
common for both nations and the study has not identified any major cross-country 
discrepancy.  
             
5.4 Constraints and Impediments to Effective PPP Governance    
 
This section discusses two sets of impediments to PPPs: 
 legal and regulatory barriers; and  
 institutional, managerial and financial constraints.   
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5.4.1 Legal and regulatory barriers    
 
5.4.1a A PPP: A legal and conceptual ambiguity  
 
Among the legal barriers to PPPs that interview data identified, the first and 
foremost is the lack of legally defined partnership's meaning in the national legislation 
in Kazakhstan and Russia.  This causes considerable confusion regarding understanding 
what a PPP is, how public agencies and private companies should treat a PPP and what 
support to partnerships is available.  Interviewees stated that, as of April 2013, the 
governments in either country have not yet adopted national laws on PPPs and, hence, 
the definition of a PPP at the national level is missing.  It is no surprise that the 
literature appraisal revealed significant variation between the two countries in the 
treatment of a PPP as a category, with a much broader and much more ambiguous PPP 
meaning in Russia as opposed to Kazakhstan (Varnavskiy et al., 2010).  For example, 
the government in Russia includes in PPPs special economic zones, production-sharing 
agreements that govern public-private collaboration in the oil sector, as well as rental 
arrangements, such as where the municipal government gives a boiler station in private 
hands in return for the hot water provision (Varnavskiy, 2004; Glumov, 2009; 
Varnavskiy et al., 2010).  In all noted arrangements in Russia, the key partnership 
characteristics, such as joint contribution of resources, sharing of risk, costs and 
responsibility, are missing, hence, contributing to confusion regarding the PPP meaning.  
In contrast to loosely defined partnerships that the Russian government claims, 
Grimsey and Lewis (2002) give a comprehensive and complete definition to a 
partnership.  They describe a PPP as an 'agreement where the public sector enters into 
long-term contractual agreements with private sector entities for the construction or 
management of public sector infrastructure facilities by the private sector entity, or the 
provision of services (using infrastructure facilities) by the private sector entity to the 
community on behalf of a public sector entity' (2002: 108).  A notable feature of 
Grimsey and Lewis’ definition (2002) is that it focuses on tangible PPP elements – legal 
long-term contracts, asset construction and provision of services with the use of 
constructed assets.  These elements set the framework for public-private collaboration.  
 260 
Yet, an additional PPP feature is that 'provision of service may be compensated through 
payments by the government or may be funded through user charges and fees' (Morallos 
and Amekudzi, 2008: 114).  
Although features of all four studied projects match the principal characteristics of 
a contractual PPP in the framework of the above-given definition, the general confusion 
in both countries regarding what project one may categorise as a PPP remains massive.     
Despite the national legislation's gap with regards to the PPP meaning, each 
country has adopted the law that defines a concession as the main PPP form.  Because 
the complexities with definitions and other partnerships' legal issues normally are 
beyond the scope of the PPP staff's attention, the researcher conducted additional 
interviews for the current study with lawyers who work for the law firms and provide 
legal advice regarding partnership formation and management.  These interviews aimed 
to draw lawyers' opinions with regards to the legal PPP framework, including 
impediments to further partnership development.    
The lawyers commented on the fundamental PPP issues that stem from the national 
legislation's imperfections.  They confirmed that the definition of a public-private 
partnership is missing in the national laws.  However, the Russian law and the 
Kazakhstani law do define the term a concession.  Although the definition may be less 
than perfect, the same laws on concessions in each country delineate the forms of 
government financial support that a concessionaire may receive.  The following excerpt 
illustrates the national legislation's gaps regarding PPPs:  
'If an investor wants to form a PPP and get funding from the government, an 
investor must form a concession and strictly follow the law on concessions.  
That's what this law is for.  If an investor is not going to apply for government 
financial support, then it can call its project anything, but it won't be a 
concession.'  
RU-Lawyer-1  
An expert from the PPP Centre of the Russian government-owned investment bank 
Vnesheconombank expressed a similar opinion about the federal legislation that governs 
PPPs in the country:  
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'We [Vnesheconombank] are a government organisation and we must work by 
the law.  We work with regional governments and their projects are large.  
They always ask for government financial support.  So, we use the law on 
concessions and specify in the project proposal the forms of support that they 
[regional governments and private investors] can receive and what they can't 
receive.  Only this law spells out what a concession is; other laws are 
supplemental.'     
RU-GOVT-3 
The same expert also commented on the bureaucracy involved in the PPP approval 
process:  
'Because projects are large and regions [regional governments] often change 
their ideas regarding what to do and how to implement their plans, it usually 
takes about two years to get all the approvals.  But for some projects it takes a 
lot longer.'    
RU-GOVT-3 
In Russia, the legal ambiguity with a concession versus non-concession created the 
management dilemma for investors interested in PPPs.  They can:    
 form a partnership using non–concessionary claims in reference to an 
arrangement that is essentially a concession (from the theoretical perspective); or  
 form a partnership as a concession according to the federal law and use the 
government funding and other forms of financial support (such as exemption for 
selected taxes) that the law permits.        
The managerial dilemma explains the significance of the non–concessionary option 
because it opens a loophole for future PPP projects.  The federal legislation defines a 
concession as a project that is formed and operates according to the relevant law.  This 
means that a concession is a project that draws some forms of government financial 
support, which the law specifies (Federalnyi Zakon Rossiyskoy Federatsii #115-FZ, 
2005).  Where the partners do not use the government financial support to a PPP, this 
permits them to argue that a project is a partnership, but not a concession.   
In one of the studied projects - a toll viaduct in Russia - the company management 
has opted for a non-concessionary legal framework for a partnership.  This means that 
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the company formed a PPP with the municipal government by receiving land (for 
temporary use) from the latter and is building a viaduct at the firm's expense.  The 
critical element of a non-concessionary framework is that a company neither requested 
nor received any form of government financial support to a PPP, which the Russian 
federal law on concessions delineates (Federalnyi Zakon Rossiyskoy Federatsii #115-
FZ, 2005).  The private sector partner will be collecting user fees, which the federal 
legislation permits, and also will have to ensure that an alternative free railroad crossing 
is available in close proximity to a toll viaduct as the federal law on automobile roads 
requires (Federalnyi Zakon Rossiyskoy Federatsii #257–FZ, 2007).   
The company decision in favour of a non-concessionary partnership has resulted in 
a successful and a relatively fast PPP project launch without government support.  In 
contrast, creating many PPPs that intend to use some form of government financial 
support has been slow due to multiple rounds of approvals at various governmental 
levels.  After the launch, the project enjoyed the fast progression through the 
construction stage that is, as of December 2012, close to completion.  One of the 
company managers described the project's swift launch and progression as follows: 
'All we [the private sector partner] had to get was the approval by the city 
government.  This was quite easy because the city does not invest anything and 
the city wants this project badly.  After that, we quickly started the 
construction as the engineering design was already prepared.  We began the 
project quickly because we didn't need any approvals from ministries or 
regional government.  We know very well that bureaucracy just kills many 
good projects.'  
RU-1-Alexander 
The fast and successful project progression has contributed to business development 
plans: the company plans to apply the same kind of PPP model to other projects that it 
wants to launch in the same region and beyond it.  The following comment by the 
company manager highlighted the extensive plan for business development:      
'The current project is going well.  We [the company] want to launch about 50 
more projects.  We know for sure that many cities and regions are very 
interested because we already talked to them.  The second project will be in the 
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same city [i.e., Ryazan].  But for these projects we need to find investors.  
That's the difficult part.'   
RU-1-Konstantin 
Clearly, one can attribute the fast project progression to an unusual method by 
which the private investor formed a PPP using a loophole in the Russian legislation.  
Other studied PPP projects did not enjoy this kind of success.  
To summarise, in the absence of a PPP legal definition in either country's national 
legislation, the gap is filled, although in part, by a legal definition and the use of a 
concession as a prevailing PPP form.  This explains why all PPP projects in Kazakhstan 
are concessions, and why most, although not all, projects in Russia also are concessions.  
Naturally, this legal barrier significantly narrows the partnership's meaning and limits 
the choice of PPP forms that are available to the government and private investors.  
Furthermore, this legal barrier creates an awkward situation where many regional 
governments in Russia have adopted their own PPP laws which include their own PPP 
definitions.  Not only does this further contribute to conceptual ambiguity with the PPP 
meaning in the country, but it also creates additional legal confusion as the regional 
legislation in Russia, by the nature and structure of its legal system, cannot replace the 
national legislation.  The national legislation’s significance in Kazakhstan is even 
greater as the country has the unitary system.  Improvements only in the national, rather 
than regional legislation can fill the gaps in the national-level legislation in both 
Kazakhstan and Russia, which calls for adopting the national PPP law in each country.               
 
5.4.1b Legal constraint to the government commitment to a PPP: Three-
  year limit set by the budget law 
 
In both countries, interviewees underscored a legal barrier to PPP development: the 
government signs a PPP contract for 15 to 30 years, whilst the budget code permits the 
budgetary commitments for up to three years.  This means that an apparent 
contradiction exists between the budget code that sets rules and regulations for 
budgeting and possible range and length of budgetary commitments and the law on 
concessions in a respective country.  From the conceptual standpoint, this means that 
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the government commitment to a partnership is legally constrained by a three-year 
period, and all guarantees that the government gives for the time beyond three years are 
invalid.  
Although in the studied PPPs an operator has not yet faced a situation where the 
public sector partner cancelled its own promises that it extended earlier, the 
contradiction between the two national laws inevitably leads to arrested PPP 
development: the constrained validity of the government’s own obligations may 
increasingly discourage private investors.   
This finding supports the notion that the literature highlights regarding the 
significance of a clear legal and regulatory framework for PPP development (Klijn and 
Teisman, 2003; Grimsey and Lewis, 2004).  Where the private sector partners are 
concerned with reliability of government payment guarantees to PPPs over the long 
term, this inevitably diminishes the private investors’ interest.  The same applies to the 
ambiguity of national and regional PPP laws and regulations: the larger the ambiguity, 
the smaller the private investors' interest.  In summary, the governments’ privileges and 
responsibilities at all levels regarding PPP formation and management remain 
ambiguous.  Naturally, it is to the government's advantage to clear up this ambiguity 
and adopt laws that would permit the public agencies to extend their commitments 
above and beyond the three-year limit and to accept the relevant long-term legal 
responsibility for the PPP contracts.    
 
 
5.4.1c The interplay between PPPs and sustainability: Are government 
  financial obligations sustainable? 
 
Interviewees expressed a large number of concerns regarding whether the 
government can guarantee its payments to a PPP.  This issue is part of a broader picture 
that highlights the impact of partnerships in the two countries on the government itself 
and on sustainable development, which this section intends to elucidate.    
In the case where the government unexpectedly suspended its payments to a 
concessionaire for an unspecified period and without an apparent reason, an interviewee 
highlighted the problem as follows: 
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'When the government suspended its payments to us [an operator], we were 
wondering what the reason might be.  Clearly, it wasn't my company's 
performance because the project's progress was on schedule.  So, it looked like 
the city government simply didn't have the money back then.  But what was the 
problem?  I don't really know, but it's entirely possible that the city has not 
received budgetary allocations from the national government for some reason.' 
 RU-2-Oleg 
 
The excerpt shows that the government future financial obligations to a PPP may 
not be sustainable, which is an area of concern for the private sector partner.  The 
government’s obligations over the long run are linked to fiscal centralisation in either 
country and the issue manifests itself as follows.  
PPPs use private funds for asset construction or renovation; however, private 
financing creates greater government future obligations because in Kazakhstan and 
Russia the government, rather than citizens, makes most payments to an operator for its 
services.  This may undermine the public sector’s stability.  The government needs 
more money in the future to pay partnerships, although sources of government funds 
remain the same.  The amount of revenue may increase or decrease depending on 
economic conditions, the taxation systems and tax rates, but securing steady annual 
increases in government tax revenue due to the need to pay PPPs presents a challenge 
for the government.  Is it prudent for the government to accept greater financial 
obligations for 20 or 30 years without knowing exactly how it will receive additional 
money in the budget?  Does it mean greater or smaller government accountability? 
Another interviewee expressed his concerns regarding sustainability of government 
payments in the following excerpt: 
'Perhaps the city budget has not got all the money in full from the federal 
budget.  It's not like the city had all the money, but didn't want to release its 
payments to a PPP. Of course, not!  Later on the government straightened out 
the problem, and we [an operator] got the payments.  But what if this happens 
again?  The governments may have some tension between them, but we [an 
 266 
operator] will be damaged by suspension of payments, and, perhaps, more than 
once.' 
    RU-2-Vladimir 
The realities of Kazakhstan and Russia, that both have a very high degree of fiscal 
centralisation, permit arguing that the PPP impact on intergovernmental systems of 
fiscal transfers is likely to be negative because sub-national governments and different 
public agencies have to engage in more intense negotiations in order to receive required 
funds.  Much like many transitional countries, in Kazakhstan and Russia, fiscal transfers 
from the national government to sub-national governments are arbitrary and are subject 
to endless negotiation (Bird et al., 1995; Bahl, 2000).  The struggle of local and regional 
governments for obtaining more national government funds creates significant 
instability in regions and municipalities regarding projects that they can finance and 
launch.  A need to pay PPPs will further intensify this instability.  The main reason 
behind the constant struggle for intergovernmental transfers is the lack of fiscal 
decentralisation as Kazakhstan and Russia do not have local or regional taxes (Bahl and 
Wallace, 2003; Ebel and Yilmaz, 2003).  In the following excerpt, through the prism of 
fiscal centralisation, an interviewee expressed his concerns regarding the validity of 
long-term PPP contracts in which the regional governments engage themselves:  
'Regions [in Kazakhstan] don't impose their own taxes.  The regional 
governments are financed by the national government.  The latter decides how 
much money each region receives.  So, when a region engages itself in 
partnerships, it essentially counts on more money from the national 
government in the future.  But who can argue with confidence that the national 
government will give this money to the region?'  
KZ-1-Damir  
The above excerpt illuminates how the centralised fiscal system in Kazakhstan and 
Russia works.  First, tax revenues flow in the national budget, and then the national 
government approves national and regional budgets.  The latter become subject for 
continuous negotiation between governments prior to the approval, as well as after the 
budget approval, as national governments in both countries make unplanned transfers in 
the course of a fiscal year.   
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To summarise, it is likely that PPPs will lead to a more intense power struggle 
between regions for funding from the national government.  When the government 
faces considerable uncertainty with finding money so that it can meet accepted 
obligations, it inevitably compromises sustainable economic and social development. 
With regards to the interplay between partnerships and sustainability, a related 
question is whether oil revenues can effectively sustain PPPs in Kazakhstan and Russia.  
Can a country’s natural resources make partnerships more sustainable, thus contributing 
to nationwide sustainable development?  With Russia and Kazakhstan both oil-rich, the 
countries enjoy significant revenue from oil export.  However, national budgets of both 
states are heavily dependent on oil sales and its price in the world market.  When the 
revenue side of the national budget grows because of the higher than forecasted price of 
oil, expenses for social programmes also increase.  When oil revenues fall, all kinds of 
government expenses, including those for PPP projects, should contract.  Oil revenue 
may create excessive optimism that encourages the government to launch partnerships; 
however, oil revenue will not make the power struggle between regions for national 
funds easier.         
 
5.4.1d PPP implementation issues 
 
Tangled PPP tender procedures 
Interviewees identified a broad range of legal and regulatory impediments that one 
can categorise as PPP implementation issues.  These issues begin from the PPP 
formation where the public agencies and private investors face the complicated 
government requirements for multiple tenders for separate partnership-related aspects 
such as a separate tender for a PPP contract, then a separate tender for land that a PPP 
will use and a separate tender for purchasing private services.  Interviewees criticised a 
current system of tenders where a PPP is essentially a set of contracts with their own 
provisions and regulations.  The following excerpt highlights this complexity: 
'At the time when we [an operator] got interested in this project, we didn't 
realise that we were supposed to bid more than once.  Then, after we submitted 
the first bid and won the tender, the process became like a snowball, which we 
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couldn't stop.  We have to bid for land, then for services.  At some point it 
really became overwhelming to the extent that we were considering giving up 
this idea.' 
RU-2-Vladimir    
The excerpt shows the discouraging effect of multiple tenders on private investors.  
All interviewees confirmed that the PPP formation process would gain immensely from 
streamlining the tender procedures and consolidating all tenders in one.  By doing this, 
the bureaucracy would be cut off and lengthy delays involved in running multiple 
tenders would be significantly reduced.  Interviewees estimated that the time to closing 
the PPP contract may be reduced from the current two to three years to about one year 
or even six months for smaller projects.      
  
Ambiguity in regional governments’ privileges and responsibilities     
The multiplicity of forms that the government financial support to PPPs may take, 
particularly at the regional level, also impacts the PPP formation.  Regional 
governments are largely unaware of the range of tools available to them in order to 
encourage partnership formation and make private investors financially interested in a 
project.  This results in a diverse picture across regions where one regional government 
may provide support to a PPP in considerably more forms than another region.  As the 
number of precedents for extending a certain form of support, such as reducing a 
corporate income tax, is very small, some regional governments may be reluctant to use 
PPP support tools trying to avoid potential legal controversy and criticism from the 
public or the national government. 
Interviewees expressed an opinion that at the bidding stage the government should 
provide extensive information and guidelines regarding forms of government financial 
support that a private partner may receive.  An interviewee described this as follows: 
'When we [a private company] were preparing a bid, we didn't know what 
kinds of government support were available. We simply were unaware what we 
could include in our proposal and what kinds of government support should be 
deemed unrealistic or even prohibited by the law.  Of course, we had some 
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conversations and asked about what we could request, but all this was 
informal, unofficial.'   
    KZ-2-Kairat 
The excerpt shows that raising awareness of PPP bidders regarding the forms of 
financial and administrative support they may receive is critically important for 
effective partnership formation.  It will reduce ambiguity regarding what resources 
regional governments can contribute to partnerships and also will make the 
requirements for the private partners' contribution clearer.  Extensive guidelines, 
personnel training and legal advice that the public agencies and/or PPP centres could 
provide should achieve raising awareness.   
              
Complex and bureaucratic tariff and wage-rate setting   
Another area of regulatory barriers to PPPs is bureaucratic tariff regulation in those 
cases where tariff setting is a part of anti-trust government policy and tariffs are subject 
for approval by the anti-monopoly agency.  Interviewees criticised the lengthy and 
cumbersome tariff approval process and insisted on direct tariff negotiations between a 
customer and a service provider, without further approval by the anti-monopoly agency. 
However, one should view the private operators' perspective that calls for direct 
tariff setting between themselves and customers as opportunistic.  As partnership 
services are often monopolistic (e.g., a railroad, a toll road, a water-treatment facility or 
a stadium), the risk of market failure where a monopoly increases the price without 
losing customers is high (Stiglitz, 2000; Hyman, 2002).  The threat of monopolistic 
manipulation with the service price and quantity requires mitigation by the 
governmental regulation of tariffs; otherwise, citizens may witness shrinking volumes 
and rising prices for traditional public services.  Hence, one should view the 
government tariff regulation as effective in terms of reducing the private partners' 
opportunistic behaviour.  Nevertheless, the government should ensure that procedures 
for submitting and processing new tariff applications are streamlined and shortened.  
In another area – wage-rate setting – the government behaviour appears 
opportunistic and interviewees criticised the government efforts to regulate wages of the 
private operators' staff.  The interviewees placed much emphasis on ensuring greater 
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private party's flexibility in business management.  Justifying restrictions on PPP 
operations, such as government regulation of contractor workers' wage rates, is a 
challenging endeavour.  In a market-oriented economy, attracting a highly qualified 
workforce requires each company to pay workers at market or above-market rates, 
whilst administrative restrictions may simply lead to staff attrition.  From this 
perspective, government regulation of wage rates seems excessive and unnecessary and 
represents the government’s opportunistic behaviour.          
 
Public versus private asset ownership    
Most of the study participants work for a private operator, rather than the 
government, and their experiences and perceptions naturally reflect the private sector 
partner's perspective.  Typically, they call for greater private party flexibility in business 
management, better opportunities and conditions for private investors in a PPP and 
more extensive government financial and administrative guarantees to a partnership.  
Persistent calls for permitting private property ownership for an asset that the private 
party constructs or renovates illustrate the latter.  Essentially, this means a legal 
introduction of a new PPP model in Kazakhstan and Russia: instead of the existing 
build–transfer–operate (BTO) model where a private party must transfer an asset's 
property ownership to the government immediately after completion of construction, 
the government may offer a new build–operate–transfer (BOT) model.   
However, the value assigned to the introduction of a new model seems excessive as 
the private property ownership is in no way a panacea for other PPP management issues 
such as frequent cost overruns, cumbersome tariff setting, procurement restrictions and 
the public sector partner dominance in decision-making (Mouraviev et al., 2012).  'It is 
clear that no matter how PPPs are defined, they fall short of a perfect mechanism for 
delivering public sector services' (Hodge and Greve, 2005: 346).  Based on the thorough 
analysis of partnerships in both industrialised nations and emerging markets, Grimsey 
and Lewis (2004) convincingly argue that:  
'... rather than conforming to a model, PPPs should be seen as a process, a 
systematic way of going about identifying the service needs, defining the 
outputs expected and the payment mechanism, evaluating and quantifying the 
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financial impacts and the inherent risks, identifying the most appropriate 
procurement model, developing commercial principles, confirming value for 
money, overseeing the design process and construction, managing the contract 
through to handback and monitoring service delivery.  If this process is 
applied rigorously to each contract, then it will inevitably result in a different 
approach for every project' (p. 245).         
Hence, although the private asset ownership may significantly improve the 
motivation for better property maintenance in the long run, it does not resolve many 
other issues of PPP management.  Nevertheless, Kazakhstan and Russia should seize the 
opportunity to introduce the private asset ownership as a tool for raising the PPP's value 
for money.   
 
5.4.2 Institutional, managerial and financial constraints   
 
Interviewees provided a large number of comments regarding barriers of 
institutional, managerial and financial nature.  Table 5.8 summarises their comments 
and related proposals of how to overcome these barriers.   
Table 5.8 shows the most significant institutional and managerial impediments to 
PPP development, such as the government’s requirement to conduct all purchasing by 
tenders (for PPP operators that the public agencies formed fully or in part) and lack of 
the government’s commitment to partnerships where the public agency fails to 
distinguish a PPP from any other private contractor.  In the latter case, the government 
tends to treat PPP requests, applications and other business needs in a lengthy and 
bureaucratic way, without any noticeable commitment to the partnership goals.   
Additionally, Table 5.8 shows financial barriers to effective PPP operations.  
Among the most significant existing drawbacks is the government’s failure to apply 
financial penalties to itself for breaching the PPP contract provisions, which means that 
currently only a private partner is subject to fines and fees for not performing specific 
tasks.  Streamlining the contract terms regarding fees and penalties to either partner 
would permit partners to achieve equal rights and would make PPP management more 
effective.  Yet an additional financial constraint is the current requirement that a PPP 
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 Table 5.8 Institutional, managerial and financial barriers to PPPs and 
         improvement opportunities   
 
Current conditions Improvement 
opportunities/  proposals 
Advantages/benefits/comments 
Institutional and managerial barriers 
 
Procurement restrictions: 
all purchasing must be 
done by tenders.  
The government should 
remove the requirement of 
PPP purchasing by tenders.  
This gives a PPP greater flexibility 
in business management; a tender 
should not be a condition for PPP 
operations. A tender does not 
necessarily ensure lower prices 
compared to off-the-shelf 
purchasing.  
 
Lack of the government’s 
commitment to a PPP: the 
government treats a PPP 
like a burden or at least 
much like any private 
contractor. 
The government may design 
preferential procedures for 
treatment of PPP requests.  
The government may 
provide training to its staff.  
This will permit achieving a 
noticeable degree of government 
commitment to a PPP; it may 
increase trust between partners.  
Financial constraints 
 
The public sector 
comparators do not serve 
as effective benchmarks for 
PPP costs.  
The government may 
employ the public sector 
comparators for limited use. 
This just gives the government an 
asset's approximate cost valuation, 
subject to adjustment for inflation 
and varying conditions.   
 
Loan financing for PPP 
projects is difficult to 
secure.  
The government should 
permit using a newly 
constructed or renovated 
facility as collateral for the 
loan. 
 
This gives a guarantee to a private 
bank and permits easier loan 
financing. 
Financial penalties for 
violation of contract 
provisions exist mostly for 
a private partner.   
 
Financial penalties should 
be instituted for both 
partners. 
This gives additional guarantees 
regarding contract enforcement to 
either PPP partner. 
Property tax on the newly 
constructed asset and VAT 
on all operators' purchases 
increase total PPP costs. 
The government may 
exempt PPPs from the 
property tax as an asset 
belongs to the public sector. 
The government may either 
exempt an operator from 
VAT or may refund VAT 
upon the project 
termination.   
 
This permits keeping PPP costs 
lower and, hence, increasing a 
PPP's value for money.   
 Source: Compiled by the author from interview data 
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operator must pay a property tax on an asset that the private partner built or renovated 
during the project.  The following excerpt highlights the controversy: 
'I'm not sure why the government imposes a tax on its own property.  The only 
possible reason is that we [a private operator] manage the property.  But we do 
this because the government hired us to do this.  So, the government pays us 
for property management and we [an operator] pay the property tax to the 
government.'               
RU-2-Oleg 
The excerpt describes the following case.  As the current law in both Kazakhstan and 
Russia requires, the private sector partner has transferred a property ownership to the 
government upon completion of construction.  Hence, an asset belongs to the 
government.   
However, the government still levies a property tax on it.  The interviewee claimed 
that paying the property tax to the government on the government-owned asset is 
unnecessary.  To conclude, as this tax increases PPP costs, it may increase the prices for 
PPP services and diminish the partnership's value for money.      
 
5.4.3 Theme summary   
 
At the conceptual level, impediments to PPPs stem from the lack of a partnership's 
legal definition in the national legislation in both Kazakhstan and Russia.  The law on 
concessions in each country has resolved, although in part, the PPP's legal and 
conceptual ambiguity.  The laws defined a concession as a principal PPP form and 
identified the multiple government tools and methods of financial support to a 
concessionaire.  If an investor is interested in receiving any form of government support, 
an investor must comply with the law on concessions.  Alternatively, an investor who is 
not requesting any form of government financial support may use the legislative 
loophole and employ a non-concessionary legal framework for a partnership.  This way 
an investor forms a PPP, but not a concession, as the experience of one studied PPP in 
Russia has illustrated.  This loophole further contributes to conceptual ambiguity 
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regarding the PPP meaning in the country, complemented by the multiple varying 
definitions of a PPP in the region's legislation, which by its nature in either country 
cannot replace the national legislation.  Interviewees have highlighted that only 
improvements in the national, rather than regional legislation, can fill the gaps in the 
national laws in both Kazakhstan and Russia.   
Yet another legal impediment to PPPs is a constraint in each country's budget law 
that limits the length of the government’s financial commitment to a PPP by three years 
and makes the PPP contract enforcement questionable.  In connection with the 
government’s commitment to a PPP, interviewees also expressed concerns regarding 
the partnerships' impact on sustainability.  At the root of the issue is the question of 
whether one can deem the government's long-term financial obligations as sustainable.  
Interviewees perceived the government's obligations as non-sustainable. This is linked 
to the high degree of fiscal centralisation in either country and non-existence of regional 
taxes that could serve as a guaranteed source of funds for public agencies and payments 
to a PPP.   
Among impediments to the PPP project implementation, interviewees emphasised 
the need to replace a series of tangled PPP-related tenders, in which a PPP is a set of 
contracts with their own regulations, with a single unified tender.  This would reduce 
bureaucracy and lengthy delays involved in the partnership formation.  In reference to 
two other implementation issues - a tariff setting and wage-rate setting - the partners 
manifested opposing kinds of behaviour.  The analysis showed that in a tariff setting, 
the private sector partners exhibit opportunism by pushing for direct tariff negotiations 
between a customer and the service provider, which is likely to result in higher prices 
for monopolistic services.  In contrast to this, in wage-rate setting, the government 
exhibits its opportunism by not allowing a private partner to pay its staff at market rates.  
Hence, interviewees identified that the government has to loosen its tight regulations of 
PPP operators' wage rates.  
Another institutional barrier is the regulation that prohibits private property 
ownership for an asset that a private party constructs or renovates.  Changing this 
regulation would motivate a private partner for a better long-term asset management.  
Other impediments include the government requirement for PPPs to arrange purchasing 
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by tenders; lack of the government commitment to partnerships; ineffective public 
sector comparators and lack of financial penalties that a contract applies to the public 
sector partners for contract violations. 
 
5.5 Chapter Summary  
 
The chapter discussed four overlapping themes, including:   
 Opportunistic behaviour in a PPP; 
 Interaction between partners in a PPP;  
 Risk management in a partnership; and  
 Legal, regulatory, institutional, managerial and financial constraints to 
effective PPP governance.   
Each theme presents a discussion of interviewees' opinions and perceptions, which 
are often complementary and are supported by excerpts.  Each theme contrasts and 
compares the data between Kazakhstan and Russia and identifies country-specific 
conclusions, as well as cross-country observations that are valid for both nations.  Each 
theme concludes with the summary.  Next, the thesis moves on to drawing up a model 
for understanding the nature of PPP governance in Kazakhstan and Russia and to 
highlighting the PPP critical success factors. 
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CHAPTER SIX: A MODEL FOR UNDERSTANDING PPP GOVERNANCE 
IN KAZAKHSTAN AND RUSSIA:  
THE POLICY PARADIGM PERSPECTIVE 
 
6.1 Chapter Introduction1 
 
This chapter develops a conceptual model for deeper understanding of PPP 
governance in the two nations and identifies PPP critical success factors.  The model 
rests on the notion that researchers must view partnership formation and PPP 
management through the prism of the policy paradigm (Hall, 1993), which subsequent 
sections will discuss.  The chapter elucidates why researchers may view the current PPP 
governance in Kazakhstan and Russia as a paradigm and examines how it is constructed.  
The chapter critically appraises the principal dynamics that contribute to the evolving 
transition in the set of ideas and standards regarding PPP governance in two countries.  
The nature of this transition signifies the departure from approaches to partnerships, 
which prevail in OECD countries, as Western academic literature and government 
reports discuss, to an emerging paradigm in public policy.  The model is based on the 
empirical data that Chapter Four analysed and findings that Chapter Five discussed.        
The chapter begins by defining a theoretical framework that guides an 
understanding of a paradigm forming.  It then discusses Kazakhstan's and Russia’s 
policy paradigm structure and the underpinning concepts.  The chapter proceeds to 
delineate dynamics that intensify the paradigm development and provides a detailed 
discussion of each contributing factor.  The chapter's concluding part highlights the PPP 
critical success factors that the interview data revealed.     
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 The author wrote the text of this chapter in 2012-2013.  Also, this text was included in the article co-
authored with Nada Kakabadse, which Policy Studies accepted for publication in 2013.  (Mouraviev, N. 
and Kakabadse, N. Public–Private Partnerships in Russia: Dynamics Contributing to an Emerging Policy 
Paradigm. Policy Studies. In press.) The author certifies that the text in this chapter is his original 
contribution to the thesis.    
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6.2 Theoretical Framework of a Policy Paradigm 
 
Prior to the delineation of the dynamics contributing to the PPP policy paradigm 
forming in Kazakhstan and Russia, this section will first discuss meanings which 
scholars attach to a policy paradigm in general, essentials that a policy paradigm 
typically includes, and why and how a policy paradigm becomes useful.  Next, this 
section draws up the theoretical framework for a paradigm and discusses the structure 
of the evolving PPP policy paradigm in Kazakhstan and Russia.     
Investigating the nature of a policy paradigm, Hall (1993) makes use of Anderson's 
(1978: 23) observation that 'policies are made within some system of ideas and 
standards which is comprehensible and plausible to the actors involved'.  Hall (1993) 
embeds policy paradigms in the broader concept of social learning and emphasises the 
key role that ideas play in the policy process.  He delineates a policy paradigm as '… a 
framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the 
kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the 
problems they are meant to be addressing' (Hall, 1993: 279).  In this approach, one can 
view a policy paradigm, first, as a mix of ‘ideas and standards’ (i.e., the policy itself), 
and second, as a tool framed by these ideas and standards, that addresses the problems 
and defines the relevant instruments.  Due to its emphasis on the defining role of ideas 
in policy making, this perspective lacks an indication of how or through what a 
government may implement public policy.  
Similar to Hall (1993) and other scholars who point out that a policy paradigm 
focuses on the formation of ideas (Menahem, 1998), Campbell (2002) argues that a 
paradigm’s cognitive nature provides taken–for–granted descriptions and specifies 
cause and effect relationships for policy makers.  Carson et al. (2009) also emphasise 
and draw elaborate insights regarding a policy paradigm’s cognitive–normative nature.  
The latter includes, in their view, a generally coherent set of assumptions and principles, 
simplifying metaphors and interpretive and explanatory discourses.  The paradigm’s 
cognitive perspective represents itself in a shared conceptual framework that defines the 
social issues and how institutions should solve them (Carson et al., 2009).   
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In contrast to Hall (1993), Carson et al. (2009) include in a paradigm’s structure 
three types of processes: cognition and meaning, expression and action and its 
institutionalisation.  This perspective significantly enriches our understanding of a 
paradigm and expands its boundaries to embrace not only the conceptualising 
component, but also institutional processes and implementation aspects.  In reference to 
a paradigm’s structure, one must acknowledge Fosler’s earlier study.  Analysing an 
economic development policy paradigm structure, Fosler (1992) accentuates its three 
principal elements including a new concept, a new set of state responsibilities and new 
institutional capacities. Thus, institutionalisation has evolved as a notable characteristic 
of a policy paradigm.   
Burns and Carson (2009) further develop a broader approach to a paradigm and 
emphasise the role that institutions and actors play in shaping ideas and their 
implementation.  They view a policy paradigm as a complex of concepts, principles and 
models that capture the interactions between ideas, institutions and organised actors 
engaged in political and administrative processes.  Discussing the structure of policy 
paradigms, Burns and Carson (2009) emphasise that such a paradigm defines problems 
and their sources, which institutions must publicly address, and identifies the 
appropriate available strategies and resources to deal with these problems.  The 
paradigm also defines 'appropriate actors (and their roles in what takes place), for 
instance, those who should have public authority relating to the application and 
development of public policy.  Furthermore, a policy paradigm usually identifies agents 
with special expertise (knowledgeable, authoritative experts) to define and solve the 
problems' (Burns and Carson, 2009). 
A policy paradigm may be useful in a certain way.  A policy paradigm '… is 
influential precisely because so much of it is taken for granted and unamenable to 
scrutiny as a whole' (Hall, 1993: 279).  Carson et al. also emphasise a policy paradigm’s 
usefulness from the cognitive perspective.  They argue that the policy paradigm concept 
permits the analysis of distinctly different, sometimes incommensurable ways of 
conceptualising the issues, problems, interests, goals and remedies involved in 
policymaking (Carson et al., 2009).  At the same time, a paradigm’s usefulness comes 
along with its inherent limitation as a cognitive tool.  This limitation stems from the 
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nature of what a paradigm involves as far as the range of political, administrative, social 
and economic activities is concerned.  'In other words, taken–for–granted paradigms 
constrain the range of policies that policy makers are likely to consider' (Campbell, 
2002: 23).  They also constrain the cognitive process as some aspects of policy making 
(that are beyond the paradigm itself) simply may fall out of a researcher’s view.   
To summarise the insights into the nature and structure of a policy paradigm, one 
can argue that a prevailing approach adopts a view, according to which a paradigm 
includes a set of elements such as ideas, defined problems, strategies and resources to 
deal with problems, organised actors and roles assigned to them, institutions, their 
capacities and processes, cognitive and analytical models, agents with special expertise, 
and interaction between all these elements that allows expression of goals, interests and 
authority (Fosler, 1992; Hall, 1993; Campbell, 2002; Burns and Carson, 2009; Carson et 
al., 2009).  Table 6.1 summarises varying approaches to a policy paradigm.    
Overlapping approaches to a policy paradigm, as Table 6.1 illuminates, are 
indicative of a growing emphasis on actors, actions and institutionalisation in policy 
making, rather than on merely cognitive aspects.  In the PPP context, institutionalisation 
means the creation of new organisational capacities, such as the formation of an agency 
charged with responsibility for the PPP development.  Additionally, one must broaden 
the concept of institutionalism to incorporate social relationships as institutions are 
engaged in multiple interactions with actors and other institutions.  Table 6.1 also 
highlights the dynamics of scholarly insights in the direction of a paradigm’s 
conceptualisation in a broader way, i.e., a paradigm includes not only a shared 
conceptual framework, but also organised actors, with their defined roles, and 
established institutions, strategies and processes (Burns and Carson, 2009).   
Borrowing from these studies, the author conceptualises the PPP policy paradigm 
in Kazakhstan and Russia as a cognitive-normative tool that includes two major aspects.  
The first aspect describes a paradigm as a tool which the government uses to facilitate 
partnership expansion.  The reason for this is that the government plans to employ 
partnerships in order to attract private funding and expertise for solving acute social and 
economic problems, such as massively overhauling the outdated housing and utilities 
infrastructure.  A paradigm assigns selected features to a partnership and disregards  
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Table 6.1 Summary of insights into a policy paradigm  
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
others.  Once the paradigm is in place, the discussion of whether a PPP is a useful      
form for implementing the public sector task is largely replaced by accepted approaches, 
institutional processes, and instruments that the government deems undisputed and that 
provide vast opportunities for partnership employment.  The second aspect is cognitive, 
i.e., consideration of multiple activities related to partnerships through the paradigm’s 
prism permits a deeper comprehension of PPP governance in Russia.   
Policy Paradigm  
 
Paradigm’s 
Structure: Key 
Components 
Comments Authors 
Is a set of ideas, 
actions and 
institutional 
strategies 
Includes a concept, a 
new set of state 
responsibilities and 
new institutional 
capacities 
Institutionalisation is a 
notable feature of a 
policy paradigm.  
 
Fosler, 1992 
Is a framework of 
ideas and standards 
Specifies problems 
to be addressed, 
goals and 
instruments 
A paradigm is a part of 
social learning. It does 
not emphasise roles of 
actors and institutions.  
Anderson, 1978; 
Hall, 1993 
Forms ideas and 
specifies cause and 
effect relationships 
for policy makers 
 
Offers taken-for-
granted descriptions 
and solutions 
The focus is on a 
paradigm’s cognitive 
nature; a paradigm 
constrains the range of 
policies to consider. 
Menahem, 1998; 
Campbell, 2002 
Is a shared 
conceptual 
framework; it is a set 
of assumptions and 
principles, 
interpretive and 
explanatory 
discourses 
Includes three types 
of processes: 
cognition and 
meaning, expression 
and action and its 
institutionalisation 
A paradigm’s 
boundaries embrace not 
only the conceptualising 
component, but also 
institutional processes 
and implementation 
aspects.  Cognitive 
aspect is useful for 
understanding issues 
and policy remedies.  
Carson et al., 2009 
Is a complex of 
concepts, principles 
and models that 
capture interactions 
between ideas, 
institutions and 
organised actors 
Defines problems 
and their sources 
and identifies 
strategies and 
resources to deal 
with these problems 
A paradigm also defines 
actors and their roles 
and agents with special 
expertise. 
Burns and Carson, 
2009 
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Based on the underpinning theoretical framework, the structure of the emergent 
PPP policy paradigm in Kazakhstan and Russia embraces three principal elements, 
namely:  
1) Ideas - i.e., the concept of the need for long-term collaboration between the 
public sector and the private sector.  The government perceives this 
collaboration as necessary in order to engage private firms more widely in 
solving the society's issues and reverse the historical public sector dominance 
that stems from the Soviet era.  By providing private firms with opportunities to 
profit in the long run, the government, at the same time, legitimises its own 
policy that aims at PPP proliferation.     
2) A changing set of government responsibilities that imply an increasing 
provision of traditional public services (such as transportation services) by the 
private sector, and corresponding decrease in government delivery; and    
3) A developing and expanding set of new institutional capacities designed for 
implementation of amended (and changing) government responsibilities (Fosler, 
1992).  From the societal perspective, new PPP institutional capacities (e.g., 
laws, regulations and PPP centres) aim to serve the wider economic and 
political goals of transitional nations, such as to create an enabled environment 
for more intense business development and support private participation in 
addressing the public sector tasks.    
Figure 6.1 highlights the PPP policy paradigm structure in Kazakhstan and Russia.      
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         Figure 6.1 The PPP policy paradigm in Kazakhstan and Russia:  
                 Principal elements   
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   Source: Compiled by the author  
  
 
6.3 PPP Policy Paradigm: The Principal Elements  
  
Figure 6.1 shows the contributing elements of the policy paradigm and the 
underlying drivers.  The discussion of contributing elements begins with ideas, i.e., the 
government concept that claims that enhanced public-private collaboration is necessary.  
From the beginning of the twenty-first century, government calls for engaging private 
sector organisations to solve public sector tasks have become persistent.  In particular, 
in the Conception for the Long-Term Social and Economic Development of the Russian 
Federation to 2020, which the Russian government approved in 2008, development of 
public-private partnership institutions and tools has been determined as a strategic 
direction (Alpatov et al., 2010: 7).  In 2008, the Kazakhstani government approved the 
Conception for Development of Public-Private Partnerships for 2009-2015.  This policy 
document has assigned a priority to the expansion of sectors for PPP employment, as 
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well as to the need for expanded use of various partnership tools and mechanisms 
(Conception for Development of Public-Private Partnerships in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan for 2009-2015, 2008: 18–19).  In addition to railroads and the energy sector, 
the document calls for using PPPs in such sectors as water supply, education, health 
care, penitentiary systems, utilities and housing infrastructure and urban transport 
infrastructure.    
Other drivers behind the need for public-private collaboration include lack of 
public funding and the intent to obtain greater access to private funds; and lack of new 
technology and anticipation that private firms will bring along technological, 
management and other kinds of innovation (Alpatov et al., 2010: 16–17; Kabashkin, 
2010: 9–11, 18–19, 30; Pankratov, 2010: 32; Varnavskiy et al., 2010: 29–30).   
 Additionally, the government justifies enhanced public-private collaboration by 
two contextual factors that highlight the acute economic needs: the need to obtain 
private financing specifically for the housing and utilities infrastructure and the need to 
increase investment attractiveness of selected industries.   
Among two internal PPP drivers, the need to obtain private financing for upgrading 
housing and utilities infrastructure is by far the most pressing.  This need is grounded in 
deeply outdated housing, the vast majority of which is the Soviet legacy, and in utility 
infrastructure that was also built often before World War II and requires massive 
replacement.  The contextual factor that explains the acute need for obtaining private 
financing in this field is the colossal size of the utility infrastructure overhaul.  The 
enormity of the task, in terms of the dollar amount required for the overhaul, forces the 
government in Kazakhstan and Russia to argue that PPP employment with private 
financing is the only feasible solution.  Delays in upgrades are likely to result in more 
frequent breakages of power lines and pipeline systems that supply water or natural gas, 
in high repair costs, as well as disruption of public service delivery to customers.  Thus, 
PPPs become an attractive solution that permits combining the interests of all 
stakeholders: citizens who need better housing and utilities infrastructure, governments 
that look for ways of financing the infrastructure renovation and private firms seeking 
profitable investments.    
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The need to increase financial attractiveness of selected sectors to private investors 
also carries significant value that one can describe as complementary to the need for 
financing the housing and utilities infrastructure overhaul.  This is because private 
investors are needed exactly in this field, and also for other infrastructure projects, such 
as construction and operation of railroads, automobile roads, airports, sea ports and in 
the energy sector.  The high cost of capital assets is a common feature in all these 
sectors that governments in Kazakhstan and Russia hope to upgrade with the help of 
private investors.  Thus, one PPP driver reinforces the other, and their enhanced 
combined influence pushes the government to seek solutions in forming and 
implementing partnership projects for massive infrastructure upgrades.        
To conclude the discussion of the need for public-private collaboration, the 
government social and economic policy has incorporated such collaboration as a 
strategic dimension.  One fundamental reason behind this government policy stems 
from the limited resources, i.e., the budget constraints.  The other set of reasons stems 
from acute economic needs.  More generally, the governments in Kazakhstan and 
Russia focus on reversing the historical trend of the government political and economic 
dominance that stems from the Soviet legacy.  They also aim to overcome lack of trust 
in the government and corresponding lack of willingness among private businesses to 
cooperate with the public agencies.  Whilst Kazakhstan and Russia continue to build a 
market oriented economy, these goals are useful as they may result in sector expansion 
in which private firms can successfully operate and use their own, not government, 
funding.  In summary, one may view PPPs as a strategic public-private collaborative 
tool for the long run.  Where the government policy creates profit-making opportunities 
for the private firms, their more active engagement in carrying out the public sector 
tasks might significantly contribute to legitimising the government and its public policy.   
The second contributing element of the policy paradigm - a changing set of 
government responsibilities - implies that the government obligations to provide public 
services shrink.  Instead of traditional public provision of services, such as 
transportation infrastructure (roads and railroads, airports, sea ports, bridges and tunnels) 
and social infrastructure (healthcare and recreation facilities, stadiums, schools and 
kindergartens), citizens will witness an increasing private service delivery.  This also 
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implies that government management and technological expertise in selected fields, 
such as an airport operation and maintenance, is likely to substantially decrease or may 
even vanish.  This thesis has identified an example that illustrates the changing set of 
government responsibilities: a Russian PPP project that aims at constructing and 
operating a toll viaduct.  The latter will be the first nation's toll viaduct that will replace 
a traditionally free older public railroad crossing.  The changing government 
responsibilities also imply that many services will be available for a fee as this is a 
common way to recover private investment.  Hence, the paradigm adopts a view that 
private service delivery will be expanding, with the corresponding decrease in the 
government provision, and the share of toll services will be growing.  This view rests on 
the pro market perspective, which argues that in a privately owned economy the 
government assumes the facilitator’s and the regulator’s role, rather than that of a 
service provider (Stiglitz, 2000).           
The third contributing element of the policy paradigm is new institutional 
capacities for PPP development.  New institutional capacities include PPP laws and 
regulations that the government devised for the national level in Russia in 2005, and in 
Kazakhstan in 2006, and regional and municipal legislation that selected regional and 
city governments in Russia approved in subsequent years.  Additionally, institutional 
capacities incorporate national and regional government PPP centres that are 
responsible for partnership development, and investment channels for PPP financing 
that the governments in both countries have established.  Institutional capacities have 
created a network of organisations and relationships that aim at furthering PPPs.  As the 
government designed capacities with the sole purpose to enhance PPP employment, this 
by itself became the policy paradigm's powerful driving force.      
Finally, the interplay between elements contributing to the policy paradigm is as 
follows.  The need for greater public-private collaboration justifies government actions 
aimed at expanding institutional capacities.  Newly created institutional capacities (e.g., 
PPP centres, investment channels and national and regional regulations) feed and 
accelerate the changes in government responsibilities: each new partnership means that 
capacity has materialised in a certain partnership project, whilst it also manifests itself 
in the government service provision’s shrinking volume and increased private sector's 
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delivery.  The latter eases the pressure on the government budget, particularly, in the 
short term, and pushes the government to seek new institutional capacities to further 
expand the partnership employment.  Hence, the policy paradigm's principal elements 
feed each other and, therefore, reinforce the paradigm itself.     
The next section turns to the discussion of the main factors that contribute to the 
evolving PPP policy paradigm.  
 
6.4 PPP policy paradigm: The underlying dynamics 
 
The nature of PPP governance in Kazakhstan and Russia concerns reversing the 
government political and economic dominance that stems from the Soviet legacy.  Also, 
the PPP governance aims at overcoming lack of trust in government and corresponding 
lack of willingness among private businesses to cooperate with the public sector 
agencies.   
Although partnerships are new to both Kazakhstan and Russia (i.e., the discussion 
regarding PPPs began in early 2000s), a range of factors has transformed the PPP 
debate into the policy paradigm.  They include an unbalanced government approach to 
perceived PPP benefits; excessive emphasis on positive PPP externalities and neglect of 
negative externalities; unjustifiably extensive government financial support to PPPs that 
private investors and the government itself  deem necessary (Firsova, 2012); an 
unwarranted approach to risk allocation in which the government tends to accept 
excessive and/or unnecessary risks; and a strong emphasis on a concession regardless of 
availability of other PPP forms and the nature of an industry.  Table 6.2 summarises the 
principal factors that contribute to an emerging PPP policy paradigm.  
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Table 6.2 PPP Policy Paradigm in Kazakhstan and Russia: The underlying 
      dynamics  
Source: Compiled by the author 
Subsequent sections discuss in detail each of the underlying dynamics.  
 
6.4.1 Perceived PPP benefits: Unbalanced government approach 
 
A government approach to perceived partnership benefits appears unbalanced and it 
strongly contributes to the PPP policy paradigm development.  An unbalanced approach 
is the one in which the government puts unjustified emphasis on PPP advantages and 
disregards drawbacks.  The government focuses on obtaining benefits from a 
partnership project in terms of improved service delivery, attracting private funds and 
the use of private technology and expertise.  However, partnership efficiency is not a 
No. Contributing Factors Comments 
1 A government approach to perceived PPP 
benefits is unbalanced, i.e., the focus is on 
benefits, whilst costs are of lesser 
importance.  
 
PPP costs are not a major concern for the 
government.  A project’s ‘social 
significance’ has replaced theoretical 
underpinnings for PPP employment as the 
principal criterion for the PPP formation. 
2 The government tends to inflate positive 
PPP externalities and downplay negative 
externalities. 
The government unjustifiably considers 
technological and other kinds of innovation 
intrinsic to a PPP. Citizens may perceive 
PPPs as a government attempt to shift 
traditional responsibilities for public services 
to private firms. Increasing costs of public 
services shift to citizens in the form of higher 
tariffs or higher budget payments to a PPP. 
3 The government provides extensive 
financial support to PPPs. 
 
The government often assumes the role of a 
partnership guarantor and of an essential 
source of funds, inputs and various benefits 
to a PPP. This increasingly creates a 
guarantee culture among private investors.          
4 A government approach to risk allocation: 
at least some risk should transfer to the 
private sector partner(s).   
The public sector partner tends to accept 
excessive and/or unnecessary risks. 
5 The government emphasises the use of a 
concession as a prevailing PPP form.    
The government tends to disregard 
availability of other PPP forms and an 
industry’s nature.   
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major government concern.  In other words, the government may approve a PPP with a 
total cost higher than that of traditional government procurement or the cost of an in–
house service provision.  The Russian language academic literature and the government 
policy documents in Kazakhstan and Russia are silent about PPP efficiency, and 
academics and policy makers are not conducting PPP cost comparisons with those of 
the public sector in–house provision.  If and when the government can create 
partnerships without much concern regarding costs, criteria for the PPP formation 
become loose, or the government can adopt arbitrary criteria on a case–by–case basis.  
A critical appraisal of the Russian language PPP literature (e.g., Kabashkin, 2010; 
Maksimov, 2010; Pankratov, 2010; Varnavskiy et al., 2010; Firsova, 2011b, 2012) 
supports this observation.  In contrast, researchers and the government tend to downplay 
Western literature’s role: they use it principally as a general justification for 
partnerships, whilst they disregard empirical data about failed or costly projects and the 
PPP criticism.  
Additionally, interviews demonstrated the understated (i.e., unimportant) role that 
the public sector comparators play in the PPP formation (see Sections 4.4.3a and 5.4.2 
for details).  For example, in the schools and kindergartens' PPP project in St Petersburg, 
the government attempted to use the public sector comparators to determine the 
construction costs.  However, interviewees strongly criticised the public sector 
comparators' validity: they likely feature significant distortions in cost estimates due to 
relatively high inflation (7 to 8 per cent annually) and varying terms and conditions 
under which private companies completed the construction in previous years.  This 
shows the government disregard of more accurate cost determinations in favour of the 
swift PPP approval process.  Furthermore, the governments in Kazakhstan and Russia, 
as interviews showed, determine the PPP project costs themselves, rather than invite 
investors to submit the bids that include the cost proposal.  This government practice 
raises serious concerns as the evidence that the government aims to reduce project costs 
is missing.  On the contrary, the government forms the project proposals in which the 
costs aim to be attractive to the bidders, i.e., not only do private investors find the costs 
acceptable, but they also intend to earn profits.           
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The Russian language literature is silent about transaction cost economics and PPP 
value for money as the government does not use these concepts as a basis for deciding 
whether to form a partnership (Mouraviev, 2012).  This is in sharp contrast to the 
Western literature that emphasises that the government should employ a PPP if and 
when a partnership incurs a lower cost as opposed to the cost of the government’s in–
house provision (Sadka, 2007; Hall, 2008a; Morallos and Amekudzi, 2008).  Although 
overall PPP costs in Kazakhstan and Russia may be higher due to extensive government 
financial support to a partnership, expensive technology and the higher cost of private 
partner borrowing, the literature claims that PPPs are a preferred form for collaboration 
between the public and private sectors (Kabashkin, 2010; Pankratov, 2010; Varnavskiy 
et al., 2010; Bazhenov, 2011; Firsova, 2012).  This means that the Russian language 
literature generally accepts a notion that PPPs incur higher total project costs (compared 
to government in–house service delivery), although the Western literature provides the 
opposite argument in support of PPPs (Mouraviev, 2012: 49).  According to KPMG 
data, the costs of contracting out in Russia are about 6 per cent less than the PPP costs 
(Shabashevich, 2011: 3–4).  This vividly demonstrates an evolving paradigm that 
provides taken–for–granted PPP acceptance, regardless of their costs.  
Furthermore, after a partnership formation, the government tends to inflate its value 
by disregarding the cost-reduction opportunities.  Interviews highlighted numerous 
examples where the government either explicitly or implicitly agreed to higher than 
planned project costs.  The interview data revealed cost increases as an ongoing 
problem in the studied projects.  Although the private sector partners should accept part 
of the responsibility for cost increases, the government also should assume a significant 
part of responsibility because its own actions lead to disregard of cost reduction 
opportunities.  The example of the latter is a PPP project in Karaganda, Kazakhstan, 
where the government insisted on simultaneous, rather than sequential, construction of 
11 kindergartens.  A Russian PPP in St Petersburg gave a similar example where the 
city government insisted on simultaneous, rather than sequential, construction of 
schools and kindergartens.   
To summarise, the government pays insufficient attention to the PPP value for 
money both at the time of partnership formation and during project implementation.  
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This demonstrates an unbalanced government approach: the government labels a PPP as 
an arrangement that carries significant value for money; however, justification of the 
actual PPP value for money often is missing. 
 
6.4.2 Government tends to inflate positive PPP externalities and downplay 
      negative externalities 
 
An unbalanced approach to perceived PPP benefits is tightly integrated with yet 
another factor that contributes to the PPP policy paradigm in Kazakhstan and Russia, 
namely that partners often inflate positive PPP externalities, whilst they discount 
negative externalities.   
Among positive externalities, the government repeatedly states that partnerships are 
supposed to bring along all kinds of innovation (Firsova, 2012).  The Russian literature 
and policy documents normally associate PPPs with technological and other kinds of 
innovation (such as in management or service delivery) and often deem innovation 
intrinsic to a partnership (Varnavskiy, 2004; Pankratov, 2010; Varnavskiy et al., 2010; 
Firsova, 2011a, 2011b, 2012).  
A private partner in a PPP has an incentive to employ innovative technology as 
long as it furthers the partnership’s economic efficiency, i.e., reduces costs, increases 
productivity, maximises profit or reduces risk, such as that of technological breakdown.   
However, the interview data have not identified any instances of significant 
innovation in the studied projects in Kazakhstan and Russia.  Whilst interviewees 
highlighted numerous cost increases, they normally attributed higher costs not to 
innovation, but to the following two reasons: (a) bureaucracy, delays and overall 
inefficiency, and (b) partner opportunistic behaviour.  The interview data did not 
demonstrate any innovative aspect of construction, service delivery or management.  To 
summarise, in the four studied PPPs innovation as a distinctive project feature was 
missing.  This shows that the government perception of a PPP as an intrinsically 
innovative project lacks justification.  However, the government approach frames the 
general public perception of partnerships in a positive way: the government 
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unjustifiably attributes innovation to partnerships regardless of the context and, hence, 
promotes the PPP policy paradigm development.                    
Among negative externalities, scholars and policy makers downplay two most often.  
The first is that by using PPPs the government may increasingly shift responsibility for 
public services to private providers.  This means that in the future the public sector 
expertise for service provision may become unavailable, to the disadvantage of 
customers.  One of the studied PPP projects vividly illustrates this negative externality.  
Interviews highlighted the details of the viaduct that is under construction in Russia and 
that will become the first toll viaduct in the country as opposed to traditional free 
railroad crossings.  In addition to the first viaduct, a PPP operator has massive 
expansion plans as it plans to build 50 more viaducts.  This means that the country may 
witness rapid shrinking of traditional free public services such as railroad crossings.  
Furthermore, facilities such as toll viaducts or toll roads may form a distinctly separate 
sector in the nation's infrastructure in which both the public ownership and expertise 
may cease to exist.  The same kind of observation applies to Kazakhstan that has 
extensive plans to build toll roads using private investments and private expertise.  The 
example of the latter is a government plan to construct a toll road from Almaty, 
Kazakhstan's major city, to Astana, the capital, using PPPs.     
The second negative externality that the government, policy makers and scholars 
tend to downplay is that PPP services in Russia often cost more as opposed to 
government in–house provision (see discussion of this factor in the preceding section).  
The ultimate implication of this negative externality is that the higher cost of public 
services shifts to citizens either in the form of higher tariffs or in the form of higher 
budgetary payments to a PPP, and/or greater future budget deficits due to larger 
government expenses in the long run.  The interview data from a railroad concession in 
Kazakhstan illustrates these implications: interviewees revealed a large number of cases 
where the operator pushed for higher tariffs due to a variety of reasons, such as the need 
to break even or the need to pay for unplanned project expenses.  Furthermore, the 
operator has never requested higher tariffs due to employing innovative technology.  
Hence, most likely higher tariffs illustrate the project's inefficiency, as well as 
inflationary pressure.  Consequently, it is no surprise that the public anti-monopoly 
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agency routinely declines applications for higher tariffs in the government’s attempt to 
reduce society's costs and curb inflation.          
Additionally, the vast majority of the population in Kazakhstan and Russia has 
become accustomed to receiving free or low–priced public services because this is how 
the government provided services in the Soviet Union.  In modern society, when the 
governments in Kazakhstan and Russia engage private firms in the public service 
provision, this is likely to create a perception that the government detaches itself from 
traditional responsibilities.  The examples of a private toll viaduct in Russia, private toll 
roads in both countries and a privately owned railroad in Kazakhstan illustrate this point.  
To counter this perception, the governments in both countries put forward a persuasive 
argument that citizens have a choice - either purchase a service from a PPP, perhaps at a 
higher cost, or not receive a service at all.  By framing citizens’ choices and providing a 
standardised solution in the form of a PPP, the government swiftly intensifies the policy 
paradigm construction.   
 
6.4.3 Government support to PPPs: Extensive financing 
 
Another factor that characterises the emerging PPP policy paradigm is extensive 
government financial support to partnerships that the government deems necessary.  
This is because the interview data and the Russian language literature argue that for 
private investors, PPPs are often unattractive because they cannot generate profit 
(Pankratov, 2010; Varnavskiy et al., 2010; Firsova, 2012).     
In line with this, the governments in both nations have passed laws and regulations 
that permit various forms of government financial contribution to a PPP.  First, there is 
a direct government payment for preparing the PPP project proposal, which at present is 
common practice in both Kazakhstan and Russia. Other forms include government 
direct financial investment in a project (e.g., at the construction phase a public agency 
may pay a pre-determined percentage of capital investment directly to material and 
equipment suppliers); a subsidy that the government can extend any time during the 
project to cover part of the cost (normally this takes the form of a payment to a private 
sector partner); government physical assets such as land, buildings and equipment (part 
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of them may be the government’s contribution to a partnership, whilst another part may 
be sold to a private partner at a market price or below market price); a tariff subsidy 
(e.g., a tariff may be set low in order to keep the service affordable to customers, whilst 
the government makes periodic payments to the private sector partner in order to ensure 
that it recovers its investment and reaps a profit); the so called shadow tolls (e.g., when 
the government pays tolls or fees to a private partner for a pre-determined volume of 
service such as for a certain number of cars that use a toll road per month); government 
guarantees for private partner loans from commercial banks; government-issued 
licenses and permits for private partner activities unrelated to the main partnership 
service (this way the government may support additional revenue-generating private 
sector partner activities and restrain prices for public services from rising); approvals 
for tariff increases above the levels pre–determined in a PPP contract; and exemptions 
from fines and/or fees (e.g., the government may exempt a private party from paying a 
late fee for not meeting the deadline for completing a specific construction phase).   
It is worth noting that the existing legislation in Russia and Kazakhstan allows 
governments to provide additional forms of support to a concessionaire, which makes 
the understanding of a concession quite different from the typical approach in OECD 
countries.  For example, Article 14 of the Law on concessions in Kazakhstan says that 
government can (a) co-finance concession projects, and (b) compensate some 
investment expenses of a concessionaire during the concession period.  This amendment 
to the original law occurred in 2008, to address concerns that PPP projects were 
financially unattractive for private companies.  The same Article says that the total 
monetary value of government support to a concessionaire should not exceed the total 
cost of an asset constructed by a private company.  In other words, this provision 
includes a possibility that the government may pay all the private partner’s investment 
expenses, whilst the population (customers) may pay some amount or even nothing.   
In Russia, contributions to partnerships result in government financial support 
ranging from 20 to 40 per cent of the total PPP project cost, which is significantly 
higher than in any other countries (10 to 20 per cent), as per KPMG data (Shabashevich, 
2011: 3–4).  Similar figures apply to Kazakhstan, although exact data are unavailable.  
However, as the author’s own calculations show, in one of the studied PPP projects in 
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Karaganda, Kazakhstan, that aims to construct and operate eleven kindergartens, the 
government’s direct payments to a concessionaire during 14 years (in nominal values) 
will constitute 47 per cent of the total PPP revenue.      
One of the studied projects - a PPP in St Petersburg, Russia, that aims at 
constructing and subsequently operating two schools and three kindergartens during 10 
years - illustrates the significant government expenses that intend to cover PPP costs.  
The estimated construction cost of each school for the private sector partner is $25.7 
million, as opposed to $42.8 million that the government has agreed to pay, including 
the maintenance expenses.  Each kindergarten’s construction cost is $6.5 million as 
opposed to the future government payment of $10.9 million, including the maintenance 
fee (GK 'Baltros' investiruyet 2.2 milliarda rublei v shkoly i detskiye sady, 2011).  The 
total government payment in nominal prices is $118.3 million, which is 67 per cent 
higher than the $70.9 million construction cost.  Although a private operator's 
maintenance fee remains undisclosed, the high total government payment raises serious 
concerns regarding PPP value for money and whether these extensive government 
payments to a partnership are justified.      
As the forms of government support to a partnership are quite comprehensive, this 
promotes rising expectations among private investors regarding government payments 
and other kinds of direct and indirect financial benefits that they may expect from 
public agencies.  In addition to rising government costs, this increasingly creates a 
guarantee culture among private investors (Pankratov, 2010: 80, 88; Varnavskiy et al., 
2010: 26) that may consider government the source of their financial gain regardless of 
the project context.   
This view of the government role furthers the PPP policy paradigm construction, in 
which the government assumes responsibility of a partnership guarantor upfront, 
without any specific, contextual justification.  In this evolving paradigm, the 
government responsibility to serve as an essential source of funds and inputs for 
partnerships transforms into the private investors’ perception of the government as a 
reliable source of benefits, whilst firms become increasingly risk averse. 
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6.4.4 Government approach to risk allocation in a PPP  
  
An additional factor that advances the PPP public policy in Kazakhstan and Russia 
as a paradigm is a government approach to risk allocation in a partnership.  The typical 
approach in OECD countries is that ‘risk should be transferred to the party best able to 
manage it in the most cost effective manner’ (European Commission, 2003: 52).  In 
contrast, the government in Kazakhstan and Russia employs a different approach: at 
least some risk should transfer to the private sector (Pankratov, 2010).  The thesis 
findings permit one to describe the underpinning logic as follows: when the government 
provides public services in-house, the government naturally bears all the risk.  When a 
public agency forms a partnership and the latter provides the service on behalf of the 
government, some kinds of risk transfer from the public to the private sector.  The 
government views this as an achievement and an advantage as the public sector risks 
decrease.   
However, this inevitably implies two effects: (a) in some cases the government 
tends to accept larger risks than an optimal allocation requires because a private partner 
may not be willing to accept a certain risk, and (b) in other cases, the government 
transfers too much risk or transfers risk for its own sake.  The latter happens where the 
government leaves no choice to a private partner regarding project design, and certain 
project design features frame risk allocation.  For example, in the studied kindergartens' 
PPP in Karaganda, Kazakhstan, the government transferred all foreign exchange risk to 
the private sector partner, which is a Turkish company, although the latter is unable to 
mitigate it.  Additionally, the government transferred construction risk to the private 
partner and significantly limited the latter's possibilities to mitigate it by requiring 
simultaneous, rather than sequential, construction of all eleven kindergartens.  At the 
same time, the government, to a large extent, eliminated the private partner's revenue 
risk by providing extensive payment guarantees for an operator's services.  In each of 
the three examples of risk allocation in the kindergartens' PPP the allocation is sub-
optimal.      
This is in sharp contrast with the OECD literature which describes principles of risk 
allocation as follows.  If a greater ability to mitigate some risks and deal with them at 
 296 
the least possible cost belongs to the public sector partner, these kinds of risk should 
remain with the public sector.  If the private sector partner can mitigate these risks 
better and more cheaply, they should transfer to the private sector (Grimsey and Lewis, 
2002; Hardcastle and Boothroyd, 2003; Klijn and Teisman, 2003).   
Western literature asserts that the lowest cost is a critical factor in deciding what 
partner should bear a certain risk because the private party’s cost has impact above and 
beyond the private sector: the government and/or citizens must compensate the private 
party’s cost.  The more the PPP project costs a private party, the more the government 
and/or citizens will have to pay.  '… The degree of risk transfer to the private sector will 
influence the overall cost of the project to the public sector as all risk will be associated 
with the price premium.  Therefore, the objective must be to achieve cost effective risk 
transfer, not simply risk allocation for its own sake' (European Commission, 2003: 52–
53).   
Although in reality risk allocation may be sub-optimal due to miscalculations, 
unforeseen circumstances or prevailing political, economic and social reasons, the 
government acceptance of larger risks (such as extending a subsidy to pay part of the 
project cost) or risks that the private sector partner normally bears (such as demand risk) 
should be unnecessary.   
However, subsidies and other ways of government financial involvement in PPPs 
are common in Kazakhstan and Russia, as the preceding section described.  Yet an 
additional example is available from the studied PPP in Eastern Kazakhstan that aims at 
railroad construction and operation.  The national government has extended to the 
operator a sizeable low interest loan (with the interest rate below 1 per cent) for more 
than 15 years for the purpose of a bond buyback trying to minimise the overall PPP's 
risks.  This illustrates how far the government financial involvement in the PPP support 
can stretch and also shows the government disregard of its own costs that include the 
loan’s opportunity cost and lost market-rate interest.  This suggests that the government 
is more concerned with partnerships’ proliferation, rather than with financial 
performance and the specific project’s results.  An emergent PPP policy paradigm, thus, 
frames both parties’ actions and behaviour: the government’s own pursuit of 
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partnerships justifies greater government risks and costs, whilst private companies 
conveniently resort to the risk–averse model of behaviour.    
 
6.4.5 A concession as a prevailing PPP form    
 
Another factor that furthers the PPP policy paradigm formation is the strong 
government emphasis on a concession.  Out of a range of forms that a PPP may take, 
the Russian and Kazakhstani governments have chosen a concession as a prevailing 
form (Zusman, 2008).  Other forms, such as a private finance initiative (PFI), an asset 
life–cycle contract (Bovaird, 2004; Hall, 2008a; Kakabadse et al., 2007) or a 
management contract are rare in Russia and examples are hard to find.  Furthermore, as 
of April 2013, all of Kazakhstan's ongoing projects are in a concession form.  In part, 
one can explain the emphasis on concessions with the existence of the relevant laws (i.e., 
the Russian federal law “On Concessional Agreements” was approved in 2005, with 
subsequent amendments in 2008, whilst Kazakhstan passed a similar national law on 
concessions in July 2006).  However, there is no federal law that defines a PFI in the 
Russian context or sets the boundaries for a party’s rights and obligations in a life–cycle 
contract.  The similar gaps in national legislation exist in Kazakhstan.  
Among the four studied PPP projects, relevant national laws categorise two 
Kazakhstani projects and one Russian project as concessions.  Additionally, one more 
project in Russia - a toll viaduct - claims that it is a PPP, but not a concession because it 
does not use the provisions of the federal law on concessions.  However, the nature of 
organisational arrangements (such as the joint contribution of resources, constructing 
the facility at the investor's expense and toll collection from customers to recover the 
investment) permits one to categorise this PPP as a concession.         
Interviews showed a variety of tangled relationships in the four studied PPPs (see 
Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3b).  Additionally, interviews revealed that both partners 
disregard opportunities to streamline the organisational arrangements within 
concessions and pay little or no attention to the need to make organisational structures 
more effective (Section 5.2.2).  This demonstrates an unbalanced, excessively high 
emphasis that the government and private partners place on the PPP form, i.e., a 
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concession, rather than on certain organisational arrangements that underpin a 
concession and can make it an effective service delivery method.     
A powerful factor that drives the extensive employment of concessions in 
Kazakhstan and Russia is perceived pressure that comes from globalisation influences.  
The latter is an important driving force behind the PPP policy paradigm.  Russia and 
Kazakhstan are striving for other countries to perceive them positively as they attempt 
to formulate policies and practices and create institutions that are in line with those of 
industrialised countries and Western orthodoxy of best practice.  One can view this as 
Kazakhstan's and Russia’s general intention to align their policies, processes and tools 
in both the public and private sectors with international trends.  From the globalisation 
perspective, the governments in each nation perceive PPPs as a worldwide trend.  
Furthermore, the governments perceive a prevailing use of concessions, as opposed to 
other PPP forms, as the international trend as well (Mouraviev, 2012).  Hence, a 
concession has become an essential part of a policy paradigm as a concession reflects 
the way in which policy makers perceive and conceptualise a PPP (Mouraviev et al., 
2012).   
 
6.5 Model Propositions   
      
Public–private partnerships are new to Kazakhstan and Russia, hence they are 
projects in progress.  As data regarding project performance are not yet fully available, 
this model surveys government approaches to PPP governance and how these 
approaches are turning into a policy paradigm.   
A model for understanding PPP governance features a critical assessment of the 
principal dynamics that contribute to changes in PPP management patterns in 
Kazakhstan and Russia.  The most influential factors include: 
 the government’s unbalanced perception of PPP benefits and shortfalls, which puts 
unjustified emphasis on advantages and disregards drawbacks;  
 the government's tendency to inflate positive PPP externalities and downplay 
negative externalities; 
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 the way that the government typically approaches risk allocation in a PPP, i.e., that 
the government intends to transfer at least some risk to the private sector regardless 
of the context; 
 the government's excessive emphasis on concession usage as a prevailing PPP form; 
and   
 excessive government financial support to partnerships.   
 
Figure 6.2 highlights a model for deeper conceptualising PPP governance in 
Kazakhstan and Russia. 
 
Figure 6.2 A model for understanding PPP governance in Kazakhstan and 
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    Source: Compiled by the author 
 
A model delineates the influence of the principal underlying factors on PPP 
formation and management, which Figure 6.2 shows separately as two distinct stages of 
PPP governance.  Arrows illustrate the direction of influence.  The model captures the 
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interplay between lines of influence and it is reflected in a set of ten propositions 
(denoted by the letter P in Figure 6.2), which this section discusses below. 
 
Proposition 1: Government financial support to partnerships and unbalanced 
perception of PPP benefits and shortfalls have a mutually reinforcing impact on 
each other.   
Where the government makes excessive financial outlays to PPPs by providing 
subsidies or by granting free resources, such as land, this forms a perception of a 
partnership as a successful enterprise.  However, this also puts unjustified emphasis on 
a partnership's advantages and disregards its drawbacks.  For example, the government 
payment of part of the PPP project cost may make a project profitable for a private 
investor.  Another illustration that this research has identified is the government's 
disregard of cost reduction opportunities, which means low PPP efficiency as the 
service delivery method, although the government pays little or no attention to this.  In 
other cases, PPP value for money may be inflated because the government may absorb 
some costs or provide a subsidy. 
Conversely, once the government has assigned a high priority to a PPP, such as to 
the one that addresses an acute social problem (e.g., construction and operation of 
schools, kindergartens or hospitals), this will likely channel more extensive government 
support to a PPP as opposed to, for example, a toll road project.   
Hence, the government financial support often inflates and/or distorts a 
partnership's benefits, such as attracting private funding, whilst excessive emphasis on a 
PPP's benefit, such as an opportunity to launch a public service provision quickly, is 
likely to secure government funding.  
 
Proposition 2: Excessive government financial support to partnerships and 
inflated PPP positive externalities, complemented by discounted negative 
externalities, have a mutually reinforcing impact on each other.  
The example that highlights this proposition is where a partnership's ability to 
innovate justifies a larger government payment in order to deliver this innovation.  
Conversely, a truly innovative partnership that employs advanced technology and 
 301 
features state-of-the-art service delivery methods is likely to receive additional 
government financial support if it is necessary.   
As for discounted negative externalities, by using PPPs the government may 
increasingly shift responsibility for public services to private providers.  In order to 
justify the shift, the government may claim that it intended to attract private sector 
funds, support private business, create jobs and achieve greater efficiency.  Nevertheless, 
the alternative perspective argues that, by employing partnerships, the government may 
distance itself from traditional public sector responsibilities.  For the government, one 
method to legitimise this distancing is to ensure higher efficiency of private operators 
by paying part of the project expenses in a variety of ways (e.g., by subsidising the loan 
interest rate).  Hence, one may view extensive financial support to PPPs as a tool that 
discounts negative externalities and furthers PPP expansion.       
 
Proposition 3: Three factors - unbalanced government perception of PPP 
benefits and shortfalls, excessive government financial support to partnerships and 
inflated PPP positive externalities and discounted negative externalities - are likely 
to have a simultaneous positive impact on PPP formation.   
These three factors taken separately or all together are likely to significantly 
increase the PPP's value for money.  In the case of Kazakhstan and Russia, the 
governments’ perception of partnerships and extensive government financing are likely 
to create a much higher PPP value for money from the perspective of stakeholders such 
as the public agencies, private investors or customers (i.e., citizens).  For a public 
agency, the value involves a larger volume of public services and greater citizens' 
satisfaction.  For private investors, the value involves long-term profits that government 
payments largely guarantee.  For customers, the value refers to an opportunity to 
receive a service (although for a fee), rather than receive no service at all because the 
government is unable to provide it without a PPP.  As all principal stakeholders may 
benefit from the PPP formation, this furthers PPP development.  However, the 
stakeholders disregard the key element that inflates the PPP's value for money - the 
excessive government payments to a PPP over the long term.  This research showed that 
partnerships in Kazakhstan and Russia did not undergo any value for money assessment.  
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Furthermore, data revealed multiple cost increases with which the government was not 
concerned.  In many cases, the government is prepared to pay more to a partnership as 
opposed to the cost of in-house service provision, which inflates the PPP’s value.  Once 
partners inflate the value and disregard the costs, this is likely to significantly ease the 
partnership formation.   
        
Proposition 4: Government unbalanced approach to risk allocation has an 
impact on PPP formation. 
Interview data showed that the government intends to transfer at least some risk 
from the public sector to the private sector, rather than follow the principle of optimal 
risk allocation, i.e., that risk should transfer to a party best able to deal with it at the 
least cost (Klijn and Teisman, 2003).  As a result, in some cases the government may 
attempt to shift more risks to a private partner.  However, this may either increase the 
risk premium that a private partner adds to its costs or may simply induce a private 
partner to not accept a PPP contract.  The more typical scenario is where the 
government is prepared to carry much larger risk than optimal risk distribution requires.  
This reduces the private sector partner's exposure to risks and makes the PPP formation 
easier.   
 
Proposition 5: Government unbalanced approach to risk allocation has an 
impact on PPP management. 
At the PPP management stage, partners may need to renegotiate some risks, both 
anticipated and unforeseen.  At this stage, not only an original contract but, most 
importantly, partner interaction determines risk reallocation.  Since the government is 
inclined to financially support partnerships by the extensive range of tools specified in 
the Kazakhstani and Russian legislation, risk redistribution at this stage is likely to 
favour a private partner, whilst the government will have to accept a larger share of risk.  
In an opposite kind of situation, where the government asks a private partner to bear a 
large unforeseen risk, all or most of the private partner's profits may be erased and the 
government faces the risk that a private partner may abandon the project.  To 
summarise, although the government transfers some risk to the private sector partner at 
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both the PPP formation stage and the management stage, the government itself has to 
bear most risks in order to launch a project and keep it going to completion.  
 
Proposition 6: Government conceptualisation of a concession as a prevailing 
PPP form is likely to facilitate PPP formation. 
To date (May 2013), Kazakhstan and Russia employed a concession as the only 
PPP form.  The governments have adopted national legislation that aims at extensive 
use of this PPP form.  This means that a concession reflects the only way in which the 
governments in the two nations conceptualise a PPP.  The legislation does not define 
other PPP forms, such as a life-cycle contract, a management contract or a private 
finance initiative.  Although the legislation limits the choice to one form only, the 
benefit is that regional and municipal governments may borrow relatively easily each 
other’s experience in the PPP formation and may also borrow the experience of large 
national concessions.  This simplifies and facilitates the PPP formation process by 
employing the typical tender arrangements and standardised contract provisions.   
 
Proposition 7: Government conceptualisation of a concession as a prevailing 
PPP form is likely to simplify PPP management. 
In addition to streamlining the PPP formation process, the exclusive government's 
focus on a concession allows all stakeholders to simplify the PPP management by 
employing standard administrative procedures and solutions that partners can borrow 
from other projects.          
For example, management has to deal with similar concession issues, such as tariff 
setting and applications for tariff adjustments, and other projects' experience might be 
very useful.  Another example also demonstrates the usefulness of borrowing the 
experience from other concessions: one project may employ an organisational structure 
that has proven successful in another project.  Additionally, a project can borrow other 
management tools, such as dispute resolution techniques, that other projects have tested 
and that have shown their successful performance.     
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Proposition 8: PPP management has a reinforcing impact on unbalanced 
government perception of PPP benefits and shortfalls. 
This proposition asserts that management may deliberately show (and inflate) 
exactly those PPP operation results that the government expects to see.  For example, an 
operator may diligently follow the government plan of simultaneous, rather than 
sequential, construction of kindergartens or schools.  This permits the government to 
report fast results and to associate the success with efficiency of the delivery method, 
i.e., a PPP.  However, this research revealed that simultaneous construction lacks 
efficiency and misses the cost reduction opportunities that stem from economies of 
scale.  Hence, empirical data suggest that a PPP becomes a 'hostage' of the government 
project design, which means that the government considerably strips a partnership's 
flexibility in decision-making and dominates what an operator should do.  Then, the 
government may use the outcomes of the bounded PPP management, such as swiftly 
achieved results or perceived PPP efficiency, as a tool that further reinforces the 
government's own perception of a PPP's benefits.  This stems from the government's 
ultimate purpose, which is to illustrate that a PPP is a viable, sustainable and beneficial 
alternative to the traditional governmental provision of public services.         
  
Proposition 9: PPP management has a reinforcing impact on excessive 
government financial support to partnerships. 
Much like Proposition 8, this proposition claims that there is a link between PPP 
management that intends to achieve the results in line with government expectations, on 
the one hand, and the government response to the achieved outcomes, on the other hand.  
Once PPP performance meets at least some government expectations, the government 
will be inclined to further support a partnership.  Furthermore, should a partnership 
experience some difficulties, such as operating risk or revenue risk, the government 
may extend additional financial support to this PPP in order to keep, enhance and 
demonstrate the positive results that a PPP has already produced.   
 
Proposition 10: PPP management has a reinforcing impact on inflated PPP 
positive externalities coupled with discounted negative externalities. 
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Similar to Propositions 8 and 9, this proposition argues that PPP management may 
have a reinforcing impact on a partnership’s positive externalities by inflating what the 
government expects to see.  This refers, for example, to technological innovation that 
the governments in Kazakhstan and Russia strive to develop.  An example of a negative 
externality that PPP management may downplay is PPP impact on a regional economy’s 
sustainability.  To date, the literature and the governments have been silent about the 
interplay between partnerships and sustainability, which requires careful investigation, 
as this research demonstrated.  
 
6.6 Model Summary 
        
In Kazakhstan and Russia, the model has identified a number of departures from 
typical approaches to PPPs, which OECD countries employ.  These departures frame 
the concepts, assumptions and actions regarding PPPs in a certain way and demonstrate 
that PPP governance is gradually turning into a paradigm.     
The author's stance is that the PPP policy paradigm is the core of the governance 
model: it is a government tool for rapid expansion of partnership employment and PPP 
management in Kazakhstan and Russia.  A paradigm assigns a specific set of features to 
a partnership, whilst it downplays or neglects other features.  The policy paradigm, once 
set, does not require extensive justification of why a partnership may be necessary for 
implementing a specific project because the paradigm rests on the taken-for-granted 
ideas, i.e., the concept of the need for long-term collaboration between the public sector 
and the private sector, and the legitimised solution, i.e., the PPP employment regardless 
of its value for money.  Most importantly, after the PPP policy paradigm becomes 
established, it legitimises a partnership as a commonly employed form of public and 
private sector collaboration without questioning whether the partnership is an efficient 
and effective collaborative tool.   
Kazakhstan's and Russia’s PPP policy paradigm is still emerging.  It is not yet fully 
defined or established.  Although a paradigm frames PPP governance, each partnership 
is unique and its success depends on certain factors.  What are the principal factors that 
ensure PPP success?  The next section addresses this question.     
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6.7 PPP Critical Success Factors 
 
Researchers define Critical Success Factors (CSFs) as those few principal areas in 
which favourable results are absolutely necessary for achieving a manager's goals 
(Rockart, 1982).  A similar view asserts that CSFs are a few key areas that dictate 
managerial success (Boynton and Zmud, 1984).  Saraph et al. (1989) echo this view and 
argue that CSFs are areas of managerial planning and action that one must practice in 
order to achieve effectiveness.  From the stakeholder management perspective, 
researchers view CSFs as 'those activities and practices that should be addressed in 
order to ensure effective management of stakeholders' (Yang et al., 2009: 337).   
To summarise, the core CSF definition, which this thesis adopts, focuses on the 
notion of crucial areas in which success or favourable results must be ensured for an 
organisation’s effective management.  
This thesis draws on the CSFs’ methodology that involves factor grouping analysis 
(Hardcastle et al., 2005).  In this methodology, instead of making a list of CSFs that are 
all critical to PPPs, a researcher determines a relatively small number of factor 
groupings that represent relationships between multiple elements that each grouping 
embraces (Hardcastle et al., 2005).       
In this research, the interviewees' opinions and perceptions have determined CSFs 
and their groupings.  Although the researcher did not ask interviewees to explicitly 
identify CSFs, they repeatedly highlighted many items of concern, with overlapping and 
complementary views regarding problems that concern them the most.  These concerns 
became the basis for coding them as improvement opportunities, which the researcher 
then grouped, whilst each group represents a set of interrelated elements.  The author 
assigned the CSF categories (groupings) broader titles as follows: 
 Factor Grouping 1: Legal and Regulatory Environment;  
 Factor Grouping 2: Partner Interaction; and 
 Factor Grouping 3: Risk Management.  
It is no surprise that the titles of two out of the three groupings coincide with the 
themes that the interviews have investigated (Groupings 2 and 3), and Grouping 1 
includes part of yet another theme that focuses on constraints and impediments to 
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effective PPP governance.  This demonstrates consistency between identified CSFs and 
the interview data and findings.    
   
6.7.1 Legal and regulatory environment 
 
This factor grouping includes four CSF components: 
 a well-designed legal framework; 
 a simplified PPP formation; 
 a market discipline; and 
 a clear tariff policy. 
 
A well-designed, elaborate legal framework is a prerequisite for all kinds of PPP 
activity (Pongsiri, 2002).  Interviewees noted the absence of the general PPP law in both 
Kazakhstan and Russia and drawbacks of the respective law on concessions in each 
country, which makes a PPP an ambiguous form of public-private collaboration.  
Additionally, interviewees pointed out the ambiguity in the range of privileges and 
responsibilities of regional and municipal governments, which manifests itself in 
varying forms of support to PPPs that governments are prepared to extend.  Eliminating 
this ambiguity by adopting laws and regulations at the national level and harmonising 
national PPP laws with regional and local legislation would ensure legislative 
consistency and might considerably boost investors' interest toward PPPs.  One specific 
area that requires legislative clarification includes defining non-concessionary PPP 
models, in addition to a concession.  Yet an additional legislative task is to create a legal 
basis for long-term financial commitment that public agencies should be able to extend 
to private partners.  
Simplifying the PPP formation procedures might significantly intensify PPP 
development in Kazakhstan and Russia.  Creating a streamlined single-tender bidding 
process that permits granting a single PPP contract to the winner, rather than a set of 
different contracts with their own provisions and regulations, such as a contract for land 
use, a separate contract for the service provision and a separate partnership contract, 
could accomplish this.  Interviewees expressed a number of critical opinions 
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highlighting excessive bureaucracy and tangled procedures in the PPP formation, which 
the government needs to simplify and shorten.      
Ensuring market discipline is also a critical area for PPP success (Jamali, 2004).  
Market discipline requires either partner to honour payments, work schedules and other 
obligations that contracts and regulations specify.  For example, either partner must 
make payments to a partner, sub-contractors, workers and customers fully, on time and 
according to contract terms and schedules.  Tools such as interest payments, fees and 
fines applied to either partner should ensure market discipline. 
The PPP regulatory environment may become more transparent and attractive to 
investors once they know and understand a tariff policy for a partnership's services.  A 
tariff policy should include at least three components - conditions for setting a new 
tariff, regulations regarding ranges of future tariff adjustments and a clear, streamlined 
application process for a new tariff.  The research has drawn this CSF from multiple 
interviewees' complaints regarding existing bureaucratic, tangled and lengthy 
procedures for tariff adjustments, which makes the partnership's window of 
opportunities obscure and does not permit effective long-term business planning.         
 
6.7.2 Partner interaction 
 
Grouping 2 embraces partner interaction issues and includes the following four 
CSF components: 
 commitment of both partners to common, clearly stated project goals;  
 effective governance structures and dispute resolution mechanisms; 
 government preferential treatment of PPP-related tasks; and 
 private partners' flexibility in business management.  
 
A clear statement of the project's goals regarding issues such as the service quality, 
completion dates, priorities and organisational arrangements permits partners to avoid 
ambiguity in managing a partnership's tasks and adds to raising either partner's 
accountability.  Key personnel's explicit commitment to the common, clearly stated PPP 
objectives should complement the partners’ staff's awareness of the project's goals.  
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This allows partners to stick to the project plan, avoid shifting the effort and costs to 
another partner, stay away from exerting unnecessary pressure to complete tasks of 
secondary importance and avoid micro-management.  From a more general perspective, 
a high level of commitment to a project's goals also implies that partners should not 
disregard cost reduction opportunities and possibilities to increase PPP value for money.   
Another CSF includes creation of effective governance structures and dispute 
resolution mechanisms.  Interviews showed that existing PPP governance structures are 
tangled and bureaucratic.  They involve complex reporting requirements and lack 
effectiveness.  For example, none of the studied partnerships had a joint PPP Board and 
none of them had a formal dispute resolution arrangement.   Creation of relatively 
simple and clear organisational forms that provide a reliable platform for partner 
interaction with minimal bureaucracy and reporting may ensure greater effectiveness of 
the PPP management decision-making.  One should pay special attention to designing 
dispute resolution mechanisms as the latter presently are missing from PPP governance 
in both Kazakhstan and Russia.   
Government preferential treatment of PPP-related tasks is another CSF in the 
category that embraces partner interaction.  Interview data revealed that the government 
does not distinguish between a PPP operator and any other private contractor, although 
a PPP implements a government delegated job with the use of public resources.  Hence, 
among the many tasks that the government faces, a PPP currently does not receive any 
priority, and the partner relationship often suffers from a lack of government attention.  
The government needs to effectively manage the public-private relationship by 
continuously supporting a PPP operator's work, e.g., by extending preferential treatment 
to PPP-related tasks, requests and applications.  This might significantly facilitate PPP 
work and enhance its effectiveness.  
Ensuring private partners' flexibility in business management is another important 
component related to partner interaction.  The government should avoid overregulation 
that constrains PPP decision-making and reduces a private party's incentives for better 
performance.  The examples of areas that require greater flexibility include procurement 
and wage-rate setting.  Avoiding a public sector partner's dominance in a PPP is also a 
critical part of effective public-private relations.    
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6.7.3 Risk management 
 
Grouping 3 represents risk management and includes three CSFs components: 
 appropriate risk allocation between partners; 
 identification of risk-mitigation tools for each partner; and  
 incentives for better private partners' performance. 
A high loading success factor is an appropriate risk allocation.  One should 
accomplish this according to the principle that ‘risk should be transferred to the party 
best able to manage it in the most cost effective manner’ (European Commission, 2003: 
52).  Avoiding risk transfer for its own sake is another perspective of a proper risk 
allocation, the overarching goal of which is reducing the long-term project costs.     
Appropriate risk allocation cannot fully guarantee the PPP's success because the 
partnership contract may not foresee some risks, whilst some other risks may require 
further negotiation.  To remedy these situations, partner collaboration should identify 
mitigation tools for each risk.  Interviews showed that partners from both sectors in 
Kazakhstani and Russian PPPs tend to pay insufficient attention to identifying risk 
mitigation tools, which often leads to greater uncertainty and unplanned expenses.  
Identification and subsequent implementation of proper risk mitigation methods might 
significantly contribute to effective risk management at the least cost.      
Another PPP success factor involves creating incentives for better private partners' 
performance.  Monetary incentives to complete key assignments with pre-specified 
quality features and on time should back critical project deliverables that mark a 
project's progress.  Additionally, penalties for non-completion should back performance 
targets.  This would motivate the private sector partners to successfully accomplish the 
project plans.  Based on enhanced private partners' motivation, the government should 
aim to reduce the volume and scope of government guarantees and other forms of 
public support to PPPs, in order to reduce a guarantee culture among private investors.   
 
 
 
 
 311 
6.8 Chapter Summary 
 
The chapter delineated the model for deeper understanding of PPP governance in 
Kazakhstan and Russia.  The model's core requires viewing PPP formation and 
management as the policy paradigm that governments in both nations rapidly intensify.  
The policy paradigm is an interplay of three elements - ideas regarding long-term 
public-private collaboration, a changing set of government responsibilities that implies 
an increasing provision of public services by private firms and an expanding set of 
institutional capacities that support a new government role. 
  In the framework of the policy paradigm, the following five factors guide PPP 
governance: 
 The government employs an unbalanced approach to perceived PPP benefits; 
 The government tends to inflate positive PPP externalities and downplay 
negative externalities; 
 The government exercises an unjustified approach to risk allocation by 
disregarding the principle of effective risk management;    
 The government provides unjustifiably extensive, often excessive financial 
support to PPPs; and 
 The government emphasises the use of a concession as a prevailing PPP form 
and disregards the availability of other PPP forms and an industry’s nature.    
The PPP governance model inevitably implies that the governments in two nations 
increasingly create a guarantee culture among private investors who become 
progressively more risk averse.  At the same time, partners from both sectors tend to 
accept excessive and/or unnecessary risks, which results in higher PPP costs.  Increased 
public service costs shift to citizens in the form of higher tariffs or higher budget 
payments to a PPP, which seriously undermines PPP value for money in both countries.  
This chapter enhanced the application of the PPP governance model by identifying 
factors that are crucial for achieving success in managing partnerships in Kazakhstan 
and Russia.  The interview data permitted the researcher to highlight eleven PPP critical 
success factors, which constituted the following three groups: legal and regulatory 
environment, partner interaction and risk management.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
7.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
Chapters Four, Five and Six presented a comprehensive analysis and discussion of 
emergent themes in the field of PPP governance in Kazakhstan and Russia.  This 
chapter will highlight the findings as they relate specifically to the primary research 
question.  The purpose of this chapter is twofold: (a) to discuss the extent to which the 
thesis answered the research question and how fully the researcher has met the research 
objectives and (b) to outline this research’s contribution to knowledge.   
The chapter begins by highlighting the key research findings and then discusses 
how well the findings and conclusions answered the research objectives.  The chapter 
then demonstrates how the study has contributed to existing knowledge in the areas of 
theory and practice.  The chapter concludes by describing the research limitations and 
outlining directions for further research.  Figure 7.1 provides the chapter outline.  
 
 Figure 7.1 Chapter Seven outline 
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Summary of
key findings
7.3 Revisiting the 
research question
7.4 Contribution to 
knowledge
7.5 Research 
limitations
7.6 Directions for 
further research
7.7 Chapter
summary
7.3.1 How research question was answered
7.3.2 Achievement of research aims and objectives 
7.4.1 Contribution to theory 
7.4.2 Contribution to practice 
 
 Source: Compiled by the author 
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7.2 Key Findings 
 
 
7.2.1 PPP partners' opportunism 
 
 
7.2.1a Opportunism in the form of the public sector partner's pressure 
 
 
The public sector partner's opportunism manifested itself in how the government 
and its private sector partner dealt with the public acceptance of a PPP project.  
Although both partners are interested in the greater project's public acceptance, the 
government behaviour appears opportunistic, whilst it elucidates an involuntary nature 
of a trade-off to which the private sector partner is exposed: not only does the 
government not want to accept any responsibility for dealing with public acceptance, 
but it also exerts pressure on the private sector partner, so that the latter carries out all 
the work and incurs related costs.  One can view government behaviour as opportunistic 
because it neglects the private sector partner's efforts aimed at raising the project's 
public acceptance.  Public acceptance is the common project's goal and thus partners 
must share the expenses related to achieving this goal.  However, by exerting formal 
and informal pressure, the government opts out of cost sharing, and the public partner's 
pressure results in shifting both the effort and costs to a private party.      
Additionally, the public sector partner's opportunism manifests itself in the public 
agency's tendency to exert both formal and informal moral pressure attempting to 
achieve results faster than a PPP contract specifies.  The government assigns heightened 
priority to achieving fast results by ignoring the private partner's efforts and costs that 
are required to achieve these results.  The outcomes of government pressure transpire in: 
(a) lost opportunities for economies of scale; 
(b) lost opportunities for knowledge transfer; and   
(c) increasing project costs.    
Government pressure to achieve quick results often stems from a project structure.  
For example, the government designed the project that involves simultaneous, rather 
than sequential, construction of 11 kindergartens, which means the lost opportunity for 
cost reduction (e.g., economies of scale).   
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Lost opportunities for capitalising on economies of scale and knowledge transfer 
mean that the PPP project cost is higher than what it could have been.  In turn, this 
inevitably means that a PPP carries smaller value for money for the government, the 
taxpayers and for society in general.  A critical link exists between the government 
opportunistic behaviour and the PPP value for money: the larger the government 
disregard of the private partner's interests, as well as cost reduction opportunities, the 
smaller the PPP value for money for the taxpayers and the whole society, including the 
government itself.  Findings show that the government's opportunistic intention to 
report results sooner than contracted undermines a natural (from the transaction cost 
economics perspective) goal of ensuring low cost to the budget and, ultimately, the 
taxpayers.  This is because the accelerated construction schedule is likely to cost 
significantly more money than the one that a private partner originally planned.  In both 
countries, the government largely disregards the overarching aim of obtaining a good 
deal for the taxpayer by PPP employment.  
 
7.2.1b Private partner's opportunism in tariff setting 
 
A private partner also exhibits opportunistic behaviour, in particular in tariff setting.  
By increasing a tariff, a private partner intends to pay for cost overruns and/or finance 
the newly transpired business needs, or to offset the increased costs of public partner 
opportunism.  An operator views its own actions as legitimate, whilst it views the anti-
monopoly agency's behaviour as opportunistic because the latter strictly follows its own 
(i.e., the government-set) rules and declines most applications for a tariff increase.  
However, for an operator, an increase in tariffs means no additional effort aimed at 
increasing the volume of service provision, quality improvements or enhancing the 
customer base.  Hence, one can categorise the private sector partner's behaviour as 
opportunistic, rather than that of a partnership, because higher tariffs diminish the PPP’s 
value for money.   
In contrast, the government pursues the goal of ensuring price stability for public 
services and, in essence, pushes a private partner to look for ways of increasing PPP 
efficiency, which contributes to greater the PPP’s value for money.  Instead of 
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increasing a tariff, an operator must look for ways to cut costs and increase project 
efficiency.     
 
7.2.1c Implications of partner opportunistic behaviour   
 
Empirical data identified two short-term implications of partner opportunistic 
behaviour: framed private partner's flexibility in business management and cost 
increases.  The chief reason behind lack of flexibility is excessive government 
regulation of private operators.  Overregulation represents the government’s 
opportunistic attempt to treat a partnership as the public sector organisation by 
minimising the private partner's opportunities to undertake business risk and by 
bounding its management flexibility.  As missed opportunities for cost reduction mean 
relatively higher budget expenses and a greater burden for the taxpayers, they are 
equivalent to cost increases due to the government’s opportunistic behaviour, i.e., 
neglect of efforts to reduce PPP costs as opposed to achieving faster results. 
 
7.2.2 Interaction between PPP partners  
 
7.2.2a Partner interaction 
 
The study showed that PPP partner interaction occurs principally with regards to 
three categories of issues including project financing, facility construction and tariff 
setting. 
Partner interaction that brought positive experiences and formed positive 
perceptions is collaboration regarding PPP project financing.  The reason is that in both 
Kazakhstan and Russia financial support that the government can extend to partnerships 
is the area that is well defined by the legislation.  This makes the framework for partner 
interaction clear and transparent.  However, this also encourages both parties to use up 
completely all available public resources, thus contributing to a guarantee culture 
among private investors.  Section 5.3.3 has discussed an emergent guarantee culture 
more fully.       
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Most interviewees highlighted their criticism and negative perceptions that were 
formed after interacting with the public agencies.  Formal and informal interaction 
between PPP partners lacks established processes and effectiveness.  Specifically, 
interviewees pointed out the lack of effective communication (particularly, regarding 
tariff setting) and lack of established administrative procedures.  Interviewees argued 
that the government tended to not distinguish a PPP from any other private contractor 
that the government hires.  Respondents also stated that much partner interaction occurs 
informally, with unpredictable outcomes for either party.   
In the interviewees' view, the following aspects characterise the government's role 
in a PPP: 
- the government has assumed a narrow role of more like a boss, rather than a 
partner;  
- the government does not understand the PPP's business and does not acknowledge, 
by the way it interacts with a private partner, that the latter implements a job instead of 
the government, i.e., delivers a public service; and  
- the government is not interested in closely interacting with the private sector 
partner and supporting a PPP by effectively managing the public-private relationship.     
Interviewees asserted that the public sector partner tended to exhibit its dominance 
in those situations where the nature of the issue lacks established structure or guidelines 
for resolution.  In the situations of uncertainty, the government normally insisted on its 
own ways of solving the problem, rather than giving flexibility to a private party for 
decision-making.   
 
7.2.2b PPP organisational forms 
 
The study identified three organisational forms that PPPs in Kazakhstan and Russia 
took. Findings showed that an organisational form that employs an SPV provides a 
better, more streamlined platform for partner interaction in a PPP as it reduces 
bureaucratic interaction, minimises reporting and permits greater effectiveness in 
management decision-making.  The two studied projects in Russia use this form.  In 
contrast, interviewees strongly criticised such organisational form as a joint venture and 
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pointed out its tangled power relations, ineffective governance structure and a lack of 
well-designed governance procedures.  More generally, the findings illustrate a lack of 
formal governance structures and procedures that would permit partners to 
communicate more effectively and would result in well-informed and improved 
decision-making.   
 
7.2.2c Tools and methods for dispute resolution between partners 
 
Partners from both sectors clearly disregard this area of PPP governance and 
neglect the importance of formal dispute resolution tools.  Dispute resolution as a sub-
field of PPP governance does not yet exist in Kazakhstan and Russia as a recognised 
area of partner interaction, with established and elaborate tools, procedures and 
governance structures.   
Furthermore, the partners' general disregard of the formal management tools 
significantly reduces the opportunities for more effective PPP governance.  Three out of 
four PPP projects under investigation do not have any governance structures that reflect 
their partnership nature.  Instead, partners tend to emphasise the importance of good 
relations at both formal and informal levels.  However, as findings showed, the absence 
of effective governance structures may lead to lengthy disputes that are resolved by 
such dramatic actions as replacement of the operator's management team.  In one of 
four studied PPP projects, the operator's Board of Directors plays the role of the 
governance structure.  However, the study found many irregularities in the Board's work 
(e.g., poor meeting attendance; meeting cancellations due to absence of key Board 
members; and lack of continuous information about the project’s progress), which 
shows considerable room for improvement in the Board's ability to effectively perform 
strategic management of a PPP project. Interviewees did not attach any significance to 
PPP governance structures: not only did participants pay insufficient attention to the 
structure that was already in place (the operator's Board of Directors), but they also 
neglected opportunities to form additional structures and employ them as an effective 
PPP management tool.   
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Another improvement opportunity for PPP management, which interviewees also 
disregarded, is effective dispute resolution.  The latter may include the employment of 
better-organised and streamlined procedures, such as that for tariff adjustments, for 
dealing with customer complaints or for formally handling the issues regarding which 
PPP partners express varying opinions.   Interviewees' experiences and perceptions 
showed a marked neglect of formal dispute resolution mechanisms, whilst respondents 
from the private sector emphasised informal friendly relations with government staff 
that, in their view, might significantly facilitate the project work.  Hence, dispute 
resolution is yet another area in PPP management that might significantly benefit from 
adoption of effective governance mechanisms and administrative procedures.   
  
7.2.3 Risk management in a PPP     
 
The study captured the interviewees' experiences and perceptions of twelve kinds 
of risk.  With regards to many risks, the study has not revealed any risk mitigation tools, 
although interviewees recognised that these risks might materialise.  For certain kinds 
of risk, such as operating risk, environmental risk and foreign exchange risk, risk 
mitigation was in place and it normally involved budgeting additional funds, although 
its effectiveness remained unknown.       
Interviewees typically viewed financial risk, which stems from errors in the 
estimation of project revenue streams and project financing costs, as high.  In three out 
of the four studied PPP projects, interviewees associated financial risk with the way the 
government treats a PPP (i.e., much like any private contractor, with no commitment to 
the latter).  This means that the government normally did not manifest its commitment 
to a partnership and, in the interviewees' opinion, a lack of commitment tended to 
materialise in reduced efficiency and higher project costs.  Furthermore, interviewees 
did not identify any tools and methods that would permit mitigating financial risk.   
In contrast to high financial risk, the research found that revenue (demand) risk in 
three out of the four studied projects was virtually nonexistent: interviewees argued that 
demand risk is close to zero.  The finding that zero demand risk is a distinctive feature 
of the PPP projects in Kazakhstan and Russia shows that the government is interested in 
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keeping the PPPs' exposure to risks low, which inevitably enhances private operators' 
risk-averse behaviour.  This behaviour rests on the preference for risk avoidance and on 
various government guarantees, including those that ensure stable, risk-free revenue 
stream to a contractor. 
In the studied projects, the government achieved almost complete transfer of risks 
to the private sector partner.  The findings showed that a private partner bore most risks.  
However, the costs of risk transfer involved extensive government financial outlays to 
the partnership, which seriously compromised the PPP value for money.  This finding is 
aligned with the literature that claims that partnerships in reality often carry little value 
for money (Morallos and Amekudzi, 2008).   
The findings showed that in order to attract private investors, the government 
intentionally designed PPP projects as low-risk.  However, by reducing investors' 
exposure to risks the government encourages their risk-averse behaviour and furthers a 
guarantee culture.  This creates a vicious circle which links private operators' risk-
averse behaviour to extensive government financial support to a PPP.  In summary, 
opportunistic behaviour of both parties regarding risk management reinforces and 
enhances a guarantee culture, which forms a prevailing set of rules for partnerships in 
both Kazakhstan and Russia.     
 
7.2.4 Constraints and impediments to effective PPP governance    
 
7.2.4a Legal barriers 
 
Among legal barriers to PPPs, the study identified conceptual ambiguity that 
manifested itself in the lack of a legally defined partnership's meaning in national 
legislation in Kazakhstan and Russia.  As a result, the two countries show significant 
variation in treating a PPP as a category.  Specifically, Russia employed a much broader 
PPP meaning.  However, in many partnership arrangements in Russia, such as 
production sharing agreements, the key partnership characteristics including joint 
contribution of resources, sharing of risk, costs and responsibility, are missing.  In 
contrast, Kazakhstan understands a PPP exclusively as a concession.  Despite the gap in 
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the national legislation, each country has adopted the law on concessions which defines 
a concession as the main PPP form.  The findings showed that only by improvements in 
the national, rather than regional legislation, which calls for the adoption of the national 
PPP law in each country, the government can fill the gaps in the national legislation in 
both Kazakhstan and Russia.   
The study revealed a non–concessionary option as a method of PPP formation, 
particularly in Russia.  This method opens a loophole for future PPP projects.  The 
federal legislation defines a concession as a project that partners form and operate 
according to the relevant law.  Where partners do not use the government financial 
support to a PPP, this permits them to argue that a project is a partnership, but not a 
concession.  Hence, a non-concessionary option opens an opportunity to form a 
partnership faster and with minimal bureaucracy.   
The study identified yet another legal impediment to PPPs, which is each country's 
budget law that limits the length of the government financial commitment to a PPP by 
three years and makes the enforcement of the long-term partnerships' contracts 
questionable.  From the conceptual standpoint, this means that the government 
commitment and guarantees to a partnership that are beyond three years are invalid.  
This implies the constrained validity of the government's own obligations, which may 
seriously discourage private investors.  This finding underscores the significance of 
creating a clear legal and regulatory framework for PPP development. 
 
7.2.4b PPP implementation issues 
 
The study showed the need to replace a series of tangled PPP-related tenders, in 
which a PPP is a set of contracts with their own regulations, with a single unified tender.  
This would reduce bureaucracy and lengthy delays involved in the partnership 
formation.  By consolidating all tenders in one, the government might significantly 
streamline the PPP formation process.    
Another finding refers to the need to raise PPP bidders' awareness regarding the 
forms of financial and administrative support that they may receive, which is critically 
important for effective partnership formation.  This would reduce ambiguity regarding 
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what resources regional governments can contribute to partnerships and would also 
make the requirements for the private partners' contribution clearer. 
The study found excessive complexity and bureaucracy in a tariff and wage-rate 
setting in PPPs.  However, the study identified the government tariff regulation as 
effective as it aims at reducing the private partners' opportunistic behaviour.  
Nevertheless, the government should streamline and shorten procedures for submitting 
and processing new tariff applications.  In contrast to tariff regulation, the study found 
government regulation of PPPs' wage rates excessive and unnecessary, which represents 
government’s opportunistic behaviour.          
The research revealed persistent calls for permitting private property ownership for 
an asset that a private partner constructs or renovates.  This implies a legal introduction 
of a new PPP model in Kazakhstan and Russia: instead of the existing build–transfer–
operate model, the government might offer a new build–operate–transfer model.  
However, the value that interviewees assigned to the introduction of a new model seems 
excessive as the private property ownership is in no way a panacea for other PPP 
management issues such as frequent cost overruns, cumbersome tariff setting, 
procurement restrictions and the public sector partner dominance in decision-making.  
Other identified impediments include the government requirement that PPPs must 
arrange purchasing by tenders; lack of preferential procedures for treatment of PPP 
requests; limited ability of public sector comparators to serve as effective benchmarks 
for PPP costs; and weak contract enforcement due to asymmetric application of 
financial penalties to partners (i.e., at present penalties normally are not applied to the 
public sector partner).  Streamlining the contract terms regarding fees and penalties to 
either partner would permit achieving a greater degree of partners' equality and would 
serve as an additional incentive for more effective PPP management.  
 
7.2.5 PPP critical success factors 
 
The study identified critical success factors in three categories:  
 Legal and regulatory environment;  
 Partner interaction; and 
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 Risk management.  
Table 7.1 summarises all critical success factors.   
 
Table 7.1 PPP critical success factors in Kazakhstan and Russia:  
  The study findings 
       Category         Contributing success factors 
Legal and regulatory environment 
 
 a well-designed legal framework; 
 a simplified PPP formation; 
 market discipline; and 
 a clear tariff policy. 
 
        Partner interaction  commitment of both partners to the 
common, clearly stated project's goals;  
 effective governance structures and 
dispute resolution mechanisms; 
 government preferential treatment 
of PPP-related tasks; and 
 private partners' flexibility in 
business management.  
 
Risk management 
 
 appropriate risk allocation between 
partners; 
 identification of risk-mitigation 
tools for each partner; and  
 incentives for better private 
partners' performance. 
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
7.3 Achievement of Research Objectives 
  
This section intends to reflect upon the stated research question and research 
objectives for the study.  The overarching research question was:   
How do key PPP stakeholders in Russia and Kazakhstan perceive and adapt to 
contract regulation, risk allocation and dispute resolution challenges in PPP 
management?   
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In order to answer the research question, the author set the following research 
objectives. 
 
The first research objective was: 
 
to investigate experiences and perceptions of key PPP actors in Kazakhstan 
and Russia regarding the contractual environment of partnership projects and 
how stakeholders perceive the effectiveness of government requirements and 
expectations.     
 
In-depth semi-structured interviews have permitted the researcher to investigate the 
respondents’ experiences, views and perceptions with regard to PPPs’ legal and 
regulatory environments in two countries.  Among study areas that emerged during the 
interviews, legal and regulatory contractual environment was undoubtedly one of the 
principal themes, which the researcher included in the thematic analysis (Section 4.4 in 
Chapter Four) and subsequently in the discussion (Section 5.4 in Chapter Five).   
Section 7.2.4 highlighted the findings regarding constraints and impediments to 
effective PPP governance.  The study identified a number of legal, regulatory, 
institutional and financial barriers that form the PPP environment in Kazakhstan and 
Russia.  In particular, the findings revealed a conceptual gap in a partnership’s legal 
definition in the national legislation in Kazakhstan and Russia.  Whilst Russia uses a 
much broader PPP meaning that embraces a variety of partnership arrangements (which 
is not in line with PPP conceptualisation in the OECD literature), Kazakhstan focuses 
exclusively on a concession as a PPP form.  Although certain regional governments in 
the two countries attempted to remedy the legislative ambiguity by adopting their own 
laws and regulations, the research showed that only improvements in the national, rather 
than regional laws, can fill the legislative gaps in both Kazakhstan and Russia, which 
calls for the adoption of the national PPP law in each country.   
Whilst Kazakhstan and Russia adopted the laws on concessions, which created the 
structured, although narrowly focused PPP framework, the research revealed a non–
concessionary option as a PPP formation method, in the Russian context.  Investors and 
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the government may bypass the federal legislation regarding a concession by not using 
government financial support to a PPP.  In this case, the partners may assert that they 
formed a partnership, but not a concession.  Hence, the research identified a non-
concessionary option as a stakeholder’s way to adapt to rigid government regulations 
that govern PPP formation.  This option opens an opportunity to form a partnership 
faster and with minimal bureaucracy.     
The study also identified interviewees' concerns regarding limited validity, due to 
legislative controversy, of the government financial commitments to a PPP, which 
makes enforcing long-term partnership contracts questionable.  Another element of the 
PPP environment that the study revealed is ambiguity regarding the resources that 
regional governments can contribute to partnerships and forms of government support 
that the private sector partners may request.  The typical stakeholder’s adaptation to this 
uncertainty involved negotiation, with heavy emphasis on informal, rather than formal 
communication between partners.  
Other identified regulatory impediments include a tangled PPP formation process 
that involves a series of tenders, in which a PPP is a set of contracts with their own 
regulations; excessive complexity and bureaucracy in a tariff and wage-rate setting in 
PPPs; the government requirement for PPPs to arrange purchasing by tenders; the non-
existent opportunity to keep private ownership for a newly constructed or renovated 
asset; lack of preferential procedures for treatment of PPP requests; difficulties with 
securing loan financing for a PPP; limited ability of public sector comparators to serve 
as effective benchmarks for PPP costs; and weak contract enforcement due to 
asymmetric application of financial penalties to partners (i.e., penalties normally are not 
applied to the public sector partner).  Interviewees often not only did identify the issues 
in legal and regulatory PPP environment, but also suggested the ways of adjusting the 
regulatory elements for ensuring better PPP governance.    
To conclude, the research has addressed multiple facets of partnership projects’ 
contractual environment in Kazakhstan and Russia in its contextual complexity and 
richness, which interviewees' excerpts have fully reflected.    
 
The second research objective was: 
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to analyse perceptions and experiences of key partnership stakeholders (such 
as project managers, officials in government agencies and national and 
regional PPP centres) regarding risk management in a project including 
initial risk allocation and how these actors should manage subsequent changes.  
 
This research thoroughly elucidated risk management as an emergent theme.  The 
researcher investigated this theme from three perspectives.  First, the study addressed 
risk management directly as a separate theme by investigating respondents' views and 
experiences regarding twelve kinds of risk.  The study reflected interviewees' opinions 
and organised the discussion by the kind of risk, rather than by the set of risks that a 
certain PPP project faced.  This permitted the researcher to capture the richness of 
experiences and opinions regarding each risk in the setting of each studied project.  This 
perspective focused on initial risk allocation and risk mitigation tools that respondents 
viewed in their projects.   
Second, the thesis analysed partners' opportunistic behaviour, which is relevant to 
how partners handled and reallocated risks in the course of project implementation.  The 
study showed diverging partners' interests, for example, in a tariff setting, which 
transformed into higher revenue risk and higher financial risk for a private partner.  
Another example of opportunistic behaviour highlighted the partners' opposing 
perspectives regarding public acceptance risk that a toll viaduct PPP project faced.  
Additionally, high operating risk could materialise where the public sector partner 
exerted formal and informal pressure in order to achieve results faster than contracted.   
Third, the thesis investigated the risk management theme from the perspective of 
PPP partner interaction.  The findings demonstrated that interviewees typically viewed 
the project environment as rigid, which does not permit private investors to renegotiate 
certain risks.  Interviewees assessed the private partners' flexibility in decision-making 
as framed and emphasised the public sector partners' dominance in PPP governance and 
related private operator overregulation.  The research paid special attention to PPP 
organisational forms as a setting for partner interaction.  The findings revealed that 
partners from both sectors tend to downplay the significance of governance structures 
 326 
that would permit them to effectively interact and resolve all kinds of issues including 
those of risk management.  Investigation of another partner interaction aspect - tools 
and methods for dispute resolution between partners, which is directly linked to risk 
management - showed that this area of collaboration is virtually non-existent.  Partners 
largely disregard formal mechanisms for dispute resolution and excessively rely on 
informal relations.              
To conclude, the three perspectives allowed the researcher to comprehensively 
investigate risk management issues in the studied projects and to fully meet the research 
objective.   
  
The third research objective was: 
 
to identify commonalities and differences in PPP management in Kazakhstan 
and Russia, with the focus on critical success factors.  
 
The analysis and discussion of the four research themes included the author's 
comments and statements regarding PPP management characteristics that are common 
for both countries and features that are unique to a certain nation.  Generally, the 
research identified a large number of commonalities in PPP management in the two 
countries and a small number of unique features.  The findings did not show any major 
discrepancy between Kazakhstan and Russia with regards to PPP partners’ behaviour, 
partner interaction and implications of partner opportunistic behaviour (such as cost 
increases, overregulation of operators and framed private partners’ management 
flexibility).  Additionally, research discovered similar advantages and disadvantages of 
PPP organisational forms in the two countries, their common reliance on informal 
relations between partners, rather than on formal PPP governance structures, and the 
common disregard to design formal mechanisms for dispute resolution.  Further, the 
study identified similar interviewees' experiences and perceptions with regards to risk 
management.  Specifically, both countries emphasised initial risk allocation that an 
original PPP contract reflected and paid little or no attention to risk management by 
effective partner interaction.  Also, the findings showed that the two countries have very 
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similar legal, regulatory, institutional, managerial and financial constraints to PPP 
development.  For example, in both countries there are similar gaps in national 
legislation: although laws do not define a PPP, they define a concession as a PPP form 
and specify what kinds of government support a concessionaire may receive.  There are 
similar contradictions between the budget law that limits government financial 
obligations to three years and each country's law on a concession that permits the 
government to extend long-term commitments.     
Only a few examples showed PPP management features that are unique to a certain 
country.  One illustration is a non-concessionary option for PPP formation that is 
available in Russia, but not in Kazakhstan.  Another illustration is more rigid power 
arrangements underpinning partnerships in Kazakhstan compared to Russia, which 
certain Kazakhstani features reflected, including more intense involvement of the 
national PPP centre, greater reporting requirements and more intense government 
monitoring of project implementation.  The government regulation of private operators' 
wage rates also reflects Kazakhstan's higher degree of economic and political 
centralisation.   
With regards to PPP critical success factors, the research has not identified any 
discrepancies between the findings in Kazakhstan and Russia.  The researcher identified 
the following CSFs categories (groupings) that were common for both countries:     
 Legal and regulatory environment;  
 Partner interaction; and 
 Risk management.  
Each grouping included success factors that were common for PPP governance in 
both nations. Section 6.7 in Chapter Six highlights these factors in detail.  Hence, the 
third research objective was fully met. 
 
The fourth research objective was: 
 
to develop a model for understanding the nature of PPP governance in 
Kazakhstan and Russia.  
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Chapter Six includes the model for more deeply understanding PPP governance in 
the two countries.  The model's core is the emergent PPP policy paradigm that the 
governments in both countries use.  The paradigm embraces the following three 
principal elements: (1) ideas - i.e., the concept of the need for long-term collaboration 
between the public and private sectors; (2) a changing set of government responsibilities 
that imply an increasing provision of traditional public services by the private sector 
and corresponding decrease in government delivery; and (3) a developing and 
expanding set of new institutional capacities designed for implementing changing 
government responsibilities.  Chapter Six fully discussed these three policy paradigm's 
contributing elements.   
The model for more deeply conceptualising PPP governance features a critical 
assessment of the principal dynamics that contribute to changes in the pattern of PPP 
management in Kazakhstan and Russia.  The most influential factors include: 
 the government’s unbalanced perception of PPP benefits and shortfalls, where the 
government unjustifiably emphasises advantages and disregards drawbacks;  
 the government's tendency to inflate positive PPP externalities and downplay 
negative externalities; 
 the way the government typically approaches risk allocation in a PPP, i.e., that the 
government tends to transfer at least some risk to the private sector regardless of the 
context; 
 the government's excessive emphasis on the use of a concession as a prevailing PPP 
form; and   
 excessive government financial support to partnerships.   
Chapter Six comprehensively discussed each of the underlying dynamics.   
Finally, the model includes ten propositions that the researcher developed in order 
to identify and analyse the relationships between the model's variables.  These 
propositions are useful for testing the model in further research and in different 
contextual settings.     
Additionally, the thesis discussed the model's implications.  The principal 
implication is that the policy paradigm is the government tool for rapid partnership 
expansion in Kazakhstan and Russia because the paradigm rests on the taken-for-
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granted ideas, i.e., the concept of the need for long-term collaboration between the 
public sector and the private sector, and a legitimised solution, i.e., PPP employment 
regardless of its value for money.  After the PPP policy paradigm becomes established, 
it legitimises a partnership as a commonly employed form of public and private sector 
collaboration without questioning whether a partnership is an efficient and effective 
collaboration tool.   
An elaborate, comprehensively developed model for understanding PPP 
governance in Kazakhstan and Russia permits one to conclude that the author has met 
the thesis' fourth research objective.  
 
7.4 Contribution to Knowledge   
 
7.4.1 Contribution to theory 
 
This research has made a number of unique and critical contributions to theory.  
With regards to conceptually understanding a PPP, the study augments a partnership’s 
theoretical underpinnings by emphasising the latter's complex nature which includes not 
only institutional and organisational elements, but also relationships between multiple 
actors.  The research adopted a stance that one must view typical PPP arrangements as 
an interplay between the public agencies, private investors, PPP centres, a special 
purpose vehicle, which is a project operator, contractual dependencies, and formal and 
informal interaction between actors.  The researcher's focus should be on PPP 
arrangements and relationships that include multiple organisations and stakeholder 
groups (Fischbacher and Beaumont, 2003; Mouraviev and Kakabadse, 2012), rather 
than just a PPP operator.   
Reflecting upon a more complex partnership environment as opposed to that of a 
single business firm, the author adopted a view on the nature of PPP arrangements as a 
cooperative effort to jointly create value for its stakeholders (Jiménez and Pasquero, 
2005; Freeman et al., 2010), although created value may benefit stakeholders unequally 
due to inevitable trade-offs.  A principal merit of this view is that it provides a 
framework for analysing whether value creation happens within the PPP arrangement 
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because what the PPP creates must align with common stakeholder values.  The 
researcher contributed to conceptualising a PPP by contrasting the value creation in a 
partnership with partners' opportunistic behaviour, which diminishes the PPP's value for 
money.  Whilst the value creation may co-exist with opportunism, the author's view was 
that opportunistic behaviour essentially demonstrates the ways and methods of partners' 
adaptation to the government PPP regulations.     
The author made a conceptual contribution to defining opportunism, particularly 
with regards to an organisation's behaviour in a partnership setting.  Drawing on the 
available definition of opportunism as actors’ self-interest (Williamson, 1993), the 
author elaborated on the significance of opportunism's key feature, namely, whether 
opportunism involves guile and what the guile's understanding in a PPP is.  The author's 
stance is that guile is unimportant as opportunism's key feature: a PPP's complex nature 
as a set of long-term arrangements makes the relationships in a partnership multifaceted 
and multidimensional, and the task to determine what exactly guile is and where it takes 
place might be challenging.  Whether a partner's action, non-action or neglect happen 
with or without guile is, first, extremely difficult to determine due to long-term 
cooperative arrangements, rather than in merely contractual bilateral obligations, and, 
second, unimportant for categorising a partner's behaviour: if a partner's self-interest 
supersedes the common value creation for a partnership (whether with guile or without 
it), the behaviour is opportunistic.   
In order to overcome opportunism's conceptual ambiguity and apply the concept of 
opportunism to the PPP research, the author adopted the following operational 
definition of opportunism:  
In a PPP, opportunism is a partner's method of pursuing self-interest with or 
without guile, whilst a partner directly or indirectly gives up, forgets or 
neglects the common partnership's interests, goals or values.  
To summarise, the author's conceptual contribution includes enhancing 
opportunism's definition and its application in the PPP setting.  This contribution 
highlights an important and hitherto unacknowledged dimension of PPP operation in the 
context of Kazakhstan and Russia, i.e., partners' opportunistic behaviour.  Such insights 
have been absent in previous PPP conceptualisations, particularly those emerging in 
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Western economies.  Hence, this research underscores the importance of context in 
considering such partnerships and makes a conceptual contribution by elucidating 
partners' opportunism in the contextual environment of countries in transition.    
Another theoretical contribution refers to the model that the author developed for 
better understanding PPP governance in Kazakhstan and Russia.  The model rests on the 
policy paradigm, to which the author has contributed insights by combining emergent 
ideas, defined problems, government strategies, organised actors and institutions, their 
capacities and expertise and interaction between all these elements (Fosler, 1992; Hall, 
1993; Campbell, 2002; Burns and Carson, 2009; Carson et al., 2009).  As a result, the 
author conceptualised the PPP policy paradigm as a cognitive-normative tool that 
includes two major aspects: (a) a paradigm is a tool which the government uses to 
facilitate partnership expansion, and (b) a paradigm has cognitive usefulness as it offers 
a convenient and pragmatic perspective through which one should view multiple 
activities related to partnerships and understand PPP governance in Kazakhstan and 
Russia.   
Further, the research develops the PPP governance theoretical model in a coherent 
and comprehensive way by outlining the model's contributing elements that include 
ideas, a changing set of government responsibilities and a new set of institutional 
capacities.  Additionally, the study has contributed insights to the model by highlighting 
the underlying dynamics contributing to the emergent policy paradigm.  
To summarise, the model shows the PPP policy paradigm’s unique features and 
characteristics in Kazakhstan and Russia.  It enables one to compare with more 
conventional approaches to partnerships based on Western orthodoxy and demonstrates 
the multifaceted and complex array of relationships between PPP actors.  The model 
makes a unique and critical contribution to our understanding of the nature and scope of 
PPP formation and operation in a context of transitional countries.  Furthermore, the 
model emphasises government efforts to legitimise partnerships.   
With regards to the model's institutional capacities for PPPs' advancement, the 
study approached a policy paradigm by acknowledging a growing theoretical emphasis 
on actors, actions and institutionalisation in policy making, rather than on merely 
cognitive aspects.  From this perspective, the study defined institutionalisation, in the 
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PPP context, as creating new organisational capacities, such as forming an agency 
charged with responsibility for the PPP development or establishing PPP financing 
channels.  Hence, the research has contributed to theory by broadening the concept of 
institutionalism to incorporate social relationships as institutions are engaged in 
multiple interactions with actors and other institutions (Burns and Carson, 2009).   
 
7.4.2 Contribution to research methods 
 
In addition to contributing to partnership theories, opportunistic behaviour and a 
policy paradigm, this study makes a significant methodological contribution.  Whilst 
research regarding PPP management in Kazakhstan and Russia is still in its infancy, the 
number of PPP studies is growing.  However, to the best of the author's knowledge this 
study is the first to use a phenomenological, or an interpretive approach (Neuman, 2007) 
to examine the subjective experiences, views and perceptions of PPP actors regarding 
management issues.  In contrast, the growing body of literature about Russia's and 
Kazakhstan's partnerships normally focuses on PPPs’ macro-level government 
regulation, legal aspects of PPP formation and financing schemes.  From the 
methodological perspective, the current research has adopted, for Kazakhstan and 
Russia, a pioneering phenomenological stance and employed an unusual data collection 
method (i.e., in-depth interviews) as opposed to the vast majority of the two countries' 
PPP studies that use documentary analysis.    
This research used in-depth interviews as a principal data collection method, which 
allowed the author to undertake a qualitative study.  The latter captured interviewees' 
experiences and perceptions, in their own words, and revealed previously unknown or 
concealed issues.  For example, previously, partners' opportunistic behaviour remained 
undiscussed.  In-depth semi-structured interviews permitted the author to unveil the PPP 
management themes that interested respondents the most, and this is how the researcher 
selected the four principal themes for investigation.  Each theme (i.e., opportunistic 
behaviour; partner interaction; risk management; and constraints to effective PPP 
governance) reflects both a pioneering field and methodology for PPP management 
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research in Kazakhstan and Russia.  The key theoretical and conceptual contributions 
outlined above have resulted from an innovative research design.    
     
7.4.3 Contribution to practice 
 
In addition to theoretical and methodological contributions, the research has 
contributed to practice.  The study included a large number of practical elements that 
formed a platform for PPP managers and practitioners for their reflection, 
implementation and better understanding of PPP governance perspectives.  The thesis 
contributed to practice along two dimensions.  The first is the set of critical success 
factors, which the research has developed.  This set of CSFs is the summary of 
conclusions and recommendations that might serve as useful guidance for all those who 
are involved in PPP governance.  The second is the set of broader, more general 
conclusions and implications that also possess salient practical significance for 
researchers, advisors, workers, managers and policymakers in the PPP community.   
The first dimension of contribution to practice includes the three groupings of PPP 
critical success factors:          
 Factor Grouping 1: Legal and regulatory environment;  
 Factor Grouping 2: Partner interaction; and 
 Factor Grouping 3: Risk management.  
In each grouping the study has identified critical elements that are most essential 
for a PPP’s success in Kazakhstan or Russia.  For example, with regards to the legal and 
regulatory environment, it is critical to build an elaborate legal PPP framework, 
simplify the PPP formation, institute market discipline for either partner and design a 
clear long-term tariff policy.  In the partner interaction grouping, it is critical to ensure 
full commitment of both partners to the common PPP goals, design effective 
governance structures and dispute resolution mechanisms and ensure government 
preferential treatment of PPP-related tasks.  In the risk management grouping, effective 
risk allocation between partners must be accompanied by identifying risk mitigation 
tools for each partner and by creating incentives for better private partners’ performance.  
As interviewees themselves identified these CSFs, by reflecting on their own 
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experiences and collaboration in a PPP, the researcher has solid ground to assert that the 
success factors have high practical significance for all those who work in or with 
public-private partnerships.     
The second dimension of contribution to practice includes broader conclusions and 
research implications.  The findings permitted the researcher to draw certain insights in 
connection with observed partners' opportunistic behaviour.  First, the discussion of 
opportunistic behaviour in a PPP has highlighted the need to create incentives for 
achieving performance targets.  Ideally, these incentives should exist for either partner, 
not only for a private operator.  Second, the findings showed that opportunism was 
linked to and led to the government overregulating the private partner.  Overregulation 
resulted in constrained flexibility and reduced PPP efficiency.  This permitted the 
researcher to conclude that the government should deregulate private operators to a 
significant extent, which would contribute to breaking a guarantee culture that certain 
operators enjoy.  Third, opportunism manifested itself in cost increases: a private 
partner lacked incentives for cost savings, whilst the public sector partner also often 
neglected cost saving opportunities.  Practitioners, particularly those in the public 
agencies, have to be concerned with ways to increase a PPP's value for money, and this 
concern should be incorporated in the public agencies' policies as a matter of economic 
principle.      
The study draws yet another broader implication of practical importance from 
partner interaction and its significance for PPP management.  The discussion of partner 
interaction showed that partners' interests often diverged and could hardly be reconciled 
after a problem has emerged.  These conflicts of interest present an ongoing concern for 
management.  The more effective approach is to manage partner interaction in order to 
mitigate emerging issues.  The research findings demonstrated that partner interaction is 
a neglected area of PPP management.  In contrast, practitioners would immensely 
benefit from paying proper attention to partner interaction by designing a formal 
framework for effective partners' communication on a continuous basis.  An important 
aspect of this formal framework includes designing PPP governance structures because 
the latter are also neglected as the current research highlighted.  The study outlined the 
advantages and disadvantages of organisational structures in the four PPP projects, 
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which permits practitioners to draw useful insights for building management structures 
for future partnerships.  Another aspect of the formal PPP framework involves the 
proper practitioners' attention to creating tools for dispute resolution between partners, 
which is presently the disregarded area of PPP management in Kazakhstan and Russia.  
Although this partner interaction discussion overlaps with highlights of the relevant 
CFS grouping, the overall general conclusion is that PPP management should fully 
incorporate partner interaction as a required field.   
Table 7.2 highlights the study's contributions to theory, methodology and praxis.     
 
Table 7.2 Summary of research contributions  
Contribution  Area or question New insights 
Theory  PPP conceptualisation  
 
 
 
 
 
 Opportunism 
 
 
 
 
 
 The PPP governance 
model 
 
 
 
 
 Institutionalisation with 
regards to PPPs 
 PPP as a set of arrangements and 
relationships 
 PPP as a cooperative effort to 
jointly create stakeholder value  
 
 In a PPP, opportunism is a 
partner's method of pursuing self-
interest with or without guile, 
whilst a partner directly or 
indirectly gives up, forgets or 
neglects the common partnership's 
interests, goals or values 
 The model's core is the PPP 
policy paradigm as a cognitive-
normative tool 
 The model includes contributing 
elements, the underlying 
dynamics and propositions 
 
 The concept of institutionalism is 
broadened to incorporate social 
relationships 
Methodology  Interpretive approach, 
in-depth interviews for 
the PPP study 
 Application of qualitative research 
methods to the Russian and 
Kazakhstani PPP context 
Praxis  PPP critical success 
factors 
 
 
 Three groupings of CSFs have 
been outlined in the context of 
Kazakhstan and Russia 
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 Opportunism's 
implications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Partner interaction 
 Creation of incentives is critical 
for achieving the performance 
targets 
 Private operators will benefit from 
deregulation 
 The public agencies should be 
concerned with a PPP's value for 
money as a matter of economic 
principle 
 
 Partner interaction should be 
incorporated in PPP management 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
7.5 Research Limitations 
 
7.5.1 Research bias 
 
One of the research limitations stems from the philosophical position that the 
author has adopted for this study.  By adopting an interpretive approach, the author 
sought to understand the subjective reality depicted by interviewees, in their own words.  
The author asserted, as the methodology chapter discussed, that an interpretive 
approach was best suited for a qualitative study because the overarching research aim 
was to capture PPP stakeholder experiences and perceptions in Russia and Kazakhstan 
regarding PPP management challenges, rather than analyse certain quantitative 
variables.  The study's results showed the data's richness and depth, which vividly 
demonstrated the high degree of appropriateness of an interpretive approach to the aims 
of this research.    
However, an interpretive approach that was based on data collection by 
interviewing inevitably involved the researcher's interaction with the study's participants.  
The researcher became affected by the subject of the research and was influenced by 
interviewees, their experiences, opinions, views and perceptions.  It is unlikely that the 
researcher remained completely independent, unbiased and unaffected during the 
interview process and when he reflected upon the collected data.  To some extent, the 
researcher's own perceptions became intertwined with those of the interviewees.   
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Nevertheless, the researcher has made every effort to separate himself and his own 
views from the respondents’ opinions.  This was accomplished by using a semi-
structured interview method, which allowed interviewees to talk freely about their 
experiences, motives and intentions without constraining them by a rigid set of 
interview questions (Saunders et al., 2003).  Semi-structured interviews permitted the 
free flow of respondents' views and perceptions because the researcher did not attempt 
to exert any influence on their opinions.  Additionally, during the semi-structured 
interviews the respondents did not attempt to influence the researcher in any way 
because normally they elaborated on a PPP management issue, rather than argued with 
the researcher's views.    
Another way to keep the researcher's neutral stance was to demonstrate the 
interviewees' voices in their original forms and shapes by including excerpts in the 
thesis' text.  Both Chapter Four (analysis) and Chapter Five (discussion) exhibit a large 
number of quotes, some of which are complementary, whilst others are conflicting.  
This allowed the researcher to show a diversity of experiences, views and perceptions in 
their richness and multiplicity and avoid uniformity that might stem from some of the 
researcher's biases.  Furthermore, the researcher's self-awareness called for and ensured 
diversity and richness of the interview data, whilst the author made a determined 
attempt to eliminate any personal bias.   
Despite every effort that the researcher has made to ensure his impartiality, the full 
exclusion of a possibility for the author's subjectivity is hardly possible (Blaikie, 2007), 
which one should acknowledge as a potential research limitation.  
 
7.5.2 Sample size limitations 
 
The researcher has conducted a total of 30 interviews with PPP actors, which limits 
the study findings’ validity.  The researcher conducted most interviews with PPP 
managers and workers.  The research scope included two PPP projects in each of the 
two countries, which highlights a certain limitation because the author derived the 
findings from a small sub-set of PPP projects.  This may limit generalisations related to 
other sectors in which partnerships operate, such as health care or utilities.  As a matter 
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of practical importance, it is worth noting that ongoing PPP projects in both Kazakhstan 
and Russia are scattered all across each country’s territories, with extremely limited 
partnership availabilities in central cities.  Due to the researcher's practical constraints 
related to time, resources and ability to travel within Kazakhstan and Russia, it was not 
feasible to expand the study's scope to include more partnerships.  Consequently, the 
research project's scope also has limited the feasibility to increase the sample size, i.e., 
the number of interviewees.    
The author has made every effort to ensure truthfulness of the study by providing a 
detailed account of interviewees' experiences and perceptions, which has led, in the 
researcher's opinion, to data saturation (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003).  However, it is 
possible that if a much larger number of respondents had participated in the study, the 
researcher could have obtained different results.  To limit the possibility of distortions 
in the findings, the author has undertaken triangulation of data sources, as the 
methodology chapter discussed (Neuman, 2007; Flick, 2009).  As a result, the author 
has not identified any major discrepancies within each studied country.  Furthermore, 
the findings revealed many commonalities in PPP management between Kazakhstan 
and Russia, which also speaks for reached data saturation (Strauss and Corbin, 1998).  
Nevertheless, the author must acknowledge research limitations due to a certain sample 
size.   
  
7.6 Directions for Further Research  
 
The research on PPP management in the setting of transitional countries, such as 
Kazakhstan and Russia, is far from complete.  The current research features its 
contextual nature, which accounts for the realities of evolving PPP policy in the two 
nations and the beginning stage of their PPP development.  Future research would be 
useful in order to better understand what approaches the governments in Kazakhstan 
and Russia use for partnership formation, management, PPP performance assessment 
and overall evaluation of PPPs' impact on the nations' sustainable development. 
One area of study calls for investigating PPPs' value for money in transitional 
countries.  This research showed massive disregard by the policymakers and 
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practitioners of the value for money concept in Kazakhstan and Russia in reference to 
PPP formation.  From the VfM perspective, it is impossible to explain and justify why 
the government forms partnerships as the latter often cost more than the government in-
house service provision.  Hence, research needs to provide new insights into the 
government motivation, which is likely to lie along the lines of value creation for 
various stakeholder groups.  By investigating how partners shape the PPP's value in 
transitional countries, research may be able to provide robust theoretical and practical 
underpinnings to PPP advancement in those nations. 
Another significant line of inquiry refers to investigating partner interaction in a 
PPP as this is a neglected area of study in the PPP management literature, particularly in 
the context of countries in transition.  This research investigated a limited range of 
organisational forms that the studied PPPs took and explored how partners approached 
dispute resolution.  Future research might investigate how the partners' relationship 
quality influences the PPP performance over time.  A longitudinal study examining 
partner interaction over a period of time would provide useful insights to whether the 
relationship quality is an important factor of a partnership’s overall success.  
Furthermore, the dynamics of relationship quality also require careful study and would 
have both theoretical and practical significance for PPP governance. 
Research also needs to address risk management in a contextual setting of specific 
PPP projects.  Whilst all partnership projects are ongoing in both countries, the ever 
growing experience in many areas, including risk management, will present a broad and 
informative material for investigation and for subsequent learning from the best practice, 
as well as from failures.  The current study has highlighted how PPP actors perceive 
certain risks and risk mitigation tools.  As PPP projects are relatively new and they 
accumulated only a few years of experience, the study demonstrated that risk 
management, including risk mitigation, was underdeveloped, oversimplified and 
ineffective.  Whilst partnerships in Kazakhstan and Russia will be acquiring more 
knowledge and experience, further studies need to investigate risk management from a 
longitudinal perspective, through the prism of partner interaction.  From a broader 
perspective, it is time to move beyond general debates about initial PPP risk allocation 
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and conduct more comprehensive studies of how partners manage risks over a period of 
time, what drives their decisions and how they resolve disagreements.       
 
7.7 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter outlined the key findings of the research and highlighted the 
contribution that the study made to knowledge in the areas of theory, methodology and 
practice.  The chapter acknowledged the study’s limitations and then suggested lines of 
inquiry for further research.  The research aims have been fulfilled.    
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